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This dissertation aims to answer a fundamental question relating to the South African legal and 
economic framework in which private equity operates. This being: 
 
 To what extent does the law address/regulate the structure of private equity funds and the 
relationships between the various parties related to a fund, that is: investors, the fund manager 
and underlying portfolio investments? This thesis also discussed how the law could better 
regulate the private equity industry. 
 
The dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter one raises such fundamental questions as ‘what 
is the nature of private equity?’ by looking at the parties involved, the private equity cycle, returns, 
liquidity, the risk, and the private equity market. In addition, it assesses whether private equity 
satisfies the criteria to be regarded as a separate asset class. 
 
Chapter two provides an analysis of the key features of private equity fund formation in South Africa. 
The choice of the most appropriate legal structure of a private equity fund starts with the choice of 
the most effective and suitable legal vehicle. Chapter two includes a discussion of the general private 
equity fund structure, the regulatory requirements of private equity firms, and certain regulatory 
considerations relevant in operating a private equity fund in South Africa. The discussion at certain 
instances reference private equity fund formation in foreign jurisdictions such the US, UK, Australia, 
and Canada.  
 
Chapter three introduces an analysis of corporate governance as it pertains to private equity funds. 
Firstly, it discusses the role of corporate governance regulation in stimulating investment. Secondly, 
it discusses the importance and benefits of corporate governance from the perspective of private 
equity managers; and seeks to explain the link between the private equity business model and 
corporate governance that is based on the assertion that there are two levels of corporate 
governance involved in private equity investing. The first level of governance relates to the private 
equity fund’s underlying portfolio investee companies and this includes inter alia, a discussion on the 
duties of the fund manager, particularly in their capacity as serving as directors on the boards of 
such companies. The second level of governance relates to the private equity fund itself which 
focuses on the relationship between the private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private 
equity fund. 
 
Chapter four examines two key impediments namely tax legislation and exit alternatives; and show 
how legislation could effectively address the former and how the lack of exit routes is an impediment 
to the growth of the local private equity industry. 




Chapter five states that, the development of the above mentioned regulatory framework will only be 
successful if the private equity industry participants themselves acknowledge and actively address 











Hierdie verhandeling is daarop gemik om 'n fundamentele vraag te beantwoord wat verband hou 
met die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel en die ekonomiese raamwerk waarin privaat-ekwiteit 
funksioneer. Dit is: 
 
 In watter mate reguleer die reg die struktuur van privaat-ekwiteit fondse en die verhoudings 
tussen die verskillende partye wat betrokke is in  'n fonds, naamlik: beleggers, die 
fondsbestuurder en onderliggende portefeulje beleggings? Hierdie verhandeling bespreek 
verder hoe die reg die privaat-ekwiteit bedryf beter kan reguleer. 
 
Die verhandeling bestaan uit vyf hoofstukke. Hoofstuk een lig fundamentele vrae soos ‘wat is die 
aard van privaat-ekwiteit?’ deur te kyk na die betrokke partye, die privaat-ekwiteit siklus, opbrengste 
, likiditeit, die risiko, en die privaat-ekwiteit mark. Verder beoordeel die verhandeling of privaat-
ekwiteit voldoen aan die kriteria dat dit as 'n aparte bateklas beskou kan word. 
 
Hoofstuk twee verskaf 'n ontleding van die belangrikste kenmerke van die vorming van privaat-
ekwiteit fondse in Suid-Afrika. Die keuse van die mees geskikte  regstruktuur van 'n privaat-ekwiteit 
fonds begin by die keuse van die mees doeltreffende en geskikte regstruktuur. Hoofstuk twee sluit 
ŉ bespreking in van die algemene privaat-ekwiteit fonds struktuur, die regulatoriese vereistes van 
privaat-ekwiteit firmas en sekere regulatoriese oorwegings wat by die bestuur van 'n privaat-ekwiteit 
fonds in Suid-Afrika relevant is. Die bespreking maak  ook verwysing na die skep van ekwiteit fondse 
in buitelandse jurisdiksies soos die VSA, die Verenigde Koninkryk, Australië en Kanada. 
 
Hoofstuk drie ontleed korporatiewe bestuur, soos dit betrekking het op privaat- ekwiteit 
fondse. Eerstens, word die rol van korporatiewe bestuur regulering vir die stimulasie van beleggings 
bespreek. In die tweede plek word die belang en voordele van korporatiewe bestuur vanuit die 
perspektief van privaat-ekwiteit bestuurders bespreek; en streef daarna om die skakel tussen die 
privaat-ekwiteit besigheidsmodel en korporatiewe bestuur, wat gebaseer is op die hipotese  dat daar 
twee vlakke van korporatiewe bestuur betrokke is in privaat-ekwiteit beleggings, te verduidelik. Die 
eerste vlak van bestuur het betrekking op die privaat-ekwiteit fonds se onderliggende portefeulje 
maatskappye waarin die fonds belê en dit sal onder andere 'n bespreking oor die pligte van die 
fondsbestuurder, veral in hul hoedanigheid as direkteure op die direksies van bogenoemde 
onderliggende portefeulje maatskappye, insluit. Die tweede vlak van bestuur het betrekking tot die 
privaat-ekwiteit fonds self, wat fokus op die verhouding tussen die privaat-ekwiteit firma en die 
beleggers wat belê in die privaat-ekwiteit fonds. 
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Hoofstuk vier ondersoek twee belangrike struikelblokke naamlik belastingwetgewing en alternatiewe 
om uit beleggings uit te tree; en toon hoe wetgewing effektief die eersgenoemde kan aanspreek en 
hoe die gebrek aan uittreemoontlikhede 'n struikelblok  vir die groei van die plaaslike privaat-ekwiteit 
bedryf kan wees.  
 
Hoofstuk vyf stel voor dat die ontwikkeling van ŉ  regulatoriese raamwerk slegs suksesvol sal wees 
indien die deelnemers aan die privaat-ekwiteit bedryf die nadele en werklike risiko's van die privaat-
ekwiteit bedryf op die Suid-Afrikaanse finansiële stelsel erken en aktief aanspreek.  
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Chapter One: The Fundamentals of Private Equity Investing 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Private equity is multi-faceted and a complex business. South African policymakers should 
understand the fundamentals of private equity as an asset class because it forms an important part 
of the financial markets.1 Private equity has its benefits, such as widening the availability of capital, 
increase the effectiveness of company valuations, identify companies with significant growth 
potential and facilitate their transformation.2 On the other hand, there are risks commonly associated 
with private equity investing such as conflicts of interest, lack of transparency and disclosure, and 
high leverage. However, it will be argued that the growth of the South African private equity industry 
will depend on creating an environment in which investors and regulators alike clearly see the 
advantages and disadvantages of private equity. 
 
Equity and debt are the two main sources of capital available to finance a company. Equity is an 
ownership interest in a company in the form of shares.3 Any company, whether it is a start up 
company or an established company that requires capital for expansion, has varying needs for 
working capital.4 For instance, a company might consider setting up an agreed overdraft facility with 
a commercial bank, enabling the company to acquire extra capital when needed. However, this 
method of financing should not be used unless the borrower has a positive cashflow with which to 
offset the interest payments and the repayment of the debt. Additional methods, by which companies 
can access capital markets for capital raising, are via the issuing of equity.5 With regard to debt 
finance, the lenders have the legal right to interest payments and repayment of the debt, irrespective 
of the success or failure of the borrowers’ company. Equity finance, typically through the issue of 
shares, is provided in exchange for the redemption of ownership rights. The providers of equity 
finance therefore become part owners of the companies in which they invest and accordingly 
participate in sharing all the risk and returns in the company. The providers of equity finance realize 
their investment by selling their shares in the companies in which they have invested.6 Equity 
financing for companies is available from a variety of sources. Sources of equity financing include 
                                                 
1Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P. (2011), ‘Private equity and long‐run investment: The case of 
innovation’, The Journal of Finance, 66(2), at pages 445-477. 
2Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P. (2011), ‘Private equity and long‐run investment: The case of 
innovation’, The Journal of Finance, 66(2), at pages 445-477. 
3See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5 th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
4Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
5See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5 th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
6See Bartlett, J.W. (1995), ‘Organising the Pooled Investment Vehicle (PIC), Equity Finance: Venture Capital, 
Buy-outs, Restructuring and Reorganisations’, 2nd edition, Vol. 3. Aspen. 
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private individuals, investment banks, insurance companies, large corporations, as well as venture 
capital and private equity funds.7  
 
Private equity investing as a source of equity finance has always been and still remains a very topical 
subject.8 According to a Coopers and 3i study, the growth phase experienced in the global private 
equity industry began approximately in 1992 and continued through the end of that decade, which 
was largely due to three factors.9 Firstly, there was a greater acceptance of private equity as a 
legitimate asset class by the majority of sophisticated investors.10 Secondly, modern portfolio theory 
encourages diversification and postulates that adding asset classes that are not highly correlated to 
an investors’ investment portfolio lowers risk and provides superior risk-adjusted returns.11 According 
to Vento, diversification is a general technique for reducing investment risk by investing in a variety 
of assets.12 A simplistic way of describing diversification is provided by the proverb ‘do not put all 
your eggs in one basket’ because placing each egg in a different basket is more diversified. There 
is more risk of losing one egg, but there is less risk of losing all the eggs.13 Thirdly, rebalancing had 
increased allocations to private equity investments as the strong United States of America (‘US’) 
equity markets before 11th September 2001 had resulted in shrinking allocations (in percentage 
terms) to other asset classes.14 These factors led institutional investors to make greater allocations 
to private equity. Despite obvious weaknesses such as limited liquidity, conflicts of interest, 
excessive fees charged by private equity firms and lack of transparency, private equity has become 
an attractive investment choice amongst investors and as a source of equity financing.15  
 
                                                 
7Gerland, B and Margulis, J (2005), ‘Angel capital; how to raise early-stage private equity financing’, John 
Wiley and Sons, 2005. Venture capital and private equity funds are more fully defined in paragraph two of this 
chapter. 
8See paragraph two of this chapter for the definition of private equity. 
9Coopers and 3i (2004),’Global Private Equity Review of the Global Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Markets’. Available at www.3i.com, assessed in August 2012. 
10An asset class is a group of assets that exhibit similar characteristics, are subject to the same laws and 
regulations and behave similarly in the marketplace. Available at www.tiaa-cref.org/public/advice-
guidance/education/saving-for-retirement/basics/asset_classes?p=1331944007105, accessed in August 
2015. Discussed in greater detail in paragraph one of this chapter.  
11See O’Sullivan, A. (2007), ‘Economics: Principles in Action’, Prentice Hall Publishers. 
12Vento, J.J. (2013), ‘Financial Independence (Getting to Point X): An Advisor's Guide to Comprehensive 
Wealth Management’, John Wiley and Sons, at chapter 9. 
13In finance, an example of an undiversified portfolio is to hold shares in only one company. It is not unusual 
for the share price of a single company to go down forty percent in a year. However, it is less likely for a 
portfolio of thirty different companies share prices to all go down that much. Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diversification_%28finance%29#cite_note-3, accessed in April 2015. 
14Rebalancing is the process of buying and selling portions of an investor portfolio in order to set the weight of 
each asset class back to its original state. For example, say the percentage of listed shares in an investor 
portfolio have increased due to an increase in the market value of such listed shares then the investor may 
increase the exposure to private equity by rebalancing its portfolio (namely set the weight of each asset class 
back to its original state). In addition, if an investor's investment strategy or tolerance for risk have changed, 
the investor can use rebalancing to readjust the weightings of each asset class in the portfolio. Available  at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/05/051105.asp, accessed in April 2015. 
15The risks commonly associated with private equity are highlighted later in this chapter and discussed in 
greater detail throughout this thesis. 
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In South Africa private equity is a major asset class,16 just like property, bonds and listed equities.17 
The South African private equity market has the potential to grow albeit not as big as in the US and 
Europe. However, the growth of the South African private equity industry will depend on creating an 
environment in which investors and regulators alike clearly see the advantages and disadvantages 
of private equity. Private equity as an asset class has clear and demonstrable benefits for the South 
African economy, but also poses several dangers.18 According to D’Angelo, private equity risk 
management by investors of private equity funds lags that of other asset classes.19 D’Angelo states: 
 
‘The private nature of the industry, relationships between investors and private equity managers, 
and long time horizon and illiquid nature of these investments create some challenges relative to 
other asset classes with regard to monitoring investments and risk.’20 
 
Gilligan and Wright listed several of the pertinent criticisms of the private equity industry: 
 
‘Private equity has been criticised both for the way that it finances and operates individual 
investments and for the way that it operates its own business. At the level of the individual 
investment, the criticisms include: using ‘excessive’ levels of debt to acquire corporations; using 
‘complex’ structures to reduce or eliminate tax; aggressively managing businesses to reap ‘short-
term’ profit at the expense of long-term performance; under-investment in new products and 
process; lack of consultation with workers prior to and after an acquisition. At the level of the fund, 
the criticisms include: a lack of public information on the funds and their investors; criticisms of 
the compensation of partners and staff of the funds; concerns on the minimum regulatory capital 
requirement of fund structures; and reiteration of concerns regarding the use of ‘tax havens’.’21 
 
In terms of the advantages of private equity to the economy, it is argued that private equity focuses 
on value creation which is predominantly driven by real growth.22 In addition, private equity clearly 
                                                 
16There are many different types of assets, for example property, bonds, cash equivalent and listed equities. 
Listed equities represent shares of ownership in publicly held companies and are typically traded via a stock 
exchange. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, an asset class is a group of assets that exhibit similar 
characteristics, are subject to the same laws and regulations and behave similarly in the marketplace. Available 
at www.investopedia.com/terms/a/assetclasses.asp, accessed in April 2015. 
17KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey 2014. 
18Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009, at page 6, 
available at SSRN 1429322. 
19D’Angelo, E. (2008), ‘Limited Partners’ Perceptions and Management of Risk in Private Equity Investing’, 
Kellog School of Management, Zell Center for Risk Research, at page 2. 
20D’Angelo, E. (2008), ‘Limited Partners’ Perceptions and Management of Risk in Private Equity Investing’, 
Kellog School of Management, Zell Center for Risk Research, at page 2. 
21Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 1. 
22Makhene, M. (2009), ‘Alternative Growth: The Impact of Emerging Market Private Equity on Economic 
Development’, Neumann Business Review, Spring 2009, at pages17-47.  
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shows a positive impact on employment and spurs economic growth via innovation.23 According to 
a European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) study, private equity has been 
found to contribute to increased economic growth.24 However, Gatauwa and Mwithiga argue that the 
studies analysing the interrelationship between private equity and economic growth have not clearly 
highlighted the influence of regulation on the impact of private equity on economic growth.25 
Stromberg, on the other hand argues that the relationship between private equity and economic 
growth could be in the reverse, that is, economic growth contributes to private equity activity.26 
Stromberg, argues that the challenge for studies with regard to the interrelationship between private 
equity and economic growth is to control for the reverse causality explanation in that growth causes 
private equity investment, rather than vice versa.27 Stromberg states: 
 
‘The private equity industry has found itself caught up in the prevailing political debate concerning 
the need for reform of financial services regulation. However, much of the debate about private 
equity tends to be based on hearsay or, at best, isolated examples, with little reference to the real 
impact of the industry on the European economic model … the beneficial effect of private equity 
on productivity and innovation suggests a positive impact on economic growth. In cross-country 
data, there is a clear positive relationship between private equity investment activity and economic 
growth. However, no rigorous academic study has analysed whether private equity actually has 
an impact on the GDP growth of a country. The problem in undertaking such studies is to control 
for the reverse causality explanation – that growth causes private equity investment, rather than 
the other way around.’28  
 
The South African Department of Trade and Industry (‘DTI’) published a working paper reviewing 
South Africa’s company law and related common law, with the aim of reforming the South African 
‘company’ in light of its role in the economy.29 This policy document set out the basic approach that 
was intended to provide a framework for detailed technical consultation to ensure that South Africa 
                                                 
23Makhene, M. (2009), ‘Alternative Growth: The Impact of Emerging Market Private Equity on Economic 
Development’, Neumann Business Review, Spring 2009, at pages17-47.  
24European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’), (2013), ‘Exploring the Impact of Private 
Equity on Economic Growth in Europe’, A Report prepared for the EVCA by Frontier Economics, May 2013, at 
pages 14-18. 
25Gatauwa, J.M. and Mwithiga, A.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity and Economic Growth: A Critical Review of the 
Literature’,  Published by European Centre for Research Training and Development, June 2014, Volume 2, 
Number 3, at pages 1-10.  
26Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009, at page 6, 
available at SSRN 1429322. 
27Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009, at page 6, 
available at SSRN 1429322. 
28Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009 at pages 1-6 
available at SSRN 1429322. 
29Department of Trade and Industry (2004), ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’, Report presented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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has company law that is competitive and up-to-date. One of the key objectives of the South African 
Government noted in the policy document is encapsulated in the following quotation: 
 
‘…a key role for government is to ensure that the regulatory framework within which enterprises 
operate promotes growth, employment, innovation, stability, [and] good governance…’30 
 
This highlights a common assumption made by policymakers wanting to replicate the US model, 
namely that private equity spurs economic growth. It is usually put forward as an untested 
assumption.31 The above mentioned Department of Trade and Industry policy document was part of 
the process whereby the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was replaced by the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
The latter Act came into effect in 2011. An explanatory note issued by the Department of Trade and 
Industry re-affirms the objective of the developers of the Companies Act of 2008 encapsulated in the 
above quotation. The explanatory note states: 
 
‘The process of developing the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 began in earnest over five years 
ago. For guidance, the developers looked to South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (May 2004), a policy document developed by the 
Department of Trade and Industry…The ultimate goal in repealing the Companies Act, No. 61 of 
1973, was to ensure that the regulatory framework for enterprises of all types and sizes promoted 
growth, employment, innovation, stability, good governance, confidence and international 
competitiveness…’32 
 
It is discussed throughout this thesis that these aforementioned fundamental characteristics of a 
regulatory framework are critical to the development of a successful private equity industry. It is 
evident that one of the fundamental objectives of the aforementioned working paper and the 
subsequent Companies Act 71 of 2008 is to advance economic transformation in the South African 
economy. This thesis will consistently discuss that private equity is a promoter inter alia of economic 
growth that directly affects the broader South African economy and this point is encapsulated in the 
aforementioned working paper and subsequent Companies Act 71 of 2008. These important policy 
considerations are acknowledged by the National Treasury of the South African Government in a 
policy document that states: 
 
                                                 
30Department of Trade and Industry (2004), ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’, Report presented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, South Africa. 
31Gatauwa, J.M. and Mwithiga, A.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity and Economic Growth: A Critical Review of the 
Literature’,  Published by European Centre for Research Training and Development, June 2014, Volume 2, 
Number 3, at pages 1-10.  
32The Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa, ‘The Companies Act, No 71 of 2008: Explanatory 
Guide, Replacing the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973’, at page 6. Accessed at 
www.cipc.co.za/Publications_files/Companies _Act_Guide.pdf, accessed in August 2014. 
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‘The financial services sector is at the heart of the South African economy and touches the life of 
each and every citizen. Financial services allow people to make daily economic transactions, save 
and preserve wealth to meet future aspirations and retirement needs, and insure against personal 
disaster … It enables economic growth, job creation, the building of vital infrastructure and 
sustainable development for South Africa and her people. It is, therefore, crucial that the sector 
is well regulated and stable. However, stability is not the only policy objective for the financial 
sector. The sector is characterised by high and opaque fees, and needs to be more transparent, 
competitive and cost effective.’33 
 
The aforementioned National Treasury policy document acknowledges that the financial services 
sector is at the heart of the South African economy. This thesis will discuss that the private equity 
industry is a critical component of the financial services sector and that private equity inter alia 
enables economic growth and job creation. However, the thesis will also discuss inter alia that the 
financial services sector and in particular the private equity industry, needs to be more transparent 
and cost effective. Therefore, the discussions in this thesis must be viewed against the favourable 
outcomes from private equity, as well as the weaknesses of the private equity business model. 
 
This analysis will focus on policy reform that will promote the development of the South African 
economy, by providing an effective regulatory environment that recognises the broader, social role 
of private equity investing. However, it is submitted that private equity is primarily about making 
profits and that it is not motivated by business development considerations. If the link between 
private equity and business development is viewed from a policy and regulatory-based logic then 
the two go hand in hand, especially when considering the role that private equity plays in enabling 
capital flows and catalysing growth of domestic businesses. In this regard, this thesis will discuss 
that private equity could make a considerable contribution to economic growth and business 
development.34 Nevertheless, this analysis collates a diverse universe of regulations, research and 
information which is aimed at providing a structured yet critical analysis of the prevailing social, 
economic and regulatory issues brought about by private equity investing. On the one hand this 
critical legal analysis will rely on the analysis of legal precedents and regulations; research reports; 
economic data; formal and informal discussions with industry stakeholders; both locally and abroad. 
On the other hand this critical legal analysis aims to contribute towards the establishment of an 
efficient private equity framework that is unique to South Africa. This leads to the first contribution of 
this analysis: considering how legislation relating to private equity investing can be structured to 
promote business development.  
                                                 
33Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2011), ‘A Safer Financial Sector to Serve 
South Africa Better’, National Treasury Policy Document, 23rd February 2011, Pretoria, South Africa, at page 
1. 
34See South African Government, National Planning Commission (2013), ‘National Development Plan 2030: 
Executive Summary’, The Department of the Presidency of the South African Government, at pages 47-48. 




Much of the discussion in this analysis will centre on the regulatory environments in the UK, Canada, 
Australia and the US, simply because they have reached a sophisticated level of development, which 
is useful in understanding the salient features related to structuring of private equity funds and 
transactions. The reference to ‘sophisticated level of development’ refers to the considerable growth 
in the aforementioned private equity markets, coupled with consistent regulatory reforms in these 
private equity markets.35 The aforementioned growth resulted in an increase awareness of the 
obvious weaknesses of the private equity business model such as limited liquidity, conflicts of 
interest, excessive fees charged by private equity firms and lack of transparency. The 
aforementioned jurisdictions have been at the forefront of consistent regulatory reforms, to inter alia 
address the aforementioned weaknesses. Nevertheless, these two crucial factors are important in 
understanding the salient features related to the structuring of private equity funds and transactions. 
This does not imply that, for example, the US regulatory system is more efficient than South Africa’s. 
On the contrary, it will become evident that the US system is much more complex and cumbersome 
than that of South Africa and so, at times, unduly complicates the structuring of private equity 
transactions in the US. Nevertheless, it is well acknowledged that the US government had 
significantly contributed towards the development of the US private equity market via consistent 
regulatory reforms.36  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the US Congress introduced legislation to promote the development 
of small business. The real growth in the US private equity market began in the late 1960s with an 
increase in the market for stock market listings,37 which resulted in significant profitable realisations 
of private equity investments made in the 1960s.38 During the late 1970s, regulatory and tax changes 
allowed US pension funds to invest in private equity for the first time, which resulted in the growth in 
the size of the US private equity market.39 In addition, specific tax regimes exist in the US, Canada, 
Australia and UK which define taxation of private equity investment vehicles on a more specific basis. 
However, much of the regulatory developments in the US, Canada, Australia and UK have been 
directed towards mitigating the risks posed by private equity investing rather than promoting private 
equity investing.40 For instance in the UK, a House of Commons Treasury Report listed several 
                                                 
35There had been considerable growth in institutional investors making greater allocations to private equity in 
the aforementioned jurisdictions, as well as policy makers having simultaneously contributed significantly 
towards the development of these private equity markets via consistent regulatory reforms.  
36Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition.  
37A stock market listing and initial public offering (‘IPO’) which is interchangeable used, refers to the method 
whereby a company’s shares are listed on a stock exchange and where the investor will be able to sell its 
shares to the public. 
38Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition.  
39Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition.  
40Discussed in detail in chapter four. 
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disadvantages of private equity investing relative to company shares traded on a stock exchange 
(publicly traded shares).41  
 
The report summarised these disadvantages: 
 
‘- Conflicts of interest, because private equity partners involved in the running of companies 
may have different priorities from other investors in the private equity fund; 
- Shorter investment horizons, because the aim is usually to sell the company after a few 
years, rather than focusing on long-term growth; 
- Lack of transparency, making them less accountable to the public and their workforces; 
- Greater leverage, making companies more vulnerable to economic downturns and with the 
potential to pose risks to lenders and the financial system; 
- Risk of job destruction through seeking to extract value; 
- Risk to pensions, through selling assets and loading companies with debt.’42 
 
The latter report, together with the Walker Report43 on transparency and disclosure in the private 
equity industry were the precursor to much of the subsequent regulatory developments in the UK.44 
The above mentioned countries have recognised the contribution of private equity to economic 
growth and business development, but they have also been cognisant of the risks. For example, 
Black and Gilson argue that many countries have tried to replicate the US private equity market and 
have failed because of the absence in those countries of well developed stock markets that permit 
private equity firms to exit through stock market listings.45 According to Cummings and MacIntosh, 
a stock market listing involves the sale of shares of a company to public investors, accompanied (but 
not always) by a listing on a stock exchange.46 Black and Gilson argue that a well developed stock 
market is critical for the existence of a vibrant private equity market. 47 Lerner et al state that the more 
favourable the environment for stock market listing is as an exit route for private equity investments, 
the more favourable the environment is for private equity firms to raise more capital.48 The authors 
further state that studies of the US market suggest that the most profitable private equity investments 
                                                 
41House of Commons Treasury Committee, (2007), ‘Private Equity’, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, Volume 
1, Ordered by House of Commons, July 2007, at chapter 3, pages 11-18. 
42House of Commons Treasury Committee, (2007), ‘Private Equity’, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, Volume 
1, Ordered by House of Commons, July 2007, at chapter 3, pages 11-18. 
43Walker, D. (2007), ‘Walker Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity’, in association with 
British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA), November 2007, at pages 16-32. 
44Discussed in chapters three and four. 
45Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 47, at pages 243-277. 
46Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (1999), ‘Venture Capital Exits in Canada and the United States,’ Working 
paper, University of Alberta and University of Toronto, at page 9. 
47Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 47, at pages 243-277. 
48Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
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have, on average, been exited by way of stock market listing.49 Therefore, an important point is that 
policymakers need to understand the link between the stock market and the private equity market. 
This requires understanding of the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and private 
equity providers; especially the importance of the opportunity to enter into an implicit contract over 
control, which gives a successful entrepreneur the option to reacquire control from the private equity 
fund by using a stock market listing as the means by which the private equity firm exits from a portfolio 
investment.50  
 
This analysis will extend the literature on private equity contracting by offering an explanation for two 
central characteristics of the US private equity market, namely: relatively rapid exit by private equity 
providers from investments in portfolio companies, and the common practice of exit through a stock 
market listing. This leads to the second contribution of this thesis: considering to what extent the 
South African laws impede the structure of the private equity industry, private equity funds and the 
contractual relationships that exist between the various parties related to a fund such as investors, 
the private equity firm and underlying portfolio investments.51  
 
In chapter four, it will be highlighted that South Africa’s capital markets are generally characterised 
by a lack of liquidity, especially for private equity investments.52 This lack of liquidity negatively 
impacts the private equity industry because a private equity firm’s success is gauged by the number 
of successful exits it has achieved.53 While trade sales and secondary buyouts are important exit 
methods available to the South African market, it is submitted that the stock market listing method 
remains critical to the long term success of the local private equity industry. In chapter four54 it will 
be argued that the sustained growth in the South African private equity market will be difficult to 
achieve unless there is an improvement in the demand for new listings because a critical 
characteristic of the private equity business model is the pre-determined, fixed life period of a private 
equity fund.55 Private equity investments are by its very nature illiquid investments that cannot be 
sold as readily, say for instance, as listed shares trading on a stock exchange. This, coupled with 
                                                 
49Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
50Claessens, S., Klingebiel, D. and Schmukler, S.L. (2006), ‘Stock market development and 
internationalization: Do economic fundamentals spur both similarly?’ Journal of Empirical Finance, 13, at pages 
316–350. See also generally paragraph 3 of chapter 1; and paragraph 3 of chapter 4. 
51This statement in the dissertation is referring to the private equity industry in broad terms and not just private 
equity as a transaction. The dissertation will also discusses the legal, tax and regulatory framework within 
which the aforementioned industry participants raise funds that are earmarked for South African investments.  
52KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA), (2014), ‘Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 
2014. 
53Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
54See paragraph three of chapter four. 
55Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
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the limited investment period highlights the crucial nature of private equity exiting, which involves the 
private equity firm ensuring the ultimate redemption of the investor’s capital and investment returns.56 
The pre-determined, fixed life period of a private equity fund basically requires that the investment 
relationship of the parties thereto, namely between the private equity firm, the investors and the 
underlying investee companies has to be terminated after a period of time.57 This creates the 
situation that the private equity firm and its investors are contractually ‘forced’ to exit from the 
underlying portfolio investee companies. Chapter four will also discuss private equity reforms in 
South Africa aimed at improving exit options such as the Venture Capital Company (‘VCC’) initiative 
which is the only specific tax incentive scheme in South Africa that encourages investment in unlisted 
companies.58  
 
In addition, chapter three submits the basic proposition that private equity firms need to address the 
corporate governance issues of an underlying portfolio investee company from the day when they 
first meet with management to consider an investment, right up to the point when a complete exit 
from the investment has been executed.59 The basis upon which the private equity firm determines 
the most appropriate timing to exit a portfolio investment can create a conflict of interest, for example 
where that investment is jointly owned by two or more funds operated by the same private equity 
firm.60 Despite the recognition that joint holdings are likely to be owned by funds that are at different 
stages of their life cycle, it is generally considered preferable for the private equity firm to enter into 
such transactions on the basis that it will divest all funds of their investments simultaneously. The 
timing for divestment will normally be determined by reference to the fund which made the original 
investment or that has reached the end of its life first. However, this approach may still present the 
private equity firm with a conflict of interest in terms of choosing between divesting an investment at 
the end of one fund’s life, set against the potential for a younger fund to benefit from receiving greater 
returns if the investment is held for a longer period.61 Chapter three discusses a number of effective 
mitigants that a private equity firm and its investors can employ to manage the risk of conflict. These 
include the contractual negotiation and disclosure of exit criteria in fund agreements; the disclosure 
of proposed exit rationale to the funds’ investors; disclosure to investors of actual divestments via 
                                                 
56Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
57Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO & Turn-Around Capital’, John Wiley 
& Sons. 
58The Venture Capital Company (‘VCC’) initiative is the only South African specific tax incentive scheme 
encouraging investment in unlisted companies, regulated by section 12J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
59Paragraph 2.2 of chapter three. 
60Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, revised 
edition, at paragraphs 1-32 to 1-35, 2-2 to 2-39, 3-1 to 3-25. As discussed in chapter two hereof, Regulation 
3(b) of ‘March 2012 Regulations’ places a positive obligation on every FSP to avoid a conflict of interest and 
where such conflict cannot be avoided, to mitigate against such conflicts. See also International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, Report by the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 2009, at pages 21-22. 
61Muller, K. and Achleitner, A.K. (2008), ‘Investing in Private Equity Partnerships: The Role of Monitoring and 
Reporting’, Springer Science and Business Media, at pages 27-37. 
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ongoing fund performance reporting; and the ability of the private equity firm to extend the fund’s life 
beyond its original term to maximise investment returns.62 To summarise, the two fundamental 
questions are: 
 
 To what extent does the law regulate the structure of private equity funds and the 
relationships between the various parties related to a fund, that is: investors, the fund 
manager and underlying portfolio investments?  
 Should the law relating to private equity funds be changed to promote business 
development?  
 
In attempting to answer the above two fundamental questions, this thesis will analyse the South 
African legal and economic framework in which private equity operates.63 It is submitted that the law 
does not promote business development and will highlight why regulatory reform of this industry is 
necessary. The analysis will show that private equity in South Africa is a major asset class and could 
have a positive impact on job creation and economic growth.64 Despite the clear and demonstrable 
benefits for the South African economy, private equity also poses several dangers which investors 
and regulators alike must be cognisant of.65 Therefore, the analysis will also address some of the 
related risks commonly associated with private equity investing such as conflicts of interest, lack of 
liquidity, lack of transparency and disclosure, high leverage and excessive fees charged by private 
equity firms. In addition, the analysis will make several recommendations inter alia the establishment 
of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for local investment vehicles and the introduction 
of a specific tax incentive for risk capital investments.66 Furthermore, the regulatory framework 
should encourage the involvement of institutional investors; and the framework should provide for 
mechanisms for exiting investments.  
 
2. Private Equity Defined 
 
                                                 
62See Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, 
revised edition, at paragraphs 1-32 to 1-35, 2-2 to 2-39, 3-1 to 3-25. As discussed in chapter two hereof, 
Regulation 4 of the ‘March 2012 Regulation states that: ‘The responsible person, manager, administrator, or 
advisor of a private equity fund must disclose to the fund any possible conflict of interest that may arise or any 
direct or indirect benefit it may obtain or may have obtained as a consequence of any transaction concluded 
by the private equity fund or in the acquisition or disposal of assets in the execution of the business of the 
private equity fund.’   
63A common thread throughout the dissertation is the submission that private equity encourages economic 
activity and growth. 
64The dissertation also discusses the development of the South African regulatory framework as a key driver 
to developing an efficient private equity industry. 
65Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009, at page 6. 
66The dissertation discusses both the clear benefits and the disadvantages and real risks posed by the private 
equity industry on the South African economic framework. 
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In the UK and much of continental Europe, the term private equity is used synonymously with that of 
venture capital.67 The same applies in South Africa where the terms venture capital and private 
equity are used interchangeably.68 Black and Gilson define venture capital as an investment by 
specialized venture capital organisations in high growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms that 
need capital to finance product development or growth and must, by the nature of their business, 
obtain this capital largely in the form of equity rather than debt.69 Black and Gilson exclude ‘buyout’ 
financing that enables a mature firm’s managers to acquire the firm from its current owners, even 
though in Europe, so-called venture capital firms often provide such financing.70  
 
British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA), defines private equity as providing: 
 
‘ … long-term, committed share capital, to help unquoted companies grow and succeed. If you 
are looking to start up, expand, buy into a business, buy out a division of your parent company, 
turnaround or revitalise a company, private equity could help you to do this. Obtaining private 
equity is very different from raising debt or a loan from a lender, such as a bank. Lenders have a 
legal right to interest on a loan and repayment of the capital, irrespective of your success or failure. 
Private equity is invested in exchange for a stake in your company and, as shareholders, the 
investors’ returns are dependent on the growth and profitability of your business.’71 
 
The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA), defines private equity as: 
 
‘ ... the provision of equity capital by financial investors over the medium or long term to non-
quoted companies with high growth potential. Venture capital is, strictly speaking, a subset of 
private equity and refers to equity investments made for the launch, early development, or 
expansion of a business. It has a particular emphasis on entrepreneurial undertakings rather than 
on mature businesses. Private equity covers not only the financing required to create a business, 
but also includes financing in the subsequent development stages of its life cycle. When financing 
                                                 
67Poser, T.B. (2002), ‘The Impact of Corporate Venture Capital on Sustainable Competitive Advantage of the 
Investing Company’, Inaugural Dissertation, Wissenschaftliche Hochschule für Unternehmensführung (WHU), 
Koblenz, Germany. 
68KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (‘SAVCA’)  (2009), ’Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Industry Performance Survey of South Africa’ covering the 2008 calendar year, at pages 9-
10: ‘…Because the definitions of the terms ‘venture capital’ and ‘private equity’ vary from country to country, 
the figure below sets out the terminology used in this survey to avoid confusion…’. The survey broadly 
classified private equity into three sub-classes, namely: venture capital, development capital and buy-out 
funding. The survey defines the term ‘private equity’ as shareholder capital invested in private companies, as 
distinguished from publicly listed companies. 
69Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 47, at pages 243-277. 
70Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 47, at pages 243-277. 
71British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2010), ‘Guide to Private Equity’, February 
2010 at page 7. 
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is required by a management team to buy an existing company from its current stakeholders, 
such a transaction is called a buyout. Private equity and venture capital may refer to different 
stages of the investment but the essential definition remains the same: it is the provision of capital, 
after a process of negotiation between the investment fund manager and the entrepreneur, with 
the aim of developing the business and creating value. For the sake of simplicity, from this point 
onwards, the term private equity will be used to cover both venture capital and buyout. Private 
equity firms have a main goal: seek out companies with the potential for growth and with the aim 
to put in place the capital, talent and strategy needed to permanently strengthen the company 
and raise its value. Private equity is often categorised under the umbrella of ‘alternative 
investments’, complementary to the stock and bond portfolios traditionally used by investors.’72 
 
In the US, however, venture capital usually refers to the provision of funds for younger, early stage 
and developing businesses whereas private equity is mainly associated with the financing of 
leveraged buy-outs and buy-ins.73 According to Lerner, the first question to ask when defining private 
equity is, ‘what constitutes a private equity fund?’74 He states that many start-up firms require 
substantial capital and a firm’s founder may not have sufficient funds to finance projects alone and 
therefore must seek outside financing. Entrepreneurial firms that are characterised by significant 
tangible assets; expect years of negative earnings; and have uncertain prospects, are unlikely to 
receive bank loans or other debt financing.75 Similarly, troubled firms that need to undergo 
restructuring may find it difficult to raise external financing. Private equity organisations finance these 
high-risk, potentially high-reward projects. They protect the value of their equity interests by 
undertaking careful due diligence before making the investments and retaining powerful oversight 
rights afterwards.76 Typically, these private equity organisations do not primarily invest their own 
capital, but rather raise the bulk of their funds from institutional investors.77 The formation process of 
a private equity fund starts with the investors, who are the sources of capital. This capital is typically 
pooled into a fund, which is managed by professional private equity firms.78 
                                                 
72European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report, (2007), ‘Guide on Private Equity and 
Venture Capital for Entrepreneurs’, An EVCA Special Report, November 2007, at page 6, paragraph 3.1. 
73Fenn, G.W, Laing, N. and Prowse, S. (1995), ‘The Economics of the Private Equity Market’, Washington, 
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
74Lerner, J. (1999), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, John Wiley and Sons, at page 520. 
75See KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA)  (2009), ’Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Industry Performance Survey of South Africa’ covering the 2008 calendar year, at 
pages 9-10: ‘…Private equity funds are generally investment vehicles that invest primarily in enterprises which 
are not listed on a public stock exchange. An enterprise may seek private equity financing for a variety of 
applications, from increasing its working capital base in times of business expansion, developing new 
technologies and products to grow and remain competitive, making acquisitions of other businesses, to buying 
out certain shareholders to restructure the ownership and management of the business. Another vital 
application of private equity in South Africa is facilitating the introduction of BEE investment…’. 
76Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
77Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
78Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 




The Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), states the following in respect of private 
equity: 
 
‘ … is a critical source of financing for companies in emerging market economies, making possible 
positive development outcomes while simultaneously providing investors with the opportunity to 
achieve superior financial returns. The term private equity encompasses growth capital, venture 
capital, leveraged buyouts and management buyouts. Private equity funds greatly improve 
access to the funding that innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) require to grow 
their businesses, leading to positive impacts such as employment, tax payments and increased 
service availability. Given the core facets of the PE model – active ownership, often of minority 
stakes, in private businesses seeking not only capital but also enhanced governance or more 
professionalized management, over a period of several years – private equity investors seek 
clarity and consistency around securities law and minority investor protections, as well as fair and 
equivalent treatment for all providers of capital regardless of mode of investment or country of 
origin.’79 
 
The Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), defines private 
equity: 
 
‘In its broadest sense, private equity is equity investment in a business not quoted on a public 
exchange. This would include, for instance, equity investment in a private family company. Private 
equity is more often used in a second, narrower sense to describe investment in unlisted 
businesses with the aim of building and improving them over a period of years and then selling 
them at an increased price. Private equity investment of this type is frequently categorised 
according to the stage of development of the company being invested in. The following categories 
are often used: seed investment; early stage investment; expansion stage investment; and buyout 
investment. An even narrower definition of private equity arises from these categories. Expansion 
and buy-out stage investments are often termed ‘private equity’ investment whereas seed and 
early stage investments are termed ‘venture capital’ investment. Private equity and venture capital 
have many common features despite the different development stages of the businesses invested 
in. Both involve equity investment typically over a 3 to 5 year investment period in unquoted 
companies that are considered to have significant growth potential. Both involve active 
involvement by the investor in the governance and management of the investee business and 
                                                 
79Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA) definition of private equity. Available at 
http://empea.org/resources/facts-about-pe/, accessed in April 2015. 
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both contemplate, at the time of investment, the subsequent sale of the investment rather than 
the indefinite retention of it.’80 
 
The South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA), defines private equity 
as: 
 
‘ … shareholder capital invested in private companies, as distinguished from publicly listed 
companies. Private equity funds are generally investment vehicles that invest primarily in 
enterprises which are not listed on a public stock exchange. An enterprise may seek private equity 
financing for a variety of applications, from increasing its working capital base in times of business 
expansion, developing new technologies and products to grow and remain competitive, making 
acquisitions of other businesses, to buying out certain shareholders to restructure the ownership 
and management of the business. Another vital application of private equity in South Africa is 
facilitating the introduction of BEE investment.’81 
 
In South Africa, a significant amendment to Regulation 28 of the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956, 
defines a private equity fund as follows:  
 
‘Private Equity Fund’ means a managed pool of capital that –  
(a) has as its main business the making of equity, equity orientated or equity related 
investments in unlisted companies to earn income and capital gains;  
(b) is not offered to the public as contemplated in the Companies Act, 2008 (No. 71 of 2008);  
(c) is managed by a person licensed as a discretionary Financial Services Provider as defined 
in the Code of Conduct for Administrative and Discretionary Financial Service Providers, 
2003, or if a foreign private equity fund managed by a person licensed as a Category I 
Financial Services Provider that is authorised to render financial services on securities and 
instruments as defined in the Determination of Fit and Proper Requirements for Financial 
Services Providers, 2008; and  
(d) is subject to conditions as may be prescribed;’82 
 
Following on from the above mentioned amendment to the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956, the South 
African Registrar of Pension Funds published a notice prescribing the conditions with which pension 
                                                 
80Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited, (2007), ‘Private Equity in Australia’, 
Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics, May 2007, at page 8, paragraph 5.1. 
81KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014, at page 
10. 
82Regulation 28 means the Pensions Fund Act, 24 of 1956: Amendment of Regulation 28 of the Regulations 
made under Section 36 of the Act (Government Notice 183 of 4 March 2011 which took effect on 1 July 2011). 
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funds must comply when investing in private equity funds.83 Similarly private equity funds will have 
to comply with the prescribed conditions in order to qualify to hold money and assets belonging to 
pension funds. A pension fund may only invest in a private equity fund which is a member of a private 
equity fund industry body recognised by the Registrar of Pension Funds and which is structured in 
one of the following ways:  
 
i. A bewind trust that provides that the pension fund is the beneficiary. The trustees of the trust 
will manage and control the assets of the trust whilst the effective rights of ownership of the 
assets will vest in the beneficiaries and not the trustees; 
ii. An en commandite partnership provided that the pension fund is the limited partner (en 
commandite partner) in the partnership. As the limited partner, the pension fund cannot be 
held liable to creditors of the partnership for more than its capital contribution to the partnership; 
iii. A company provided that the assets and liabilities of the company are limited to the assets and 
liabilities arising from investments made by the private equity fund;  
iv. A foreign private equity fund, provided that such a fund is a limited partnership, an open-ended 
investment company or a company in which the assets and liabilities are limited to the assets 
and liabilities arising from the investments made by the private equity fund. 
 
It seems that the Registrar of Pension Funds aims to ensure that pension funds enjoy the benefits 
of limited liability against the claims of creditors. In addition, pension funds are required to invest in 
private equity funds on condition that any person rendering a financial service, whether discretionary 
or otherwise, to that private equity fund, is a discretionary Financial Services Provider (‘FSP’) or a 
representative of such an FSP.84 The notice provides a number of factors that pension funds must 
consider before investing in a private equity fund and this will be discussed in greater detail in 
paragraph 4.1 of chapter two. Gilligan and Wright provide an all encompassing, but succinct 
definition of private equity: 
 
‘Private equity is risk capital provided in a wide variety of situations, ranging from finance provided 
to business start-ups to the purchase of large, mature quoted companies, and everything in 
between. Buy-outs are examples of private equity investments in which investors and a 
management team pool their own money, usually together with borrowed money, to buy a 
business from its current owners.’85 
 
                                                 
83‘March 2012 Regulations’ means the regulations dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Regulations made under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in 
Private Equity Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (Government Notice 1 of 15 March 2012). 
84The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002 (the ‘Act’) and its Regulations.   
85Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 1. 
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Taking into account the comments above, private equity can be defined to be investment in usually 
unlisted enterprises, which is in the form of pure equity, shareholder loans or subordinated debt, with 
the objective of increasing the value of the company over the medium to long term. Furthermore, 
venture capital is distinct from buyouts because of the phase of the underlying company’s life and 
the risk profile of the investment.86 The latter distinction is discussed in paragraphs 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 
of this chapter.  
 
According to Missankov et al,87 private equity investment may be further categorised according to 
the stage of development of the underlying company and the specific transaction which is being 
financed. This is typically referred to as the sub-classes of the private equity universe which include 
early stage venture capital, late stage venture capital, leveraged buyouts and management 
buyouts.88 Each of these sub-classes offers a unique trade-off of risk and return and has its own 
distinct capital cycle. Cumming and Johan, state that: 
 
‘The key characteristics of private equity investing can be highlighted as being that it requires 
equity participation; there is value added through active and ongoing involvement with the 
companies in which they invest; and that the investment objectives are of a long-term nature.’89  
 
Private equity providers become co-owners of these companies and share risk and returns to the 
extent in which they participate in them. Their investment returns depend directly on the growth and 
profitability of the investee firm. The private equity providers realize their returns through selling their 
shares in investee companies. Successful investments are usually exited through trade sales or 
offerings on the stock market, as mentioned earlier.90  
 
In South Africa, the main providers of formal private equity are captive and independent private 
equity firms.91 The distinction between captive and independent private equity firms is that 
                                                 
86Missankov, I., Van Dyk, R., Van Biljon, A., Hayes, M., and Van der Veen, W., (2006), ‘Is Private Equity a 
Suitable Investment for South African Pension Funds’, Presented at the Convention of the Actuarial Society of 
South Africa October,  2006, at pages 9-17. 
87Missankov, I., Van Dyk, R., Van Biljon, A., Hayes, M., and Van der Veen, W., (2006), ‘Is Private Equity a 
Suitable Investment for South African Pension Funds’, Presented at the Convention of the Actuarial Society of 
South Africa October,  2006, at pages 9-17. 
88Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. See also Goldman, Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell Capital Inc. (1996), 
‘Survey of Alternative Investments by Pension Funds, Endowments and Foundations’, New York: Goldman, 
Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell Capital Inc. Leveraged buy-outs, financial distress and mezzanine financing 
are more fully discussed in paragraph three of this chapter. 
89At page 18 earlier, quoting Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Contracting: An International Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
90Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
91KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014, at page 
16. 
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independent firms manage funds on behalf of third parties and captives manage on-balance sheet 
investments that were funded by a parent organisation.92 Increasingly, some of these captives also 
raise funds from other institutional investors. They are known as semi-captives.93 Nevertheless, the 
majority of private equity providers are independent private equity firms.94 These firms raise their 
funds for investment from external sources, mainly institutional investors such as banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds. Unlike captive funds, independent funds are usually closed ended.95 
This means that once a fund has been raised, it is closed out, following which no further commitments 
are accepted from third parties. Independent private equity managers usually earn income from a 
combination of a management fees based on total commitments plus an enhanced carried interest, 
which is based on the performance of the fund relative to a benchmark.96 For institutional investors, 
fixed-life funds managed through independent and semi-captive private equity firms are the primary 
vehicles for investing in private equity. In South Africa, the legal structures commonly used for these 
fixed life closed-end funds are either a bewind trust or an en commandite partnership (limited liability 
partnership).97  
 
3. The Types of Private Equity  
 
Fenn, Liang and Prowse,98 defined the organized private equity market as having three major players 
and an assortment of minor players. Firstly, there are the private equity firms which are regarded as 
the financial intermediaries between institutional investors and the underlying portfolio investee 
company in which the fund managers invest. Secondly, there are the investors, such as pension 
funds, wealthy private individuals, banks and insurance companies, which invest in the private equity 
fund and which act as providers of capital.99 Thirdly, there is the underlying portfolio investee 
                                                 
92According to the annual KPMG and SAVCA (2013) survey, captive firms are ‘those funds making investments 
mainly on behalf of a parent or group, typically an insurance company, bank or institutional asset manager, 
often from an indeterminate pool of money’. KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (SAVCA), (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa 
covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. 
93KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA), (2013), ‘Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 
2013. Captive funds are for the purpose of this survey further classified into the captive funds of government, 
financial services (including banks and insurance companies) and other captive funds (including corporates). 
A further category of funds were included in the 2011 survey for investment holding companies. An investment 
vehicle that acts as a holding company by owning shares of other companies. Investment holding companies 
typically do not have committed investable sources of capital from third parties (as the case with independents) 
and typically are able to have longer term investment holding periods. 
94KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey 2013. 
95KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014, at page 
16. 
96Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
97Discussed in chapter two. 
98Fenn, G.W, Laing, N. and Prowse, S. (1995), ‘The Economics of the Private Equity Market’, Washington, 
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
99Fenn, G.W, Laing, N. and Prowse, S. (1995), ‘The Economics of the Private Equity Market’, Washington, 
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company into which the fund managers invest and later exit.100 These underlying portfolio investee 
companies are regarded as issuers of private equity and are categorised by investment stage into 
leveraged buyouts, management buyouts, growth equity and venture capital.101 These issuers of 
equity seek to raise finance based on their capital requirements. In the case of buyout transactions, 
the institution proposing to lend the money (debt finance) would typically be a bank or banks.102  
 
3.1 Leveraged Buyout  
 
As mentioned in the aforementioned introductory paragraph 3 and paragraph 2 of this chapter, 
‘private equity’ is a generic term used to identify a suite of alternative investing methods, which 
includes leveraged buyouts (also referred to as LBOs). Leveraged buyout itself is a generic phrase 
that refer to the use of leverage to acquire a company.103  Kaplan and Stromberg states: 
 
‘In a leveraged buyout, a company is acquired by a specialised investment firm using a 
relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt financing. The 
leveraged buyout investment firms … refer to themselves … as private equity firms. In a 
typical leveraged buyout transaction, the private equity firm buys majority control of an 
existing or mature firm. This arrangement is distinct from venture capital firms that typically 
invest in young or emerging companies, and typically do not obtain majority control.’104 
 
                                                 
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
100Fenn, G.W, Laing, N. and Prowse, S. (1995), ‘The Economics of the Private Equity Market’, Washington, 
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
101It must be noted that this thesis will not discuss all the various categories of private equity finance, but will 
only undertake a critical analysis of the salient features of the predominant categories, namely leveraged 
buyouts, management buyouts, growth equity and venture capital. For instance, mezzanine capital is regarded 
as a form of private equity finance; however it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the salient features 
of mezzanine finance. Mezzanine financings are typically structured as either debt or preference shares. See 
generally Thompson, J. (2013), ‘Alternative Financing Instruments for SMEs and Entrepreneurs: the Case of 
Mezzanine Finance’, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Centre For 
Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development, Final Report, February 2013, at page 4. See generally 
Robinson, A.D., Fert, I. and Webb, D.N. (2011), ‘Mezzanine Finance: Overview’, Practical Law Company, 
Simpson Thacher and Bartlett LLP, at page 6. Investopedia defines mezzanine finance as: ‘A hybrid of debt 
and equity financing that is typically used to finance the expansion of existing companies. Mezzanine financing 
is basically debt capital that gives the lender the rights to convert to an ownership or equity interest in the 
company if the loan is not paid back in time and in full. It is generally subordinated to debt provided by senior 
lenders such as banks and venture capital companies.’ Available at  
www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mezzaninefinancing.asp, accessed in April 2015. Due to the unique nature of 
mezzanine investments, it does not form part of the typical classification of what would constitute a debt 
provider, on the one hand, and an equity investor on the other hand. See Berman, A. (2013), ‘Mezzanine Debt 
and Preferred Equity in Real Estate in Alternative Investments: Instruments, Performance, Benchmarks and 
Strategies’, John Wiley and Sons, at chapter 9. 
102Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 2. 
103Available at www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/leveraged-buyouts.asp, accessed in June 
2017. 
104Kaplan, S.N. and Stromberg, P. (2008), ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Volume 22, No. 4, at page 1. 
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A leveraged buyout takes place when a private equity firm acquires a controlling stake in a 
company's equity and where a significant part of the purchase price is financed through borrowing. 
In turn the assets of the acquired company are used as security for the borrowed capital.105 The 
equity component of the purchase price pertaining to a leveraged buyout transaction can be provided 
by multiple private equity funds that co-invest to come up with the needed equity for a purchase.106 
Similarly, multiple lenders may syndicate to provide jointly the debt required to fund the 
transaction.107 Not all companies are suitable targets for leveraged buyouts because of the 
importance of debt and the ability of the acquired company to make regular loan payments after the 
completion of a leveraged buyout.108 For example, a significant part of the purchase price in a 
leverage buyout is typically financed through borrowing and sometimes the assets of the target 
company wanting to be acquired are not sufficient to be used as security for the capital that needs 
to be borrowed. 
 
Some of the potential features that make companies possible targets for leveraged buyouts would 
be low levels of debt; valuable assets such as property and trade debtors that could be used as 
security for secured debt; undervalued share price; and the potential for management to improve 
cashflows.109 According to Rachidi, the key attributes of what the South African private equity 
industry considers to make companies attractive targets for leveraged buyouts are: 
 
‘(in order of priority) strong and partner-able management, steady and predictable cashflow, 
viable exit strategy and strong market position ... Therefore in order of significance this ranking 
describes the valued attributes about or of the entity that is suitable for an LBO type investment.’110 
 
In addition, Rachidi argues that a lender’s priority was primarily towards the cash flow generative 
capability of the target company.111 Acquisition debt in a leveraged buyout is usually non-recourse 
to the private equity firm and to the private equity fund that the firm manages. Non-recourse debt is 
                                                 
105Pilger, D. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: An Introductory Practical Guide to LBOs’, Harriman House 
Publishers, at chapter 1. 
106Pilger, D. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: An Introductory Practical Guide to LBOs’, Harriman House 
Publishers, at chapter 1. 
107Pilger, D. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: An Introductory Practical Guide to LBOs’, Harriman House 
Publishers, at chapter 1. 
108Pilger, D. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: An Introductory Practical Guide to LBOs’, Harriman House 
Publishers, at chapter 1. 
109Pignataro, P. (2013), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: A Practical Guide to Investment Banking and Private Equity’, 
John Wiley and Sons Publishers, at chapter 1. 
110Rachidi, M. (2010), ‘Attributes of a good Leveraged Buyout ‘LBO’ Target Company: The South African 
Private Equity’s Perspective’, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town, December 2010, at 
pages 3. 
111Rachidi, M. (2010), ‘Attributes of a good Leveraged Buyout ‘LBO’ Target Company: The South African 
Private Equity’s Perspective’, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town, December 2010, at 
pages 3. It must be noted that the primary aim of Rachidi’s study was to gather opinions from the local private 
equity industry and to a limited extent contrast this with opinions from debt providers of leveraged buyout 
transactions. The study have a specific focus on the target company and was positioned at the due diligence 
stage of the leveraged buyout process. 
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a secured loan that is secured by security but for which the borrower is not personally liable.112 
However, if the borrower defaults, the lender can take the security but the lender's recovery is limited 
to the security provided; and if the security is insufficient to cover the outstanding loan balance, the 
difference between the value of the security and loan value becomes a loss for the lender.113 In 
addition, unlike in a hedge fund, where debt raised to purchase certain securities is also securitised 
by the fund's other securities, the acquisition debt in a leveraged buyout is restricted only to the 
company purchased in a particular leveraged buyout transaction.114 Therefore, a leveraged buyout 
transaction's financial structure is particularly attractive to a private equity fund's investors, affording 
them the benefits of leverage but restricting the recourse of that leverage.115 The first significant 
benefit of this type of transaction is that the private equity investors via the private equity fund only 
need to provide a fraction of the capital for the acquisition.116 Secondly, if the internal rate of return 
on the investment is greater than the weighted average interest rate on the acquisition debt (in 
addition to accounting for the exit proceeds), returns to the private equity fund will be greatly 
enhanced. 117 In addition, a leveraged buyout typically increases a company’s capitalisation which 
often serves to revitalise a mature company which in turn may enable the company to improve its 
market position.118 According to Pilger, there is also a tax advantage associated with acquiring a 
company through debt financing rather than an outright purchase because the cost of servicing the 
debt is deductible.119  
 
There are also disadvantages associated with leveraged buyouts, for instance such transactions 
have been characterised as leading to the downsizing of operations and employees losing their 
employment.120 For example, a leveraged buyout could be unsuccessful and the company could 
                                                 
112Available  at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonrecourse_debt. accessed in July 2016. 
113Available  at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonrecourse_debt. accessed in July 2016. 
114Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
115Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
116Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
117Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
118Tripathi, P. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyout Analysis’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, National Law 
School of India University, Bangalore India, December 2012, Volume 2, 4(6), at page 90. 
119Pilger, D. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: An Introductory Practical Guide to LBOs’, Harriman House 
Publishers, at chapter 1. See paragraph 3.1.1 of this chapter hereinafter. 
120Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
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face bankruptcy if the company's cash flow and the sale of assets are not sufficient to meet the 
interest payments of the debt.121 According to Tripathi, much of the criticism regarding leveraged 
buyouts is as result of conflicts of interest between the management and the shareholders.122 For 
instance, management negotiating the sale of the company to themselves are engaged in self-
dealing while on the other hand these managers have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to sell 
the company at the highest possible price.123 Despite the potential conflict of interests, a leveraged 
buyout transaction through the management team can also benefit the shareholders. Tripathi argues: 
 
‘The insider managers know how to deal with the transaction and protect the interest of the 
company as well as the shareholders. From this the shareholders may be willing the insider 
managers rather than the outsiders to rejuvenate the company.’124 
 
In paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of chapter three the fiduciary duties of directors and conflicts of interests 
are discussed in greater detail, however it is important to highlight such potential conflicts of interest 
as part of the this discussion.  
 
Leveraged buyouts emerged as a popular form of private equity finance in the 1980s and Jensen 
predicted that the leveraged buyout organisation would become the dominant corporate 
organisational form.125 He argued that the private equity firm itself combined concentrated ownership 
shareholding in its portfolio companies, high-powered incentives for the private equity firm’s team of 
professionals and an efficient organisation with minimal overhead costs.126 The private equity firm 
then applied performance-based managerial compensation, highly leveraged capital structures and 
active governance to the companies in which it invested.127 His argument was that these structures 
were superior to those of the common public corporation with widespread shareholders, low leverage 
and weak corporate governance. Kaplan and Stromberg argued that Jensen’s predictions seemed 
to have been premature because by the early 1990s, the high-yield128 bond market crashed following 
                                                 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
121Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
122Tripathi, P. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyout Analysis’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, National Law 
School of India University, Bangalore India, December 2012, Volume 2, 4(6), at page 89. 
123Tripathi, P. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyout Analysis’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, National Law 
School of India University, Bangalore India, December 2012, Volume 2, 4(6), at page 89. 
124Tripathi, P. (2012), ‘Leveraged Buyout Analysis’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, National Law 
School of India University, Bangalore India, December 2012, Volume 2, 4(6), at page 87. 
125Jensen, M. (1989), ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’, Harvard Business Review, September, at 61-74. 
126Jensen, M. (1989), ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’, Harvard Business Review, September, at 61-74. 
127Jensen, M. (1989), ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’, Harvard Business Review, September, at 61-74. 
128High yield bond (non-investment grade bond, speculative grade bond or junk bond) is a bond that is rated 
below investment grade at the time of purchase. These bonds have a higher risk of default or other adverse 
credit events, but typically pay higher yields than better quality bonds in order to make them attractive to 
investors. 
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the demise of the investment bank, Drexel Burnham Lambert;129 several high-profile leveraged 
buyouts resulted in default and bankruptcy; and leveraged buyouts of public companies130 all but 
disappeared.131 It was during the 1980s that many private equity investments were termed ‘corporate 
raids’, especially those leveraged buyouts that involved the hostile takeover of a company.132 These 
transactions were characterised by asset stripping, large scale retrenchments and/or major 
corporate restructuring activities.133 According to Vincent, a notable example of an investor to be 
labelled a corporate raider was Carl Icahn.134 Carl Icahn135 developed a reputation as a corporate 
raider after his hostile takeover of Trans World Airlines (‘TWA’)136 in 1985.137 The takeover started 
when Icahn bought more than 20 percent of TWA’s shares in 1985 and then delisted TWA from the 
stock exchange making a significant profit via a payment of $469 million to himself. This was at the 
same time that TWA was saddled with $540 million in debt. Thereafter Icahn sold the airline's London 
routes for $445 million in 1991.138  The latter sale in part contributed to the demise of TWA because 
the London routes were very valuable and the airline ultimately went bankrupt.139 According to Bruck, 
many of the corporate raiders were former clients of Michael Milken, whose investment banking firm, 
Drexel Burnham Lambert (as mentioned above) helped raise pools of capital with which corporate 
raiders could make hostile takeovers and provided high-yield debt financing of such buyouts.140  
 
Following the aforementioned, major corporate and accounting scandals in the US affecting Enron, 
Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom, prompted regulatory changes for 
publicly traded companies, more specifically the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.141 
                                                 
129Drexel Burnham Lambert was the investment bank most responsible for the boom in private equity during 
the 1980’s due to its leadership in the issuance of high-yield debt. Drexel reached an agreement with the 
government in which it pleaded nolo contendere (no contest) to six felonies, three counts of stock parking and 
three counts of stock manipulation. It also agreed to pay a fine of $650 million, which at the time, the largest 
fine ever levied under securities laws. Milken left the firm after his own indictment in March 1989. On February 
13, 1990 after being advised by United States Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady, the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange and the Federal Reserve, Drexel Burnham 
Lambert officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. See Stewart Den of Thieves (1991). 
130So called public-to-private transactions. 
131Kaplan, S.N. and Stromberg, P. (2008), ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Volume 22, No. 4. 
132Gaughan, P.A. (2010), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions & Corporate Restructurings’, John Wiley & Sons, 5th Ed, at 
pages 291-334. 
133Gaughan, P.A. (2010), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, & Corporate Restructurings’, John Wiley & Sons 5th Ed, at 
pages 291-334. 
134Vincent, J.K (2013), ‘Profiting from Hedge Funds: Winning Strategies for the Little Guy’, John Wiley & Sons, 
at chapter 7.  
135Carl Celian Icahn is an American businessman, activist shareholder and investor. He is the majority 
shareholder of Icahn Enterprises, a diversified holding company. 
136Trans World Airlines (‘TWA’) was a major American airline from 1925 until 2001. 
137Vincent, J.K (2013), ‘Profiting from Hedge Funds: Winning Strategies for the Little Guy’, John Wiley & Sons 
at chapter 7.  
138Vincent, J.K. (2013), ‘Profiting from Hedge Funds: Winning Strategies for the Little Guy’, John Wiley & Sons 
at chapter 7.  
139Vincent, J.K (2013), ‘Profiting from Hedge Funds: Winning Strategies for the Little Guy’, John Wiley & Sons 
at chapter 7.  
140Bruck, C. (2013), ‘Predator’s Ball’, Simon and Schuster Publishers, part 3, chapter 10.  
141De Vay, D.L. (2006), ‘The Effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in Preventing and Detecting 
Fraud in Financial Statements’, Universal Publishers, at pages 1-27. 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is formally known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002 and commonly called Sarbanes-Oxley.142 These scandals, which 
cost investors billions of dollars when the share prices of affected companies collapsed, shook public 
confidence in the US securities markets. Named after sponsors US Senator Paul Sarbanes and US 
Representative Michael G. Oxley, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was approved by the House by 
a vote of 334-90 and by the Senate 99-0.143 The legislation set new or enhanced standards for all 
US public company boards, management and public accounting firms. However, it does not apply to 
privately held companies.144 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 contains eleven titles, or sections, 
ranging from additional corporate board responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement rulings on requirements to comply with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.145 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created a new, quasi-public 
agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) charged with overseeing, 
regulating, inspecting and disciplining accounting firms in their roles as auditors of public 
companies.146 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also covers issues such as auditor independence, 
corporate governance, internal control assessment, and enhanced financial disclosure.147  
 
Nevertheless, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US during July 2002 had a profound 
impact on the leveraged buyout and private equity markets because it added to growth of the 
leveraged buyout market. It resulted in a large number of US companies recognising the benefits of 
avoiding increasingly burdensome regulations that were imposed on public companies based on the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.148 By ‘going private’ the companies were not subject to the increased 
financial, disclosure and corporate governance requirements and the costs of remaining public in 
the prevailing regulatory environment, which was exacerbated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.149 
The reference to a company ‘going private’ is with regard to a private equity transaction as discussed 
in the thesis, with the common structure being a leveraged buyout. 
 
                                                 
142It is a US federal law enacted on 30th July 2002. 
143Fernando, A.C. (2009), ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’, Pearson Publishers, at 
pages 3-40. 
144Fernando, A.C. (2009), ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’, Pearson Publishers, at 
pages 3-40. 
145Fernando, A.C. (2009), ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’, Pearson Publishers, at 
pages 3-40. 
146Stephen, S.K. (2008), ‘The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the US Financial Markets’, The 
University of Texas at Arlington, ProQuest Publishers, at pages 1-11. 
147Stephen, S.K. (2008), ‘The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the US Financial Markets’, The 
University of Texas at Arlington, ProQuest Publishers, at pages 1-11. 
148Kaplan, S.N. and Stromberg, P. (2008), ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Volume 22, No. 4, at page 1. 
149Kaplan, S.N. and Stromberg, P. (2008), ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Volume 22, No. 4, at page 1. 
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In the mid-2000s, public-to-private transactions re-emerged. One such transaction was the purchase 
of Manchester United Football Club by the American Glazer family by way of a leveraged buyout.150 
In 2005 the Glazer family took their shareholding of the club to seventy five percent allowing them to 
delist it from the London Stock Exchange. In the same year the Glazer family increased their share 
to ninety eight percent which was enough for a compulsory buyout of all remaining shareholders.151 
The debt taken on by the Glazers to finance the club was £660 million which accrued interest 
payments of £62 million per annum. The loans were secured against the clubs assets.152 In 2010 the 
clubs debts had increased to in excess of £716 million and it had to refinance the debt through a 
bond issue of £504 million. This allowed the club to pay off most of the £509 million it owed to the 
lending banks.153  
 
Less than twenty years after the previous crash, the global economy experienced a second 
leveraged buyout boom.154 In 2006 and 2007, a record amount of capital was committed to private 
equity, both in nominal terms and as a fraction of the overall stock market.155 Hence, Jensen’s 
prediction seemed more relevant than ever. In July 2007, turmoil that had been affecting the 
mortgage markets spilled over into the leveraged finance and high-yield debt markets.156 The 
                                                 
150House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, (2011), ‘Football Governance: Report, Together 
with Formal Minutes’, House of Commons Papers Series, The Stationery Office Publishers, at pages 63-67. 
151House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, (2011), ‘Football Governance: Report, Together 
with Formal Minutes’, House of Commons Papers Series, The Stationery Office Publishers, at pages 63-67. 
152House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, (2011), ‘Football Governance: Report, Together 
with Formal Minutes’, House of Commons Papers Series, The Stationery Office Publishers, at pages 63-67. 
153House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, (2011), ‘Football Governance: Report, Together 
with Formal Minutes’, House of Commons Papers Series, The Stationery Office Publishers, at pages 63-67. 
154As 2005 ended and 2006 began, new ‘largest buyout’ records were set and surpassed several times with 
nine of the top ten buyouts at the end of 2007 having been announced in an 18-month window from the 
beginning of 2006 through the middle of 2007. In 2006, private equity firms bought 654 US companies for $375 
billion, representing 18 times the level of transactions closed in 2003. Additionally, US based private equity 
firms raised $215.4 billion in investor commitments to 322 funds, surpassing the previous record set in 2000 
by 22 percent and 33 percent higher than the 2005 fundraising total. The following year, despite the onset of 
turmoil in the credit markets in the summer, saw yet another record year of fundraising with $302 billion of 
investor commitments to 415 funds. See Samuelson, R.J., (2007), ‘The Private Equity Boom’, The Washington 
Post, March 15, 2007. In South Africa 2007 was a year of ‘mega- transactions’, such as Bain Capital’s Edcon 
buy-out, Actis and Ethos’ Alexander Forbes Limited buy-out, Brait, Old Mutual and Sanlam’s buy-out of Consol 
Limited and Brait and the Mine Workers Investment Company’s Primedia Limited buy-out. Many of the mega-
transactions were concluded in 2007 but a number of large transactions were announced but not successfully 
concluded, such as Shoprite Holdings Limited, Iliad Africa Limited and Gold Reef Resorts Limited. Reported 
private equity investments in South Africa increased by 270% from R6.9 billion during 2006 to R25.5 billion 
during 2007. The total number of investments increased by 34 from 806 to 840 during the same period, 
representing a 4% increase. See KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, 
(SAVCA), (2007), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital’, Survey, 2007, at page 26. 
155As 2005 ended and 2006 began, new ‘largest buyout’ records were set and surpassed several times with 
nine of the top ten buyouts at the end of 2007 having been announced in an 18-month window from the 
beginning of 2006 through the middle of 2007. In 2006, private equity firms bought 654 US companies for $375 
billion, representing 18 times the level of transactions closed in 2003. Additionally, US based private equity 
firms raised $215.4 billion in investor commitments to 322 funds, surpassing the previous record set in 2000 
by 22 percent and 33 percent higher than the 2005 fundraising total. The following year, despite the onset of 
turmoil in the credit markets in the summer, saw yet another record year of fundraising with $302 billion of 
investor commitments to 415 funds. See Samuelson, R.J., (2007), ‘The Private Equity Boom’, The Washington 
Post, March 15, 2007.  
156Fleischer, C. (2013), ‘Predicting Leveraged Buyout Success’, GRIN Verlag Publishers, at pages 1-8. 
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markets had been highly robust during the first six months of 2007, and covenant light debt was 
widely available to finance large leveraged buyouts.157 However, by July 2007 there was a notable 
slowdown in issuance levels in the high yield and leveraged loan markets with only few issuers 
accessing the market.158 As 2007 ended and 2008 began, it was clear that lending standards had 
tightened and the era of mega-buyouts had come to an end.159 However, in 2008, with the turmoil in 
the debt markets, private equity appeared to have declined again.160 
 
A major criticism to emerge from the above discussion of the historical development of leveraged 
buyouts has been the reliance on unrealistic forecasts of the target company’s revenues by private 
equity firms. This overpricing of the target firm and its assets by leveraged buyout firms have led to 
financial distress after acquisition, often resulting in the inability to repay the debt.161 This also poses 
a risk to a country’s revenue base because leveraged buyout transactions lead to a substantial 
                                                 
157Moody’s Investor Services Report, (2013), ‘Covenants Signs of a ‘Covenant Bubble' Suggest Future Risks 
for Investors: Quest for yield could leave creditors vulnerable in a downturn’, May 2013, at pages 1-8. Cov-lite 
(‘covenant light’) is financial jargon for loan agreements which do not contain the usual protective terms and 
conditions for the benefit of the lending party. Although traditionally banks have insisted on a wide range of 
contractual terms and conditions which allow them to intervene if the financial position of the borrower or the 
value of underlying assets deteriorates, from around the year 2006 the increasing strength of private equity 
firms and the decreasing opportunities for traditional corporate loans made by banks fuelled something of a 
‘race to the bottom’ with syndicates of banks competing with each other to essentially offer ever less invasive 
terms to borrowers in relation to leveraged buyouts. Cov-lite lending is seen as more risky because it removes 
the early warning signs lenders would otherwise receive through traditional contractual terms and conditions. 
Against this, it have been countered that cov-lite loans simply reflected changes in bargaining power between 
borrowers and lenders, and followed from the increased sophistication in the loans market where risk is quickly 
dispersed through syndication or credit derivatives. However, this spreading have been shown to be false. 
According to the above mentioned Moody’s Investors Services Report (at page 1): ‘Robust issuance of 
covenant-lite loans and high-yield bonds with weak investor protections suggest a ‘covenant bubble’ that could 
leave fixed-income investors vulnerable in a credit cycle downturn. The quest for yield is driving looser 
covenant terms that may not reflect debt issuers’ underlying credit fundamentals. In a distressed situation, 
these looser covenants would limit creditors’ rights. As strong issuance narrows credit spreads, investors may 
not be fully compensated for the risks they are taking on.’ 
158Uncertain market conditions led to a significant widening of yield spreads which led many companies and 
investment banks to put their plans to issue debt on hold. However, the expected rebound in the market did 
not materialize and the lack of market confidence prevented transactions from pricing. By the end of September 
2007, the full extent of the credit situation became obvious as major lenders including Citigroup and UBS AG 
announced major write downs due to credit losses. The leveraged finance markets came to a near standstill. 
159Fleischer, C. (2013), ‘Predicting Leveraged Buyout Success’, GRIN Verlag Publishers, at pages 1-8. 
160Sismangil, H.E. (2014), ‘Creditor Protection in Private Equity-Backed Leveraged Buyout and 
Recapitalisation Practices: A Comparative Analysis of Company and Insolvency Law Mechanisms in England, 
Germany and Turkey, Volume 72 of Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften – Zivilrecht’, John Wiley and 
Sons Publishers, at pages 1-58. 
161Andrade, G., and SN. Kaplan, (1998), ‘How costly is financial (not economic distress)? Evidenced from 
Highly Leveraged Transactions that became distressed’, Journal of Finance, 53, 1443-1494. Certain US courts 
have found that leveraged buyout debt constitutes a fraudulent transfer under US insolvency law if it is 
determined to be the cause of the acquired firm's failure, (US Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(2); Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 4). This is because the company usually gets no direct financial benefit from the 
transaction but incurs the debt for it nevertheless. However, the Bankruptcy Code includes a so-called ‘safe 
harbor’ provision, preventing bankruptcy trustees from recovering settlement payments to the bought-out 
shareholders (US Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)). In 2009, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
in the case QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, --- F.3d ---, Case No. 08-1176 (6th Cir. July 6, 2009), held that such 
settlement payments could not be avoided, irrespective of whether they occurred in a leveraged buyout of a 
public or private company. See paragraph 3.1.2 of this chapter hereinafter with regard to financial assistance 
by a company in terms of section 44 and section 4 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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interest deduction which in turn leads to a loss of revenue for the government. From a South African 
perspective these criticisms lead to two important legal questions. Firstly, what is the legal position 
of the deductibility of interest where borrowed funding is used with regard to leveraged buyouts in 
South Africa? However, at the outset it must be noted that it is not the intention of this thesis to 
discuss all the South African tax implications of leveraged buyouts, as well as the tax treatment of 
dividends and underlying portfolio interests.162 Secondly, in the context of a leveraged buyout, are 
there rules preventing the target company from giving financial assistance for the purpose of 
assisting a purchase of shares in the target company? If so, how does this affect the ability of a 
target company in a buyout to give security to lenders? In addressing the first question, paragraph 
3.1.1 below will discuss an important South African case study, namely the proposed buyout of 
Shoprite Holdings by Brait Private Equity in 2006.163  
 
3.1.1 Tax Issues with regard to Leveraged Buyouts in South Africa 
 
The characteristics of a leveraged buyout in South Africa are similar to a leveraged buyout in most 
developed countries, such as the US and the UK. Typically the private equity firm or group of firms 
planning a leveraged buyout would form a new company to serve as a special purpose vehicle 
(‘SPV’) to buy the target company. The private equity firm(s) would arrange for the SPV to borrow 
most of the acquisition finance and provide the remainder of the acquisition finance as equity finance. 
The SPV would arrange the borrowed funds in tranches ranging from senior debt, senior 
subordinated debt and junior subordinated debt.164 Levin argues that in order to obtain each 
successively more junior layer of debt financing the SPV must offer a progressively higher interest 
rate and/or a progressively larger equity interest to each more subordinated layer.165 A key feature 
of the leveraged buyout transaction is that the private equity firm(s) and the investors in the private 
equity fund are not liable for the borrowed money raised to fund the buyout.166 It is only the SPV 
and/or the target company that would be liable to the lender for the borrowed funds.167 
 
                                                 
162However, in the context of a private equity fund, brief reference is made in paragraph 3.1.3(e) of chapter 
two to African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1969) 4 SA 259 (A), CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 
1156 (A), 58 SATC 283, 1996 Taxpayer 150, and ITC 1412 (1983) 48 SATC 157. The brief discussion relates 
to the proceeds from the realisation of the shares in the investee company which can be said to be of a capital 
nature resulting in the return to the investors being liable to the lower capital gains tax. 
163The proposed buyout of Shoprite Holdings by Brait Private Equity in 2006 is a case study of two South 
African companies which was subject to the South African regulatory regime. The transaction was ultimately 
not concluded. 
164Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
165Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
166Pignataro, P. (2013), ‘Leveraged Buyouts: A Practical Guide to Investment Banking and Private Equity’, 
John Wiley and Sons Publishers, at chapter 1. 
167Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
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The private equity firm would also secure key management, either sourced from within the target 
company or recruited to manage the target company once the leveraged buyout is completed.168 
The private equity firm usually incentivises management, for example by way of share options in the 
underlying portfolio investee companies. This is an important part of private equity investing and is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter four.169 The management of the target company could also be 
the originator of a leveraged buyout and would approach a private equity firm to secure the equity 
finance for the acquisition. This is typically referred to as a management buyout and is discussed in 
paragraph 3.2 of this chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the key tax features of a leveraged buyout in South Africa which would have 
been evident of the proposed buyout of Shoprite Holdings by Brait, would have been to optimize the 
interest deductions for the interest resulting from the high leverage used in the transaction. In terms 
of the transaction, a SPV170 was formed which would have been funded with approximately R9,4 
billion of debt borrowed from several local and international banks.171 The equity finance of 
approximately R2,5 billion to the SPV was largely provided by Brait, but also included key 
management and re-investing shareholders. Approximately 79 percent of the SPV’s acquisition 
funding was made up of debt. The SPV was a wholly owned subsidiary of Shoprite Checkers and 
Shoprite Checkers in turn being a wholly owned operating subsidiary of Shoprite Holdings.172 
Thereafter, Shoprite Checkers would dispose of its business to the SPV in exchange for 
approximately R11,9 billion in debentures in the SPV and R700 million in equity in the SPV. The 
South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) was critical of the proposed leveraged buyout because of 
the high gearing created by the transaction.173 SARS was of the view that the substantial interest 
deductions would lead to a loss of revenue by the State. The introduction of debt into the SPV would 
have resulted in significant interest charges to the target company. The criticisms by SARS were 
extensively covered by the local press: 
 
‘SA Revenue Service (Sars) Commissioner Pravin Gordhan accuses the dealmakers of ‘robbing 
not only the fiscus of tax revenue, but all South Africans’ … attacking transactions which ‘show 
complete and reckless disregard for tax morality’. Although he didn’t give names, those in the 
                                                 
168Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
169Paragraph 2.2 of chapter four discusses the taxation of share options in investee companies. 
170The SPV was referred to as New Opco in the proposed Shoprite buyout. 
171For more detailed outline of the transaction, see Shoprite Holdings Limited Cautionary Announcement 
(2006), ‘Internal re-organisation of Shoprite, in specie distribution, delisting, liquidation and further cautionary 
announcement’, Available at  www.rhp.co.za/sites/default/files/xSHOPRITE.pdf, accessed in April 2015. 
172For more detailed outline of the transaction, see Shoprite Holdings Limited Cautionary Announcement 
(2006), ‘Internal re-organisation of Shoprite, in specie distribution, delisting, liquidation and further cautionary 
announcement’. 
173Hogg, A. (2007), ‘Taxman adds pressure to block Shoprite delisting’, Moneyweb article, 15th January 2007, 
Available at www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/taxman-adds-pressure-to-block-shoprite-delisting/, accessed in April 
2015. 
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know believe Gordhan was referring to the proposed Shoprite transaction. Advisers Brait have 
put together a complex structure designed primarily to avoid having to pay tax of R1,4bn on the 
transaction …’174 
 
The deductibility of this interest expenditure against the income of the target company would typically 
be determined in terms of the general deductions contained in section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962. To determine the tax liability of a taxpayer, it is required to establish the ‘taxable income’, 
which is the amount remaining after deducting all allowable deduction and allowances from the 
income of a taxpayer.175 Section 11(a) reads: 
 
‘11. General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income.—For the purpose of 
determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade, there shall be 
allowed as deductions from the income of such person so derived – (a) expenditure and losses 
actually incurred in the production of the income, provided such expenditure and losses are not 
of a capital nature.’ 
 
Consideration must be giving to section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which prohibits the 
deduction of,  
 
‘any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to which such 
moneys were not laid out or expended for the purpose of trade’. 
 
According to De Koker et al, whether or not expenses incurred by a taxpayer can be deducted from 
such taxpayer’s gross income will depend on the results of an analysis of the general deduction 
formula, as contained in section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.176 
The key requirements of the general deduction formula are:  
 
‘a trade to be carried on; income to be derived from such trade; there be expenditure and losses; 
actually incurred; in the production of income; not of a capital nature’177 
                                                 
174Hogg, A. (2007), ‘Taxman adds pressure to block Shoprite delisting’, Moneyweb article, 15th January 2007, 
Available at www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/taxman-adds-pressure-to-block-shoprite-delisting/, accessed in April 
2015. 
175Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 7, at pages 136-163. 
176De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C. and Silke, A.S. (2014), ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2013-2014’, Butterworths 
Publishers. 
177Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 7, at pages 136-163. For example, 
expenditure will only be deductible in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 if the expense 
results in income derived from carrying on a trade.  In ITC 1476, 1989, 52 SATC 141 (T) it was held that “the 
carrying on of a trade involves an ‘active step’, something more than watching over existing investments that 
are not income-producing and are not intended or expected to be so”. In this case for a specific period, the 
shares and investments did not produce dividends or income and were merely investments in other companies 




All these requirements must be met for an expense or loss to be deductible.178 Failure to meet any 
of the requirements will result in a disallowance of the expenditure for taxation purposes.179 In the 
context of the proposed buyout of Shoprite by Brait the transaction was structured to derive a 
deduction for interest incurred by forming a SPV to acquire the operating assets of Shoprite 
Checkers. Therefore, the simplistic answer to the determination as to whether or not expenses 
incurred by a taxpayer can be deducted from such taxpayer’s gross, income will depend on the 
results of an analysis of the general deduction formula, as contained in section 11(a) read with 
section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Nevertheless, section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962 allows an interest deduction when income is derived from the carrying on of a trade and the 
interest was incurred in the production of income. Section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 has 
no requirement that interest must not be of a capital nature in order for the interest to be deductible.180 
 
Section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 overrides the above mentioned general rule181 as 
section 24J(1) includes premiums and discounts on financial instruments in the definition of interest. 
In addition, section 24J(3) requires all interest earned (as determined in terms of section 24J) to be 
included in the gross income of the lender irrespective of whether it is of a capital or revenue nature; 
and section 24J(2) provides that the interest amount on an instrument, determined in terms of section 
24J must be deducted from the trade income of the borrower if the interest is incurred in the 
production of income.182 Section 24J(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 reads: 
 
                                                 
to enable the speculation in immovable property.  The company failed to prove that the company was carrying 
on a trade. 
178Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 7, at pages 136-163. In ITC 770, 1953, 19 
SATC 216 the judge stated at 217 that the definition of trade is “obviously intended to embrace every profitable 
activity and which I think should be given the widest possible interpretation.”  From this case it can be deduced 
that “trade” involves an active step where the taxpayer is taking a chance by acquiring shares in companies. 
Undertaking a risk can be viewed as an act of carrying on a trade. Investing in other companies requires 
involvement in the investment from the taxpayer’s position. A taxpayer’s main purpose in acquiring shares is 
to receive maximum benefits in the form of dividends and/or capital gains on sale of the shares. In Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 1936 8 SATC 13, at 247, Watermeyer AJP said: “Chance, in other 
words, increases the expenses, or makes additional expenses, but though chance causes them to arise they 
nevertheless remain expenses so closely linked to a necessary business operation that they can be regarded 
as part of the cost of performing such operation. In this case the potential liability is there all the time and is 
inseparable from the employment of drivers, that is to say, inseparable from the carrying on of the business.” 
179Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 7, at pages 136-163. 
180In CIR v Shapiro 1928 NPD 436 4 SATC 29, Matthews J stated ‘the payment of interest on borrowed money 
obviously not being an outgoing of a capital nature, the contention was that it was an outgoing actually incurred 
during the year of assessment in the production of the taxpayer’s income’. 
181Namely, the general deduction formula, as contained in section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
182Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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‘(2) Where any person is the issuer in relation to an instrument during any year of assessment, 
such person shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to have incurred an amount of interest 
during such year of assessment, which is equal to 
 
(a) the sum of all accrual amounts in relation to all accrual periods falling, whether in whole 
or in part, within such year of assessment in respect of such instrument; or 
(b) an amount determined in accordance with an alternative method in relation to such year 
of assessment in respect of such instrument; 
which must be deducted from the income of that person derived from carrying on any trade, 
if that amount is incurred in the production of the income;’ 
 
According to Haupt: 
 
‘Section 24J was introduced into the Act in 1995 to address what was considered by the Revenue 
Service to be a serious problem concerning the timing of interest and finance charges for income 
tax purposes. A taxpayer could, for example, have borrowed R100 in terms of an arrangement 
which provided for the repayment of R160 after three years. The R60 premium payable at the end 
of the contract was claimed as a section 11(a) deduction on day 1 on the basis that it represented 
an expense actually incurred. Section 24J addressed such problems by providing a basis for the 
determination of the time of accrual and incurral of interest. Whether or not such amounts were 
taxable or deductible had to be determined under the normal gross income rules and section 
11(a). An amendment in the 2004 Revenue laws Amendment Act changed this. As a result of the 
amendment which came into operation on 1 January 2005 the section now deals with the gross 
income inclusion and section 24J deduction in respect of interest.’183 
 
According to Stiglingh et al: 
 
‘At the time of its introduction, it was commonly accepted that s 24J merely aimed to regulate the 
timing of interest accruals and deductions and that it did not represent a charging section. 
Amounts were accordingly taxed by virtue of the fact that the constituted “gross income”, or they 
qualified for deduction as a result of the application of s 11(a). In other words, s 24J was directed 
solely at the timing of accrual or incurral of interest. Subsequent amendments altered the 
principles outlined above: 
 
- Section 24J(2) now specifically provides for the deduction of interest. 
                                                 
183Haupt, P. (2012), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 31st edition, at pages 534-535. See also Stiglingh, 
M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African Income 
Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. 
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- Section 24J(3) makes provision for the inclusion of amounts in gross income. 
 
These amendments were deemed necessary by the legislature as taxpayers and the tax 
authorities contended that certain amounts of discount, premium and interest that were treated 
as interest under the provisions of s 24J were not taxable or deductible due to their capital 
nature.’184 
 
Therefore section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is the main section under which interest will 
be either deductible or included in income, as opposed to section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962. For the sake of clarity, it must be reaffirmed at this point that it is not the intention of this thesis 
to discuss all the tax implications with regard to the deductibility of interest where borrowed funding 
is used, specifically all the fundamental concepts contained in section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962.185 Nonetheless, the substantive provisions of section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
are  summarised succinctly by Stiglingh et al: 
 
‘-  where there is any form of financial arrangement 
- in terms of which one taxpayer (the borrower/issuer) 
- undertakes to another (the lender/holder) 
- to pay interest 
- or to pay a premium (an amount greater that the amount that the borrower received when 
the instrument was issued) on an instrument that premium is in addition to the face value of 
the capital sum or because the instrument has been acquired at a discount on face value 
- the following results ensue in terms of s24J: 
o in the hands of the taxpayer incurring the liability, the total financing cost to him over 
the total period of the arrangement is deemed to have been incurred on a day-to-day 
basis 
o in the hands of the recipient, there is an accrual of the interest on a day-to-day basis 
until he disposes of the instrument or until maturity of the instrument.’186 
 
Furthermore, in calculating the interest expense incurred by issuers of financial instruments, the 
provisions of section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 apply to all ‘instruments’ as defined.187 
Section 24J(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 defines ‘instrument’ as: 
                                                 
184Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at page 728. 
185Section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is detailed, complex and contain numerous fundamental 
concepts and provisions. A detailed discussion of all such concepts and provisions is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
186Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at page 734. 
187Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at page 735. 




‘…(c) any interest-bearing arrangement or debt; (d) any acquisition or disposal of any right to 
receive interest or the obligation to pay any interest, as the case may be, in terms of any other 
interest-bearing arrangement; or (e) any repurchase agreement or resale agreement ... but 
excluding any lease agreement (other than a sale and leaseback arrangement as contemplated 
in section 23G)or any policy issued by an insurer as defined in section 29A ...’ 
 
Nevertheless, to restate the abovementioned: the basis of section 24J(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962 is that the taxpayer can deduct the interest expense from income from carrying on trade, 
provided that the expenditure was incurred in the production of income. Therefore, if a taxpayer is 
carrying on a trade and is paying interest in respect of the acquisition of an asset which will produce 
income, that the interest should be deductible.188 Section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is a 
charging section on which a taxpayer can rely to claim a deduction and under which tax liability can 
arise.189  
 
As mentioned above, it is not a requirement in section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 that the 
interest must not be of a capital nature. All that is required is that the interest be deductible against 
income from the carrying on of a trade and that it be incurred in the production of income.190 In the 
proposed buyout of Shoprite, Brait introduced capital into the structure through the formation of a 
SPV that purchased operating assets. The transaction was structured to establish a link between 
the income and the interest to give rise to expenditure in the production of income. This was intended 
to satisfy the provisions of section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 that the interest expenditure 
would have been deductible from income derived from the carrying of trade and would have been 
incurred in the production of income.191 In addition, Brait introduced capital into the structure through 
the formation of a SPV that purchased operating assets. The transaction was structured on the basis 
that as these assets were operating assets, there was an adequate link between the income and the 
interest to give rise to expenditure in the production of income. Therefore at the time of the proposed 
Shoprite buyout there was a sound argument based on the provisions of section 24J that the interest 
expenditure would have been deductible from income derived from the carrying of trade and would 
have been incurred in the production of income. However, subsequent to the proposed Shoprite 
                                                 
188Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See De Koker, A.P., 
Williams, R.C. and Silke, A.S. (2014), ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2013-2014’, Butterworths Publishers. 
189Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 512-515. 
190Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 512-515. 
191Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 512-515. 
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leveraged buyout in 2006, SARS introduced section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 in 2011 
as an anti-avoidance provision.192  
 
On the one hand the purpose of section 24J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is to determine the 
accrual and incurral of interest, while on the other hand the deduction of interest in relation to the 
direct acquisition of equity interests is subject to anti-avoidance provisions that were first introduced 
into the Income Tax Act in 2011.193 These provisions, namely section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962, initially applied to indirect acquisitions of equity interests but have been amended to extend 
their application to direct acquisitions of equity interests.194 In addition, section 23K of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 required an application to SARS for a directive that covers a specific interest 
deduction. The provisions of section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 were only applicable to 
acquisition transactions where interest-bearing or debt arrangements were effected after 1 January 
2013. The deduction was also only available for as long as the requirements stipulated above were 
met and the conditions as stipulated in the Section 23K directive were applicable. Subsequently, with 
effect from 1st April 2014 section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 was replaced by section 23N 
which now applies to transactions entered into on or after 1st July 2013.195 Section 23N of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 set out the permanent rules to disallow ‘excessive interest’.196 The acquisition 
debt interest incurred by the new operating company must in any year of assessment and for a 
period of five years of assessment thereafter, not exceed forty percent of the higher of the adjusted 
taxable income determined (i) in the particular year of assessment; or (ii) in the year in which the re-
organisation occurred.197 
 
At the time of the proposed buyout of Shoprite by Brait, there were inter alia two separate (but 
related) tax considerations. On the one hand consideration had to be given to the deductibility of 
interest expenditure from income derived from the carrying of trade and that would have been 
incurred in the production of income. On the other hand consideration had to be given to the 
                                                 
192The proposed transaction with regard to the buyout of Shoprite by Brait was never concluded. 
193Section 23K was inserted into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 by the Taxations Laws Amendment Act 24 of 
2011. 
194De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C. and Silke, A.S. (2014), ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2013-2014’, Butterworths 
Publishers. 
195Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments 
Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National 
Treasury and SARS (Version as presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). 
196Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments 
Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National 
Treasury and SARS (Version as presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). 
197Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 586-587. See also Standing Committee on Finance 
(SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration 
Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National Treasury and SARS (Version as 
presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). Section 23N provides for an 
adjustment to the allowable percentage of ‘adjusted taxable income’ to the extent that South Africa's repo rate 
is subject to an increase beyond ten percent. 
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deductibility of interest on loans used to acquire shares. The first aforementioned consideration has 
been discussed. Next, the second consideration will be discussed. As stated previously in this 
paragraph, the proposed buyout of Shoprite by Brait was structured to derive a deduction for interest 
incurred by forming a SPV to acquire the operating assets of Shoprite Checkers rather than the 
equity of Shoprite Checkers.198 If the transaction included the purchase of the equity of Shoprite 
Checkers, the interest deduction would not have been allowed on the basis that it was not incurred 
in the production of income but rather to acquire a dividend producing asset.199 At the time of the 
proposed buyout of Shoprite by Brait, the position of SARS was that the interest on loans used to 
acquire shares may not be deducted because the taxpayer earns exempt dividend income and it 
would have been difficult to prove that the interest deduction is directly linked to the production of 
taxable income. Therefore, if the loan was raised to purchase shares, a deduction of the interest 
would have generally not been available.  
 
Nevertheless, dividends are exempt from tax therefore expenditure incurred for the purpose of 
producing dividends is not deductible. The position of SARS at the time of the proposed Shoprite 
buyout was that on the one hand if the purpose of borrowing money was to apply the funds to earn 
income of a kind that is taxable under the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, then the interest on the loan 
is a deductible expense for income tax purposes. On the other hand, dividends are exempt from tax 
therefore expenditure incurred for the purpose of producing dividends is not deductible.200 Therefore 
the purpose of a loan must be determined at the time of the borrowing of the funds. The interest on 
loans to purchase shares requires that if interest paid on money borrowed by a company to acquire 
shares in another company is linked with the actual or prospective receipt by the company of 
dividends, it cannot be allowed as a deduction because almost all dividends constitute exempt 
income.201 However, if it can be shown that the sole or main purpose of the acquisition of the shares 
is the production of income, and that any receipt or accrual of dividends on these shares is purely 
incidental to the main purpose; interest paid on money borrowed to acquire the shares would 
properly be allowable as a deduction. Therefore it does not necessarily follow that interest paid by a 
company on moneys borrowed to acquire shares may not be deducted from its income.202  
 
                                                 
198Shoprite Holdings Limited Cautionary Announcement (2006), ‘Internal re-organisation of Shoprite, in specie 
distribution, delisting, liquidation and further cautionary announcement’, Available at 
www.rhp.co.za/sites/default/files/xSHOPRITE.pdf, accessed in April 2015. 
199Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 121, 364. 
200Sallies Limited v CSARS 2007, 70 SATC 39. 
201Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 121, 364. 
202Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 121, 364. 
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In ITC1820203 the court had to decide whether the taxpayer was entitled to deduct the interest 
incurred by it in respect of an amount borrowed in order to acquire certain shares. The case was 
considered by the High Court and published as Sallies Limited v CSARS.204 The court found in both, 
that Sallies had not incurred the interest expense in the production of income.205 In Sallies Limited v 
CSARS,206 the matter turned on whether the interest incurred by Sallies Limited on the loan which 
had been utilised to acquire the shares in Witkop Fluorspar Mine (Pty) Ltd, satisfied the criteria for 
deductibility laid down in the general deduction provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, namely 
section 11(a) read with section 23(g). For income tax purposes, Sallies Limited claimed a deduction 
in respect of interest on the loan. SARS refused to allow the interest as a deduction. Sallies objected 
to the assessment and asserted its claim to a deduction. When the matter came before the Tax 
Court, the court ruled in favour of SARS. On further appeal to the High Court,207 Judge Goldstein in 
his judgment, quoted from CIR v Allied Building Society,208 where Ogilvie-Thompson JA stated:  
 
‘on the facts of that case, the ultimate use or destination of the borrowed money could not be 
elevated into a decisive factor in determining its deductibility under the Act. The dominant question 
was what was the true nature of the transaction and the most important factor in that inquiry was 
the purpose of the borrowing.’209 
 
According to Judge Goldstein, the purpose of a loan must be determined at the time of the borrowing 
of the funds. The High Court in the Sallies case210 held that Sallies Limited had not proved that it had 
acquired the shares in Witkop Fluorspar Mine (Pty) Ltd ‘in the production of income’ and the appeal 
failed and the interest was thus not deductible. Interest on loans to purchase shares states that if 
interest paid on money borrowed by a company to acquire shares in another company is linked with 
the actual or prospective receipt by the company of dividends, it cannot be allowed as a deduction, 
since almost all dividends constitute exempt income.211 Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow 
that interest paid by a company on moneys borrowed to acquire shares may not be deducted from 
its income.212 If it can be shown that the sole or main purpose of the acquisition of the shares is the 
production of income, and that any receipt or accrual of dividends on these shares is purely incidental 
                                                 
203ITC1820, 2007 69 SATC 163. 
204Sallies Limited v CSARS 2007, 70 SATC 39. 
205Sallies Limited v CSARS 2007, 70 SATC 39. 
206Sallies Limited v CSARS 2007, 70 SATC 39. 
207Sallies Limited v CSARS (Johannesburg High Court, case A3034/07; judgment delivered 30 November 
2007). 
208CIR v Allied Building Society 1963, 25 SATC 343. 
209CIR v Allied Building Society 1963, 25 SATC 343, at page 1.3 C-H. 
210Sallies Limited v CSARS (Johannesburg High Court, case A3034/07; judgment delivered 30 November 
2007). 
211Williams, R.C (1995), ‘Income Tax in South Africa’, Law and Practice, Juta.  
212See for example ITC 1124 (1968) 31 SATC 53(T), where the court held that the only connection was, at 
best, an indirect one, and consequently the payment of interest was only indirectly connected with the income-
producing operations of the parent company. Since the parent company could not establish a sufficiently close 
connection between the interest and its income-producing operations its appeal failed. 
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to the main purpose, interest paid on money borrowed to acquire the shares would properly be 
allowable as a deduction.213  
 
In CIR v G Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd214 the court summarised these principles as follows:   
 
‘In a case concerning the deductibility or otherwise of interest payable on money borrowed, the 
enquiry relates primarily to the purpose for which the money was borrowed.  That is often the 
‘dominant’ or ‘vital’ enquiry, although the ultimate user of the borrowed money may sometimes 
be a relevant factor.  Where a taxpayer’s purpose in borrowing money upon which it pays interest 
is to obtain the means of earning income, the interest paid on the money so borrowed is prima 
facie an expenditure incurred in the production of income … If, on the other hand, the purpose of 
the borrowing was for some other purpose than obtaining the means of earning income (e.g. to 
pay a dividend), the interest is not deductible’.215 
   
In CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC216 it was held that the purpose of the loan was to enable a dividend to 
be paid to Dr Ticktin. The court held that the interest was not deductible in the hands of the taxpayer. 
The facts of the aforementioned case were that Dr Ticktin’s father sold his shareholding in a timber 
merchant company to four trusts for the benefit of his four sons. It was then decided that the equity 
of the business would be acquired by the one son, Dr Ticktin. The trust was dissolved. Dr Ticktin 
bought the shares owned by the other three trusts for R1,8 million and the company was converted 
to a close corporation. Dr Ticktin was the sole member of the close corporation.217 The purchase 
price for the shares plus interest thereon remained payable to the trusts by Dr Ticktin. The close 
corporation then declared dividends which were not paid, but credited to Dr Ticktin’s loan account in 
the books of the close corporation.218 Interest would be charged by Dr Ticktin in respect of the close 
corporations’ use of the money owed to him.219 The court held that a close corporation cannot borrow 
                                                 
213See for example CIR v Drakensberg Garden Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) SA 475(A), 23 SATC 251 in which a 
company, in order to obtain absolute control of hired premises from which it derived rent and business profits, 
thereby ensuring security of tenure and a continuance of its income, borrowed money in order to acquire the 
shares in another company owning the leased premises. The decision of the majority of the court was that as 
the purchase of the shares was not for the purpose of securing dividends, but to ensure the control by the 
company of its revenue-producing asset, the restriction limiting deductions to expenditure in the production of 
income did not apply. The majority further held that as the Special Court had found as a fact that the connection 
between the payment of interest and the production of the respondent’s income was sufficiently close to 
warrant its deduction and as this was a finding which could not be held to be one at which no court could 
reasonably arrive, the appeal was dismissed. See also Williams, R.C (2009), ‘Income Tax in South Africa: 
Cases and Materials’, Law and Practice, Third Edition, Butterworths, at pages 458-461. 
214CIR v G Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd 1994 56 SATC 47. 
215CIR v G Brollo Properties (Pty) Ltd 1994 56 SATC 47, at paragraphs 152J-153B. 
216CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. 
217Therefore, the taxpayer had been a company before the shares were bought by the present sole 
shareholder, namely Dr Ticktin who, upon acquiring them, had procured the conversion of the company into a 
close corporation. 
218For the next five years, the close corporation declared all its profits each year to the sole member, Dr Ticktin. 
219CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. See also Williams, R.C (2009), ‘Income Tax in South Africa: 
Cases and Materials’, Law and Practice, Third Edition, Butterworths. 
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money to pay a dividend and then deduct the interest to arrive at its taxable income.220 In addition, 
money borrowed by a close corporation to finance a dividend is not money borrowed in order to 
produce income and that the onus was on the close corporation to prove that the loan had been 
incurred in the production of income for such interest expense to be deductible in terms of section 
11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.221  
 
The court held that the question to be asked is: what is the purpose for which the money has been 
borrowed?222 The answer is that the close corporation’s purpose was to discharge the distribution 
debt.223 The court will not look at why the loan is not being repaid which in this case might have been 
that the close corporation wished to retain capital for use in its business, making it look as if the 
expenditure is incurred in the production of income.224 The purpose of structuring the transaction this 
way ensured that the close corporation assisted Dr Ticktin to pay the interest owed to the trusts.225 
The court held that the intention was to increase Dr Ticktin’s income and not that of the close 
corporation. In addition, the loans that were created were not necessary, since there was an excess 
of cash available and only increased the close corporation’s expenses.226 Therefore the link between 
the loan and the dividend could not be sufficiently established.227    
 
In CSARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd228 the taxpayer declared a dividend to its holding company 
and simultaneously entered into a loan agreement. At the time of declaring the dividend, the 
company had cash reserves in excess of the dividend and would have been able to continue with its 
normal business activities but required funding towards the end of the following year.229 The court 
summarised the principles resulting from this case as follows: 
  
                                                 
220It should be noted that during the years in question, the company tax rate was higher than the maximum 
marginal rate for individuals, so it was favourable from the tax point of view for income to be taxed in the hands 
of an individual. The sole member (Dr Ticktin) also needed funds from the close corporation in order to pay 
interest on loans he had incurred in order to purchase his membership in the close corporation. The net effect 
of this practice by the close corporation was that the interest the corporation paid on the balance of the loan 
account was part of the gross income of the member and a deductible expense by the close corporation. 
221CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. The South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) disallowed the 
expense in the hands of the close corporation on the grounds that it had been incurred in order to pay the 
dividend each year. The taxpayer argued that the two actions were separate and distinct; the corporation had 
every right to declare its profits as dividends, and also to finance its activities with loan capital. 
222CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. 
223CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. 
224CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. See also Williams, R.C (2009), ‘Income Tax in South Africa: 
Cases and Materials’, Law and Practice, Third Edition, Butterworths, at pages 470-472. 
225CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. 
226CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399. 
227CIR v Ticktin Timbers CC 1999 61 SATC 399 at paragraph 263. See also Williams, R.C (2009), ‘Income 
Tax in South Africa: Cases and Materials’, Law and Practice, Third Edition, Butterworths, at pages 470-472. 
228CSARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 68 SATC 229; (5) SA559 (SCA). 
229CSARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 68 SATC 229; (5) SA559 (SCA). 
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(i) Firstly, determine the purpose for which the money was borrowed. If the purpose of the loan 
is to obtain the means of earning income, the interest paid on the loan is expenditure 
incurred in the production of income and thus deductible; 
(ii) Secondly, consider the intention of the company for raising the loan. If a dividend is declared 
and a loan agreement is simultaneously entered into by a taxpayer, determine whether the 
dividend and the loan are interdependent and whether one can exist without the other. 
(iii) Thirdly, consider whether the company has sufficient cash available to pay the dividend and 
to continue its normal business operations without an immediate need to procure finance 
by way of a loan; and  
(iv) Lastly, consider whether the income-earning capacity of the taxpayer declaring the dividend 
has been increased by the loan funding obtained.230  
 
Nevertheless, it is evident from the abovementioned listed principles that a dominant test applied by 
South African courts concerning the deductibility of interest payable on a loan is to establish the 
purpose of borrowing the money. In practice the general rule is that the interest on loans used to 
acquire shares may not be deducted because the taxpayer earns exempt dividend income and it is 
virtually impossible to prove that the interest deduction is directly linked to the production of taxable 
income.231 Therefore, if the loan was raised to purchase shares, a deduction of the interest is 
generally not available.  
 
The abovementioned general rule that the interest on loans used to acquire shares may not be 
deducted because the taxpayer earns exempt dividend income has led to the use of innovative 
transaction structures that allow for interest deductions. This led to the introduction of Section 24O 
of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 in 2013.232 Section 24O of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 allows 
the taxpayer to deduct interest on the purchase of shares, if (i) the target company is an operating 
company, (namely the target company must be a business that provides goods or services for 
consideration and carries on that business on a continuous basis); or (ii) the target company is a 
controlling-group company of an operating company; and (iii) when after the transaction is 
concluded, the purchaser becomes a controlling-group company with at least a seventy percent 
interest; and (iv) only if the deductions are available in respect of wholly domestic acquisitions.233 
                                                 
230CSARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 68 SATC 229; (5) SA559 (SCA). See also Williams, R.C (2009), 
‘Income Tax in South Africa: Cases and Materials’, Law and Practice, Third Edition, Butterworths, at pages 
475-484. 
231De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C. and Silke, A.S. (2014), ‘Silke Tax Yearbook 2013-2014’, Butterworths 
Publishers. 
232Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Which became effective from 1st January 2013. 
233Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. See also South African Revenue Service (2013), ‘Request For Public Comment 
For Incorporation Into The Forthcoming 2013 Tax Laws Amendment Bill: Proposed Limitation Against 
Excessive Interest Tax Deductions,’ 29th April 2013. 
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Section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as mentioned above) was extended to include 
acquisition transactions conducted under Section 24O of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.234  
 
In terms of section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 where interest-bearing loan funding is used 
by the acquirer to fund the purchase of shares in a target company in terms of section 24O of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 the acquirer may not claim a deduction for the interest incurred by it on 
the loan funding, unless the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service issues a directive 
that the interest may be deducted by the acquirer. In this regard, the Commissioner may only issue 
a section 23K directive if and to the extent that the Commissioner is satisfied that the issuing of that 
directive will not lead nor be likely to lead to a significant reduction of the aggregate taxable income 
of all parties who incur, receive or accrue interest in respect of and for all periods during which any 
amounts are outstanding in terms of the loan funding.235 
 
The provisions of section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 were only applicable to acquisition 
transactions where interest-bearing or debt arrangements were effected after 1 January 2013. The 
deduction was also only available for as long as the requirements stipulated above were met and 
the conditions as stipulated in the Section 23K directive were applicable. Subsequently, with effect 
from 1st April 2014 section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 was replaced by section 23N which 
now applies to transactions entered into on or after 1st July 2013.236 Section 23N of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 applies where an amount of interest is incurred by an acquiring company on loan 
funding raised for a section 24O acquisition or in respect of any debt used directly or indirectly for 
the purpose of redeeming, refinancing or settling the debt raised for a section 24O acquisition. 
Section 23N of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 set out the permanent rules to disallow ‘excessive 
interest’.237 The acquisition debt interest incurred by the new operating company must in any year of 
assessment and for a period of five years of assessment thereafter, not exceed forty percent of the 
                                                 
234See South African Revenue Service (2013), ‘Request For Public Comment For Incorporation Into The 
Forthcoming 2013 Tax Laws Amendment Bill: Proposed Limitation Against Excessive Interest Tax Deductions,’ 
29th April 2013. 
235National Treasury have indicated that although the provisions of section 23K of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 were designed to target the potential erosion of the tax base caused by interest deductions on excessive 
loan funding, these provisions were introduced as an interim measure only. National Treasury have also 
acknowledged that the process of obtaining a section 23K directive from the Commissioner is not viable as a 
permanent solution as it is a time consuming and discretionary process, and furthermore, taxpayers who 
require loan funding for a section 24O acquisition require decisive rules before entering into and concluding 
negotiations for such transactions. 
236Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments 
Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National 
Treasury and SARS (Version as presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). 
237Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments 
Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National 
Treasury and SARS (Version as presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). 
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higher of the adjusted taxable income determined (i) in the particular year of assessment; or (ii) in 
the year in which the re-organisation occurred.238  
 
This paragraph 3.1.1 discussed the position of SARS at the time of the the proposed Shoprite 
leveraged buyout transaction and SARS subsequent position. Nevertheless, leveraged buyouts such 
as the proposed Shoprite leveraged buyout structure are largely tax driven which made use of the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 applicable at the time to avoid liability to income tax. 
SARS criticised the aforementioned transaction, among others, on the basis that it was an abuse of 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which led SARS to recommend several 
amendments to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 such as those discussed above.239 It is submitted 
that that these amendments are aimed at limiting interest deductions. More importantly, these 
amendments are intended to ensure that interest deductions are incurred in terms of bona fide 
leveraged buyout transactions and not in terms of synthetically structured schemes aimed at 
avoiding the payment of tax. SARS is clearly concerned about the adverse effect that highly geared 
leveraged buyout transactions are having on the South African tax base. 
 
3.1.2 Financial Assistance Rule   
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 is the principal legislative enactment that regulates the merger and 
acquisition legislative framework in South Africa.240 In addition, it regulates fundamental transactions, 
such as schemes of arrangement, amalgamation and mergers and disposals of all or the greater 
part of the assets or undertaking of a company.241 However, it must be noted that it is not the intention 
of this discussion to provide a detailed legal analysis of the requirements of fundamental 
transactions, particularly as contained in Chapter 5 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, including the 
related legislation and case law. The discussion is aimed at addressing the question as to whether 
there rules preventing the target company in a leveraged buyout transaction from giving financial 
                                                 
238Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 23, at pages 726-774. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 586-587. See also Standing Committee on Finance 
(SCOF): Report-Back Hearings on the Draft Taxation Laws Amendments Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration 
Laws Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from National Treasury and SARS (Version as 
presented to Standing Committee on Finance on 11th September 2013). Section 23N provides for an 
adjustment to the allowable percentage of ‘adjusted taxable income’ to the extent that South Africa's repo rate 
is subject to an increase beyond ten percent. 
239SARS can recommend/suggest amendments but ultimately National Treasury decides on policy 
considerations which when adopted go through the normal legislative processes. 
240Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, chapter 15, at pages 674-675. 
241Although the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not define the phrase ‘fundamental transaction’, it provides 
three types of fundamental transactions in Part A of Chapter 5. These transactions, which fundamentally alter 
a company, compromise: an amalgamation; a disposal of all or greater part of the assets or the undertaking 
of a company; and a scheme of arrangement. Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, 
J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, chapter 15, at 
page 674. 
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assistance for the purpose of assisting a purchase of shares in the target company? If so, how does 
this affect the ability of a target company in a buyout to give security to lenders?  
 
In simplistic terms, financial assistance in the context of a leveraged buyout arises when the bank(s) 
or other lenders of the debt take security on the assets of the target company. The bank(s) or lenders 
would not lend without security provided by the target company. The acquired company is therefore 
assisting in the raising of the acquisition finance to complete the acquisition.242 Cumming and 
Zambelli state that: 
 
‘Leveraged buyouts involve the acquisition of the equity capital of a target firm by another 
company (‘newco’) through the adoption of a large amount of debt relative to the asset value of 
the acquired firm. The newco obtains debt financing under the expectation that the acquired 
company will repay it. As a result, the target pays the economic price of its own acquisition.’243 
 
In South Africa, the target company would have to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 44 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 before the target company would be allowed in the context of a 
leveraged buyout to assist in financing the purchase of its own shares by third parties.244 In terms of 
section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 a company may give financial assistance for the 
purchase or subscription of its securities if certain requirements are met.245 Financial assistance is 
not defined except where section 44(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 states that financial 
assistance does not mean lending of any money by a company whose primary business is the 
lending of the money. Section 44(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘In this section, ‘financial assistance’ does not include lending money in the ordinary course of 
business by a company whose primary business is the lending of money’. 
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not contain a precise definition of financial assistance. Prior to 
the introduction of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the courts used certain tests to determine if 
financial assistance had been given by a company. For instance, the courts applied the 
impoverishment test in the case Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd.246 This test involved asking 
if a company had become poorer as a result of what was done for the purpose of, or in connection 
                                                 
242Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 86. 
243Cumming, D.J. and Zambelli, S. (2010), ‘Illegal buyouts’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(2) July 2010 
at 441-456. 
244Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 328-329. 
245Set out in section 44(3) and section 44(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
246Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd & Another 1959 (4) SA 419 (A). 
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with, the purchase of or subscription for the company’s shares.247 In Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra 
Printers Ltd,248 Schriener JA stated: 
 
'The question whether it was to give financial assistance would depend not on how it obtained the 
money by loan, secured or not, by realising assets or otherwise but on what it was to do with the 
money when available.'249  
 
The impoverishment test was also analysed by Miller JA in Lipschitz NO v UDC Bank Ltd,250 where 
he stated that:   
 
‘the concern is not only at preventing actual loss of company funds but also at the exposure of 
company funds to possible risk’.251  
 
In Gardner v Margo,252 Van Heerden JA stated:  
 
‘Moreover, financial assistance within the meaning of s 38(1) is given only when the direct object 
of the transaction is to assist another financially the s 38 prohibition is not contravened when the 
direct object of the transaction is merely to give another that to which he or she is already 
entitled’.253 
 
However, section 44(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that financial assistance includes 
assistance by way of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise, to any person for the 
purpose of, or in connection with, the subscription of any option, or any securities, issued or to be 
issued by the company or a related or inter-related company, or for the purchase of any securities 
of the company or a related or inter-related company.254 However, this excludes lending money in 
the ordinary course of business by a company whose business is lending of money. Furthermore, 
section 44(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company provides otherwise, 
the board may authorise the company to provide financial assistance by way of a loan, guarantee, 
the provision of security or otherwise to any person for the purpose of, or in connection with, the 
subscription of any option, or any securities, issued or to be issued by the company or a related 
                                                 
247Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd & Another 1959 (4) SA 419 (A) at 425E. 
248Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd & Another 1959 (4) SA 419 (A). 
249Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd & Another 1959 (4) SA 419 (A) at 425E. 
250Lipschitz NO v UDC Bank Ltd 1979 (1) SA 789 (A). 
251Lipschitz NO v UDC Bank Ltd 1979 (1) SA 789 (A) at 797H-798A. 
252Gardner v Margo 2006 SCA 36 (SA). 
253Gardner v Margo 2006 SCA 36 (SA) at pages 28-29. 
254The word ‘securities’ is widely defined in section 1 and includes shares, debt instruments as well as 
debentures. 
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or inter-related company, or for the purchase of any securities of the company or a related or 
inter-related company, subject to subsections (3) and (4).’255 
 
The question whether financial assistance exists in any given case for the purpose of section 44 of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 will be determined based on the extensive case law that has been 
built up around the meaning of the words 'or otherwise' in section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973. However, as stated above it is not the intention of this discussion to provide a detailed legal 
analysis of the capital maintenance rule in terms of section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and 
relevant case law.256  
 
Section 44(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 affords authority to the board of directors of the target 
company to provide financial assistance.257 However the authority to provide financial assistance is 
subject to the fulfillment of the requirements of section 44(3) and section 44(4) of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008. Section 44(3) and section 44(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘3. Despite any provision of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation to the contrary, the board 
may not authorise any financial assistance contemplated in subsection (2), unless— 
(a) the particular provision of financial assistance is— 
(i) pursuant to an employee share scheme that satisfies the requirements of section 97; or 
(ii) pursuant to a special resolution of the shareholders, adopted within the previous two 
years, which approved such assistance either for the specific recipient, or generally for 
a category of potential recipients, and the specific recipient falls within that category; and 
(b) the board is satisfied that— 
(i) immediately after providing the financial assistance, the company would satisfy 
the solvency and liquidity test; and 
(ii) the terms under which the financial assistance is proposed to be given are fair and 
reasonable to the company. 
                                                 
255Section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 applies to ‘securities’ as stipulated by the Securities Services 
Act, 36 of 2004 (which was repealed by the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012), which includes ‘shares, bonds, 
and debentures’ and this is different to section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which only applied to 
shares. 
256The leading South African cases pertaining to the definition of ‘financial assistance’ are: Gardner and 
Another v Margo 2006 (6) SA 33 (SCA); Gradwell (Pty) Ltd v Rostra Printers Ltd 1959 (4) SA 419 (A); Lewis v 
Oneanate (Pty) Ltd 1992 (4) SA 811(A); Lipschitz v UDC Bank Ltd 1979 (1) SA 789 (A) 51.  The leading English 
cases are: England Anglo Petroleum Ltd and another v TFB (Mortgages) Ltd 2008 1 BCLC; Arab Bank Plc v 
Mercantile Holdings Ltd 1994 2 All ER 74; Belmont Finance Corp v William Furniture (No.2) Ltd 1980 1 All ER 
393 (CA); Brady v Brady 1989 AC 755 (HL) at 780; Chaston v SWP Group Plc 2003 1 BCLC 675 (CA); 
Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd v Tempest Diesels Ltd 1986 BCLC1; Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd 
v Craddock (No.3) 1968 1 WLR 1555; Spink (Bournemouth) Ltd v Spink 1936 Ch 544; Trevor v Whitworth 
1887 12 App Cas 409 (HL) 416; Victor Battery Co Ltd v Curry's Ltd 1946 Ch 242. 
257Section 44(2) reads ‘Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company provides 
otherwise, the board may authorise …’. 
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4. In addition to satisfying the requirements of subsection (3), the board must ensure that any 
conditions or restrictions respecting the granting of financial assistance set out in the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation have been satisfied.’258 
 
A target company in the context of a leveraged buyout can provide financial assistance to any other 
person for the purpose of acquiring or subscribing to any shares in the target company, including 
providing security to lenders, provided the conditions for financial assistance mentioned above are 
met. Cassim et al summarises the conditions for financial assistance as follows:259 
 
‘Irrespective of what the Memorandum of Incorporation may say, financial assistance is prohibited 
unless the requirements set out in s 44(3) and (4) are met. The requirements are:260 
 
 the particular provision of financial assistance must be pursuant to an employee share 
scheme that satisfies the requirements of s 97,261 or pursuant to a special resolution of the 
shareholders, adopted within the previous two years, which approved such assistance 
either for the specific recipient, or generally for category of potential recipients, and the 
specific recipient falls within that category;262 
 the board must be satisfied that immediately after providing the financial assistance, the 
company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test; 
 the board must be satisfied that the terms under which the financial assistance is proposed 
to be given are fair and reasonable to the company;263 and 
 the board must ensure that any conditions or restrictions respecting the granting of financial 
assistance set out in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation have been satisfied.’ 
 
In terms of the first requirement listed above,264 the financial assistance must either be pursuant to 
a section 97 employee share scheme, or to a special resolution adopted within the previous two 
years that approved such assistance for a specific recipient or generally for a category of potential 
recipients.265 Yeats and Jooste argue that the resolution approving financial assistance generally for 
a category of potential recipients may prove problematic.266 Cassim et al state: 
                                                 
258The conditions with respect to the granting of financial assistance stipulated in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation must be satisfied before any decision is made. Section 44(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
requires a board to ensure that all conditions in the Memorandum of Incorporation are complied with. 
259Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 328. 
260Section 44(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
261Section 44(3)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
262Section 44(3)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
263Section 44(3)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
264Section 44(3)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
265Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 329. 
266Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 579. 




‘Needless to say, the special resolution requirement will have administrative and cost implications 
for companies (especially large public companies and listed companies). A pragmatic board may 
therefore decide to propose a suitably drafted resolution at, for example, the annual general 
meeting every two years. The question then arises whether a category or categories of potential 
recipients may be so widely framed so as to effectively give the board the discretion whether to 
provide the assistance or not without consulting the shareholders again. So, for example, would 
it satisfy the requirements of s 44(3) and (4) if the shareholders resolve that the company may 
provide financial assistance to any person if, in the opinion of the directors, the provision of such 
financial assistance would serve to further the BEE objectives of the company? This possibility 
would largely remove the protection ostensibly afforded to shareholders by the resolution 
requirement, because in these circumstances the board will be able to provide financial 
assistance without obtaining shareholder approval. However, nothing that appears from the 
section militates against such an interpretation, nor is there anything in the Act that prevents the 
passing of a number of such ‘boilerplate’ resolutions, widely framed, in respect of a number of 
different categories of recipients every two years as a matter of course.’267 
 
In addition, section 44(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, requires that the board of the target 
company may not authorise any financial assistance unless it is satisfied that ‘the terms under which 
the financial assistance is proposed to be given are fair and reasonable to the company’. According 
to Yeats and Jooste,268 the language in this section with regard to a board being satisfied has raised 
a lot of debate as to the actual meaning of the word. These authors are of the view that the wording 
will bring a lot of ambiguity in the interpretation of the section 44(3)(b)(ii).269 Cassim et al state:270 
 
‘It will be recognised that this requirement makes the Act tougher to negotiate than s 38 of the 
1973 Act. As a result of the exception to s 38 introduced by the amendment in 2006, as long as 
there was a special resolution and the solvency and liquidity criteria were met, there was no 
contravention of s 38 even if the terms under which the assistance was given were not fair and 
reasonable to the company. As has been said271 the change is to be welcomes, although it is not 
clear what is meant by ‘the terms under which the assistance is proposed’ being ‘fair and 
reasonable to the company’. Does it mean that, viewed from a commercial perspective, the 
transaction, whatever it might be, will benefit the company? In other words, must there be a 
reasonable quid pro quo? Or does it simply mean that the company is provided with ‘fair and 
                                                 
267Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 329. 
268Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 579. 
269Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 579. 
270Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 330 and 332. 
271Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 579. 
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reasonable’ security? If the latter, and this needs to be clarified …the only rationale for the 
inclusion of the ‘fair and reasonable’ criterion is s 44(3)(b)(ii) seems to be the possible liability of 
a director to the company or its shareholders created in s 44(6) of the Act.’272 
 
As discussed above, an important characteristic of leveraged buyouts is the substantial amounts of 
debt applied in the structure. The target company typically provides security to the lenders for such 
debt. Importantly, the target company must be satisfied that immediately after the transaction the 
company will remain solvent and will be liquid for the duration of the transaction.273 The solvency 
and liquidity test referred to in section 44(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is governed by 
the provisions of section 4 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 4 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 reads: 
 
‘1. For any purpose of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test at a particular 
time if, considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at that 
time - 
(a) the assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities of the company, 
as fairly valued; and 
(b) it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary 
course of business for a period of - 
(i) 12 months after the date on which the test is considered; or 
(ii) in the case of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘distribution’ 
in section 1, 12 months following that distribution. 
2. For the purposes contemplated in subsection (1) - 
(a) any financial information to be considered concerning the company must be based on- 
(i) accounting records that satisfy the requirements of section 28; and 
(ii) financial statements that satisfy the requirements of section 29; 
(b) subject to paragraph (c), the board or any other person applying the solvency and liquidity 
test to a company - 
(i) must consider a fair valuation of the company’s assets and liabilities, including any 
reasonably foreseeable contingent assets and liabilities, irrespective of whether or not 
arising as a result of the proposed distribution, or otherwise; and 
(ii) may consider any other valuation of the company’s assets and liabilities that is 
reasonable in the circumstances; and 
(c) unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company provides otherwise, when 
applying the test in respect of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition 
of ‘distribution’ in section 1, a person is not to include as a liability any amount that would 
                                                 
272See Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 579. 
273Section 44(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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be required, if the company were to be liquidated at the time of the distribution, to satisfy 
the preferential rights upon liquidation of shareholders whose preferential rights upon 
liquidation are superior to the preferential rights upon liquidation of those receiving the 
distribution.’ 
 
The solvency and liquidity test prohibits a target company from providing financial assistance (in the 
context of this discussion) if, after considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances, 
the target company is, or would after providing financial assistance be unable to pay its debts as 
they become due in the course of business.274 The solvency and liquidity test prohibits a company 
from providing financial assistance if after considering all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances at that time, the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would after the 
payment, be less than the consolidated liabilities of the company.275 On the other hand, it would also 
be prudent for lenders such as banks to consider diligently whether they are convinced that the board 
of the target company is satisfied before accepting security from the company, because if it emerges 
that the board of the target company was not satisfied then that security will be invalidated.276  
 
According to Makapela, the introduction of section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has brought 
a reduction of the absolute restrictions.277 According to Makapela:278 
 
‘… the Act makes strong recommendations for directors to take fiduciary responsibility to ensure 
that they are not acting recklessly when recommending that the company provides financial 
assistance. This means that the directors must also consider any liabilities that may arise, 
including any contingent liabilities.’279 
 
                                                 
274Section 4(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
275Section 4(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
276Section 44(5) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, discussed below. It must be noted that it is not within the 
scope of this discussion to clarify all the key points around the Turquand rule which exists in both common law 
and in terms of section 20(7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Basically, the Turquand rule relates to the 
presumption of the authority of an agent of a company. For a more detailed discussion on the Turquand rule, 
see the judgment of One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd and Another, 
2015 ZAWCHC 89, which clarified several key points around the Turquand rule. See also section 20(7) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, which have somewhat codified the Turquand rule. The general rule is that if an 
agent is unauthorised, he/she does not validly bind the principal and no valid contract is concluded with the 
principal. This rule would have prejudicial effects in the context of the daily operations of companies 
contracting. Therefore there have existed a common law rule whereby a third party may presume that an agent 
of the company have followed all internal procedures and secured the all internal approvals before concluding 
a contract on the company's behalf. See Royal British Bank v Turquand, 1856, 6 E and B 327.  
277As was the case in terms of section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
278Makapela, L. (2010), ‘Capital Rules in the New Companies Act 71 of 2008’, University of Pretoria, Faculty 
of Law, April 2010, at page 23. 
279Section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not contain criminal liability provision. A punitive sanction 
appears possible in the form of a fine of an administrative nature flowing from a failure to comply with the 
compliance notice issued by the Companies Intellectual Property Commission established in terms of section 
185 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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In terms of section 44(5) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a board decision to provide financial 
assistance is void to the extent that the provision of that assistance would be inconsistent either with 
section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 or any conditions or restrictions in respect of the granting 
of financial assistance set out in the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company.280 Section 44(5) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘A decision by the board of a company to provide financial assistance contemplated in subsection 
(2), or an agreement with respect to the provision of any such assistance, is void to the extent 
that the provision of that assistance would be inconsistent with - 
(a) this section; or 
(b) a prohibition, condition or requirement contemplated in subsection (4).’ 
 
Section 44(6) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 read with section 77(3)(e)(iv) of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, provides that a director is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company 
as a direct or indirect result of the director having been present at a meeting, or participated in the 
making of a decision adopted by written consent of a majority of the directors, and failing to vote 
against the provision of financial assistance as contemplated in section 44 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, despite knowing that the provision of such financial assistance was inconsistent with the 
requirements of the section, or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.281 Section 44(6) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘If a resolution or an agreement is void in terms of subsection (5) a director of the company is 
liable to the extent set out in section 77(3)(e)(iv) if the director – 
(a) was present at the meeting when the board approved the resolution or agreement, or 
participated in the making of such a decision in terms of section 74; and 
(b) failed to vote against the resolution or agreement, despite knowing that the provision of 
financial assistance was inconsistent with this section or a prohibition, condition or requirement 
contemplated in subsection (4).’ 
 
According to Van Der Linde, section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was based on a system of 
share capital maintenance which required that the company had to maintain the level of funding 
contributed by its shareholders.282 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 has done away with the 
maintenance of share capital rule and replaced it with the solvency and liquidity test as contained in 
                                                 
280Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 332. 
281Yeats, J. and Jooste, R. (2009), ‘Financial assistance a new approach’, SALJ 126(3), at page 584. 
282Van Der Linde, K. (2009), ‘The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008’, TSAR(2) at 
pages 224-238. 
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section 4 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 283 The purpose of Section 44 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 is also to preserve a company’s capital in the interest of creditors and shareholders.284 The 
solvency and liquidity tests provide safeguards for minority shareholders and creditors of the 
company.285 The solvency and liquidity test discussed above has two elements. The solvency 
element tests whether a company’s assets exceed its liabilities and thus requires an examination of 
the balance sheet. The liquidity element tests whether a company is able to satisfy its debts as they 
become due and payable and thus requires an examination of the cash flow statement. According 
to Van Der Linde, both these elements are considered to be essential because they address two 
different concerns.286 The solvency element is aimed at ensuring that a creditor is not prejudiced by 
the company stripping itself of material assets or incurring excessive liabilities. The liquidity element 
is aimed at ensuring that creditors will be paid on time.287 A major shortcoming of the maintenance 
of capital rule was that it did not address the liquidity element at all despite including some of the 
characteristics of the solvency element.288 
 
It is submitted that the legal position with regard to the deductibility of interest on loans used in 
leveraged buyouts is set out in permanent rules to disallow ‘excessive interest’.289 As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, SARS has been critical of the high levels of debt used in leveraged buyout 
transactions, which led SARS to recommend several amendments to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
such as those discussed above. Secondly, the introduction of section 44 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 read together with section 4 of the Companies Act 71 0f 2008 has placed considerable onus 
on the board of directors of the target company to decide whether or not to authorise any proposed 
financial assistance transactions, for instance permitting a company to give financial assistance for 
the purchase of its shares by a third party subject to adequate safeguards for the creditors and 
minority shareholders. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides a flexible procedure that a company 
could follow in order to allow the granting of financial assistance in the case of a leveraged buyout. 
In the situation where a private equity firm(s) via a SPV seeks to acquire a controlling interest in the 
shares of a target company; it is financial assistance if the private equity firm(s) via the SPV intends 
                                                 
283Van Der Linde, K. (2009), ‘The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008’, TSAR(2) at 
pages 224-238. 
284See Moloi, G. (2013), ‘Financial Assistance and Balancing of Stakeholder Interests in Terms of Section 44 
of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008’, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law 
and Management, School of Law, at pages 1-90. 
285Davis, D., Geach, W., Mongalo, T., Butler, D., Loubser, A., Coetzee, and Burdette, D. (2014), ‘Companies 
and other Business Structures in South Africa’, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, South Africa. 
286Van Der Linde, K. (2009), ‘The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008’, TSAR(2) at 
pages 224-238. 
287Van Der Linde, K. (2009), ‘The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008’, TSAR(2) at 
pages 224-238. 
288Erasmus, N. (2010), ‘Capital Rules Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, with Emphasis on Financial 
Assistance’, University of Pretoria Faculty of Law, April 2010, at pages 6-17. 
289For example Section 23N of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. See Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF): 
Report-Back Hearings on Draft Taxation Laws Amendments Bill, 2013 and Tax Administration Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2013, Draft Response Document from Treasury and SARS (presented to Standing Committee 
on Finance on 11th September 2013). 
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gaining control of the company and to use the assets of the company as security for securing 
payment of the price for the shares. 
 
3.2 Management Buyout 
 
A special form of acquisition is a management buyout (commonly referred to as a ‘MBO’) which 
occurs when a company's managers buy or acquire a large part of the company. A management 
buyout is similar in all major legal aspects to any other acquisition of a company.290 The 
characteristics of a private equity backed leveraged buyout is very much the same as a private equity 
backed management buyout. For example, a private equity firm or group of private equity firms form 
a SPV, whose equity is privately held by the management and private equity fund, with the objective 
of acquiring the target company. In addition, both leveraged buyouts and management buyouts are 
predominantly financed by the use of high levels of debt as previously discussed.  
 
The distinctive feature between a leveraged buyout and a management buyout is that the group of 
investors in the management buyout includes members of the management of the target company. 
However, in the proposed buyout of Shoprite Holdings by Brait as discussed in paragraph 3.1 of this 
chapter, management was part of the leveraged buyout as investors in the SPV. The fact that 
members of the management of the target company are part of the transaction does not make a 
leveraged buyout a management buyout. What distinguishes a management buyout is that that the 
incumbent management of the target company acquires a substantially greater portion of the SPV’s 
and in turn the target company’s equity, than it previously had.291  
 
Robbie and Wright, define a management buyout as: 
 
‘An MBO involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring a significant equity 
stake as individuals with institutional support in order to control the company.’292 
 
In addition, it is the incumbent management of the target company that usually initiates a 
management buyout. For example, often the target company’s management instead of the private 
equity firm(s) originate the transaction and the target company’s management would approach a 
private equity firm(s) to provide the equity finance for the acquisition of the target company.293 
                                                 
290Harris, R., D. Siegel, and M. Wright, (2005), ‘Assessing the impact of management buyouts on economic 
efficiency: plant-level evidence from the United Kingdom’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 87, at 
pages 148-153. 
291Amihud, Y. (2002), ‘Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences’, Beard Books 
Publishers, at pages 3-5. 
292Robbie, K. and Wright, M. (1996), ‘Management buy-ins: entrepreneurship, active investors and corporate 
restructuring’, Manchester University Press, at pages 4-19. 
293Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
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According to Levin, this often happens where the target company’s owner shareholders have offered 
to sell the target company to the existing management provided they can secure the acquisition 
finance.294 According to Amihud, it is this feature of management buyouts that gives these 
transactions their name.295  
 
A basic chronological description of a management buyout transaction would be that the incumbent 
management of the target company will not usually have the money available to buy the company 
outright themselves.296 They would first seek to borrow the acquisition finance from a bank, provided 
the bank was willing to accept the risk. Management buyouts are frequently seen as too risky for a 
bank to finance the purchase through a loan alone.297 If a bank is unwilling to lend, the management 
will commonly look to private equity investors to fund the buyout.298 A high proportion of management 
buyouts are financed in this way. The private equity investors will invest money in return for a 
proportion of the shares in the company, though they may also grant a loan to the management.299 
The exact financial structure will depend on the backer's desire to balance the risk with its return, 
with debt being less risky but less profitable than capital investment.300 Although the management 
may not have resources to buy the company, private equity firm will require that the managers each 
make as large an investment as they can afford in order to ensure that the management is locked in 
by an overwhelming vested interest in the success of the company.301 Private equity backers are 
likely to have different goals to the management. They aim to achieve the maximum return and make 
an exit after a specific time period (for example 5 years) whereas the management will typically take 
a long-term view.302   
 
A management buyout of a target company could also be facilitated through vendor finance, which 
occurs when the management and the original owner of the company agree on a transaction 
                                                 
294Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 1-9 to 1-10. 
295Amihud, Y. (2002), ‘Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences’, Beard Books 
Publishers, at page 3. 
296Ahlers, O. (2014), ‘Bargaining power in family firm buyouts: Does family influence make a difference?’, 
Family Firms and Private Equity, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, at pages 129-157. 
297Ahlers, O. (2014), ‘Bargaining power in family firm buyouts: Does family influence make a difference?’, 
Family Firms and Private Equity, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, at pages 129-157. 
298Jensen, M. and K. J. Murphy., (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 98, at pages 225-264. 
299Appelbaum, E., Batt, R. and Clark, I. (2013), ‘Implications of financial capitalism for employment relations 
research: evidence from breach of trust and implicit contracts in private equity buyouts’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 51, No. 3, at pages 498-518. 
300Appelbaum, E., Batt, R. and Clark, I. (2013), ‘Implications of financial capitalism for employment relations 
research: evidence from breach of trust and implicit contracts in private equity buyouts’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 51, No. 3, at pages 498-518. 
301Appelbaum, E., Batt, R. and Clark, I. (2013), ‘Implications of financial capitalism for employment relations 
research: evidence from breach of trust and implicit contracts in private equity buyouts’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 51, No. 3, at pages 498-518. 
302Kaplan, S. N., (1989a), ‘The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value’, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 24, at pages 217-254. 
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whereby the seller finances the buyout.303 The price paid at the time of sale will be nominal, with the 
real price being paid over the following years out of the profits of the company.304 According to 
Axelson et al, this represents a disadvantage for the vendor, which must wait to receive its money 
after it has lost control of the company.305 It is also dependent on the returned profits being increased 
significantly following the acquisition, in order for the deal to represent a gain to the seller in 
comparison to the pre-sale situation. This will usually only happen in very particular circumstances.306 
The vendor may nevertheless agree to vendor financing for tax reasons, as the consideration could 
be classified as capital gain rather than as income.307 It may also receive some other benefit such 
as a higher overall purchase price than would be obtained by a normal purchase.308 The advantage 
for the management is that they do not need to become involved with private equity or a bank and 
will be left in control of the company once the consideration has been paid.309 
 
The remainder of the discussion will focus on the practical consequences that follow from the 
managers of the company being the ‘buyers’ of the company in the case of a management buyout. 
For example, the due diligence process will in all probability be limited as the buyers already have 
knowledge of the company.310 In addition, the seller will only give the most basic warranties because 
the management will know more about the company than the sellers do.311 A criticism of 
management buyouts is that they create a conflict of interest because they give managers an 
incentive to mismanage the company, depressing its share price and then profiting handsomely by 
implementing effective management after the successful management buyout.312 According to 
Cumming et al, this is based on the view that asymmetric information possessed by management 
may offer them an unfair advantage relative to current owners.313 According to Green, the impending 
possibility of a management buyout may lead to principal-agent problems and downward 
                                                 
303Ahlers, O. (2014), ‘Bargaining power in family firm buyouts: Does family influence make a difference?’, 
Family Firms and Private Equity, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, at pages 129-157. 
304The timescale for the payment is typically 3-7 years. 
305Axelson, U., Jenkinson, T., Strömberg, P. and Weisbach, M.S. (2013), ‘Borrow cheap, buy high? The 
determinants of leverage and pricing in buyouts’, The Journal of Finance 68, No. 6, at pages 2223-2267. 
306Axelson, U., Jenkinson, T., Strömberg, P. and Weisbach, M.S. (2013), ‘Borrow cheap, buy high? The 
determinants of leverage and pricing in buyouts’, The Journal of Finance 68, No. 6, at pages 2223-2267. 
307Depends on the fiscal regulations of the relevant jurisdiction. 
308Kaplan, S. N., (1989a), ‘The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value’, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 24, at pages 217-254. 
309Kaplan, S. N., (1989a), ‘The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value’, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 24, at pages 217-254. 
310Arcot, S., Fluck, Z, Gaspar, J.M. and Hege, U. (2015), ‘Fund managers under pressure: Rationale and 
determinants of secondary buyouts’, Journal of Financial Economics 115, No. 1, at pages 102-135. 
311Fox, I. and Marcus, A. (1992), ‘The causes and consequences of leveraged management buyouts’, 
Academy of Management Review 17, No. 1, at pages 62-85. 
312Cumming, D.J., Siegel, D.S. and Wright, M. (2007), ‘Private equity, leveraged buyouts and governance’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 13, No. 4, at pages 439-460. 
313Cumming, D.J., Siegel, D.S. and Wright, M. (2007), ‘Private equity, leveraged buyouts and governance’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 13, No. 4, at pages 439-460. Information asymmetry transactions with the study 
of decisions in transactions where one party have more or better information than the other. This creates an 
imbalance of power in transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. 
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manipulation of the share price prior to the sale.314 In addition, Kaplan states that such adverse 
information disclosure could include accelerated and aggressive loss recognition, public launching 
of questionable projects315 and adverse earnings surprises.316 Naturally, such corporate governance 
concerns would exist whenever current senior management is able to benefit personally from the 
sale of their company or its assets. According to Easterwood et al corporate valuation (for the 
purpose of a management buyout) is often subject to considerable ambiguity, and since it can be 
influenced by inside information, questions could arise challenging the validity of management 
buyouts and consider them to represent potentially a form of insider trading.317 In terms of this view, 
management buyouts have been criticised as ‘robbing shareholders of wealth that is rightfully 
theirs’.318 Wright et al argue that in order to control such agency risks the structuring of a 
management buyout should include the introduction of significant equity incentives for the incumbent 
management involved, together with substantial external funding and active monitoring by investors, 
such the private equity firm.319 
 
Despite the potential conflicts of interest that exist between the incumbent management and the 
shareholders, a management buyout can still achieve its benefits if the division of the gains between 
the managers and other stakeholders is equitable.320 In addition, the managers of a company must 
                                                 
314Green, S. (1992), ‘The Impact of Ownership and Capital Structure on Managerial Motivation and Strategy 
in Management Buy-Outs: A Cultural Analysis’, Journal of Management Studies 29, No. 4, at pages 513-535. 
The principal-agent problem treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric 
information when a principal hires an agent, such as the problem that the two may not have the same interests, 
while the principal is, presumably, hiring the agent to pursue the interests of the former. Various mechanisms 
can be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, such as profit sharing, efficiency 
wages, legislation and performance measurement. 
315See Wright, M.S., Weir, C. and Burrows, A. (2007), ‘Irrevocable commitments, going private and private 
equity’, European Financial Management 13, No. 4, at pages 757-775. This paper discusses public to private 
buy-outs and mechanisms to ensure bid success. Using a hand-collected dataset of 155 public to private buy-
outs, the study examines the determinants of irrevocable commitments. Irrevocable commitments involve 
undertakings given by existing shareholders to agree to sell their shares to the bidder before the bid to take 
the company private is announced. In terms of the findings, the level of irrevocable commitments in 
management buy-outs increased by the bid premium, as well as the reputation of the private equity backer 
and board shareholdings. The level of irrevocable commitments is reduced by rumours of a takeover bid and 
bid value. Therefore the evidence shows that management and the private equity firms' activity prior to the 
bid's announcement can have an important impact on the process of going private. 
316Kaplan, S. N., (1989a), ‘The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value’, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 24, at pages 217-254. 
317Easterwood, J.C., Singer, R.F., Seth, A. and Lang, D.F. (1994), ‘Controlling the conflict of interest in 
management buyouts’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, at pages 512-522. 
318Booth, R.A. (1985), Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty’, New 
York University Law Review 60, at page 630. 
319Wright, M.S., Robbie, K., Thompson, S. and Starkey, K. (1994), ‘Longevity and the life cycle of MBOs’, 
Strategic Management Journal 15, at pages 215-27. 
320Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. See also Fourie NO 
v Newton 2010 JOL 26517 (SCA), where Cloete JA states at paragraph 41: ‘It seems to me that the evidence 
about the conclusion of the amended retailer agreement (‘ARA’) shows businessmen with conflicting interests 
finding a mutually beneficial commercial solution to their differences, rather than a reckless carrying on of the 
business of Consolidated’. 
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fulfill their fiduciary duties to the company and their responsibility to those they manage.321 Fiduciary 
duties are discussed in chapter three as part of a broader discussion on corporate governance in 
relation to private equity. The notion of a compromise between the corporate governance issues 
raised above and the investment benefits which result from a management buyout is therefore critical 
when structuring a management buyout.322 Robbie and Wright argue that: 
 
‘If wider gains can only be achieved through a buy-out, then management need to be incentivized 
adequately, otherwise their willingness to undertake the risks involved in such transactions will 
be reduced and the benefits will be lost.’323 
 
The complexity of the manager and shareholder relationship has been extensively dealt with by local 
and foreign courts. In this discussion, an important 1985 US Delaware Supreme Court case is Smith 
v Van Gorkom324 which is often called the ‘Trans Union case’. The case involved a proposed 
leveraged buyout of TransUnion by Marmon Group which was controlled by Jay Pritzker.325 The 
defendant Jerome Van Gorkom, who was the TransUnion's chairman and CEO, chose a proposed 
price of $55 per share without consultation with outside financial experts. He only consulted with the 
company's CFO and that consultation was to determine a per share price that would work for 
a leveraged buyout. Van Gorkom and the CFO did not determine an actual total value of the 
company.326 The court was highly critical of this decision, writing that ‘the record is devoid of any 
competent evidence that $55 represented the per share intrinsic value of the Company’. The 
proposed buyout was subject to Board approval. At the Board meeting, a number of items were not 
disclosed, including the problematic methodology that Van Gorkom used to arrive at the proposed 
price.327 Also, previous objections by management were not discussed. The Board approved the 
proposal. The Court found that the directors were grossly negligent, because they quickly approved 
the merger without substantial inquiry or any expert advice. For this reason, the board of directors 
breached the duty of care that it owed to the corporation's shareholders. As such, the protection of 
the business judgment rule was unavailable. The Court stated:  
 
                                                 
321Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Steier, L.P., Wright, M. and D’Lisa, N.M. (2012), ‘An agency theoretic analysis 
of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms’, Journal of Family Business Strategy 3(40) at 
pages 197-206. 
322Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Steier, L.P., Wright, M. and D’Lisa, N.M. (2012), ‘An agency theoretic analysis 
of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms’, Journal of Family Business Strategy 3(40) at 
pages 197-206. 
323Robbie, K. and Wright, M. (1996), ‘Management buy-ins: entrepreneurship, active investors and corporate 
restructuring’, Manchester University Press, at page 7. 
324Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 Delaware 1985. 
325Bainbridge, S.M. (2008), ‘Smith v Van Gorkom’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper, May 
2008, at 08-13. 
326Bainbridge, S.M. (2008), ‘Smith v Van Gorkom’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper, May 
2008, at 08-13. 
327Bainbridge, S.M. (2008), ‘Smith v Van Gorkom’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper, May 
2008, at 08-13. 
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‘The rule itself ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.’ ... Thus, the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must 
rebut the presumption that its business judgment was an informed one.’328 
 
Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the substantial premium paid over the 
market price indicated that it was a good deal. 329 In so doing, the court noted the irony that the board 
stated that the decision to accept the offer was based on their expertise, while at the same time 
asserting that it was proper because the price offered was a large premium above market value.330 
The decision also clarified the directors' duty of disclosure, stating that corporate directors must 
disclose all facts germane to a transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote.331 
 
According to Applebaum et al,332 the general agency view postulates that the decision rights of a 
company should be entrusted to a manager (agent) to act in shareholders' (principal) interests at all 
times.333 In the context of a management buyout there are various conflicts of interest that can impact 
manager's decisions to act in shareholders' interests.334 According to Chrisman et al, agency costs 
mainly occur when ownership is separated or when managers have objectives other than enhancing 
shareholder value.335 On the one hand you have the shareholders that legally own shares of the 
company. These shareholders typically concede control rights to managers. On the other hand the 
managers are responsible for making decisions about company policy and strategy.336 In the case 
of management buyouts, the incumbent management may even venture into fraud by manipulating 
financial figures to optimize the target company’s valuation.337 In chapter three it will be argued that 
corporations should respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights 
and it will be submitted that disclosure and transparency are intimately intertwined with these goals. 
                                                 
328Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 Delaware 1985, at page 872. 
329Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 Delaware 1985. 
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3.3 Venture Capital 
 
Black and Gilson define venture capital as an investment by specialized venture capital organisations 
in high growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms that need capital to finance product 
development or growth and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the 
form of equity rather than debt.338 Venture capital is also defined as money provided by investors to 
start-up firms and small businesses with perceived long-term growth potential. This is a very 
important source of funding for start-ups that do not have access to capital markets. It typically entails 
high risk for the investor, but it has the potential for above-average returns.339  
According to Levin, venture capital start-up transactions can be categorised into: 
 
‘(1) seed money and (2) early stage. Seed money refers to financing a potential business which 
requires substantial research, development, and/or other threshold activities before the 
entrepreneur can begin revenue-generating activities. Early-stage venture capital, on the other 
hand, refers to financing an entrepreneur who has passed the seed-money stage and is ready 
actually to begin (or has recently begun) revenue-generating activities. Start-up transactions can 
further be broken down into high tech, low tech, and no tech, depending on the degree of cutting 
edge technology necessary for the business to succeed. Businesses financed by venture 
capital/private equity investors can range from high-tech bio-tech engineering company to a low-
tech manufacturing enterprise to a no-tech retail or fast food chain.’ 340 
 
Lerner defines venture capital as a broad subcategory of private equity that refers to equity 
investments made in less mature companies for the launch, early development, or expansion of a 
business.341 Venture capital investment is commonly found in the application of new technology and 
new products that have yet to be proven. It is often sub-divided by the company’s stage of 
development, ranging from early stage capital used for the launch of start-up companies to late stage 
and growth equity, which is often used to fund expansion of existing business that are generating 
revenue but may not be profitable or generating cashflow to fund future growth as yet.342 A venture 
capital fund is a pooled investment vehicle that primarily invests the financial capital of third-party 
investors in enterprises that are too risky for the standard capital markets or bank loans.343 It typically 
                                                 
338Black, B.S. and Gilson, R.J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus 
Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 47, at pages 243-277. 
339Sourced and available at www.investopedia.com/terms/v/venturecapital.asp#ixzz3YUnzbSZR, accessed in  
April 2015. 
340Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, (Aspen 
Publishers), 2003 edition, at page 1-7. See also Levin, J.S. and Rocap, D.E. (2012), ‘Structuring Venture 
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edition. 
341Lerner, J. (2000), ‘Something Ventured, Something Gained’, Harvard Business School, July 24, 2000. 
342Lerner, J. (2000), ‘Something Ventured, Something Gained’, Harvard Business School, July 24, 2000. 
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looks at investing in new companies with limited operating history that are too small to raise capital 
in the public markets and are too immature to secure a bank loan or complete a debt offering. The 
venture capitalists usually get a significant portion of the company's ownership for the high risk that 
they assume.344 Rosiello et al state that although venture capital is most often closely associated 
with fast-growing technology and biotechnology fields, venture funding has been used for other more 
traditional businesses.345 It is also associated with job creation, the knowledge economy and used 
as a proxy measure of innovation within an economic sector or geography. Entrepreneurs often 
develop products and ideas that require substantial capital during the formative stages of their 
companies' life cycles.346 Many entrepreneurs do not have sufficient funds to finance projects 
themselves, and must therefore seek outside financing.347  
 
Historically, one of the first steps toward a professionally-managed venture capital industry was 
taken in the US by means of the passage of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The 1958 
Act officially allowed the US Small Business Administration (‘SBA’) to license private ‘Small Business 
Investment Companies’ (‘SBICs’) to help the financing and management of the small entrepreneurial 
businesses in the US.348 This led to the common form of private equity fund emerging in the 1960s, 
which is still in use today. Such venture capital firms organized limited partnerships to hold 
investments in which the investment professionals served as general partner and the investors, who 
were passive limited partners, put up the capital.349 The compensation structure also emerged with 
limited partners paying an annual management fee of between 1 and 2 percent of the value of the 
fund350 and a carried interest typically representing up to 20 percent of the profits of the 
partnership.351 With the passage of the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act (‘ERISA’) in 
1974, corporate pension funds were prohibited from holding certain risky investments including many 
                                                 
Management 17.4, at pages 619-654.  
344Cumming, D.J. and Dai, N. (2011), ‘Fund size, limited attention and valuation of venture capital backed 
firms’, Journal of Empirical Finance 18(1), at pages 2-15. 
345Rosiello, A., Avnimelech, G. and Teubal, M. (2011), ‘Towards a systemic and evolutionary framework for 
venture capital policy, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, at pages 195-216. 
346Rosiello, A., Avnimelech, G. and Teubal, M. (2011), ‘Towards a systemic and evolutionary framework for 
venture capital policy, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, at pages 195-216. 
347Lerner, J. (1996), ‘The Government as a Venture Capitalist: The Long Run Impact of the SBIR Program’, 
NBER Working Paper 5753. 
348Lerner, J. (1996), ‘The Government as a Venture Capitalist: The Long Run Impact of the SBIR Program’, 
NBER Working Paper 5753. 
349Private equity funds are typically limited partnerships with a fixed term of 10 years. At inception, institutional 
investors make an unfunded commitment to the limited partnership, which is then drawn over the term of the 
fund. A private equity fund is raised and managed by investment professionals of a specific private equity firm 
(the general partner). Typically, a single private equity firm will manage a series of distinct private equity funds 
and will attempt to raise a new fund every 3 to 5 years as the previous fund is fully invested. 
350There are various methodologies applied in calculating management fees and this is discussed under 
paragraph 4.1 of chapter 1, but the underlying premise is that the remuneration/fee structure is typically agreed 
between the investors and the private equity firm upfront. 
351Carried interest is a share of the profits of the fund's investments (typically 20 percent), paid to the private 
equity funds’ management company as a performance incentive. The remaining 80 percent of the profits are 
paid to the fund's investors. 
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investments in privately held companies.352 In 1978, the US Labor Department relaxed certain of the 
ERISA restrictions, under the ‘prudent man rule’, thus allowing corporate pension funds to invest in 
the asset class and providing a major source of capital available to venture capitalists.353 The venture 
capital industry originated in the US, and US venture capital firms have traditionally been the largest 
participants in venture capital transactions and the majority of venture capital has been deployed in 
US companies.354 However, non-US venture investment is growing and the number and size of non-
US venture capitalists is expanding.355 Venture capital has been used as a tool for economic 
development in both developed and various developing regions. In many developing regions, with 
less developed financial sectors, venture capital plays a role in facilitating access to finance for small 
and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’) that in most cases would not qualify to receive bank loans.356  
 
This discussion on venture capital is restricted to its pertinent characteristics and will follow with a 
description of a typical venture capital transaction and highlight some of the important legal 
considerations with regard to venture capital investing. This discussion of venture capital will not 
discuss the regulatory and policy developments aimed at promoting venture capital investing, as well 
as developments aimed at investor protection. These are discussed in chapter four, with specific 
reference to venture capital investing in the US, UK, Australia, Canada and South Africa. For 
example, chapter four will discuss some of the developments in Canada that are worth noting such 
as Canadian technology companies that have attracted interest from international venture capitalist 
because of the generous tax incentive through the Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development (‘SR and ED’) investment tax credit programme.357 The basic incentive available to 
any Canadian corporation performing research and development (‘R and D’) is a non-refundable tax 
credit that is equal to 20 percent of ‘qualifying’ R and D expenditures such as labour, material, R and 
D contracts, and R and D equipment.358 An enhanced 35 percent refundable tax credit is available 
to certain small Canadian-controlled private corporations (‘CCPCs’). Since the CCPC rules require 
a minimum of 50 percent Canadian ownership in the company performing R and D, foreign investors 
who would like to benefit from the larger 35 percent tax credit must accept a minority position in the 
                                                 
352Popov, A. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Industry Structure: Evidence from Local US Markets’, Review of 
Finance, 18(3), at pages 1059-1096. 
353Lerner, J. (1996), ‘The Government as a Venture Capitalist: The Long Run Impact of the SBIR Program’, 
NBER Working Paper 5753. See also Popov, A. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Industry Structure: Evidence 
from Local US Markets’, Review of Finance, 18(3), at pages 1059-1096. 
354Poser, T.B. (2002), ‘The Impact of Corporate Venture Capital on Sustainable Competitive Advantage of the 
Investing Company’, Inaugural Dissertation, Wissenschaftliche Hochschule für Unternehmensführung (WHU), 
Koblenz, Germany. See also Popov, A. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Industry Structure: Evidence from Local 
US Markets’, Review of Finance, 18(3), at pages 1059-1096. 
355Poser, T.B. (2002), ‘The Impact of Corporate Venture Capital on Sustainable Competitive Advantage of the 
Investing Company’, Inaugural Dissertation, Wissenschaftliche Hochschule für Unternehmensführung (WHU), 
Koblenz, Germany. 
356Kirschner, S. (2008), ‘Venture Capital's Grandfather’, The Boston Globe, April 6, 2008. 
357Parsons, M., and Phillips, N. (2007), ‘An evaluation of the federal tax credit for scientific research and 
experimental development’, Canada Department of Finance, Working Paper, September 2007, at 1-68. 
358Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
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company, which might not be desirable.359 The SR and ED programme does not restrict the export 
of any technology or intellectual property that may have been developed with the benefit of SR and 
ED tax incentives.360 Canada also has a fairly unique form of venture capital investment vehicle in 
the form of the Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (‘LSVCC’). These funds, also known 
as Retail Venture Capital or Labour Sponsored Investment Funds (‘LSIF’), are generally sponsored 
by labour unions and offer tax breaks from government to encourage retail investors to purchase the 
funds.361 Generally, these Retail Venture Capital funds only invest in companies where the majority 
of employees are in Canada.  
 
A typical venture capital investment is structured so that the venture capitalist gets convertible or 
redeemable preference shares in the underlying investee company.362 For instance, the preference 
shares give the venture capitalist a preference over the ordinary shareholders in the event of a 
liquidation or merger.363 These preference shares often include the right after a fixed period of time 
and at the discretion of the investor, to be redeemed at a fixed price.364 For instance, investors usually 
build into the preference shares they purchase, preferences that entitle them to receive a 
predetermined amount which would typically include the investment amount plus the accrued 
dividend365 before other shareholders in the event the company is liquidated.366 In certain instances, 
the preference shares may also be convertible into ordinary shares at the option of the holder or 
automatically convertible by the occurrence of a certain event.367 For example, the preference shares 
could convert to ordinary shares in the event of the company being listed on a stock exchange. This 
would be to simplify the capital structure of the company and facilitate the listing.368  
 
A hypothetical venture capital transaction could occur where for example an entrepreneur or group 
of entrepreneurs (‘entrepreneur’) intends to start a business.369 The entrepreneur may have a new 
                                                 
359Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
360Williamson, I. (2007), ‘Your guide to arranging bank and debt financing for your own business in Canada’, 
2007-2008 edition, Productive Publications. 
361Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
362Richardson, C. (2013), ‘Richardson's Growth Company Guide 5.0: Investors, Deal Structures, Legal 
Strategies’, Read Janus LLC, at pages 1-18 and 367-393. 
363Discussed later hereinafter.  
364Richardson, C. (2013), ‘Richardson's Growth Company Guide 5.0: Investors, Deal Structures, Legal 
Strategies’, Read Janus LLC, at pages 1-18 and 367-393. 
365These same preference shares typically include provisions that entitle the investor to receive dividends 
before dividends are issued to holders of ordinary shares. 
366Richardson, C. (2013), ‘Richardson's Growth Company Guide 5.0: Investors, Deal Structures, Legal 
Strategies’, Read Janus LLC, at pages 1-18 and 367-393. 
367Richardson, C. (2013), ‘Richardson's Growth Company Guide 5.0: Investors, Deal Structures, Legal 
Strategies’, Read Janus LLC, at pages 1-18 and 367-393. 
368A brief description of preference shares is provided below. 
369Several of the key feature of this hypothetical example have been referenced and adapted from Levin, J.S. 
(2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, (Aspen Publishers), 
2003 edition, at pages 2-3 to 2-56; and Levin, J.S. and Rocap, D.E. (2012), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private 
Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2012 edition. 
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high-tech invention or a low-tech improvement on an existing product, or the entrepreneur may have 
a new low-tech approach to the manufacture or marketing of an established product or service.370 
The entrepreneur’s concept may require substantial research, development, and/or other activities 
before the proposed business will be ready to begin actual sales of goods or services, for which the 
entrepreneur is seeking money.371 Alternatively, the entrepreneur may have passed the seed money 
stage and may now need early-stage venture capital to begin producing goods or providing 
services.372 In either event, the entrepreneur has approached a venture capital firm (venture 
capitalist) seeking R2 million to start the proposed new business or to enhance a business which the 
entrepreneur already commenced. In this regard, the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist have 
decided to form Venco, which will be registered as a private company in terms of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008. 
 
The entrepreneur makes the following proposal to the venture capitalist in terms of their contribution 
to, ownership of, and control positions in, Venco. The proposal is simplistic in that it is all based on 
an ordinary share transaction. In terms of this proposal the venture capitalist provides the R2 million 
investment for 40 percent of the ordinary shares of Venco. The entrepreneurs provide the ideas, 
experience and future services in exchange for 60 percent of the ordinary shares of Venco. In 
addition, the entrepreneur sees no need for any additional contractual arrangements among the 
entrepreneur, venture capitalist and Venco; for example the control of Venco’s board of directors.373  
 
The above mentioned proposal is not acceptable to the venture capitalist for several reasons. Firstly, 
Venco as a private company registered under the laws of South Africa, will be subject to income tax 
in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The venture capitalist would want at least a portion of its 
R2 million investment in Venco to be debt in order that the venture capitalists return on the amount 
so invested will be tax deductible to Venco as an interest expense and hence will reduce Venco’s 
corporate level income tax.374 Secondly, if Venco is successful and is profitably sold several years 
later, the venture capitalist wants a preference for most of its R2 million investment and wants only 
the profits to be shared. In terms of the entrepreneurs above mentioned proposal this would be 40 
percent to the venture capitalist and 60 percent to the entrepreneur. For example, if Venco is sold 
after 5 years for R10 million, which would be R8 million more than the R2 million invested, the venture 
capitalist should not receive R4 million (40 percent of R10 million), but rather should receive its R2 
                                                 
370Levin, J.S., Ginsburg, M.D. and Rocap, D.E. (2008), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and 
Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2008 edition. 
371Levin, J.S. and Rocap, D.E. (2012), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial 
Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2012 edition. 
372Levin, J.S., Ginsburg, M.D. and Rocap, D.E. (2008), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and 
Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2008 edition. 
373See Rosenbusch, N., Brinckmann, J. and Müller, V. (2013), ‘Does acquiring venture capital pay off for the 
funded firms? A meta-analysis on the relationship between venture capital investment and funded firm financial 
performance’, Journal of Business Venturing 28, No. 3, at pages 335-353. 
374See discussion on tax implications of leveraged buyouts in paragraph 3.1 of this chapter.  
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million investment (perhaps plus an interest yield) plus a percentage of the remaining profit, namely 
R8 million profit less a possible interest yield on the venture capitalist’s investment. However, if 
Venco is not successful and liquidates before Venco has spent all of the venture capitalists R2 million 
investment, the venture capitalist wants a preference for most of its R2 million investment. It would 
be fair to state that the venture capitalist would not want to only receive 40 percent of what remains 
of the R2 million investment. For example, if Venco’s project becomes unfeasible and Venco 
prematurely liquidates after spending only R200,000 (while Venco still has R1,8 million), the entire 
R1,8 million, rather than only R720,000 (40 percent of R1,8 million), should go to the venture 
capitalist.375 
 
Thirdly, the venture capitalist would want more than 40 percent of Venco’s ordinary shares because 
the venture capitalist is supplying 100 percent of Venco’s funding and the venture capitalists money 
is worth the full R2 million. Furthermore, the venture capitalist believes in this hypothetical scenario 
that the entrepreneur’s services and ideas are not that novel, therefore the venture capitalist wants 
a higher return than it would expect to realise from only owning 40 percent of Venco’s ordinary 
shares.376 Finally, the venture capitalist also wants the entrepreneur to take investment risk and 
invest enough money in Venco to show commitment to Venco. In terms of these above mentioned 
considerations, the venture capitalist presents a counter proposal to the one proposed by the 
entrepreneur.  
 
In terms of the venture capitalist proposal, the R2 million will be structured as a R1 million 
subordinated debenture, and R880,000 of cumulative convertible preference shares and R120,000 
of ordinary shares, of which 60 percent will be to the venture capitalist (60 shares at R2,000 per 
share) and 40 percent to the entrepreneur (40 shares at R2,000 per share).377  
 
       Entrepreneur   Venture Capitalist 
Subordinated debentures       R1 million 
Cumulative convertible preference shares     R880,000 
Ordinary shares 
 60% Venture Capitalist       R120,000 
 40% Entrepreneur    R80,000 
Total       R80,000  R2 million      
 
There are several reasons why the venture capitalist has proposed this more complex capital 
structure. Firstly, the venture capitalists has a senior claim to Venco’s first R1,880,000 (plus accrued 
                                                 
375See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, at page 2-8.  
376See Smolarski, J. and Kut, C. (2011), ‘The impact of venture capital financing method on SME performance 
and internationalization’, International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 7, No. 1, at pages 39-55. 
377See Weakley, S.L. (2014), ‘Sales and Mergers of California Businesses’, CEB Publishers, at pages 2-41. 
See also Levin, J.S., Ginsburg, M.D. and Rocap, D.E. (2008), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and 
Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2008 edition. 
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interest on the debenture and accrued preferred dividends on the preference shares) of distributions 
and any excess available for distribution by Venco will be distributed 60 percent to venture capitalist 
and 40 percent to entrepreneur.378 A portion of the venture capitalists R1,880,000 senior claim is 
structured as debt (debenture), which will allow Venco a deduction for interest on debt that accrued 
to the venture capitalist on the debenture and the venture capitalist return of capital treatment on the 
redemption of the debenture.379 The remainder of the venture capitalists senior claim is structured 
as preference shares, so that Venco’s debt:equity ratio will not be excessive, in order to maximize 
the likelihood that the debenture will be treated as debt for tax purposes. The deduction of interest 
expense on borrowed money has been already discussed under the discussion of leveraged buyouts 
earlier. Secondly, where the entrepreneur has a substantial personal investment in Venco’s ordinary 
shares, the entrepreneur will be less likely to abandon Venco should the development of Venco’s 
business not progress as expected.380 In terms of the venture capitalists proposed structure, the 
entrepreneur will pay R80,000 in cash to Venco to purchase the entrepreneurs 40 ordinary shares. 
Therefore, the entrepreneur will pay in cash the same price per ordinary share as the venture 
capitalist would, namely R2,000 per share. At the outset, Venco has assets of R2,080,000, namely 
R2 million from the venture capitalist and R80,000 from entrepreneur. After subtracting Venco’s 
R1,880,000 in senior obligations, Venco’s aggregate ordinary shares appears to be worth R200,000. 
This is R2,000 for each of Venco’s 100 outstanding ordinary shares.381 
 
Preference shares and debentures are two important elements of the capital structure of the venture 
capital transaction discussed above. Cassim et al in defining preference shares, state: 
 
‘Where the rights of classes of shares differ on the basis of rights to priority with regard to 
dividends and/or return of capital, the class or classes that enjoy preference right are referred to 
as ‘preference’ shares. The shares that enjoy no preferred rights are referred to as ‘ordinary’ 
shares … They have some preference or priority over ordinary shares.’382 
 
In general, preference shares have preference in dividend payments. The preference does not 
assure the payment of dividends, but the company must pay the stated dividends on preference 
shares before paying any dividends on ordinary shares.383 Preference shares may 
                                                 
378See Levin, J.S., Ginsburg, M.D. and Rocap, D.E. (2008), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and 
Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2008 edition. 
379See Levin, J.S. and Rocap, D.E. (2012), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial 
Transactions’, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business Publishers, 2012 edition. 
380 Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, (Aspen 
Publishers), 2003 edition, at pages 2-10 and 2-11. 
381 See also Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, at pages 2-10 and 2-11. 
382Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 216. 
383Bundgaard, J. (2014), ‘Debt-flavoured Equity Instruments in International Tax Law’, Intertax, 42(6), at pages 
416-426. 
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be cumulative or non cumulative. Cumulative preference shares requires that if a company fails to 
pay a dividend or pays less than the stated rate, it must make up for it at a later time.384 Dividends 
accumulate with each passed dividend period which for example may be quarterly, semi-annually or 
annually.385 When a dividend is not paid in time, it has ‘passed’ and all passed dividends on a 
cumulative class of share make up a dividend in arrears.386 A class of share without this feature is 
known as a non cumulative and any dividends passed are lost if not declared.387 In addition, there is 
diversity in preference shares. Additional types of preference shares include for example 
participating preference shares that gives the holder the right to receive dividends equal to the 
normally specified rate that preferred dividends receive as well as an additional dividend based on 
some predetermined condition.388 The additional dividend paid to the preference shareholders is 
commonly structured to be paid only if the amount of dividends that ordinary shareholders receive 
exceeds a specified per-share amount.389 Furthermore, in the event of liquidation, participating 
preference shareholders can also have the right to receive the share purchasing price back as well 
as a pro-rata share of any remaining proceeds that the ordinary common shareholders receive.390 
Another type of preference share is cumulative convertible preference share. Cumulative convertible 
preference share is a type of preference share where the dividend payable accumulates, if not paid. 
After a specified date, these shares will be converted into equity capital of the company.391    
 
A case worth mentioning in this regard is the Australian case Beck v Weinstock.392  In terms of 
company law in Australia, a ‘preference share’ is a share that carries a preference or priority over 
another class of share. A company can issue preference shares or convert ordinary shares into 
preference shares only if the rights attached to the preference shares are set out in the company's 
constitution, or if they have been approved by a special resolution of the company.393 However, in 
the Australian Court of Appeal case Beck v Weinstock394 Chief Justice French held that neither the 
                                                 
384Bundgaard, J. (2014), ‘Debt-flavoured Equity Instruments in International Tax Law’, Intertax, 42(6), at pages 
416-426. 
385Bundgaard, J. (2014), ‘Debt-flavoured Equity Instruments in International Tax Law’, Intertax, 42(6), at pages 
416-426. 
386Andres, C., Betzer, A., Van den Bongard, I., and Goergen, M. (2014), ‘Dividend policy, corporate control 
and the tax status of the controlling shareholder’, Corporate Control and the Tax Status of the Controlling 
Shareholder, July 2014. 
387Andres, C., Betzer, A., Van den Bongard, I., and Goergen, M. (2014), ‘Dividend policy, corporate control 
and the tax status of the controlling shareholder’, Corporate Control and the Tax Status of the Controlling 
Shareholder, July 2014. 
388Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
389Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
390Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
391Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
392Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15. 
393Section 254A and section 254G(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).   
394Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15. 
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Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)395 nor the New South Wales (NSW) Companies Act 1961 defined the 
term ‘preference share’. These Acts used the term in a generic sense to encompass shares defined 
by a variety of priority rights and issued for a variety of purposes.396 The facts of the case was that 
LW Furniture was an incorporated company with its articles of association providing for fourteen 
different classes of shares from ‘A’ to ‘N’ worth one dollar each. Classes ‘A’ to ‘D’ were described as 
‘preference’ shares with ‘C’ being redeemable preference shares.397 The rest were classified as 
ordinary shares. The ‘C’ class shares gave the holder preference to the return of capital over the 
holder of any ordinary shares but otherwise had no preferential rights. Eight class ‘C’ shares were 
issued to Mrs Hedy Weinstock with the intention of reducing death and estate duties payable on the 
death of Leo Weinstock. The directors of LW Furniture were Mr and Mrs Weinstocks children, Mr 
Amiram Weinstock and Mrs Tamar Beck.398 Mrs Weinstock died in 2004 and Amiram purported to 
pass a resolution redeeming, for one dollar each, the eight ‘C’ class shares which his mother had 
held at her death. Tamar, as executor of the estate of Mrs Weinstock claimed that the ‘C’ class 
shares were not redeemable because they were not preference shares within the meaning of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the New South Wales (NSW) Companies Act 1961.399 
 
French CJ concluded that the historic use of the preference share as a means of raising original 
capital supported the argument that preference shares could be issued in the absence of issued 
ordinary shares. Chief Justice French held: 
  
‘Once it is accepted that preference shares were able to be issued … to raise part of the original 
capital of a company, the historical rationale for the proposition that a share issued, absent the 
issue of ordinary shares, could not be designated as a ‘preference share’ within the meaning of 
the 1961 Act and the 2001 Act, is weakened to the point of extinguishment.’400 
 
In this case Chief Justice French and Judge Gageler delivered separate judgments, while Judge 
Hayne, Judge Crennan and Judge Keifel delivered a joint judgment. The central issue for Judge 
Hayne, Judge Crennan and Judge Keifel was ‘what was meant in the 1961 Act by 'preference 
share'’.401 These three judges held that as long as a company's constitution expressly authorised the 
issue of shares that carried some preferential right over other shares that could be issued, then those 
                                                 
395Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is an act of the Commonwealth of Australia that sets out the laws dealing 
with business entities in Australia at federal and interstate level. It focuses primarily on companies, although it 
also covers some laws relating to other entities such as partnerships and managed investment schemes. 
396Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 36 and 39.   
397Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
398Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
399Whitehead, I. (2014), ‘What's in a Name-History, Language and Preference Shares in Beck v Weinstock’, 
Sydney Law Review, 36, at 369. 
400Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 31. 
401Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 74. 
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shares were ‘preference shares’.402 They held that there was no basis for implying into the 
Companies Act 1961 any additional requirement that the company concerned should have already 
issued shares that had inferior rights to the preference shares.403 Judge Hayne, Judge Crennan and 
Judge Keifel held: 
 
‘The disputed shares had rights which preferred the holder of these shares over the holder of any 
ordinary share in the Company. That no ordinary shares were ever issued does not deny that the 
disputed shares were preference shares. The company's articles of association provided that the 
disputed shares were liable to be redeemed. They were redeemable preference shares.’404 
 
The Australian Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that it was an essential quality of a preference 
share that it confers an advantage over another class of share.405 Subsequently, the ‘C’ class shares 
were not preference shares since no ordinary shares had ever been issued and thus, there were no 
other shares on issue over which they had preference. The Court of Appeal held that the power 
conferred on the directors to issue new shares from available nominal capital could be exercised at 
all times.406 In addition, there was nothing in the Companies Act 1961 that required a preference 
share to be given preference or priority over some other issued share. The emphasis in the 
Companies Act 1961 is the definition of the rights of shareholders in the memorandum and articles 
of association. If a company’s memorandum and articles provided a share carried rights in respect 
of repayment of capital, voting, priority of payment of a dividend, and so forth, then the shares would 
be a preference share. Therefore, they were redeemable preference shares.407  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the two important methods of raising capital for a company are 
to issue debt or equity securities.408 According to Cassim, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 defines 
debt instruments to include all securities other than shares whether issued in terms of a security 
document or not, but excluding promissory notes and loans.409 In South Africa, a debt instrument is 
governed by section 43 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 43(1)(a) and section 43(1)(b) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads as follows: 
 
‘(a) debt instrument’ – 
                                                 
402Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 67 and 74. 
403Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 70. 
404Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 75. 
405Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 31-44. 
406Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 31-44. 
407Beck v Weinstock 2013 HCA 15 at 74-94. 
408Cassim, F.H.I. (2011), ‘The Practitioners Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Chapter 10: Corporate 
Finance: Shares and Distributions, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 115. 
409Cassim, F.H.I. (2011), ‘The Practitioners Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Chapter 10: Corporate 
Finance: Shares and Distributions, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 115. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 67 
 
(i) includes any securities other than the shares of a company, irrespective of whether or not 
issued in terms of a security document, such as a trust deed; but 
(ii) does not include promissory notes and loans, whether constituting an encumbrance on 
the assets of the company or not; and 
(b) ‘security document’ includes any document by which a debt instrument is offered or proposed 
to be offered, embodying the terms and conditions of the debt instrument including, but not 
limited to, a trust deed or certificate.’ 
 
Section 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 defines ‘securities’ as follows: 
 
‘means any shares, debentures or other instruments, irrespective of their form or title, issued or 
authorised to be issued by a profit company.’ 
 
According to Cassim et al, neither the Companies Act 61 of 1973 nor the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
defines what a debenture is.410 In the case Edmonds v Blaina Furnaces,411 Justice Chitty stated the 
following: 
 
‘The term debenture has not, so far as I am aware, ever received any precise legal definition. it 
is, comparatively speaking, a new term … The term itself imports a debt - an acknowledgment of 
a debt … Generally, if not always, the instrument imports an obligation or covenant to pay. This 
obligation or covenant is in most cases at the present day accompanied by some charge or 
security. So that there are debentures which are secured, and debentures which are not secured.’ 
 
In the case English Scottish Trust v Brunton,412 Justice Bowen held that a debenture could be: 
 
‘(1) A simple acknowledgment under seal of the debt; (2) an instrument acknowledging the debt 
and charging the property of the company with repayment; (3) an instrument acknowledging 
the debt, charging the property of the company with repayment, and further restricting the 
company from giving any prior charge.’413 
 
The law in regard to debentures is often set within the terms of the debenture itself such as, for 
example, the rate of interest if any.414 Cassim et al, state that: 
 
                                                 
410Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 231-233. 
411Edmonds v Blaina Furnaces (1887) 36 Chancery Division 215. 
412English Scottish Trust v Brunton (1892) 2 QB 700. 
413English Scottish Trust v Brunton (1892) 2 QB 700. 
414Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 233. 
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‘Every document creating or acknowledging a debt of a company is not necessarily a debenture 
... A debenture holder is a particular kind of creditor.415 The holder of the company for the amount 
of the loan and interest, whose rights are defined by the terms of the issue read with the provisions 
of the Act.’416 
 
In terms of section 43(2)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the board of a company may authorise 
the company to issue a secured or unsecured debt instrument at any time, except to the extent 
provided otherwise by the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation; and and section 43(2)(b) states 
that it must determine whether each such debt instrument is secured or unsecured. In terms of 
section 43(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, every security document must clearly indicate, on 
its first page, whether the relevant debt instrument is secured or unsecured. There is no restriction 
on the manner in which a debt instrument is secured. Section 43(3)(a) and section 43(3)(b) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, states that: 
 
‘(3) Except to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, a 
debt instrument issued by the company may grant special privileges regarding -  
(a) attending and voting at general meetings and the appointment of directors; or 
(b) allotment of securities, redemption by the company, or substitution of the debt instrument 
for shares of the company, provided that the securities to be allotted or substituted in terms 
of any such privilege, are authorised by or in terms of the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation in accordance with section 36.’ 
 
In addition to ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures usually form part of a typical 
venture capital transaction. When venture capitalists negotiate the purchase of such securities, they 
typically negotiate to attach varying degrees of rights thereto. This varies from transaction to 
transaction as discussed above.  
 
Other rights typically associated with venture capital investing would be voting rights negotiated by 
the venture capitalist supplemented with rights to participate in developing or approving the 
company’s business plan; to participate in certain board of director committees’ and to receive 
regular financial reports from company management.417 The rights to approve certain types of major 
transactions or changes in company direction are also common. In practice, venture capital investors 
who do not join a company’s board of directors often request a separate agreement giving them 
rights to attend board meetings and confer with management and to receive various reports, such 
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as financial statements and related information.418 Other rights typically negotiated between the 
venture capitalist and entrepreneur would be preemptive rights and first refusals on the company’s 
ordinary shares.419 These rights are usually supplemented with first refusal agreements that entitle 
the venture capitalist to purchase shares sold by management at the price management negotiates 
with a willing outside buyer.420  
 
According to Conti, founders and management of the investee company are usually required to enter 
into agreements that require their full time attention to the company’s business and protect its trade 
secrets.421 These agreements typically also prevent the founders and managers from going into 
competition with the company. Such agreements can provide powerful incentives to keep 
management from leaving the business to engage in competitive enterprises.422 Conti also argues 
that company employees are usually required to sign confidentiality and proprietary rights 
agreements as a condition to the closing of a venture capital financing transaction.423 It is common 
practice for most companies to have these agreements in place to protect the company’s trade 
secrets and insure the company’s rights to inventions created by company employees.424 These 
agreements frequently include provisions preventing employees from soliciting customers or other 
employees away from the company.425   
  
Once the investee company and the venture capitalist agree on the terms and conditions of the 
venture capitalist investment in the company (Venco in the case of the hypothetical example), the 
respective parties’ lawyers will prepare and finalise the definitive agreements reflecting the 
transaction.426 The main agreement will be the share purchase agreement, which typically contains 
the price of the shares to be sold and the number of shares to be purchased; representations and 
warranties of the company; the covenants of the company; conditions to concluding of the 
transaction; and cross referencing to related agreements, which contain additional negotiated rights 
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for the venture capitalist, such as those discussed above.427 The financing agreements prepared by 
venture capital investors are detailed and include extensive representations by the company and, 
sometimes, individual management members respecting all aspects of the company’s operations.428 
Representations and warranties from the company are almost always present as part of a venture 
capital investment. A breach of the company’s representations and warranties usually result affords 
investors various remedies laid out in the agreement.429 Examples of common representations that 
companies are expected to make include the exact outstanding capitalisation of the company; that 
the company’s financial statements are true and correct in all basic respects and have been prepared 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting procedures; that the company has no liabilities 
other than those reflected in its most recent balance sheet or occurring in the ordinary course of 
business since the date of the last balance sheet; that the company owns all of the assets it claims 
to own, without liens or encumbrances except those disclosed; that the company’s intellectual 
property and products don’t infringe the rights of others; that the company is in compliance with all 
relevant laws that govern its operations; and in the case of early-stage companies, venture capitalists 
may insist that the founders make the representations and warranties personally.430 
 
Despite all of the above mentioned risk mitigating techniques employed by venture capitalist, venture 
capitalists are not totally immune to litigation. In the case Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation,431 the 
court highlighted the implications for private equity and venture capital firms both as investors and 
as directors of portfolio companies. In this case the court held that management directors, the 
directors appointed by the venture capitalist and one seemingly independent director with strong ties 
to another venture capitalist were personally interested in a merger transaction that triggered 
payments on the preference shares to the venture capital investors while paying ordinary 
shareholders nothing.432 In addition, the court found the board had wrongfully considered only the 
interests of the preference shareholders to the exclusion of ordinary shareholders and failed to 
institute any procedural safeguards for common shareholders in approving the merger.433 Even 
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though the court found the board’s process was procedurally unfair, it nevertheless found the 
transaction satisfied the entire fairness standard based on price alone.434 The facts of the case were 
that Trados Inc. was founded in 1984 and began several rounds of venture capital financing through 
the issuance of preference shares in 2000.435 The venture capitalists were issued convertible 
preference shares with features of the preference shares being: a liquidation preference payable 
upon any transaction that resulted in a change of control of the company; voting rights identical to 
ordinary shares; venture capital control rights, such as the veto right over change in control 
transactions; and the right to appoint directors to the Trados board.436 As a result of these features, 
the venture capitalists collectively controlled a majority of the voting power and held the power to 
elect the majority of the board.437 
 
In the years leading up to the merger, the company showed the ability to generate revenue but could 
not achieve meaningful profitability.438 Consequently, the venture capitalist directors updated the 
partners at their respective venture capital firms throughout this period and advised them that 
although an exit was achievable, they were not likely to see significant returns on their investments. 
Against this background, in July 2004 the board hired a new chief executive officer (CEO).439 The 
board also approved a management incentive plan that gave senior executives, including the newly 
appointed CEO, an incentive to pursue a sale of Trados by offering management an increasing 
percentage of the total sales proceeds as the sales price increased even if the ultimate sale paid 
nothing to ordinary shareholders.440 Also in 2004, the board rejected an initial $40 million acquisition 
proposal from SDL plc, which it considered too low, because it was well below the venture capitalist 
liquidation preference at that time.441 The new CEO advised the board that the company had two 
options, namely Trados and its venture capital investors could invest additional capital in the form of 
either debt or equity to reposition its core business for growth in the enterprise sector, or the company 
could focus on a potential sale or merger transaction as an exit strategy for the venture capitalist.442 
Although additional investment in Trados as a stand-alone enterprise may have permitted the 
                                                 
434Monterverde, J.E. (2014), ‘A Review of Trados and Its Impact’, American Bar Association, Securities 
Litigation Section, March 2014. Available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/ 
articles/winter2014-0314-recent-developments-in-entire-fairness-litigation.html, accessed in April 2015. 
435Wimberly, J. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity and the ‘Entire Fairness’ Test: In re Trados’, Review 
of Banking and Financial Law, Volume 331, at pages 418-429. 
436Wimberly, J. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity and the ‘Entire Fairness’ Test: In re Trados’, Review 
of Banking and Financial Law, Volume 331, at pages 418-429. 
437Wimberly, J. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity and the ‘Entire Fairness’ Test: In re Trados’, Review 
of Banking and Financial Law, Volume 331, at pages 418-429. 
438Broughman, B. And Fried, J.M. (2013), ‘Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell 
Start-Ups’, 98 Cornell Law Review 1319, 1346 No. 86.  
439Gold, A.S and Miller, P.B (2014), ‘Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law’, Oxford University Press at 
pages 41-47. 
440Gold, A.S and Miller, P.B (2014), ‘Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law’, Oxford University Press at 
pages 41-47. 
441Bagley, C.E. (2015), ‘Managers and the Legal Environment: Strategies for the 21st Century’, 8th Edition, 
Cengage Learning, at pages 610-644. 
442Bagley, C.E. (2015), ‘Managers and the Legal Environment: Strategies for the 21st Century’, 8th Edition, 
Cengage Learning, at pages 610-644. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 72 
 
company to generate a modest return, it did not appear to offer a realistic opportunity for the type of 
success sought by the venture capitalist that would provide meaningful returns for both them and 
ordinary shareholders.443 Thus, the board focused on an exit strategy for the venture capitalists. 
However, because venture capitalists in such sales often exit as preferred shareholders with 
liquidation preferences that must be paid in full before ordinary shareholders receive any pay-out, 
ordinary shareholders usually receive little (if any) pay-out.444  
 
In June 2005, Trados agreed to be acquired by SDL for $60 million in cash. Owing to the terms of 
the management incentive plan, the first $7.8 million of proceeds went to the management directors 
and other employees. The remaining $52.2 million went to the venture capitalists to satisfy their total 
combined liquidation preference of the preference shares of $57.9 million.445 Without the 
management incentive plan payments to management, the ordinary shareholders would have been 
entitled to $2.1 million in proceeds but instead received nothing.446 The merger agreement was 
approved by the required percentages of the preference shareholders and the ordinary shareholders, 
with the venture capitalists owning enough of the preference shares to approve the merger on their 
own.447 The plaintiff, an ordinary shareholder initially brought an action for appraisal of his shares 
but later brought a second action alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a result of 
discovery during the appraisal action.448 The plaintiff alleged that the board ignored the interests of 
the ordinary shareholders by focusing entirely on achieving an exit that would benefit the preference 
shareholders, despite the fact that the company could have continued to operate profitably as a 
stand-alone entity and thereby generate value for ordinary shareholders.449 
 
The case Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation450 involved the typical situation of a venture capital or 
private equity firm investing in a company for preference shares and board control, thereafter the 
venture capital firm establishes that the company will not be able to produce the desired return, who 
in turn decides to exit and implement a sale of the business.451 In the shareholder action for breach 
of fiduciary duty, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation,452 held that 
a majority of the directors were conflicted and that the venture capital fund’s principal directors were 
inherently conflicted and that the transaction was thus subject to entire fairness review. However, 
under the particular facts of the case, entire fairness was satisfied despite lack of fair dealing, 
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because in receiving no consideration in the merger, the common stockholders received ‘the 
substantial equivalent of what they had before’ as the common stock had no value before the 
transaction. 453  
 
According to Wimberly, the court made clear that unfair process can ‘infect the price’ and lead to 
liability for directors.454 Wimberly goes on to argue that: 
 
‘so preferred stockholding directors should be sure to thoroughly consider the interests of the  
common stockholders in structuring exits and implement procedural protections to the extent 
feasible. Additionally, in structuring the voting agreements for their portfolio companies, venture 
capital and private equity funds can largely insulate themselves from liability by negotiating for 
contractual provisions allowing them to dodge fiduciary duties.’455  
 
The above mentioned case is important as it raises important issues for venture capital investing in 
that a typical venture capital start-up transaction similar to the hypothetical example discussed 
above, could subject venture capitalists to litigation and liability in terms of fiduciary law. South 
African case law on fiduciary duties is discussed in chapter three.  Although venture capital has many 
advantages, it is also essential to consider the risks associated with venture capital investing.  
 
In conclusion, one of the main advantages of venture capital financing is the ability for company 
expansion that would not be possible through a bank loan because most start-ups have a limited 
operating track record.456 Furthermore, the repayment of the venture capitalist investment is often 
not an obligation like it would be for a bank loan because the venture capitalist carries the investment 
risk. In addition to financial capital, venture capitalists provide valuable expertise, advice and industry 
networks to the benefit of the company.457 Venture capital is also associated with job creation as 
discussed in paragraph 1 of this chapter and has been used as a proxy measure of innovation within 
an economic sector or geography.458  
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Venture capital investing has also been shown to have disadvantages. For example, securing a 
venture capital investment for a company can be a difficult process for an entrepreneur due to the 
accounting and legal costs the company and/or the entrepreneur could incur.459 The start-up 
company must also give up ownership to the venture capitalist and the extent of such ownership 
interest will vary from transaction to transaction. This results in a partial loss of control for the 
entrepreneur and it usually occurs that the venture capitalists become involved in most decision-
making processes of the company.460 In addition, venture capital transactions are subject to onerous 
stipulations and restrictions, such as the composition of the start-up's management team, employee 
salaries, decision making and such. 
 
3.4 Growth Equity 
 
Growth equity refers to a type of private equity investment, most often a minority investment, in 
relatively mature companies that are looking for capital to expand or restructure operations, enter 
new markets or finance a significant acquisition without a change of control of the business.461 It is 
also referred to as expansion capital. Companies that seek growth equity will often do so in order to 
finance a transformational event in their lifecycle.462 These companies are likely to be more mature 
than venture capital-funded companies, able to generate revenue and operating profits but unable 
to generate sufficient cash to fund major expansions, acquisitions or other investments.463 Growth 
equity can also be used as part of a restructuring of a company's balance sheet, particularly to reduce 
the amount of debt the company has on its balance sheet. Growth equity is often structured as either 
ordinary shares or preference shares, although certain investors will use various hybrid securities 
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that include a contractual return, for example an interest payment, in addition to an ownership 
interest in the company.464   
 
A growth equity transaction can occur when for example, a company requires capital for expansion; 
or to develop a new product; or build a new plant; or to acquire a company for strategic purposes; or 
combinations hereof.465 The company’s capital requirements may exceed the amount it is able to 
raise from traditional funding sources such as a secured loan from a bank. In this instance the 
company may approach a private equity firm(s) to raise the capital needed or raise sufficient capital 
to serve as a foundation for borrowing the remainder of its capital needs from traditional lenders.466 
Such a private equity investment in an existing company is commonly referred to as a growth equity 
investment.467 A company seeking a growth equity investment is usually more established than a 
start-up company therefore a growth equity investment is also often referred to as a later stage 
investment.468 However, a growth equity investment has the characteristics of both a venture capital 
transaction and a leveraged buyout transaction. According to Stewart: 
 
‘Growth equity (or growth capital) resides on the continuum of private equity investing at the 
intersection of venture capital and control buyouts. Growth capital is designed to facilitate the 
target company’s accelerated growth through expanding operations, entering new markets, or 
consummating strategic acquisitions.’469 
 
The terms and conditions of a growth equity transaction vary from deal to deal. On the one hand a 
growth equity investment may be documented very similarly to a traditional later-stage venture 
capital financing transaction discussed in paragraph 3.3 of this chapter, and may vary depending on 
the operating history of the company, the financial performance, the capitalisation of the company 
and so forth. On the other hand a growth equity transaction may be documented very similarly to a 
traditional leveraged buyout as discussed in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 this chapter. For example, some 
growth equity investments involve acquisitions of majority stakes.470 These transactions usually 
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involve companies with a base of existing investors, such as founders, employees and venture 
capital and other private equity investor(s) who sell a stake to a larger investor who they believe can 
lead the next phase of the company’s growth.471 In situations where the company is owned by 
founders, a family for example, the growth equity investment may be the first institutional capital in 
the company.472 In these so-called growth buyout transactions, the sellers typically retain active 
involvement in the business at the management level, while the institutional investors are 
represented at the board level.473 LeClaire et al argue that it is difficult, if not impossible to define 
growth equity.474  
 
According to LeClaire et al: 
 
‘the concept of ‘growth equity’ can be defined so broadly as to be meaningless. After all, every 
private equity and/or venture capital deal involves equity and the expectation that the enterprise 
in which the investment is made will grow. So defined, every private equity and venture capital 
investor is a growth equity investor.’475 
 
Bertoni et al argue that growth equity investing is more complex than venture capital investing.476 
However, there are certain characteristics that differentiate growth equity from venture capital 
investments.477 For instance, most growth equity investments involve acquisitions of minority 
interests in profitable, growing and usually substantial companies, while venture capitalist 
investments are in early stage operating companies with unproven business models.478 Stewart 
argues that growth equity investments are in companies that are regarded as the market leader 
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within the industry and/or sector, while venture capital investments are in multiple early stage 
companies within an industry and/or sector.479 A further differentiating characteristic is that a growth 
equity investment requires the company to have a defined plan to achieve its profitability potential, 
while a venture capital investment is based on substantial revenue growth projections.480 In addition, 
venture capital investments are in companies with undefined future capital requirements, while 
growth equity investments are characterised by limited or no future capital requirements to achieve 
profitability potential after the growth equity investment has been completed.481  
 
There are also certain characteristics that differentiate growth equity investments from buyout 
investments. For example, growth equity investments are in operating companies with limited or no 
free cash flow, while buyouts investments are in highly profitable operating companies with 
consistent free cash flow.482 Furthermore, growth equity investments are in operating companies 
with minimal or no funded debt, while buyout investments apply debt financing to leverage the 
investment.483 Growth equity investments occur at a point in the company’s development where the 
investment will initiate substantial revenue and profitability growth, while buyouts invest at a point 
where revenue and profitability are in any event projected to grow steadily.484 In addition, buyouts 
invest in a controlling equity interest, while growth equity investments invest in a minority equity 
interest.485  
 
It must be noted before this discussion continues that this paragraph 3.4 will not analyse the tax 
implications of growth equity investments because it is beyond the scope of this thesis and because 
each growth equity transaction varies. In addition, most growth equity investments have similar 
characteristics to venture capital investments and buyouts and some of the principal tax 
                                                 
479Stewart, M. (2012), ‘Growth Equity: The Intersection of Venture Capital and Control Buyouts’, Fenwick and 
West LLP, 9th November 2012. Available  at https://www.pehub.com/2012/11/growth-equity-the-intersection-
venture-capital-control-buyouts/ accessed in April 2015. Bertoni, F., Ferrer, M. A. and Martí, J. (2013), ‘The 
different roles played by venture capital and private equity investors on the investment activity of their portfolio 
firms’, Small Business Economics, 40(3), at pages 607-633. 
480Stewart, M. (2012), ‘Growth Equity: The Intersection of Venture Capital and Control Buyouts’, Fenwick and 
West LLP, 9th November 2012. Available  at https://www.pehub.com/2012/11/growth-equity-the-intersection-
venture-capital-control-buyouts/ accessed in April 2015. Bertoni, F., Ferrer, M. A. and Martí, J. (2013), ‘The 
different roles played by venture capital and private equity investors on the investment activity of their portfolio 
firms’, Small Business Economics, 40(3), at pages 607-633. 
481Stewart, M. (2012), ‘Growth Equity: The Intersection of Venture Capital and Control Buyouts’, Fenwick and 
West LLP, 9th November 2012. Available  at https://www.pehub.com/2012/11/growth-equity-the-intersection-
venture-capital-control-buyouts/ accessed in April 2015.  
482Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley and Sons, at chapter 4, at paragraph 4.2. 
483 Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wley and Sons, at chapter 4, at paragraph 4.2. 
484Stewart, M. (20120, ‘Growth Equity: The Intersection of Venture Capital and Control Buyouts’, Fenwick and 
West LLP, 9th November 2012. Available  at https://www.pehub.com/2012/11/growth-equity-the-intersection-
venture-capital-control-buyouts/ accessed in April 2015. 
485Stewart, M. (20120, ‘Growth Equity: The Intersection of Venture Capital and Control Buyouts’, Fenwick and 
West LLP, 9th November 2012. Available  at https://www.pehub.com/2012/11/growth-equity-the-intersection-
venture-capital-control-buyouts/ accessed in April 2015. 
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considerations have been discussed in paragraph 3.1 of this chapter. A hypothetical example of a 
growth equity investment would be if an existing company (‘Growco’) requires additional capital to 
expand its business and Growco is unable to secure such capital requirements from traditional 
sources, such as a secured bank loan.486 Growco decides to approach a private equity firm(s) to 
make a growth equity investment in Growco in order to supply sufficient equity capital or equity 
capital plus subordinated debt to improve Growco’s existing borrowing base so that Growco can 
secure the balance of its needed cash from traditional lenders such as a bank(s).487 The private 
equity firm is of the opinion that Growco’s value will increase once Growco has the required capital 
for expansion and Growco’s share ownership is re-arranged to incentivize the incumbent 
management.488 
 
In this hypothetical example, Growco is seeking R50 million of capital to acquire an existing company 
engaged in the same industry; expand Growco’s business nationally; develop a new product; and 
build a new plant. Important features of Growco’s business worth noting are that it has sales of R200 
million; net income of R20 million; 100 ordinary shares; ten shareholders which consist of five active 
management shareholders owning 10 percent of the 100 ordinary shares and five passive 
shareholders owning 90 percent of the 100 ordinary shares. The private equity firm is considering 
an investment in Growco of R20 million to support a R30 million bank loan. In preparation for this 
growth equity investment, the private equity firm conducts an extensive due diligence.489 The private 
equity firm believes that Growco has a fair value before the growth equity investment of R200 million. 
If the private equity firm were to make a R20 million ordinary share investment into Growco, the 
ordinary shares would be worth R220 million.490 Therefore, the private equity firm’s R20 million 
investment would be only 9,1 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares,491 so that the private equity firm 
would only own 10 ordinary shares out of 110 ordinary shares. However, the private equity firm seeks 
a larger share of Growco’s ordinary shares492 and also wants some Growco fixed securities493 in 
exchange for a portion of its R20 million investment. In addition, the private equity firm wants 
Growco’s active management shareholders to own a larger percentage of Growco’s ordinary shares 
instead of the 10 percent they currently own or the 9,1 percent they would own if the private equity 
                                                 
486Other traditional sources could be for example an insurance company private debt placement, a private 
offering of debt or equity securities to Growco’s shareholders, their friends and fam ily, or a public offering of 
debt or equity securities. 
487Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 4-3 to 4-4; from which this hypothetical growth equity investment have been 
modelled. 
488The incentivisation of management may include new managers appointed by the private equity firm. 
489Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, Aspen 
Publishers, 2003 edition, at pages 4-3 and 4-4. 
490Namely R200 million fair value before investment plus R20 million new ordinary share investment. 
491Namely R20 million investment divided by R220 million ordinary share fair value after the private equity 
firm’s investment equals 9,1 percent. 
492Namely a larger share of Growco’s future appreciation. 
493Namely subordinated debentures and/or preference shares. 
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firm simply made a R20 million ordinary share investment, so that the active management 
shareholders will have a greater incentive to perform.  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the private equity firm would like Growco to engage in a front-
end re-arrangement of the shareholding so that the passive non-management shareholders own a 
smaller share of Growco’s ordinary shares;494 and the active management shareholders own a larger 
share of Growco’s ordinary shares. The private equity firm wants the active management 
shareholders to own 50 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares which would give them a greater 
incentive to stay with Growco and perform. In addition, the private equity firm would like Growco to 
engage in a front-end re-arrangement of the shareholding so that the private equity firm is able to 
acquire for its R20 million of new money a larger share of Growco’s ordinary shares, namely 25 
percent in this instance plus some subordinated debentures and/or preference shares.495 There are 
several methods of achieving this front-end re-arrangement of Growco’s equity. Levin lists a few.496 
One such method could be an ordinary share redemption from the passive shareholders for 
subordinated debentures. Another method could be a preference share recapitalisation with the 
passive shareholders which basically involves an exchange of new preference shares for existing 
ordinary shares. A further method could be by way of a pro rata dividend of preference shares to all 
of Growco’s shareholders combined with the formation of a new holding company (‘Holdco’) to hold 
all of Growco’s ordinary shares. In the instance of the above mentioned hypothetical example, 
Holdco’s ordinary shares would be owned in the desired 25-50-25 ownership ratio.497 Any of the 
three above mentioned methods can also be combined with an issuance to active management of 
additional ordinary shares or options to acquire new ordinary shares.498 As mentioned in paragraph 
3.1.1 of this chapter, private equity firms usually incentivise management, for example by way of 
share options in the underlying portfolio investee companies. This is an important part of private 
equity investing.499 
 
(a) Re-Arranging Equity Through Redemption 
 
                                                 
494Plus some preference shares or subordinated debentures. 
495See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, at pages 4-5 and 4-6. 
496See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, chapter 4, at pages 4-5 to 4-75. 
497See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, chapter 4, at pages 4-5 to 4-75. 
498For example, with each Rand of share purchase price, or option exercise price, purchasing a far higher 
percentage of post-transaction ordinary share interest than it would have purchased pre-transaction because 
each of the above three techniques have transformed much of Growco’s ordinary equity value into preference 
shares or subordinated debentures. 
499Discussed in greater detail in paragraph 2.2 of chapter 4, namely the taxation of share options in investee 
companies. 
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In terms of this redemption approach, Growco’s passive shareholders swap some or all of their 
ordinary shares for new subordinated debentures in order to increase the percentage of Growco’s 
ordinary shares held by active management and the private equity firm. Before the redemption, 
Growco’s fair value is R200 million, the five passive shareholders own 90 percent of Growco’s 
ordinary shares (fair value R180 million), and the five active management shareholders own 10 
percent (fair value R20 million). In the redemption, the five passive shareholders swap R170 million 
of their R180 million of Growco ordinary shares for new straight subordinated debentures with a 
R170 million face value at a fixed interest rate equal to the prevailing prime lending rate plus two 
percent and ten year maturity period. This leaves the passive shareholders with only R10 million of 
ordinary shares. Before the redemption, the passive shareholders own 90 percent of Growco’s 100 
common shares. In the redemption, they swap 85 of their 90 ordinary shares for the new 
subordinated debentures leaving them with 5 ordinary shares out of 15 ordinary shares outstanding 
or 33 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares (plus R170 million of Growco subordinated debentures). 
Before the redemption, the five active management shareholders own 10 percent shares out of 100 
ordinary shares. After the redemption (and before the new private equity firm’s investment), they 
own 10 ordinary shares out of 15 ordinary shares or 67 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares. Hence 
after the redemption and before the new private equity investment, Growco still has an enterprise 
value of R200 million, of which R170 million is now represented by the new subordinated debentures 
(held by the passive shareholders) and R30 million is now represented by 15 ordinary shares which 
is held 33 percent or R10 million fair value by the passive shareholders and 67 percent or R20 million 
by the active shareholders. The private equity firm then purchases 5 new shares of Growco’s 
ordinary shares, which will then constitute 25 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares, for R10 million; 
and R10 million of subordinated debentures. This transaction can be summarised as follows:500 
 
Passive Shareholders        Fair Value  
Ordinary Fair Value Before Redemption      R180 million 
Surrender Ordinary for Subordinated Debentures     (R170 million) 
Ordinary Fair Value after Redemption       R10 million 
  
Private Equity Firm Purchases      Fair Value  
Ordinary Shares         R10 million 
Subordinated Debentures        R10 million 
  
Total          R20 million 
  
 
Summary of Ownership after Redemption and Private Equity Firm Investment 
Ordinary Shares  Subordinated 
Debentures  
Fair Value 
                                                 
500See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, at page 4-11; from which this hypothetical growth equity investment have 
been modelled. 
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    No. of Shares Fair Value Percent    
Passive Shareholders   5 R10 million 25  R170 million  
Active Mgmt Shareholders  10 R20 million 50   --------- 
Private Equity Firm   5 R10 million 25  R10 million 
 Total           20 R40 million 100  R180 million 
 
(b) Preference Share Recapitalisation  
 
In terms of the preference share recapitalisation approach, Growco’s passive shareholders swap 
some or all their ordinary shares for new preference shares in order to increase the percentage of 
Growco’s ordinary shares held by active management and the private equity firm.501 The transaction 
summary in terms of this approach will be the same as the re-arranging of Growco’s equity through 
redemption as discussed in (a) above, except that the passive shareholders swap ordinary shares 
for new preference shares instead of swapping ordinary shares for new subordinated debentures. 
502 
 
(c) Re-Arranging Equity Through Preference Share Dividend  
 
In terms of this approach, Growco first issues new preference shares pro rata to all of Growco’s 
ordinary shareholders in order to make Growco’s existing ordinary shares less valuable. Thereafter, 
newly formed Holdco organized by the private equity firm and to be owned by the private equity firm, 
active management and the passive shareholders in the desired ratio 25-50-25 respectively, 
acquires all of Growco’s ordinary and the portion of Growco’s preference shares held by the active 
management in exchange for Holdco ordinary shares.503 Before the equity arrangement, Growco’s 
fair value is R200 million, the five passive shareholders own 90 percent of Growco’s ordinary shares 
and five active management shareholders own 10 percent as described above. Growco pays a pro 
rata dividend consisting of the R188,888,889, being the redemption amount of new preference 
shares, to all of its old ordinary shareholders; R170 million (90%) to the passive shareholders; and 
R18,888,889 (10%) to the active management shareholders thereby reducing the fair value of 
Growco’s aggregate ordinary shares to R11,111,111.504 At this point Growco’s passive shareholders 
own 90 percent ordinary shares worth R10 million and Growco’s active management 10 ordinary 
shares worth R1,111,111. In addition, the passive shareholders own R170 million of Growco’s 
preference shares505 and the active management shareholders own R18,888,889 of Growco 
                                                 
501See Bratton, W. W. and Wachter, M. L. (2013), ‘A Theory of Preferred Stock’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Volume 161, at pages 1825-1831. 
502See Bratton, W. W. and Wachter, M. L. (2013), ‘A Theory of Preferred Stock’, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Volume 161, at pages 1825-1831. 
503See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, at page 4-21 to 4-22. 
504R200 million fair value before the private equity firm’s investment less R188,888,889 of newly issued 
preference shares. 
50590 percent of R188,888,889. 
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preference shares.506 The private equity firm invests R1 million cash in Holdco and receives in 
exchange 100 Holdco shares. At the same time Growco’s passive shareholders transfer all their 
Growco ordinary shares (fair value R10million) to Holdco in exchange for 100 Holdco ordinary shares 
with Growco’s passive shareholders retaining their R170 million of Growco preference shares. 
Thereafter Growco’s active management shareholders transfer all of their Growco ordinary shares 
(fair value R1,111,111) plus all of their Growco preference shares (fair value R18,888,889) to Holdco 
in exchange for 200 Holdco ordinary shares. Finally, the private equity firm purchases from Growco 
for R10 million cash Growco preference shares having a total face value of R10 million. The 
transaction is summarised:507  
 
  Fair Value of Growco Redemption Amount  Fair Value of Growco 
  Ordinary Shares before  of Growco Preferred   Ordinary Shares after 
Preferred Dividends  Distributed   Preferred Dividends 
Passive  
Shareholders  R180 million  R170 million   R10 million 
Active Management 
Shareholders   R20 million  R18,888,889   R1, 111,111 
Total   R200 million  R188,888,889   R11,111,111 
 
 
Summary of Ownership After Equity Re-Arrangement and Private Equity Firm Investment 
Holdco Ordinary Shares              Growco Preference 
Shares  
Fair Value 
    No. of Shares Fair Value Percent    
Passive Shareholders   100 R10 million 25  R170 million  
Active Mgmt Shareholders  200 R20 million 50   --------- 
Private Equity Firm   100 R10 million 25  R10 million 
 Total    400 R40 million 100  R180 million 
 
There are benefits for passive shareholders willing to exchange part of their ordinary shares for 
preference shares and/or subordinated debentures as discussed above, for example they will 
receive a higher yield on the new preference shares and/or subordinated debentures.508 Also it could 
be argued that it is better to have a smaller shareholding percentage in a company that has a highly 
incentivized management team and capital, than having a larger shareholding in a company that has 
a dissatisfied management team and that lacks adequate capital. A further benefit put forth by Levin 
is that there is less downside risk on the preference shares than with the ordinary shares.509 In 
contrast, Bratton and Wachter state that this is always not the case and argue that although directors 
                                                 
50610 percent of R188,888,889. 
507See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, chapter 4, paragraph 404.2 at pages 4-23 to 4-24. 
508See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, chapter 4, paragraph 405, at page 4-28. 
509See Levin, J.S. (2003), ‘Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions’, 
(Aspen Publishers), 2003 edition, chapter 4, paragraph 405, at page 4-28. 
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do owe fiduciary duties to preference shareholders, preference shareholder rights are largely 
contractual in nature and are governed by the specific rights and preferences.510  
 
In the case LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James511 the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the 
duties that directors owe to preference shareholders when allocating private equity investment 
consideration between ordinary and preference shareholders. The plaintiff, LC Capital Master Fund, 
Ltd (‘LC Capital’) was a preference shareholder of QuadraMed Corporation (‘QuadraMed’). Pursuant 
to the certificate of designation establishing the rights and powers of preference shares (the 
‘Certificate’), preference shareholders had the right to convert their preference shares into ordinary 
shares at a specified ratio. The Certificate also established other rights and preferences, such as 
dividend rights and liquidation preferences.512 The QuadraMed board formed a special committee of 
independent directors (the ‘Special Committee’) to evaluate the private equity investment bids. The 
Committee recommended the acquisition of QuadraMed by Francisco Partners II, L.P. (‘Francisco 
Partners’) via a merger.513 In the merger, the holders of QuadraMed preference shares were cashed 
out at the price the preference shareholders would have received for their ordinary shares had they 
exercised their conversion rights before the merger.514 LC Capital sought to stop the merger, alleging 
that the QuadraMed directors breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the holders of 
preference shares. LC Capital argued that the directors unfairly allocated the merger consideration 
between the ordinary and the preference shareholders by allocating based solely on the conversion 
rights of the preference shares and not according value to other contractual rights of the preference 
shares, such as the dividend rights and liquidation preferences.515  
 
The Delaware Court of Chancery explained that, although directors do owe fiduciary duties to 
preference shareholders, preference shareholders’ rights are largely contractual in nature and are 
governed by the specific rights and preferences set forth in the certificate of incorporation (including 
the certificate of designation).516 Once directors honour the contractual rights of the preference 
shareholders, they are entitled to favour the interests of the ordinary shareholders. The Court 
explained that a board of directors must honour the contractual rights of preference shareholders, 
but it need not go further and grant unspecified benefits to the preference shareholders at the 
expense of the ordinary shareholders.517 The Court held that LC Capital had failed to show a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits of its breach of fiduciary duty claims. In declining to 
                                                 
510Bratton, W. W. and Wachter, M. L. (2013), ‘A Theory of Preferred Stock’, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Volume 161, at pages 1825-1831. 
511See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). Available at 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-court-of-chancery/1594543.html, accessed in April 2015. 
512See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010).  
513See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). 
514See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). 
515See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). 
516See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010).  
517See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). 
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stop the merger, the Court also considered the balance of the equities, noting that it would be 
reluctant to grant injunctive relief harmful to the ordinary shareholders where a preference 
shareholder could pursue appraisal rights and an equitable damages case.518  
 
In the US this case is seen as a follow-on to the important case of Trados Inc. Shareholder 
Litigation519 (discussed in paragraph 3.3 of this chapter) in which preference shareholders received 
gains on their investments, but the ordinary shareholders received nothing.520 It is clear from that the 
judgments in both cases by the Delaware Chancery Court that in a conflict situation, a board of 
directors’ duty is to the ordinary shareholders.521 Secondly, the preference shares are limited to their 
express contract rights. This implies that preference share investors should take care to ensure that 
their underlying documents are properly drafted, as the preference shares are entitled to nothing 
more than what is in the governing documents.522  
 
It is hereby submitted that a private equity backed growth equity investment is generally more 
complex than the venture capital investment discussed in paragraph 3.3 of this chapter where the 
venture capitalist had only the entrepreneur with whom to negotiate. In a growth equity investment 
transaction, the private equity firm is investing in an existing company which typically has several 
shareholders with different interest and goals. In addition, Growco in this hypothetical example has 
more assets, contingent liabilities and operating history than did Venco (in paragraph 3.3 of this 
chapter), therefore it is more important that the private equity firm undertake a substantial business, 
legal and accounting due diligence to uncover any possible weaknesses and risks. In this regard the 
private equity firm should draft a more extensive agreement allocating the risks of unknown liabilities 
and any other contingencies between the private equity firm and Growco’s current shareholders. 
Growth equity investments are deal specific, however many growth equity investments share some 
of the same characteristics of venture capital investments and buyout investments as discussed in 
paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 of this chapter. According to Demaria, growth equity investments have the 
characteristics of both buyout investments and venture capital investments and are to some extent 
a combination of both.523 While there are a number of dedicated growth capital firms, growth capital 
                                                 
518See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010). 
519Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
520Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013), the Delaware Chancery Court refused to 
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty action against directors brought by ordinary shareholders for a merger in 
which the preference shares was to receive less than its full liquidation preference and the ordinary shares 
was being wiped out. While this does not mandate a payment to the ordinary shareholders, that can be seen 
as the practical effect of the decision. 
521‘It will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of 
the ordinary shares . . . to the interests of the preferred stock’. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd v James C.A. No. 
5214-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2010), citing Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
522Wimberly, J. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity and the ‘Entire Fairness’ Test: In re Trados’, Review 
of Banking and Financial Law, Volume 331, at pages 418-429.   
523Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley and Sons, at chapter 4 paragraph 4.2. 
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investments are also made by late-stage venture capital investors as well as more traditional buyout 
equity firms.524  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
It is apparent from this discussion of the types of private equity,525 that private equity firms play a 
central role in private equity transactions. Simplistically put: The private equity firm manages funds 
contributed by the private equity investors (such as pension funds) to acquire underlying portfolio 
investee companies, most often using additional debt capital borrowed from banks or debt 
markets.526 To this end, the private equity firm, the investors, underlying portfolio investee 
companies, banks, and other debt providers are the main players in private equity transactions.527 
However, among the above mentioned key participants, the private equity firm plays the most 
important role because it obtains investor funds, identify the target company and initiate relationships 
with banks and other debt providers to finance private equity transactions.528 This leads to the next 
part of this chapter, which will discuss the salient features of the private equity business model. 
 
4. Characteristics of the Private Equity Investment Model  
 
Private equity firms are central to the private equity investment model.529 The private equity firms 
have four primary roles. Their first role is to raise funds from investors, which are used to make 
investments, mainly in private companies. The funds raised by the private equity firms are from 
investors such as pension funds, banks, insurance companies and high net worth individuals.530 
According to the South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA), the largest 
investors in private equity, both locally and abroad, are pension funds and insurance funds.531 These 
investors will generally invest via a private equity fund which in South Africa is legally structured as 
either a bewind trust or en commandite partnership.532  
                                                 
524Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley and Sons, at chapter 4 paragraph 4.2. 
525Paragraphs 3.1 to 3.4 of this chapter. 
526Hoskisson, R.E., Shi, W., Yi, X. and Jin, J. (2013), ‘The Evolution and Strategic Positioning of Private Equity 
Firms’, Academy of Management Perspectives, Volume 27, No. 1, at page 22. 
527Hoskisson, R.E., Shi, W., Yi, X. and Jin, J. (2013), ‘The Evolution and Strategic Positioning of Private Equity 
Firms’, Academy of Management Perspectives, Volume 27, No. 1, at page 22. 
528Hoskisson, R.E., Shi, W., Yi, X. and Jin, J. (2013), ‘The Evolution and Strategic Positioning of Private Equity 
Firms’, Academy of Management Perspectives, Volume 27, No. 1, at page 22. 
529As stated above in paragraph 3 of this chapter. 
530Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 4. 
531KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey 2014. 
532Chapter two will show that the predominant legal forms used by private equity firms in South Africa are the 
bewind trust and the en commandite partnership. In addition, chapter two will argue that there are several 
drivers for the appropriate legal structure for a private equity fund; and that one of the main objectives in 
structuring a private equity fund is to ensure that the liability for taxes is not on the fund vehicle itself but on 




The second role of private equity firms is to source investment opportunities and make investments. 
A private equity fund must source and execute successful transactions to make a profit and support 
the raising of further funds.533 It is evident from the discussion in paragraph 3 of this chapter that a 
significant amount of effort and resources is required on the part of private equity firms in sourcing, 
executing and managing private equity investments in underlying portfolio companies, including 
relationship management with individuals who may give access to such transactions.534  
 
The third role of private equity firms is to manage the investments in underlying portfolio companies. 
The private equity business model is characterised by the active involvement by the private equity 
firm in the underlying portfolio companies.535 Gilligan and Wright state that: 
 
‘While they do not exercise day-to-day control, they are actively involved in setting and monitoring 
the implementation of strategy. This is the basis of the argument that private equity has become 
an alternative model of corporate governance.’536 
 
The fourth role of private equity firms is to exit underlying portfolio companies and make a profit for 
the private equity fund it manages, for example by selling the funds’ interest in such underlying 
portfolio companies.537 This is achieved by exiting the underlying portfolio investee companies and 
this process is an integral part of the private equity business model.538 In addition, the ultimate 
success of a private equity firm is reflected by the number of successful exits it has achieved, which 
in turn has a direct impact on the ability of such a private equity firm to attract investors and raise 
more funds.539 Therefore, the various potential exit routes in a private equity market also directly 
impacts on an investor(s) decision as to whether or not it will commit to invest in a particular private 
equity fund.540 Chapter four will also highlight that although fund raising and investment activity in 
                                                 
the investors in the fund. Therefore one of the main reasons why these legal vehicles are used to structure 
private equity funds is that they are ‘tax transparent’. 
533Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 4. 
534These would include investment bankers, accountants, advisers and so forth. 
535Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
536Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 5. 
537In paragraph three of chapter four, it will be argued that the objective of a private equity fund is to realise the 
return on its investment in each underlying portfolio investee company after a period of time once the initial 
transaction was concluded. 
538Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Venture Capital: Investment Strategies, Structures, and Policies’, Kolb Series in 
Finance, Essential Perspectives, 2010. 
539Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
edition, Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0470650915. 
540Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2007), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity 
Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 31, pages 3218-3250. 
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South Africa seems reasonably consistent, exiting alternatives remain a challenge for the local 
industry.541  
 
It is submitted that the inherent strength of the private equity investment model described above is 
that it is based on a clear alignment of interests between the private equity firms, the investors and 
the underlying portfolio investee companies they support.542 As discussed above, the success of a 
private equity investment is determined by the sale of all or a large part of the portfolio companies 
equity (exit) via a stock market listing or private sale. Therefore, it is a basic principle of private equity 
investing that the returns are achieved through the realized gains made once an investment is 
sold.543 The common model is for the private equity firm employees to keep 20 percent of the 
difference between the amount initially invested and the amount realized in the fund at the end of 
the ten year lifetime of the fund and distributed to investors.544 These arrangements help to align the 
interests of the investors and those of the private equity firm, specifically because rewards accrue 
based on success in delivering the returns.545  
 
Nevertheless, like any other industry, the private equity industry has its critics.546 The private equity 
industry has been criticised both in terms of how private equity firms finance and manage the 
underlying portfolio investee companies; as well as for the way that private equity firms operate its 
own business.547 In addition, chapter three will consider corporate governance in relation to the 
private equity business model and will seek to explain the link between the private equity business 
model and corporate governance that is based on the assertion that there are two levels of corporate 
governance involved in private equity investing. In continuation of the discussion at hand, the next 
section discusses several features that underpin the private equity investment model. 
 
4.1 Remuneration of the Private Equity Firm and Investors 
 
As mentioned earlier, the most commonly used investment vehicle to invest in private equity in South 
Africa, is the fixed-life fund which is structured either as a bewind trust or an en commandite 
partnership, managed by a private equity firm. In the case of an en commandite partnership, the 
                                                 
541KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. 
542Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
543Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
544The 20 percent is referred to carried interest and is discussed in greater detail below. 
545Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition.  
546Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at pages 1-2. 
547Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at pages 1-2. See also paragraph 1 of this chapter where several of 
the disadvantages of the private equity investing are highlighted.  
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investors constitute the limited partners and the private equity firm act as general partners.548 In the 
case of a bewind trust, the investors constitute the trust beneficiaries and the private equity firm acts 
as the fund manager of the bewind trust (private equity fund).549 Since the private equity firm raises 
new funds every three to five years, a private equity firm usually manages several private equity 
funds, which are each set up between several investors and the private equity firm.550 As mentioned 
above, a private equity fund usually has a fixed ten-year life during which the private equity firm 
selects investments, structures transactions, monitors investments and designs the appropriate exit 
strategies on behalf of the private equity fund. In exchange, the private equity firm is remunerated 
via two primary sources: a management fee plus a share of the capital gains of the private equity 
fund.551 The private equity firm’s sharing of the profits of the private equity fund is typically referred 
to as the carried interest or the ‘carry’.552 The payment of the private equity firm’s management fee 
and the sharing of the profits of a particular private equity fund is typically governed by contractual 
arrangements, the terms and conditions of which are usually contained in the trust deed553 or the 
partnership agreement.554 The management fees received by the private equity firm are expressed 
as a percentage of the funds the private equity firm has managed to raise from investors.555 
According to Gilligan and Wright, the larger the private equity fund, the greater the management fee 
income, although the percentage typically declines from approximately 3 percent in smaller funds to 
1 percent in larger private equity funds.556 Lerner defines a management fee as the percentage of 
committed capital or net asset value (‘NAV’) that is paid by the private equity fund to the private 
equity firm to cover salaries and expenses.557 Therefore, the management fees pay for the operating 
costs of the private equity firm and any excess belongs to the private equity firm. Gilligan and Wright 
argue that there is an incentive for a private equity firm to maximise the fund size in order to increase 
the management fee income. Gilligan and Wright state:558 
 
‘… as fund size has grown, the funds’ costs have grown less rapidly and therefore the profit from 
fee income has become material. It is argued that this income, which is effectively guaranteed, 
has created a misalignment between the partners in private equity funds and their investors. In 
                                                 
548See chapter two. 
549See chapter two. 
550Adveq (2012), ‘Benefits of Private Equity for the European Economy: Insights from the Macro, Company 
and Investor Perspective’, Adveq Management AG, Winter 2012/2013. 
551Adveq (2012), ‘Benefits of Private Equity for the European Economy: Insights from the Macro, Company 
and Investor Perspective’, Adveq Management AG, Winter 2012/2013. 
552Gompers, P.A and Lerner, J. (1995), ‘An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership’, 
Working Paper, Harvard University, at pages 3-44. 
553If a trust is used. 
554If a limited liability partnership is used. 
555Adveq (2012), ‘Benefits of Private Equity for the European Economy: Insights from the Macro, Company 
and Investor Perspective’, Adveq Management AG, Winter 2012/2013. 
556Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 5. 
557Lerner, J. (1999), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 11-144. 
558Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 5. 
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essence a new principal-agent problem is said to have been created by the high levels of 
guaranteed income from fees.559 
 
For instance, an annuity stream of excessive management fees can represent a misalignment of 
interests by reducing the financial incentive of the private equity firm to achieve high returns. 
Therefore it can be argued that economic supply and demand factors ultimately dictate what the 
management fee will be. When the resultant demand for a private equity firm is high, then the 
management fee charged by such a manager will be at the higher end of the range. Additionally, 
strong private equity firms with proven track records tend to be able to command premium fees. In 
paragraph 2(b) of chapter three, it is argued that an area of potential conflict of interest between the 
private equity firm and investors relates to the final size of the private equity fund. It is submitted in 
chapter three that there remains a potential conflict of interest between the private equity firm’s 
ambitions to raise increasingly larger sized private equity funds, whereas the potential investors’ goal 
is to ensure that whatever capital is raised can be effectively deployed towards suitably attractive 
investment opportunities within the fund’s proposed investment period.560 Therefore, the larger the 
size of the private equity fund, the more fees the private equity firm would earn. This serves the 
interests of the private equity firm without any real increased investment benefit to the prospective 
investors.561  
 
Chapter three will inter alia highlight some of the methods used by investors and private equity firms 
to show an alignment of interest. For example the private equity fund that is to be raised, would be 
subject to the condition that the private equity firm will commit to co-invest a set percentage of their 
own capital on a co-investment basis alongside the private equity fund.562 The set percentage would 
be determined in relation to the total amount of investor committed capital. Another example of risk 
mitigation against the misalignment of interest is by adopting a budget-based approach to 
management fees, commonly referred to as ‘budgeted fees’.563 Budgeted fees are management fees 
determined by the budgeted annual operating expenses of the private equity fund.564 In essence the 
annual budget is presented to the advisory board of the private equity fund or investors of the fund 
                                                 
559See also Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
560Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0.  
561Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0. See also Bartlett, J.W. (1995), ‘Organising the Pooled Investment Vehicle (PIC), Equity 
Finance: Venture Capital, Buy-outs, Restructuring and Reorganisations’, 2nd edition, Vol. 3. Aspen.  
562Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services 
Industry’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, 1st edition, at pages 138-170. 
563William Mecer Inc. (1996), ‘Key Terms and Conditions for Private Equity Investing’, William Mecer Inc., at 
pages 24-34. 
564Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, revised 
edition. 
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for approval.565 This fee structure aims at creating accountability and implies a better alignment of 
interests. The budgeted fee approach is an application of the cost analysis private equity firms make 
when evaluating potential transactions.566 In order to reduce the potential difficulties that may arise, 
the process by which budgeted fees are negotiated each year and resolution of any disputes should 
be formally defined in the fund agreements.567 What is important is that this type of fee structure 
methodology creates a check and balance system each year that subjects the private equity firm to 
greater accountability, planning and cost control.568 In essence it is no different from the disciplines 
applied by the private equity firm when monitoring and controlling expenses in the investments made 
by the private equity fund.569  
 
Another example of risk mitigation against the misalignment of interest is by adopting a scaled fee 
approach.570 This management fee structure can also be useful for reflecting the higher level of effort 
by the private equity firm during the earlier years of the private equity fund, where the deal-making 
and due diligence efforts are more intense.571 A sliding fee scale is a management fee that varies 
over the life of the private equity fund.572 Typically these are negotiated fees that attempt to recognise 
the higher level of due diligence and analysis required during the earlier years as the fund makes 
investments. These fees are higher during the earlier years of the private equity fund and decline 
over time.573 Such a management fee structure, which first slides up during the earlier years of the 
fund, levels off, and then slides down in the later years, can also create an appropriate alignment of 
interests.574 An example would be 1.5 percent in the first year, 2 percent during the second year, 2.5 
percent in the years three through five, then scaling downward to 1.5 percent in years six and seven, 
and to 1 percent in years eight to ten. It is submitted in chapter three that a private equity firm is 
strongly motivated to protect its reputation and to maintain a healthy relationship with its investors 
                                                 
565Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, revised 
edition. 
566Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, revised 
edition. 
567Lemke, T.P., Lins, G.T., Hoenig, K.L. and Rube, P.S. (2014), ‘Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds: 
Regulation and Compliance’, 2014 Edition, Securities Law Handbook Series, Thomson West Publishers, at 
13:20. 
568Lemke, T.P., Lins, G.T., Hoenig, K.L. and Rube, P.S. (2014), ‘Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds: 
Regulation and Compliance’, 2014 Edition, Securities Law Handbook Series, Thomson West Publishers, at 
13:20. 
569William Mecer Inc. (1996), ‘Key Terms and Conditions for Private Equity Investing’, William Mecer Inc., at 
pages 24-34. 
570Goldman, Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell Capital Inc. (1996), ‘Survey of Alternative Investments by 
Pension Funds, Endowments and Foundations’, New York: Goldman, Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell 
Capital Inc. 
571Goldman, Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell Capital Inc. (1996), ‘Survey of Alternative Investments by 
Pension Funds, Endowments and Foundations’, New York: Goldman, Sachs and Co. and Frank Russell 
Capital Inc. 
572Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
573Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
574Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
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because of future fund raising.575 It is also submitted in chapter three that the main mitigating factor 
against the potential conflicts of interests is that the fund-raising process is subject to contractually 
binding negotiations between the private equity firm and the investors, where investors are able to 
negotiate definitive terms and conditions relating to the management fees and performance based 
fees to be earned by the private equity firm.576  
 
4.1.1 Carried Interest 
 
In addition to the management fee received by the private equity firm, the private equity firm also 
receives a share of the profits generated by the private equity fund. This is generally known as 
‘carried interest’ as mentioned earlier.577 According to Kocis et al, the origin of carried interest can be 
traced back to the 16th century, when European ships were crossing to Asia and the Americas. The 
captain of the ship would take a 20 percent share of the profit from the carried goods, to pay for the 
transport and the risk of sailing over oceans.578 According to Lemke et al, carried interest is: 
 
‘… a form of performance fee that rewards the manager for enhancing performance.’579 
  
The Private Equity Group Capital Council (‘PEGCC’) defines carried interest as: 
 
‘the share of profits that a general partner of an investment fund receives from his or her 
ownership interest in the fund’s assets.’580 
 
According to the PEGCC, carried interest plays a crucial role in private equity growth capital investing 
and is provided to the private equity firm in recognition of the substantial and material work required 
to restructure and direct the underlying portfolio investments of the private equity fund.581 In addition, 
it also serves to align the interest of the private equity firm with those of the investors.582 Carried 
interest is based on the principle that if the private equity fund does well, the private equity firm 
                                                 
575Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services 
Industry’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, 1st edition, at pages 138-170. 
576Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services 
Industry’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, 1st edition, at pages 138-170. 
577Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
578Kocis, J.M., Bachman, J.C., Long, A.M. and Nichols, C.J. (2009), ‘Inside Private Equity’, John Wiley 
Publishers, 1st Edition, at page 22. 
579Lemke, T.P., Lins, G.T., Hoenig, K.L. & Rube, P.S. (2014), ‘Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds: 
Regulation and Compliance’, 2014 Edition, Securities Law Handbook Series, Thomson West Publishers, at 
13:20. 
580Available at www.pegcc.org/about/the-pegcc-and-public-policy/carried-interest/, accessed in April 2015. 
581Available at www.pegcc.org/about/the-pegcc-and-public-policy/carried-interest/, accessed in April 2015. 
582Available at www.pegcc.org/about/the-pegcc-and-public-policy/carried-interest/, accessed in April 2015. 
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shares in the gains; however if the private equity fund does not do well, the private equity firm 
receives nothing.583 Investopedia defines carried interest as: 
  
‘A share of any profits that the general partners … receive as compensation, despite not 
contributing any initial funds. This method of compensation seeks to motivate the general partner 
(fund manager) to work toward improving the fund's performance … While all funds tend to have 
a small management fee, the management fee is meant to only cover the costs of managing the 
fund, with the exception of compensating the fund manager. Carried interest is meant to serve as 
the primary source of income for the general partner. However, the general partner must ensure 
that all the initial capital that the limited partners contribute is returned along with some previously 
agreed upon rate of return.’584 
 
In order to receive carried interest, the private equity firm must first return all capital contributed by 
the investors, plus the pre-agreed rate of return referred to as the ‘hurdle rate’ to investors. The 
hurdle rate is calculated on the amounts actually invested.585 According to Gilligan and Wright, the 
customary hurdle rate in the US is seven to eight percent per annum586 and in South Africa it is eight 
to 10 percent per annum.587 Therefore a hurdle rate of 10 percent means that the private equity fund 
needs to achieve a return of at least 10 percent before the profits are shared according to the carried 
interest arrangement.588 Once this is achieved, then only will the private equity firm share in the 
excess, usually to the extent of 20 percent of any excess.589 Typically in practice, the private equity 
firm will only receive its carried interest after the successful exiting of an underlying portfolio 
investment, which may take several years taking into account the long term nature of private equity 
investing. This sharing of the profits of the private equity fund is also referred to as the 80/20 rule 
because the profits are shared on an 80/20 basis with 80 percent going to the investors and 20 
percent to the private equity firm.590  
 
                                                 
583Available at www.pegcc.org/about/the-pegcc-and-public-policy/carried-interest/, accessed in April 2015. 
584Available at www.investopedia.com/terms/c/carriedinterest.asp#ixzz3a08qjHLY, accessed in April 2015. 
585Fang, L., Ivashina, V. and Lerner, J. (2014), ‘The disintermediation of financial markets: Direct investing in 
private equity’, Journal of Financial Economics, August 2013, at pages 1-31. 
586Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 5. 
587Sourced and available at www.ethos.co.za/communications/archived-news/private-equitys-retail-tilt/, 
accessed in April 2015. 
588Fang, L., Ivashina, V. and Lerner, J. (2014), ‘The disintermediation of financial markets: Direct investing in 
private equity’, Journal of Financial Economics, August 2013, at pages 1-31. 
589Kumpf, S. (2013), ‘Listed Private Equity: Investment Strategies and Returns’, Volume 6 of Alternative 
Investments, Diplomica Verlag Publishers, at pages 17-20. 
590Lerner, J. (1999), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 11-144. 
It must be noted at this point, that it is not the intention of this discussion to discuss the various accounting 
methodologies and investment formulas used in calculating carried interest as it is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. 
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The most vociferous criticisms of the remuneration of private equity firms relate to the taxation of 
carried interest.591 Carried interest is typically taxed as a capital gain and the management fee 
income is usually taxed as income.592 The reason why carried interest is taxed as capital gains is 
that a private equity firm hold its investments for several years and as such, the capital gains from 
private equity funds typically qualify as long term capital gains, which receive favourable tax 
treatment. The taxation of carried interest has been subject to much criticism since the mid-2000s.593 
Chapter four will examine these criticisms as part of the discussion of the taxation of carried interest 
in the US, Canada, Australia, UK and South Africa. For example, in paragraph 2.3 of chapter four it 
will be noted that there is a continuous debate in the US over the taxation of carried interest. This 
debate pertains to the treatment of carried interest as capital gain for the managers of private equity 
funds. Under current US tax law,594 income resulting from carried interests is often taxed at capital 
gains rates. However, in terms of legislative proposals in the US carried interest income would be 
taxed at the higher ordinary income tax rates.595 Nevertheless, in concluding this paragraph, it is 
submitted that carried interest serves as the primary source of income for the private equity firm for 
(a) successfully raising a private equity fund; (b) sourcing investment opportunities and structuring 
investment transactions on behalf of the private equity fund; (c) managing the underlying portfolio 
investments on behalf of the private equity fund; and (d) exiting the underlying portfolio investments 
on behalf of the private equity fund at a profit. In addition thereto, the private equity firm receives an 
annual management fee which is determined as a percentage of the capital it has raised from 
investors. This management fee is meant primarily to cover the operating costs of the private equity 
firm rather than for meaningful wealth creation for the private equity firm.  
 
Despite the criticism of the remuneration model of private equity firms, it is also evident (particularly 
when considering the discussion in paragraph 3 of this chapter) that a significant amount of effort 
and resources are required on the part of private equity firms in sourcing, executing and managing 
private equity investments in underlying portfolio companies, including relationship management 
with individuals who may give access to such transactions.  
 
4.1.2 Distribution Policy Provisions  
 
                                                 
591Discussed in paragraph 4.1.1 of chapter one and paragraph 2.3 of chapter four. 
592Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 6. 
593Available  at http://www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-
through-taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf, accessed in April 2015. 
594Section 702 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
595Field, H.M. (2012), ‘The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the Carried Interest Tax Proposals’, Florida Tax 
Review, 13, 2012):1-503. Paragraph 4 of chapter three will discuss contractual techniques intended to create 
an alignment between the interests of the private equity firm and the outside investors, in relation to the 
remuneration arrangements between the private equity firm and investors. 
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The distribution policy provisions are one of the most important provisions incorporated in private 
equity fund agreements. According to Schell, the distribution policy refers to the transfer of cash from 
the private equity fund to each investor and the private equity firm.596 The distribution policy regulates 
and determines how both the private equity firm and the investors will receive the capital gains 
realized when the underlying portfolio investments are exited from the private equity fund.597 The 
distribution policy is typically structured to ensure that the private equity firm will only receive its 
carried interest after the underlying portfolio investments have been exited and an amount equal to 
the committed capital plus the pre-agreed hurdle rate has been returned to each investor.598 Typically 
all the expenses and fees (including the management fees paid to the private equity firm) incurred 
by the private equity fund are offset from the realized capital gains when calculating the hurdle rate 
because the realized gains referred to above must be net of all fees and expenses before the private 
equity firm can receive its carried interest.599 Exceptions to this general principle do occur. A 
distribution policy may be drafted on the basis that the private equity firm will begin receiving the 
capital gains realized when the underlying portfolio investments are exited and the fund’s committed 
capital is recovered, without regard to the recovery of management fees.600 Investopedia defines the 
distribution policy as: 
 
‘the method by which capital is distributed to a fund's investors as underlying investments are 
sold. It specifies, for example, that an investor will receive his or her initial investment plus a 
preferred return before the general partners can participate in the profits.’601 
 
Therefore, the crucial questions that need to be considered when drafting the private equity fund 
agreements are when and how the distribution policy is to be implemented. The distribution policy 
can be implemented in various ways, but the escrow602 account mechanism is the most common 
                                                 
596Schell, J.M. (1999), ‘Private equity Funds: Business, Structure and Operations’, Law Journal Press, revised 
edition, at pages 9-26 to 9-28. 
597Private equity exits are more fully discussed in paragraph three of chapter four. 
598Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
599Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
600Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. See also 
Bartlett, J.W. (1995), ‘Organising the Pooled Investment Vehicle (PIC), Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buy-
outs, Restructuring and Reorganisations’, 2nd edition, Vol. 3. Aspen.  
601Available  at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/distribution-waterfall.asp#ixzz3a7JaDjsD, accessed in  
May 2015. 
602The term ‘escrow’ refers to a legal concept in which a financial instrument or an asset is held by a third party 
on behalf of two other parties that are in the process of completing a transaction. The funds or assets are held 
by the escrow agent until it receives the appropriate instructions or until predetermined contractual obligations 
have been fulfilled. Money, securities, funds, and other assets can be held in escrow. Available at 
www.investopedia.com/terms/e/escrow.asp, accessed in June 2017. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 95 
 
method used.603 In terms of the escrow account agreement, the private equity firm’s share of the 
capital gains realized when the underlying portfolio investments are sold are held in escrow until 
certain agreed conditions are met.604 For example, the private equity firm may only receive its share 
of the profits once all the underlying portfolio investments are sold and the entire private equity fund 
is liquidated.605 Other variations are when the private equity firm and the investors receive profits 
simultaneously; and when the investors share profits on a predetermined date.606  
 
In drafting the provisions regulating an escrow account, there are several basic features that should 
be considered. Firstly, effectively worded and drafted escrow agreements will reduce potential 
misunderstandings and conflict as to when and how the distribution policy is to be implemented.607 
Secondly, the provision should be drafted based on the underlying proposition that the investors 
should recover an amount equal to their capital commitment and their share of management fees 
paid to the private equity firm before the private equity firm receive the capital gains realized when 
the underlying portfolio investments are exited from the private equity fund.608 Thirdly, the distribution 
should be made as profits become available, even though this may be inconvenient for the private 
equity firm which may prefer to make distributions on a predetermined date.609 By making 
distributions on a predetermined date, the private equity firm can smooth its own income and 
establish greater certainty as to when it will receive distributions.610 Fourthly, the profits can be 
distributed to the investors and the private equity firm both in the form of cash or shares in the 
underlying portfolio investment(s) (also referred to as in-kind distributions) or as a combination of 
both.611 In addition, the actual distribution structure and escrow account format should be concisely 
defined in the fund’s agreements, aimed at eliminating time-consuming interpretation and negotiation 
as to who can make distributions, when the distributions should be made, under what conditions the 
distributions should be made, and the types of distributions.612 
                                                 
603Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition. See also Levin, J.S., Rocap, D.E. and Welke, W.R. (2010), 
‘Carried Interest Legislative Proposals and Enterprise Value Tax’, Tax Notes, 1st November 2010. 
604Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition. See also Levin, J.S., Rocap, D.E. and Welke, W.R. (2010), 
‘Carried Interest Legislative Proposals and Enterprise Value Tax’, Tax Notes, 1st November 2010. 
605See Burke, K.C. (2010), ‘Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform’, Columbia Journal of Tax Law, 1, 
2010:1. 
606See Burke, K.C. (2010), ‘Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform’, Columbia Journal of Tax Law, 1, 
2010:1. 
607Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at 713. 
608Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at 713. 
609Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at 713. 
610Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at 713. 
611Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at 713. 
612Kogelman, S (1996), ‘Survey: Alternative Investments by Pension Funds, Endowments & Foundations’ at 
1-12. 




These are just some of considerations to be taken into account, but ultimately distributions should at 
all times be made in accordance with the relevant provisions in the private equity fund’s constitutional 
documents. Clarity over what is distributed and how it is accounted for in the calculation of carried 
interest are all important issues. Addressing these when drafting the private equity fund’s 
constitutional documents will ensure that disputes do not arise as to the apportionment of profits and 
losses of the private equity fund, and mitigate against any misalignment of interest between the 
private equity firm and the fund’s investors. 
 
4.2 Allocation of Fees and Expenses 
 
The management fee discussed above in paragraph 4.1 of this chapter, typically covers only salaries 
of the full-time professionals and administrative personnel and the ordinary and necessary expenses 
involved in the private equity fund’s routine operations. Legal and accounting fees, and all other 
costs, are charged to the private equity fund as a current or capital expense.613 Consulting fees for 
example can be a major burden because many private equity firms routinely contract the the services 
of professional consultants to act as advisors during the the feasibility process, when considering 
making an underlying investment.614 On the one hand, consulting fees are typically charged to the 
private equity fund because the private equity firm usually cannot afford to pay them.615 On the other 
hand, when and if the private equity firm’s appointee serves on the boards of the underlying portfolio 
companies and are paid directors’ fees, the usual rule is that these fees are either remitted to the 
private equity fund or credited against the management fee to avoid double counting.616  
 
Quite often in the management of third party private equity funds, the private equity firm is also 
engaged in corporate finance activities that may yield fees or revenues earned from investment 
banking activities.617 This could include fee income received by the private equity firm from the work 
involved in taking a company to market via a stock market listing, mergers and acquisitions and 
corporate finance services offered to the underlying portfolio investee companies.618 Historically, the 
practice was that the private equity firm would receive all such transaction fee income in addition to 
the annual management fees for managing the private equity fund. The common practice now is for 
                                                 
613Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
614Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
615Venture Economics Report (1999), ‘1998 Investment Benchmark Report: Buy-outs and Other Private 
Equity’, Newark, NJ: Venture Economics Information Services. 
616Venture Economics Report (1999), ‘1998 Investment Benchmark Report: Buy-outs and Other Private 
Equity’, Newark, NJ: Venture Economics Information Services. 
617Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
618Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value creation: 
Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies 26, No. 2, at pages 368-402. 
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private equity firms to share the transaction fee income with the fund’s investors.619 In the US, the 
general industry principle is that all such transaction fee income accrues to investors, as investors 
are already paying the manager a fee for managing a fund.620 Transaction fees can be applied as a 
reduction of management fees by crediting them against future management fees or refunding earlier 
fees to the extent of the sharing arrangement.621 This will resolve any potential timing differences 
between management fees paid and transaction fees received. 
 
The allocation of fees and expenses between the private equity firm and the private equity fund 
should be fair and reasonable. For example, the non-disclosure and excessive allocation of fees and 
expenses to the private equity fund can represent a misalignment of interests between the private 
equity firm and the private equity fund. As mentioned in paragraph 4.1 of this chapter, chapter three 
will outline possible mitigating measures alongside this misalignment of interest with regard to the 
allocation of fees and expenses to the private equity fund. According to Hussein, both the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
(‘OCIE’) and the Asset Management Unit of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement (the ‘AMU’) have 
increasingly focused their attention on conflicts of interest with respect to private equity firms.622  
Hussein argues that in the US, the SEC has made it clear that it views conflicts as material and that 
private equity firms, as fiduciaries to their clients, must disclose them.623 In particular, the SEC 
beginning 2014 commenced the review of how private equity firms disclose the allocation of fees 
and expenses to their investors.624  
 
According to Rendón et al, the SEC reported widespread violations of law or material weaknesses 
in controls related to the allocation of fees and expenses among the newly registered private equity 
firms it examined.625 Rendón et al, referred to the remarks of Bowden626 who stated that the OCIE 
                                                 
619Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
620Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
621Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
622Hussein, A. (2015), ‘Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere: When ‘No Harm, No Foul’ is Not a Defense’, 30th April 
2015, for the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Available at http://www.pegcc.org/newsroom/in-
the-news/conflicts-conflicts-everywhere-when-no-harm-no-foul-is-not-a-defense/#_ftn3, accessed in May 
2015. 
623Hussein, A. (2015), ‘Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere: When ‘No Harm, No Foul’ is Not a Defense’, 30th April 
2015, for the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Available at http://www.pegcc.org/newsroom/in-
the-news/conflicts-conflicts-everywhere-when-no-harm-no-foul-is-not-a-defense/#_ftn3, accessed in May 
2015. 
624Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity 
Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at page 1. 
625Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Holton, R.E. and Sylvester, M.E. (2014), ‘New Developments in the SEC 
Focus on Private Funds’, Arnold and Porter LLP, December 2014, at page 1.  
626Bowden, A.J. (2014), ‘Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity’, remarks of Bowden, A.J., Director, Office of 
Compliance, Inspections and Examinations, Private Equity International (PEI), Private Fund Compliance 
Forum, NY 6th May 2014. Available  at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail / Speech/1370541735361#, 
accessed in May 2015.  
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found extensive evidence of insufficiently disclosed fees in the private equity industry, particularly 
payments to consultants;627 expenses shifted from a private equity firm to the private equity fund 
sometime after the private equity fund’s inception;628 the characterisation of expenses (traditionally 
regarded as being part of the management fee) as fund expenses;629 and a variety of hidden fees.630 
Therefore, despite the extensive negotiation of the terms and conditions of the fund agreements 
between the private equity firm and its investors, such agreements often still lack sufficient detail 
regarding the disclosure and allocation of fees and expenses.631 Rendón et al state that: 
 
‘Undisclosed fees and expenses may run afoul of the securities laws, creating the risk of both 
regulatory actions and investor lawsuits based on claims of purported fraud, misrepresentation, 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of limited partnership agreements. Although the typical rule 
is that a fact is material and must be disclosed if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of this omitted fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as important to its investment, there 
is the prospect that the SEC or investors may claim that any undisclosed allocation of fees and 
expenses is material.’632 
 
Riewe goes on to state that in the context of conflicts of interest, that there is:  
 
                                                 
627Consultants, also known as ‘operating partners’, are individuals whom the private equity firm engages to 
provide assistance to underlying portfolio investee companies. Operating partners often appear to investors to 
be employees of the private equity firm. However, unlike actual employees of the private equity firm (the 
expense of which is generally borne by the private equity firm), they are either paid directly by the portfolio 
companies they advise or their compensation is expensed to the private equity fund, and such payments do 
not reduce the management fee paid by the private equity fund to the private equity firm. According to the 
SEC, this arrangement is often not sufficiently disclosed to investors. See Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., 
Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity Management of Fees and Expenses: A 
Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at page 2. 
628For example, the private equity firm shifts expenses from the private equity firm to the private equity fund in 
the middle of the fund’s life, without disclosure to the investors. In certain cases, a private equity firm will hire 
an individual as its employee during the fundraising phase, only later to terminate and rehire the individual as 
a consultant’ or an ‘operating partner’, whose fees are paid by the private equity fund or by the underlying 
portfolio investee company rather than the private equity firm. See Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, 
K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary 
Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at page 2. 
629For example, a private equity firm bills the private equity fund for various functions that the private equity 
firm should perform in exchange for the management fee, such as certain regulatory compliance, accounting 
and investor reporting functions. However, private equity firms sometime change the characterization of such 
expenses from private equity firm expenses to private equity fund expenses without proper disclosure to 
investors. See Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private 
Equity Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter, May 2014, at page 2. 
630For example, certain fees are not disclosed to the private equity fund investors, such as transaction fees not 
contemplated by the private equity fund agreements that regulate the relationship between the private equity 
firm and investors. See Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. & Kurzman, J.S. (2014), 
‘Private Equity Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at 
page 2. 
631See Berman, K., Larkin, G., Giglio, P.V., Berthou, E., Harrell, M P., Murray, J.C. and Kittredge, G. (2015), 
‘Expense allocation: the SEC brings down the hammer’, Journal of Investment Compliance, 16(1). 
632Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity 
Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at pages 1-2. 
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‘no exception to disclosure: no ‘well-meaning or good-faith adviser’ exception for an investment 
adviser that legitimately believes it is putting its clients’ interests first notwithstanding any conflicts; 
no ‘mitigation’ exception for an investment adviser that believes it has taken adequate internal 
measures to account for potentially incompatible interests; and no ‘potential conflict’ exception for 
an investment adviser that did not act upon the conflict to enrich itself at the expense of its 
clients.’633 
 
Hussien, referring to the remarks of Riewe quoted above, state:  
 
‘Differently said, ‘no harm, no foul’ is not a defense; a manager ought to be identifying, disclosing 
and mitigating all conflicts of interest.’634 
 
Two important enforcement action cases in this regard was brought by the SEC in 2014, namely 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Clean Energy Capital, LLC and Scott A. 
Brittenham;635 (‘Clean Energy’) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Lincolnshire 
Management, Inc.636 (‘Lincolnshire’). In the Clean Energy case,637 the SEC brought charges against 
Clean Energy Capital, LLC (‘CEC’) and its main portfolio manager, Scott Brittenham.638 The SEC 
alleged that CEC and Brittenham improperly allocated more than $3 million of CEC’s expenses to 
certain private equity funds that CEC managed. The SEC alleged that such allocations were made 
without adequate disclosure to investors, and therefore constituted a misappropriation of assets from 
the CEC funds.639 Such alleged improper expenses included the salaries of the majority of CEC 
employees, executive bonuses, health benefits, retirement benefits and rent.640 These kinds of 
expenses are typically paid by the private equity firm out of the management fees that it receives 
from the private equity fund, rather than charged to the private equity fund. The SEC also alleged 
that CEC and Mr. Brittenham secretly caused the private equity funds to borrow money to pay the 
                                                 
633Riewe, J. (2014), ‘Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere’, remarks to IA Watch 17th Annual IA Compliance 
Conference: The Full 360 View, Julie M. Riewe is Co-Chief, Asset Management Unit, Division of Enforcement 
of the SEC, Washington, DC, 26th February 2015. Available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/conflicts-
everywhere-full-360-view.html, accessed in May 2015.  
634Hussein, A. (2015), ‘Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere: When ‘No Harm, No Foul’ is Not a Defense’, 30th April 
2015, for the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Available at http://www.pegcc.org/newsroom/in-
the-news/conflicts-conflicts-everywhere-when-no-harm-no-foul-is-not-a-defense/#_ftn3, accessed in May 
2015. 
635Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Clean Energy Capital, LLC and Scott A. Brittenham, 
(Respondents), Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 9551, 2014 WL 709469, February 2014. 
636Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Lincolnshire Management, Inc., (Respondents), Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 3927, September 22, 2014. 
637Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Clean Energy Capital, LLC and Scott A. Brittenham, 
(Respondents), Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 9551, 2014 WL 709469, February 2014. 
638On 25th February 25, 2014 the SEC instituted proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of Securities Act of 1933, 
Sections 15(b) and 21C of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sections 203(e), 203(f) and 203(k) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 9(b) of Investment Company Act of 1940 against Clean Energy 
Capital, LLC and Scott A. Brittenham. 
639Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-9667.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
640Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-9667.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
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expenses from CEC at unfavorable rates, pledging the funds’ own assets as collateral.641 Initially, 
CEC refuted the SEC’s charges and may have prevailed in the action, however on 17th October 2014 
CEC and Brittenham agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle the action.642 CEC and Brittenham neither 
admitted nor denied the final charges, which were listed in the settlement as fraud caused by 
negligence, a shift from the SEC’s initial charges of intentional fraud.643 According to Rendón  et al, 
despite the allegations in the CEC case being extreme: 
 
‘any undisclosed fees or expense allocations may be deemed to run afoul of the securities laws, 
particularly in the context of an SEC regime that is strongly enforcement-oriented. Undisclosed 
fees and expense allocations put private equity fund managers at risk of both regulatory action 
and investor lawsuits based on claims of purported fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary 
duty and breach of limited partnership agreements.’644 
 
In the Lincolnshire case,645 the SEC entered a cease and desist order against Lincolnshire 
Management Inc. finding among other things, that it violated Section 206(2) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 by breaching its fiduciary duty owed to its funds.646 The SEC charged 
Lincolnshire Management Inc. with failing to allocate expenses properly after Lincolnshire 
Management Inc. integrated portfolio companies of two affiliated private equity funds, which did have 
common ownership, and managed the two portfolio companies together, with the two companies 
sharing certain annual expenses based on each company’s contributions to their combined 
revenue.647 The SEC charged that this expense allocation policy was not properly followed. The 
SEC’s argument was that the co-mingling of assets across different private equity funds must be 
done in a manner that satisfies the private equity firm’s fiduciary duties to each fund and that prevents 
one private equity fund from benefiting to the detriment of the other. Although Lincolnshire 
Management Inc. never admitted to the charges, which included a failure to adopt and implement 
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the violation of section 206(4) and 
Rule 206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Advisers Act violations, Lincolnshire 
                                                 
641Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-9667.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
642Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Holton, R.E. and Sylvester, M.E. (2014), ‘New Developments in the SEC 
Focus on Private Funds’, Arnold and Porter LLP, December 2014, at page 2. 
643Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Holton, R.E. and Sylvester, M.E. (2014), ‘New Developments in the SEC 
Focus on Private Funds’, Arnold and Porter LLP, December 2014, at page 2. 
644Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity 
Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at page 2. 
645Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Lincolnshire Management, Inc., (Respondents), Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 3927, September 22, 2014. On 22nd September 2014, the SEC 
deemed it appropriate that cease-and-desist proceedings be instituted pursuant to Section 203(k) of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 against Lincolnshire Management Inc., being the Respondent. 
646The SEC also contended that Lincolnshire Management Inc. violated Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-7 of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 separately by failing to adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 arising from 
integrating two portfolio companies owned by separately advised Lincolnshire Management Inc. private equity 
funds. 
647Available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/ia-3927.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
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Management Inc. was ordered to cease and desist from such violations, and agreed to pay the SEC 
$2.3 million to settle the charges.648 The allegations in both the above mentioned cases are extreme 
in nature. The cases were settled before going to trial and it would have been interesting to see the 
US courts response thereto. What is clear though is that the SEC in the US is taking the allocation 
of fees and expenses seriously and is prepared to take appropriate action where necessary. 
According to Rendón  et al, the golden rule of disclosure in the private equity business model is that: 
 
‘if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of an omitted fact would be viewed by a 
reasonable investor as important to its investment decision, then the fact is material and 
disclosure is required. Depending on the circumstances … any allocation of fees and expenses 
to the fund or its portfolio companies that is not fully disclosed is material.’649 
 
Therefore it is important for private equity firms to adopt expense allocation policies and to take steps 
to ensure that expenses are allocated in accordance with those policies. In addition, private equity 
firms should ensure that they and the underlying portfolio companies also have written policies in 
place designed to allocate all expenses.650 It will also be interesting to see whether or not South 
African policy makers, the local private equity industry body and/or the local Regulator will respond 
to the US example in reviewing how private equity firms disclose the allocation of fees and expenses 
to their investors. If they do, the next question would be how they intend implementing such a review. 
 
4.3 Active Ownership 
 
It is evident from the contents of the earlier discussions651 that a key element of the private equity 
investment model is value creation through active ownership. For example, earlier it was stated that: 
 
                                                 
648Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Holton, R.E. and Sylvester, M.E. (2014), ‘New Developments in the SEC 
Focus on Private Funds’, Arnold and Porter LLP, December 2014, at pages 2-3. 
649Rendón, V.E., Fleishhacker, E.K., Lavin, K.J., Esser, M.B. and Kurzman, J.S. (2014), ‘Private Equity 
Management of Fees and Expenses: A Cautionary Tale’, Arnold and Porter LLP, May 2014, at page 3. 
650Robinson, D.T. and Sensoy, B.A. (2013), ‘Do private equity fund managers earn their fees? Compensation, 
ownership, and cash flow performance’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(11), at pages 2760-2797. 
651Paragraph 2 of this chapter defined private equity and in so doing active ownership was highlighted as a 
key element central to the definition of private equity. Secondly, paragraph 3 of chapter one discussed the 
various types of private equity transactions and it is evident that the private equity firm is the most important 
role player with regard to private equity investing because it plays an active role in raising money from 
investors; sourcing and executing private equity investments; and actively managing the private equity fund’s 
interest in such investments; and finally exiting the private equity fund’s interest from such investments. Thirdly, 
in paragraph 4.1 of this chapter it is also evident that the remuneration model of private equity firms have 
evolved based on the underlying principle of active ownership, particularly when it comes to justifying a private 
equity firm’s primary source of remuneration, namely carried interest. 
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‘The key characteristics of private equity investing can be highlighted as being that it requires 
equity participation; there is value added through active and ongoing involvement with the 
companies in which they invest; and that the investment objectives are of a long-term nature.’652  
 
It was also earlier argued (quoting Wright et al653) that the structuring of a management buyout should 
include the introduction of significant equity incentives for the incumbent management involved, 
together with substantial external funding and active monitoring by investors, such the private equity 
firm.654 Earlier in paragraph 2 of this chapter, the common characteristic in all the various definitions 
of private equity was active ownership. For example, an extract of the Emerging Markets Private 
Equity Association (EMPEA) definition of private equity reads: 
 
‘Given the core facets of the PE model – active ownership, often of minority stakes, in private 
businesses seeking not only capital but also enhanced governance or more professionalized 
management, over a period of several years.’655 
 
In addition, an extract of the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited 
(AVCAL) definition of private equity reads:  
 
‘Both involve active involvement by the investor in the governance and management of the 
investee business and both contemplate, at the time of investment, the subsequent sale of the 
investment rather than the indefinite retention of it.’656 
 
Therefore, as mentioned earlier in paragraph 3 of this chapter, private equity firms select portfolio 
companies at various stages of development into which they invest money and thereby acquire 
shareholder rights.657 The financing of the company is restructured to align better the incentives of 
management and investors and increase the potential for growth and value creation.658 
Representatives from the private equity firm, often highly experienced in the industry of the portfolio 
company, take a very active governance role in directing the company's strategy and supervising 
                                                 
652At page 17 earlier, quoting Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Contracting: An International Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc. 
653Wright, M.S., Robbie, K., Thompson, S. and Starkey, K. (1994), ‘Longevity and the life cycle of MBOs’, 
Strategic Management Journal 15, at pages 215-27. 
654At paragraph 3.2 of this chapter. 
655Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA) definition of private equity, as stated at paragraph 
2 earlier in this chapter 1. Available at http://empea.org/resources/facts-about-pe/, accessed in April 2015. 
656Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), (2007), ‘Private Equity in 
Australia’, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics, May 2007, at page 8, paragraph 5.1. 
As stated at page 14 of paragraph 2 earlier in this chapter 1. 
657Wright, M.S., Robbie, K., Thompson, S. and Starkey, K. (1994), ‘Longevity and the life cycle of MBOs’, 
Strategic Management Journal 15, at pages 215-27. 
658Wright, M.S., Robbie, K., Thompson, S. and Starkey, K. (1994), ‘Longevity and the life cycle of MBOs’, 
Strategic Management Journal 15, at pages 215-27. 
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management, though leaving day-to-day operational control to managers.659 When the value 
creation plans have been executed and the companies are ready to move into the next development 
stage, the private equity firm will evaluate the best point at which to realise the value built up in the 
underlying portfolio investee company, at which point the private equity firm will divest the private 
equity fund’s interest in the investee company.660   
 
Private equity firms conduct extensive due diligence on each prospective investment for the private 
equity fund and secure any other financing that might complement the equity investment. Thereafter 
they act as very engaged non-executive directors to the company, with strong participation in 
determining the composition of the board, deployment of management incentive systems, selection, 
support and revision of management teams, development of strategy, monitoring of performance 
and in the introduction of best management practices.661 According to Bloom et al, the active 
ownership by private equity firms often lead to better management practices and higher productivity 
growth.662 This published study of four thousand manufacturing firms in Europe, the US and Asia 
showed that private equity owned firms had better management practices than firms under any other 
type of ownership.663 A second study of US manufacturing firms demonstrates that private equity 
owned firms increase productivity two percentage points above non-private equity owned firms within 
two years and more than seventy percent of this outperformance is the result of better management 
of existing facilities.664 In addition, Lerner et al looked at the impact of ownership structures on 
research and development (R and D) investments.665 Their research shows that private equity owned 
companies are more effective investors in research and development than listed companies. The 
study analysed four hundred and ninety five firms and found that companies that undergo a buyout, 
pursue more economically important innovations as measured by patent citations in the years after 
private equity investment.666   
 
This active ownership principle has been subject to criticism, largely because of the general view 
that there is often a misalignment of interest between private equity firms and the investors whose 
money they manage; and there is also often a misalignment between the interests of the private 
                                                 
659Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc.  
660The ‘exiting’ of private equity investments are discussed in paragraph 3 of chapter four.  
661Acharya, V., Hahn, M., and Kehoe, C., (2009), ‘Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), January 2009. 
662Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J., (2009), ‘Do Private Equity Owned Firms Have Better 
Management Practices?’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2009.  
663Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J., (2009), ‘Do Private Equity Owned Firms Have Better 
Management Practices?’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2009.  
664Gurung, A. and Lerner, J. (2009), ‘Private Equity, Jobs & Productivity’, Economic Impact of Private Equity 
Report 2009. 
665Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P., (2008), ‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of 
Innovation’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008. 
666Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P., (2008), ‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of 
Innovation’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008. 
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equity firm and the interest of the underlying portfolio investee companies within which the private 
equity firm’s invest.667 For example with regard to the misalignment of interest between the private 
equity firm and the underlying portfolio company, the general view is that private equity firms often 
engage in asset stripping by selling off important parts of the portfolio companies, without having 
due regard for the longer term viability of the remaining entity.668 However, a response to such a 
criticism could be that often a company needs to undertake necessary restructuring by, for example, 
closing unprofitable business and/or product lines to preserve cash and defend its market position 
in order to guarantee long-term survival.669 Another response could be that a company that sells off 
a non-essential part of its operations at a fair price to a better owner is acting economically rationally 
and in almost all cases in the best interests of all parties.670 According to Davis et al, private equity 
owned companies in the US do divest more relative to non-private equity owned firms, but on the 
other hand they acquire more than non-private equity owned firms.671 Acharya et al, analysed sixty 
six of the three hundred and fifty UK transactions whose value exceeded €100 million for the period 
1996 to 2004.672 This study showed that while there were significant divestments in thirteen of the 
transactions, sixteen involved significant acquisitions by the portfolio company; the balance of the 
thirty seven transactions had neither significant acquisitions nor divestments.673 So the evidence is 
that private equity both divests and acquires more as they restructure the companies they own with 
a view of enhancing their value.674 Therefore it is submitted that private equity creates returns by 
developing more focused, better managed, operationally stronger companies with better prospects 
for long-term development and growth.675  
 
As mentioned earlier in paragraph 4 of this chapter, the private equity investment model has been 
criticised at two levels. Firstly, at the underlying portfolio investee company level and secondly, at 
the level of the private equity fund. At both levels, a common criticism has been the lack of 
transparency and disclosure of information by private equity firms and their investors; and the conflict 
of interests of the private equity firm with those of the investors whose money the private equity firm 
                                                 
667Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2007), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity 
Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 31, at pages 3218-3250. 
668Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2007), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity 
Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 31, at pages 3218-3250. 
669Gurung, A. and Lerner, J., (2009), ‘Private Equity, Jobs & Productivity’, Economic Impact of Private Equity 
Report 2009.  
670Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2007), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity 
Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 31, at pages 3218-3250. 
671Davis, S.J., Haltiwanger, J.C., Jarmin, R.S., Lerner, J. and Miranda, J. (2008), ‘Private Equity and 
Employment’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008. 
672Acharya, V., Hahn, M., and Kehoe, C., (2009), ‘Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), January 2009. 
673Acharya, V., Hahn, M., and Kehoe, C., (2009), ‘Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), January 2009. 
674Acharya, V., Hahn, M., and Kehoe, C., (2009), ‘Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), January 2009. 
675Gurung, A. and Lerner, J., (2009), ‘Private Equity, Jobs & Productivity’, Economic Impact of Private Equity 
Report 2009. 
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manages.676 Also in paragraph 4.2 of this chapter it is evident that there is a developing trend towards 
an increased focus on conflicts of interest with respect to private equity firms.  For instance, Hussein 
argues that in the US, the SEC has made it clear that it views conflicts as material and that private 
equity firms, as fiduciaries to their clients, must disclose them.677 This is evident from the case 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v BlackRock Advisors, LLC and Bartholomew A. 
Battista,678 whereby the SEC charged BlackRock with breaching its fiduciary duty by failing to 
disclose a conflict of interest created by the outside business activity of one of its portfolio managers 
(Daniel Rice).679 According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding, Daniel 
Rice was managing energy-focused funds and separately managed accounts at BlackRock when 
he founded Rice Energy, a family-owned and operated oil-and-natural gas company.680  Daniel Rice 
was the fund manager of Rice Energy and personally invested approximately $50 million in the 
company.  Daniel Rice’s three sons were the CEO, CFO, and VP of Geology of Rice Energy. In 
February 2010, Rice Energy formed a joint venture with Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. (‘ANR’), a 
publicly-traded coal company held in the BlackRock funds and accounts managed by Rice.681 By 
30th June 2011, ANR shares was the largest holding (9.4 percent) in the Rice-managed $1.7 billion 
BlackRock Energy and Resources Portfolio, primarily as a result of ANR acquiring two other public 
companies held in that portfolio. The SEC’s order finds that BlackRock knew and approved of Daniel 
Rice’s investment and involvement with Rice Energy as well as the joint venture, but failed to disclose 
this conflict of interest to either the boards of the BlackRock registered funds or its advisory 
clients. The SEC’s contention was that BlackRock violated its fiduciary obligation to eliminate the 
conflict of interest created by Daniel Rice’s outside business activity or otherwise disclose it to 
BlackRock’s fund boards and advisory clients. The SEC’s argument was that by failing to make such 
a disclosure, BlackRock deprived its clients of their right to exercise their independent judgment to 
determine whether the conflict might impact portfolio management decisions.682  
 
                                                 
676Chapter three will more fully examine these criticisms as part of the discussion on the corporate governance 
considerations for private equity. However, the discussion in chapter three will be restricted to the risks inherent 
to the private equity fund investors from potential conflicts of interest which may exist within the private equity 
firm or within the private equity fund and will outline possible mitigating measures alongside the potential 
conflict of interest risks. 
677Hussein, A. (2015), ‘Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere: When ‘No Harm, No Foul’ is Not a Defense’, 30th April 
2015, for the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Available at http://www.pegcc.org/newsroom/in-
the-news/conflicts-conflicts-everywhere-when-no-harm-no-foul-is-not-a-defense/#_ftn3, accessed in May 
2015. 
678Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v BlackRock Advisors, LLC and Bartholomew A. Battista, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 4065, Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC Release 
No. 31558, April 2015. 
679The SEC instituted public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Sections 203(e) and 
203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Sections 9(b) and 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 against BlackRock Advisors, LLC and pursuant to Section 203(k) of the Advisers Act and Section 9(f) of 
the Investment Company Act against Bartholomew A. Battista (together being the Respondents). 
680Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
681Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
682Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
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The SEC’s order also found that BlackRock and its then-chief compliance officer Bartholomew 
Battista caused the funds’ failure to report a ‘material compliance matter’, namely Rice’s violations 
of BlackRock’s private investment policy, to their boards of directors.683 The SEC’s contention was 
that BlackRock failed to adopt and implement written compliance policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to prevent violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the rules thereunder, as 
required by Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-7 thereunder, 
concerning the outside activities of its employees, including how they should be assessed and 
monitored for conflict purposes, and when an employee’s outside activity should be disclosed to the 
BlackRock funds’ board of directors or to BlackRock advisory clients.684 BlackRock’s chief 
compliance officer Bartholomew Battista was held to have caused BlackRock’s this compliance-
related violations.685 
 
The SEC’s order also found that BlackRock and Battista caused the registered funds’ failure to have 
the funds’ chief compliance officer report to the funds’ boards of directors, which was in violation of 
Rule 38a-1(a)(4)(iii)(B) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Daniel Rice’s violations of 
BlackRock’s private investment policy.686 The SEC’s view was that BlackRock and Battista knew 
about Rice’s violations, and knew or should have known that they were not reported to the funds’ 
boards.687 Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v BlackRock Advisors, LLC and 
Bartholomew A. Battista,688 is the first SEC case to charge violations of Rule 38a-1(a)(4)(iii)(B) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 in the US for failing to report a material compliance matter such 
as violations of the private equity firm’s policies and procedures to a fund board.689 The SEC’s 
argument is that BlackRock and Battista caused the funds’ failure to report Rice’s violations of 
BlackRock’s private investment policy and denied the funds’ boards critical compliance information 
alerting them to Rice’s outside business interests.690 
 
Similarly to the two previous cases discussed earlier in paragraph 4.2 of this chapter,691 BlackRock 
agreed to be censured and consented to the entry of the SEC’s order finding that the firm willfully 
violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-
                                                 
683Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
684Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
685Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
686Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
687Available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4065.pdf, accessed in May 2015, at page 2. 
688Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v BlackRock Advisors, LLC and Bartholomew A. Battista, 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release No. 4065, Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC Release 
No. 31558, April 2015. 
689Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in  May 2015. 
690Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in May 2015. 
691Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Lincolnshire Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, SEC Release No 3927, September 2014 and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (US) v Clean 
Energy Capital, LLC and Scott A. Brittenham, (Respondents), Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC Release 
No. 9551, 2014 WL 709469, February 2014. 
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7.692  The order finds that the firm caused violations of Rule 38a-1 of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940. 693  Battista also consented to the entry of the order finding that he caused violations of 
Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, Rule 206(4)-7, and Rule 38a-1.694 BlackRock and Battista were 
required to cease and desist from committing or causing any further violations, however BlackRock 
and Battista neither admitted nor denied the findings. In the end, BlackRock agreed to settle the 
charges and pay a $12 million penalty and Battista agreed to pay a $60,000 penalty to settle the 
charges against him. In addition, BlackRock agreed to engage an independent compliance 
consultant to conduct an internal review.695 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, a key element of the private equity investment 
model is value creation through active ownership. This is largely due to the fact that representatives 
from the private equity firm, often highly experienced in the industry of the underlying portfolio 
investee company, take a very active role in the company, though leaving day-to-day operational 
control to the company’s managers. In addition, various academic studies mentioned above indicate 
that private equity investing creates value in portfolio companies; and that private equity backed 
companies grow employment, sales and assets faster than comparable firms without private equity 
backing.696 However, this active ownership principle has been subject to criticism as highlighted 
above, largely because of the general view that there is a misalignment of interest between private 




It is evident from the above discussion that private equity is multi-faceted and a complex business 
that requires a wide range of legal, financial and business skills. It is important for policymakers to 
understand the fundamentals of private equity as an asset class because it forms an important part 
of the financial markets and can significantly enhance capital market efficiency.697 Private equity can 
                                                 
692Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in  May 2015. 
693Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in  May 2015. 
694Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in  May 2015. 
695Available at www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-71.html, accessed in  May 2015. 
696Achleitner, A.K. and Klockner, O., (2005), ‘Employment contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital 
in Europe’, European Venture Capital Association, November 2005. For example, private equity firms are able 
to support portfolio companies in their innovation led growth by bringing experience and expertise in supporting 
growing firms and commercialising new technologies and business models. See also Acharya, V., Hahn, M., 
and Kehoe, C., (2009), ‘Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity’, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), January 2009. See also Gurung, A. and Lerner, J., (2009), ‘Private Equity, 
Jobs and Productivity’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2009. See also Davis, S.J., 
Haltiwanger, J.C., Jarmin, R.S., Lerner, J. and Miranda, J. (2008), ‘Private Equity and Employment’, The Global 
Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008. See also Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P., (2008), 
‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of Innovation’, The Global Economic Impact of Private 
Equity Report 2008. See also Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J., (2009), ‘Do Private Equity Owned 
Firms Have Better Management Practices?’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2009. 
697Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P. (2011), ‘Private equity and long‐run investment: The case of 
innovation’, The Journal of Finance, 66(2), at pages 445-477. 
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widen the availability of capital, increase the effectiveness of company valuations, identify companies 
with significant growth potential and facilitate their transformation.698 South African policy makers 
should bear in mind the significant variation in the level and form of regulation of private equity in 
different jurisdictions around the globe and should be conscious of the need to ensure that its regime 
is effective. Over-regulation can be detrimental to capital market efficiency, but too little regulation 
can damage market confidence. South African policy makers as part of their ongoing regulatory 
approach should aim to maintain the competitive position of the South African capital markets, of 
which the private equity market has become an important part. 
 
It would be fair to state that South Africa faces two crucial challenges. South Africa needs more new 
companies that (a) can compete internationally and facilitate economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and (b) address the major issue of unemployment. The above-mentioned is reaffirmed by the South 
African government’s vision for its economy, captured in the Integrated Manufacturing Strategy 
(‘IMS’) of the Department of Trade and Industry.699 The IMS states that South Africa needs an 
economy that can sustainably meet the needs of all its citizens. The policy document on South 
Africa’s company law reform stated that a key role for government is to ensure that the regulatory 
framework within which enterprises operate promotes growth, employment, innovation, stability, 
good governance, confidence and international competitiveness.700 Furthermore, the South African 
Government’s National Development Plan (‘NDP’) states that the private sector employs about three-
quarters of South Africa’s workers and accounts for over two thirds of investment and research and 
development (‘R and D’) expenditure.701 The NDP states that: 
 
‘South Africa needs a thriving private sector that is investing in productive capacity. While the 
profit motive drives business, companies cannot grow unless they operate in an environment 
where employment and income levels are rising. Legislation requires business to consider 
employment equity, black economic empowerment, the environment, skills development, local 
content, small-business development, community social responsibility and several location-
specific imperatives, such as mining area development strategies. In this complex context, it is in 
the long-term interests of all businesses for the country to grow faster and for more people to be 
employed.’702 
                                                 
698Lerner, J., Sorensen, M. and Strömberg, P. (2011), ‘Private equity and long‐run investment: The case of 
innovation’, The Journal of Finance, 66(2), at pages 445-477. 
699Available at www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/ims_0.pdf, accessed at May 2015. 
700Department of Trade and Industry (2004), ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’, Report presented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, South Africa. 
701South African Government, National Planning Commission (2013), ‘National Development Plan 2030: 
Executive Summary’, The Department of the Presidency of the South African Government, at pages 47-48. 
Available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-
%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
702South African Government, National Planning Commission (2013), ‘National Development Plan 2030: 
Executive Summary’, The Department of the Presidency of the South African Government, at pages 47-48. 




Private equity can to a large extent afford considerable economic and employment benefits that 
address these challenges. Policymakers around the world have tried to duplicate the success of the 
US private equity market because they believe that private equity spurred innovation, led to the 
formation of new companies and employment growth in the US, and can do so elsewhere. This is 
an important premise of this thesis, particularly in light of the prevailing socio-economic and political 
debate in South Africa. As discussed earlier,703 the claim that private equity spurs economic growth 
via innovation and employment growth is supported by the results of two leading studies by Kortum 
and Lerner704 and Belke et al705. Kortum and Lerner706 set out to evaluate the common premise that 
private equity has a profound impact on innovation. Before Kortum and Lerner’s article, the purported 
relationship between private equity and innovation, however, had not been systematically 
scrutinized. These authors addressed this omission by exploring the experience of twenty industries 
covering the US manufacturing sector over the three-decade period. They first examined, in reduced-
form regressions, whether, controlling for R and D spending, the amount of private equity funding 
has an impact on the number of patented innovations. They found that private equity disbursements 
are associated with a significant increase in patenting.707 
 
Whereas Kortum and Lerner attempted to answer the question of whether private equity fosters 
innovation; Belke et al go one step further in examining the premise that private equity is crucial for 
financing structural change, new firms and innovations and therefore possibly also for employment 
growth.708 The authors argue that the ability of a country to encourage and sustain innovation by 
firms is one of the main sources of economic and employment growth. In addition, logic suggests 
that private equity firms have a key role to play in this respect because they have often been able to 
provide promising companies with adequate risk financing.709 The authors highlight that economists 
in the past have not paid attention to the possibility of a virtuous circle between entrepreneurial 
dynamism, innovative start-ups, and a dynamic private equity industry and job creation.710 
 
                                                 
703Department of Trade and Industry (2004), ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’, Report presented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, South Africa, at 
pages 9-10. 
704Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (1998), ‘Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation?’, NBER Working Papers 6846, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
705Belke, A., Fehn, R., and Foster, N., (2003), ‘Does Venture Capital Investment Spur Employment Growth?’, 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 930. 
706Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (1998), ‘Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation?’, NBER Working Papers 6846, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
707Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (1998), ‘Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation?’, NBER Working Papers 6846, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
708Belke, A., Fehn, R., and Foster, N., (2003), ‘Does Venture Capital Investment Spur Employment Growth?’, 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 930. 
709Belke, A., Fehn, R., and Foster, N., (2003), ‘Does Venture Capital Investment Spur Employment Growth?’, 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 930. 
710Belke, A., Fehn, R., and Foster, N., (2003), ‘Does Venture Capital Investment Spur Employment Growth?’, 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 930. 
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Both the above-mentioned studies show that private equity investing is conducive to job creation in 
new and innovative firms and that it facilitates the process of structural change towards the economy. 
Belke et al are quick to point out that their results, however, should not be misinterpreted as a 
justification for government subsidies to the private equity industry or for government-run private 
equity activities. On the contrary, the government should provide an institutional framework which is 
favourable to the development of a flourishing private equity industry and entrepreneurial dynamism. 
There are a number of possible ways of achieving the latter.711 For example, the pension fund system 
could be capitalized to a greater extent and pension funds could be allowed to invest part of their 
assets in private equity firms.712 Based on the US example, this should further spur the development 
of the private equity market. Secondly, a well functioning market for stock market listings needs to 
be created as an exit route for private equity investments.713 Thirdly, the education system, especially 
at the university level, along with an institutional framework for transforming innovative ideas into 
new business ventures would be the primary levers to address the scarcity of able human 
resources.714 Lastly, the tax system should provide adequate incentives for entrepreneurs to take 
risks rather than having the government participate only via highly progressive taxes in the upside 
of ventures.715 
 
It will also become apparent from the discussion in chapter four that much of the regulatory 
developments in the US, Canada, Australia and UK have been directed towards mitigating against 
the risks posed by private equity investing rather than aimed at the promotion of private equity 
investing.716 For example as mentioned at the beginning of chapter one, in the UK, a House of 
Commons Treasury Report listed several disadvantages of private equity investing relative to 
company shares traded on a stock exchange (publically traded shares).717 
 
While private equity has been found to contribute to increased economic growth, it has also been 
argued that the studies analysing the interrelationship between private equity and economic growth 
have not clearly highlighted the influence of regulation on the impact of private equity on economic 
growth.718 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Stromberg argues that the relationship between 
private equity and economic growth could be in the reverse, that is, economic growth contributes to 
                                                 
711Bedu, N., and Montalban, M. (2014), ‘Analysing the uneven development of private equity in Europe: legal 
origins and diversity of capitalism’, Socio-Economic Review, 12(1), at pages 33-70. 
712Bedu, N., and Montalban, M. (2014), ‘Analysing the uneven development of private equity in Europe: legal 
origins and diversity of capitalism’, Socio-Economic Review, 12(1), at pages 33-70. 
713See paragraph 3 of chapter four. 
714Bedu, N., and Montalban, M. (2014), ‘Analysing the uneven development of private equity in Europe: legal 
origins and diversity of capitalism’, Socio-Economic Review, 12(1), at pages 33-70. 
715See paragraph 2 of chapter four. 
716Discussed in detail in chapter four. 
717House of Commons Treasury Committee, (2007), ‘Private Equity’, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, 
Volume 1, Ordered by House of Commons, July 2007, at chapter 3, at pages 11-18. 
718Gatauwa, J.M & Mwithiga, A.S (2014), ‘Private Equity and Economic Growth: A Critical Review of the 
Literature’, Published: European Centre for Research Training and Development, June 2014 2(3) at pages 1-
10.  
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private equity activity.719 Nevertheless, the above mentioned countries have recognised the 
contribution of private equity to economic growth and business development, but they have also 
been cognisant of the risks. Some of the risks commonly associated with private equity investing 
mentioned in this chapter are conflicts of interest, lack of transparency and disclosure, high leverage 
and the allocation of fees and expenses by private equity firms.  However, the growth of the South 
African private equity industry will depend on creating an environment in which investors and 
regulators alike clearly see the advantages and disadvantages of private equity. Private equity as 
an asset class has clear and demonstrable benefits for the South African economy, but also poses 
several dangers. Despite obvious weaknesses, private equity has become an attractive investment 
choice amongst investors and as a source of equity financing.  
 
Regulatory policy in South Africa needs to recognise the unique South African context and promote 
transformation consistent with the prevailing socio-political and economic climate. In addition using 
of private equity methodology as a financial instrument can assist the South African economy to 
foster the attainment of these objectives. As mentioned earlier, good regulatory policy can create a 
protective and vibrant environment for economic activity but it cannot, by itself, create that activity. 
Investors and economic participants in creating such activity respond to a wide range of incentives 
and disincentives. It is evident from the above discussion that private equity has, will and must 
continue to play an important role in the South African economy. 
 
Chapter two will provide an analysis of the key features of private equity fund formation. The 
discussion will include a discussion of the general private equity fund structure, the regulatory 
requirements of private equity firms, and certain regulatory considerations relevant in operating a 
private equity fund in South Africa. The discussion will focus on fund formation as it pertains to South 
Africa, however at certain instances reference will be made to private equity fund formation in foreign 
jurisdictions such the US, UK, Australia, and Canada.  
  
                                                 
719Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research 
Findings’, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute for Financial Research, September 2009, at page 6. 
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This chapter will provide an analysis of the key features of private equity fund formation. This will 
include an analysis of the general private equity fund structure, the regulatory requirements of private 
equity firms, and certain regulatory considerations relevant in operating a private equity fund in South 
Africa. The analysis will focus on fund formation as it pertains to South Africa, however at certain 
instances reference will be made to private equity fund formation in foreign jurisdictions such the US, 
UK, Australia, and Canada. While this chapter will provide a legal analysis of the law as it pertains 
to partnerships and trusts, it will also attempt to cover the key legal and regulatory requirements of 
fund formation, such as the licensing requirements that have to be complied with by a private equity 
firm before it can manage a private equity fund. Chapter two will argue that the two main legal 
vehicles suitable for a equity fund is the bewind trust and en commandite partnership.720 The reasons 
for the use of these two legal structures, are that they both (a) allow the income and capital gains of 
the private equity fund to be taxed in the hands of investors according to the tax status of each 
investor; (b) allow for the appointment of a private equity firm, which will be responsible for the daily 
administration of the private equity fund. This ‘outsourcing’ of the daily administration and all 
operational matters allows the private equity firm a fair amount of autonomy in sourcing and 
executing private equity investments on behalf of the private equity fund; (c) provide investors in the 
private equity fund with limited liability. The investor’s liability is restricted to the actual capital amount 
committed to the private equity fund; and (d) afford contractual flexibility in structuring and 
documenting the commercial arrangements between the investors and the private equity firm, which 
also means that the private equity fund can be established fairly quickly applying internationally 
acceptable contractual terms.  
 
The legal structure of a private equity fund needs to take into account all the specificities of the 
private equity business model, therefore this chapter will critically analyse, inter alia, the legal nature; 
general taxation considerations; administration; termination; and parties to both the en commandite 
partnership and bewind trust. The first part of this chapter comprehensively deals with the pertinent 
legal characteristics of the en commandite partnership and bewind trust, and examines the rationale 
behind these two legal structures and their tax implications. The second part of this chapter 
addresses the regulatory and licensing considerations as it pertains to South Africa. Reference will 
                                                 
720Chapter four will discuss the Venture Capital Company (‘VCC’) initiative, which is the only South African 
specific tax incentive scheme encouraging investment in unlisted companies and is regulated by section 12J 
of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. However, it is seldom used to structure third party private equity funds in. 
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be made to the commonly used private equity fund vehicles in foreign jurisdictions such as the US, 
UK, Australia, and Canada.721  
 
Paragraph 4 of this chapter analyses the key regulatory and licensing requirements, but also the key 
trends and developments in the relevant areas, highlighting the most significant issues which are 
current and emerging, both in South Africa and the foreign jurisdictions mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, with this in mind, chapter two aims to: 
 
 Critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of private equity fund structures such as the 
en commandite partnership and bewind trust, and contribute to the policy considerations 
postulated in chapter five; and 
 Provide a critical comparison of the private equity fund structures and pertinent regulatory 
developments in foreign jurisdictions such the US, UK, Australia, and Canada, which would 
encourage best practices and necessitate requirements for efficient fund structuring in South 
Africa.722 
 
2. Private Equity Fund Defined 
 
Private equity funds are investment vehicles formed by private equity firms looking to raise capital to 
make multiple investments in a specified industry sector or geographic region.723 According to 
Naidech: 
‘Private funds are ‘blind pools’ under which passive investors make a commitment to invest a set 
amount of capital over time, entrusting the fund’s sponsor to source, acquire, manage and divest 
the fund’s investments.’724 
 
According to Persuad and Atkinson,725 the ‘term private equity fund’ is used to describe a broad 
range of actively managed pooled investment vehicles that invest in underlying companies and these 
                                                 
721Chapter four is a comparative study of the extent to which the law impacts the private equity market. The 
applicable regulatory developments and legislation of the US, UK, Canada and Australia are analysed and 
compared to the South African position in order to determine whether the South African law can learn anything 
from these jurisdictions. Chapter four will consider and analyse two key impediments; namely tax legislation 
and exit alternatives; and show how legislation could effectively address the former and how the lack of exit 
routes is an impediment to the growth of the South African private equity industry. 
722See paragraph 3.6 of this chapter hereinafter. 
723Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at pages 1-5. Available at www.chadbourne.com/files/publication/ 
3d5a9a56-734c-4d30-a5e4- 0a8c593967ab/presentation/publicationattachment/12cdc9fc-964d-4b0e-a0d4-
c48ce9dd7c2f/naidech_privateequityfundformation_nov11.pdf, accessed in May 2015. 
724Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 1. 
725Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-3. 
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pooled investment vehicles have a finite duration.726 In South Africa, these private equity funds are 
typically organized as bewind trusts or en commandite partnerships where sophisticated and 
institutional investors make a capital commitment to fund investments over the duration of the fund. 
Gilligan and Wright define a private equity fund as a:727 
 
‘form of ‘investment club’ in which the principal investors are institutional investors such as 
pension funds, investment funds, endowment funds, insurance companies, banks, family 
offices/high net worth individuals and funds of funds, as well as the private equity fund managers 
themselves.’728 
 
These authors argue that the objective of a private equity fund is to invest equity or risk capital in a 
portfolio of private companies which are identified and researched by the private equity firm; and 
which are generally designed to generate capital profits from the sale of investments in the portfolio 
companies rather than income from dividends, fees and interest payments.729 As discussed in 
chapter one,730 the key economic incentives for the private equity firm are management fees and 
profit participation.731 The key economic incentive for investors is the opportunity to earn a rate of 
return on their invested capital through access to a portfolio of investee companies sourced and 
managed by the private equity firm that has expertise in the target sectors or geographies of the 
fund.732 
 
According to Gilligan and Wright, a private equity fund can be structured in several ways; however 
they are very similar to many other collective investment vehicles.733 These authors state that the 
differences are largely due to regulatory and tax issues in the various jurisdictions that impact the 
operation of the private equity fund and its investors; and the fact that private equity funds usually 
have a ten-year limited life period.734 Nevertheless, a private equity fund must be structured to 
achieve a balance between the maximum tax efficiency to the investors and private equity firm; to 
be able to manage the fund’s and private equity firm’s regulatory obligations; control and manage 
                                                 
726Typically ten years with the ability to extend the term for two or three consecutive one-year periods. 
727Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 29. 
728Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 29. 
729Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 29. 
730Discussed in paragraph 4 of chapter one. 
731Referred to as ‘carried interest’ and as discussed in paragraph 4 of chapter one. 
732Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 1. 
733Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 29. 
734The aim of the private equity fund model is to eliminate entity-level tax while protecting the investors in the 
fund from personal liability for the debts and obligations of the fund. 
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potential liabilities to the investors and private equity firm; and maintain confidentiality regarding its 
investors.735 
 
There are several common criticisms of the private equity fund structure. For instance, a typical 
private equity fund is an institution-only investment vehicle that is predominantly only available to 
institutions and other larger sophisticated investors.736 For example, a private equity fund will require 
investors to commit large minimum capital amounts.737 This feature invariably limits access to many 
‘smaller’ and less sophisticated investors. A further common criticism is that private equity funds are 
illiquid by their very nature because private equity firms take a long term view when investing in 
underlying portfolio investee companies.738 It is for this reason that private equity funds are typically 
structured as ten-year vehicles.739 Despite the criticisms of the private equity fund model, the primary 
aim of the model is to eliminate entity-level tax while protecting the investors in the fund from personal 
liability for the debts and obligations of the fund. 
 
It is submitted that a private equity fund is a collective vehicle that makes investments in a portfolio 
of underlying companies. Typically a private equity fund has a number of investors whose liability is 
limited to the amount of their investment in the fund; and which is managed by one private equity 
firm on behalf of all the investors.740 A private equity fund may take minority or majority stakes in its 
investments in underlying portfolio investee companies, for example it will typically take a majority 
stake in the case of a buyout.741 When a private equity fund makes an investment in an underlying 
portfolio company, there is usually bank debt or other debt capital raised to meet part of the capital 
required to fund the acquisition.742 In this regard, there are a variety of private equity funds with 
different investment types and purposes. For example, buyout funds acquire controlling interests in 
companies, whereas venture capital funds invest in early and development stage companies. This 
chapter intends to provide an analysis of the key considerations involved in forming a private equity 
fund including: 
 
 The legal forms of a private equity fund in South Africa; 
 The legal forms of private equity funds in the US, UK, Canada and Australia;  
                                                 
735Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at page 29. 
736Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at pages 47-1 to 47-66. 
737In South Africa, this could be R50 million upwards. 
738For example, a private equity firm will typically commit to each underlying investment for several years. 
739Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at pages 47-1 to 47-66. 
740Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW Corporate 
Finance Faculty, 2nd Edition, March 2010, at pages 29-30. 
741As discussed in paragraph 3 of chapter one. 
742As discussed in paragraph 3 of chapter one. 
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 The regulatory requirements of private equity firms in South Africa and abroad; and 
 Highlight further regulatory considerations relevant in operating a private equity fund in South 
Africa.  
 
This chapter will not discuss the taxation of private equity funds, other than to highlight general 
taxation considerations with regard to partnerships and trusts in paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 
respectively. A discussion on the taxation of private equity funds is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
however chapter four does examine the key impediments to the development of a private equity 
market and will argue that tax legislation is one such impediment. Chapter four will also discuss the 
applicable regulatory developments and legislation of the US, UK, Canada and Australia and 
compare it to the South African position in order to determine whether  the South African law can 
learn anything from these jurisdictions. 
 
3. Private Equity Fund: Legal Form 
 
Private equity funds are structured as closed-end investment vehicles. It will be discussed later that 
in South Africa these closed-end private equity investment vehicles are structured as either bewind 
trusts or en commandite partnerships. In addition, it will be noted that a principal advantage of using 
either a bewind trust or an en commandite partnership as a fund vehicle is because both these 
vehicles are ‘pass-through’ entities for income tax purposes and, therefore, are not subject to 
corporate income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Instead, the bewind trust or en 
commandite partnership’s income, gains, losses and deductions are passed through to the investor’s 
and taxed only once at the investor level.743 A second advantage of using these two legal structures 
is that the investors in the fund, similar to the shareholders in a company, benefit from limited liability 
and are not personally liable for the liabilities of the bewind trust or en commandite partnership.744 
Therefore an investor’s obligations and liabilities to contribute capital and/or make payments to the 
private equity fund are limited to its capital commitment and its share of the fund’s assets, subject to 
the applicable laws. A third advantage of using these two legal structures is that they both allow for 
the appointment of a private equity firm. The private equity firm becomes responsible for all the daily 
operational and administrative duties of the private equity fund, including the sourcing and execution 
of private equity investments on behalf of the private equity fund. Finally, these features, together 
with the contractual nature of both legal forms, allow for private equity funds to be established with 
relative ease; which typically include internationally acceptable contractual terms and organisational 
practices. 
 
                                                 
743See discussion on tax considerations impacting private equity in chapter four. 
744See generally Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), 
‘Contemporary Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town. 




3.1 Legal Form in South Africa 
 
The private equity industry in South Africa does not have a specifically designated regulator or its 
own industry-specific legislation. Apart from case law, private equity investment in South Africa is 
regulated by various enactments. Applicable legislation include inter alia the Companies Act,745 the 
Collective Investment Schemes Act,746 Trust Property Control Act,747 Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act,748 Pension Funds Act,749 The Financial Markets Act750 and the Income 
Tax Act.751 The choice of the most appropriate legal structure of a private equity fund starts with the 
choice of the most effective and suitable legal vehicle. As repeatedly stated, the predominant legal 
forms used by private equity firms in South Africa are the bewind trust and the en commandite 
partnership. As mentioned earlier, the legal structure of a private equity fund needs to take into 
account all the specificities of the private equity business model. The paragraph will analyse, 
therefore, the pertinent legal characteristics of the en commandite partnership and bewind trust, and 
examines the rationale behind these two legal structures and their tax implications. 
 
There are no major tax advantages or disadvantages of the bewind trust over the en commandite 
partnership structure and vice versa, particularly where all the investors in the fund and all the 
investments of the fund are domiciled in South Africa. Income, capital gains and any other proceeds 
from the portfolio companies ought to be subject to taxation at the investor level but not at the private 
equity fund level (to avoid double taxation).  Private equity funds are structured depending on the 
individual circumstances of the investors the funds are designed to attract. Investors can generally 
be classified into three categories, namely (a) local investors that are taxable in South Africa; (b) 
local investors that are exempt from a South African tax perspective, for instance pension funds; and 
(c) non-residents that are generally not subject to tax in South Africa.  
 
A second driver is limited liability. The private equity fund must provide for limited liability because 
investors will generally require it. Limited liability can be provided by means of a company in terms 
of Companies Act 71 of 2008. A private equity fund can also be structured as a company 
incorporated or registered under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. In terms of the company structure, 
the ownership rights of an investor are those of a shareholder.752 However, the downside of using a 
                                                 
745Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
746Collective Investment Schemes Act 45 of 2002. 
747Trust Property Control Act, 57 of 1988. 
748Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002.  
749Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956. 
750The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
751Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
752Pretorius, J.T., Delport, P.A., Havenga, M. and Vermaas, M. (1999), ‘Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book : a Collection of Cases on Company Law, with Explanatory Notes and 
Comments’, Juta and Company Ltd, 6th Edition, at pages 35-37. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 118 
 
company is that it does not create any conduit with reference to the flow-through of income and 
losses which may arise from the activities of the fund from a tax perspective. For instance, if a 
company is used, then capital gains and any other proceeds from the underlying portfolio investee 
companies would be subject to taxation at the investor level and at the private equity fund level 
(double taxation). Both a bewind trust and en commandite partnership provides investors with limited 
liability and an investor will not have liability exceeding its contractual commitment to the private 
equity fund.753 In the case of the en commandite partnership, the rights and duties of the partners 
amongst themselves are determined by the partnership agreement.754 Since the partnership, unlike 
a company, is not a separate legal persona in its own right, these rights and duties do not exist vis-
à-vis the partnership, but only vis-à-vis the co-partners in the partnership.755 Every partner is entitled 
to share in the net profits of the partnership and is obliged to share in the net losses too. In the case 
of a bewind trust, the beneficiaries of the trust will enjoy limited liability for the debts of the trust, 
irrespective of whether the trust is an ordinary trust or a bewind trust.756 
 
A third driver would be the issue of perpetual succession. The private equity fund must provide for 
perpetual succession, a legal term which describes the continuation of an entity’s existence despite 
the death, bankruptcy, change in membership or exit from the business of any owner or member or 
any transfer of shares. A fourth consideration would be the regulatory environment in South Africa. 
There must not be any laws or regulations restricting or limiting the investment activities and 
marketing of private equity funds.  
 
3.1.1 Use of a Partnership 
 
According to Henning, partnership law is as old as commerce itself and its history as a profit-sharing 
‘device’ can be traced from the ancient Near-Eastern civilizations to its present day position as one 
of the most important forms of business enterprise.757 At the outset it must be noted that it is not the 
intention of this chapter to critically analyse all the salient aspects of partnership law, but rather to 
list the five essentials of a partnership to provide a context for the discussion on the distinguishing 
features of an en commandite partnership.   
 
                                                 
753Pretorius, J.T., Delport, P.A., Havenga, M. and Vermaas, M. (1999), ‘Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book : a Collection of Cases on Company Law, with Explanatory Notes and 
Comments’, Juta and Company Ltd, 6th Edition, at pages 35-37. 
754Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at pages 239-240. 
755Henning, J.J. and Delport, H.J. (1997), ‘Partnership’ in LAWSA volume 19 (revised in 2006 by Henning, J.J, 
assisted by Snyman-van Deventer). 
756Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2012), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 31st edition. 
757Henning, J.J. (2007), ‘The Mediaeval Contractum Trinius and the Law of Partnership’, Fundamina: A Journal 
of Legal History, 13(2), at page 34. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 119 
 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that partnerships are not addressed by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
and are largely governed by common law. The Companies Act 61 of 1973, which preceded the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, imposed a maximum limit of twenty partners. The current Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 no longer places any restriction on the number of partners or members of an 
association formed for carrying on business for the acquisition of gain, and a partnership may now 
have an unlimited number of partners.758 Henning also states that the contribution of Roman law is 
evident both in so far as the basic concept of partnership as a consensual contract of the utmost 
good faith as well as the relationship constituted by it between the partners inter se are concerned.759 
He states the following:  
 
‘Developments advanced by the lex mercatoria include the doctrine of mutua praepositio, the 
liability in solidum of partners to third parties for partnership obligations and the entity theory of 
the legal nature of partnership. The commenda was an arrangement by which an investor 
(commendator) entrusted capital to a merchant (commendatarius) for employment in business on 
the understanding that the commendator, while not in name a party to the enterprise and though 
entitled to a share of the profits, would not be liable for losses beyond his capital. This concept 
served as the precursor of the present day Continental (and South African) partnership en 
commandite as well as the Anglo-American limited partnership.’760 
 
As stated above, the relationship between partners must display uberrimae fides,761 the utmost good 
faith or commonly referred to as the highest degree of good faith; and this requirement must at all 
times be considered when drafting the terms of a partnership agreement and/or any dealing in 
relation to such partnership.762 For instance, a partner would be in breach of his duty of utmost good 
faith, if it is found that such partner made a secret profit, or competes in business with the partnership. 
Therefore, a partner must not put him/herself in a situation where his/her personal interests and the 
interests of the partnership conflict or may potentially be in conflict.763 According to Henning, a 
partner is accountable to the partnership for any profits or benefits he/she accrues in the 
                                                 
758See Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 68-69. 
759Henning, J.J. (2007), ‘The Mediaeval Contractum Trinius and the Law of Partnership’, Fundamina: A Journal 
of Legal History, 13(2), at pages 33-34. 
760Henning, J.J. (2007), ‘The Mediaeval Contractum Trinius and the Law of Partnership’, Fundamina: A Journal 
of Legal History, 13(2), at pages 33-34. This concept of limiting the liability of non-managing investors spread 
from Italy to French commercial law, becoming the société en commandite, the predecessor of the present 
limited or en commandite partnership. It was incorporated into Roman-Dutch law retaining its French name. 
See  Van der Linden, J. (1806), ‘Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek’, Unkown Publisher, at 
4.1.12. 
761The Latin expression meaning utmost good faith. 
762This theoretical framework of the law of partnerships discussed in paragraph 3 of this chapter 2 will be 
contextualised to its practical aspects with regard to the relationship between the private equity fund manager 
and the investors, as well as the private equity funds’ assets/underlying portfolio investee company(ies) in 
paragraph 4 of chapter 3.  
763See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd (1921) AD 168. 
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performance of his/her duties and cannot apportion for themselves profits, assets, opportunities and 
benefits which are those of the partnership.764 In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 
Ltd,765 Innes CJ stated that: 
 
‘where one man stands to another in a position of confidence, involving a duty to protect the 
interests of that other he is not allowed to make a secret profit at the other’s expense or place 
himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty.’766  
 
Furthermore, Gibson et al define a partnership as a contract between persons, in which the persons 
concerned agree to contribute money, labour or skill to a common stock and to carry on business 
with the object of making a profit for their joint benefit.767 Gibson et al states that the term partnership 
may either refer to the contract between the parties or to the relationship brought about by that 
contract.768 Therefore, a partnership may be established through a legally binding agreement 
between the intending partners, commonly referred to as a contract.769 In Oblowitz v Oblowitz,770 it 
was held that it is essential that there should be a valid contract between the parties, otherwise no 
partnership can arise. All essentials of a contract must therefore be present, for example, the contract 
must not be illegal or contrary to public policy. However, the essential feature is the contract, for the 
rights and obligations of the partners flow from the terms, express or implied, of their agreement.771 
It was held in Festus v Worcester Municipality772 that a contract of partnership need not necessarily 
be expressed, it could be tacit or implied from the facts; provided the parties admit of no other 
conclusion than that the parties intended to create a partnership. However, it would be better for the 
partnership agreement to be in writing. Therefore a partnership may be formed by the conduct of the 
parties.773  
                                                 
764Henning, J.J. (2007), ‘The Mediaeval Contractum Trinius and the Law of Partnership’, Fundamina: A Journal 
of Legal History, 13(2) at page 33. 
765Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd (1921) AD 168. 
766Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd (1921) AD 168. 
767Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 240. See also Henning, J.J. (2015), 
‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
768Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 239. See also Henning, J.J. (2015), 
‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
769Ex parte Buttner Brothers 1930 CPD 138 at paragraph 145. 
770Oblowitz v Oblowitz 1953 (4) SA 426 (C) at 433. 
771Henning, J.J. (2015), ‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 
1st Edition. 
772Festus v Worcester Municipality 1945 CPD 186 (C). 
773In the case Fink v Fink and Another 1945 WLD 226, the facts of the case was that a wife owned the farm 
and the husband managed it. The husband and wife were married out of community of property. They bought 
cows and the milk produced being in excess of what they needed for their own use, the surplus was sold. From 
that small beginning a very substantial milk-producing and distribution business was established. To that 
business, both had contributed money and labour. All profits made were pooled back into the business. The 
question before the court was whether this could be seen as a partnership. The court looked at the essentials 
of what makes up a partnership. The court held that both parties added to the business aim of the business 
which was to benefit the partnership. The object of the business was to make profit and court found that the 




Briefly turning to the legal nature of a partnership, Pretorius et al states that, unlike a company, a 
partnership is not a separate person in law, with rights and duties apart from its members.774 A 
company acts through its directors, while a partnership acts through its partners with each partner 
being an agent of the partnership.775 The assets and liabilities of a partnership are the assets and 
liabilities of its members.776 This principle is defined as follows in Wille et al: 
 
‘Although the assets or property mentioned above are invariably referred to as ‘partnership 
property’, they do not actually belong to the firm, since the firm is not a persona and cannot 
therefore own property. The property is owned jointly by the partners in undivided shares, i.e. they 
are co-owners, in such proportions as have been stipulated.’777 
 
Gibson et al states that a partnership is simply a group of people acting jointly; and that the 
relationship between a partnership and third parties is governed by the law of agency.778 Therefore, 
partners are agents of each other.779 The agency of a partner for his co-partners arises by implication 
of law as soon as the relationship of partnership is established. In Potchefstroom Diaries and 
Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply,780 De Villiers JP held that a partner has not only the 
powers of an agent, but he is also a surety for his fellow partners for they are all liable jointly and 
severally. The learned Judge stated further that not only is a partner an agent, but he has the double 
character of agent and principal in one and the same transaction.781 When a partner makes a contract 
with a third party, he acts as an agent for his other partners and as a principal for himself. He can 
bind the partnership if he acts in the name of the partnership and within the scope of the partnership 
business.782 However, at common law a partnership is not a persona, but as stated in Potchefstroom 
                                                 
wife’s contribution went far beyond the duties of a wife in such a case. The court held a partnership existed 
between the spouses.   
774Pretorius, J.T., Delport, P.A., Havenga, M. and Vermaas, M. (1999), ‘Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book : a Collection of Cases on Company Law, with Explanatory Notes and 
Comments’, Juta and Company Ltd, 6th Edition, at page 35. 
775Pretorius, J.T., Delport, P.A., Havenga, M. and Vermaas, M. (1999), ‘Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book : a Collection of Cases on Company Law, with Explanatory Notes and 
Comments’, Juta and Company Ltd, 6th Edition, at page 35. 
776Pretorius, J.T., Delport, P.A., Havenga, M. and Vermaas, M. (1999), ‘Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book : a Collection of Cases on Company Law, with Explanatory Notes and 
Comments’, Juta and Company Ltd, 6th Edition, at page 35. Support for this contention is to be found 
in  Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at pages 242-243. 
777Wille, G., Du Bois, F. and Bradfield, G. (2007), ‘Wille's Principles of South African Law’, Juta and Company 
Ltd, Eighth Edition, at page 612. See also Muller and Another v Pienaar 1968 (3) SA (A) 195 at 202 F-H; and 
Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente 1979 (2) SA 206 (T) at 209 C-D. 
778Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 246. See also Henning, J.J. (2015), 
‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
779Munro v Ekerold 1949 (1) SA 584 (SWA) at 589. 
780Potchefstroom Diaries and Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD at 506-513. 
781Potchefstroom Diaries and Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD at 506-513. 
782Potchefstroom Diaries and Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD at 506-513. 
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Diaries and Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply, is ‘a contractual compound of several 
personae’.783  
 
Nevertheless, a partnership is a contract as mentioned above, therefore all the essentials of a 
contract must be present.784 The essential features of a partnership were expressed in the following 
terms in the case Joubert v Tarry and Co: 
 
‘These essentials are fourfold. First, that each of the partners brings something into the 
partnership, or binds himself to bring something into it, whether it be money, or his labour or skill. 
The second essential is that the business should be carried on for the joint benefit of both parties. 
The third is, that the object should be to make profit. Finally, the contract between the parties 
should be a legitimate contract.’785 
 
According to Gibson et al, if these four essentials are present then prima facie a partnership exists, 
however they are not in themselves a sufficient test because there may be other facts that show that 
actually no partnership was intended and that there was no partnership.786 For example in Pezzutto 
v Dreyer,787 the court held that each partner must contribute something appreciable, thus something 
of commercial value, although such contribution need not be capital. The contribution may be in the 
form of money, skill or labour. In Pezzutto v Dreyer788 the partners had intended jointly to exploit a 
mine dump. Thus the contribution made by Pezzutto and De Polo was the right to exploit the mine 
dump. In Pezzutto v Dreyer,789 Smalberger JA stated the following:  
 
‘For a partnership to come about there must be an agreement to that effect between the 
contracting parties. In determining whether or not an agreement creates a partnership a court will 
have regard, inter alia, to the substance of the agreement, the circumstances in which it was 
made and the subsequent conduct of the parties. The fact that parties regard themselves as 
partners, or referred to themselves as such, is an important, though not necessarily decisive, 
consideration. What is necessary to create a partnership agreement is that the essentialia of a 
partnership should be present … The three essentials are (1) that each of the partners bring 
something into the partnership, whether it be money, labour or skill; (2) that the business should 
be carried on for the joint benefit of the parties; and (3) that the object should be to make a profit 
                                                 
783Potchefstroom Diaries and Industries Co Ltd v Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co 1913 TPD at 513. See also 
Gcilitshana v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd, 1985 (2) SA 367 at paragraph 371. 
784Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 240. 
785Joubert v Tarry and Co 1915 TPD 277 at 280-281. 
786Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 240. See also Henning, J.J. (2015), 
‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
787Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) at 390. 
788Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) 390. 
789Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) 390. 
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… A fourth requirement mentioned … is that the contract should be a legitimate one. However, 
as has been pointed out previously, this requirement is one common to all contracts and is 
therefore not a particular essential of a partnership … Where Pothier's four requirements are 
found to be present the court will find a partnership established unless such a conclusion is 
negatived by a contrary intention disclosed on a correct construction of the agreement between 
the parties ... In essence, therefore, a partnership is the carrying on of a business (to which each 
of the partners contributes) in common for the joint benefit of the parties with a view to making a 
profit. In this context a business is ‘anything which occupies the timê and attention and labour of 
a man for the purpose of profit’ (Standard General Insurance Co v Hennop790). The business need 
not be a continuous one; a joint venture in respect of a single undertaking can amount to a 
partnership provided the essentialia of a partnership are present … Finally, it should be noted that 
the contribution to be made by each partner need not be of the same character, quantity or value 
(Pothier: 1.3.9). However, each partner must contribute something ‘appreciable’, i.e something of 
commercial value, although such contribution need not be capable of exact pecuniary 
assessment as, for example, where a partner contributes his labour or skill (Pothier: 1.3.9 and 
10; B v The Commissioner of Taxes791).’792 
 
Nevertheless, the final essential element to be discussed is that the business must be carried on for 
the joint benefit of the parties. The aforesaid element is a defining element of a partnership.793 The 
element of joint benefit includes several other related elements discussed above, namely that the 
business must be carried on; the parties to the contract must be co-owners of property rights of the 
partnership and co-holders of all other rights belonging to the partnership; the partnership must have 
a common stock; and the business must be carried on in common because where each party can 
act independently and in his own interest no partnership exists.794 According to Gibson et al, it is an 
essential of a partnership that the profit made be for the joint benefit of the partners.795 These authors 
state: 
 
                                                 
790Standard General Insurance Co v Hennop 1954(4) SA 560 (A) at 565 A. 
791B v The Commissioner of Taxes 1958(1) PH T4 (SR). 
792Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) 390 at paragraphs 31-35. 
793See Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition. See Also Clarkson, K., Miller, R. and Cross, 
F. (2010), ‘Business Law: Text and Cases: Legal, Ethical, Global, and Corporate Environment’, Cengage 
Learning. See also Henning, J.J. (2007), ‘The Mediaeval Contractum Trinius and the Law of Partnership’, 
Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History, 13(2). See also Henning, J.J. and Delport, H.J. (1997), ‘Partnership’ 
in LAWSA volume 19 (revised in 2006 by Henning, J.J, assisted by Snyman-van Deventer). See also Havenga, 
M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law International, at pages 
109-118. 
794As discussed in paragraph 3.1.1 of this chapter above, co-owners are not necessarily partners. It must not 
only be agreed that a person will act on his own behalf but on behalf of all the parties to the contract. The 
partnership should not merely be carried on for the benefit of every partner but on his behalf. 
795Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 242. 
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‘Put differently, they must share the profits between them. These profits are not gross profits – 
the losses must first be deducted. So it is essential that the partners share in profits and losses.’796 
 
In Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas797 the court held that if the partnership activities result 
in the making of a profit, this will be divided among the partners. Profit in this instance, was held by 
the court to be net profit after the deduction of all expenses so that an agreement whereby one 
person receives a proportion of the gross income of any undertaking, such as a commission on 
sales, is not an agreement of partnership.798 In Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas it was 
stated as follows: 
 
‘The sharing of profits and losses therefore implies that a partner must at all events share in the 
losses 'so far, at least, as  G  they constitute a charge upon, and a diminution or deduction from 
the profit'.’799 
 
In Fink v Fink and Another,800 the court stated that the profits are shared by the partners in the 
proportions expressly agreed between them. However, in the absence of an agreement, the profits 
are shared in the same ratio as the value of their contributions to the common stock. Furthermore, if 
it is impossible to say that one partner has contributed more than another, the profits are shared 
equally.801 This commonly occurs where one of the partners contributes money and the other skills 
or know-how necessary to the successful running of the undertaking.802 A partnership agreement 
can specify any proportion for sharing of the profits and can even provide for such matters as the 
payment of a salary to a partner before the determination of distributable profit or payment of interest 
on the various capital accounts.803 On the other hand, in Enslin v Colonial Trust Corporation804 the 
court held that if a partner fails to share profits, such a partner may be compelled to do so by the 
actio pro socio. Losses are typically shared in the same proportion as profits; however variations can 
also be made when dealing with losses incurred by the partnership.805 For instance, one partner may 
share only in profits but bear no share of any losses incurred. In Dickenson and Brown v 
Fisher's Executors806 the court held this to mean net losses or profit over a period and not to mean 
that one person will share only in the results of profitable transactions and not in those of unprofitable 
                                                 
796Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 242. 
797Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas 1922 TPD 130 at 138. 
798Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas 1922 TPD 130 at 138. 
799Blumberg and Sulski v Brown and Freitas 1922 TPD 130 at 138. 
800Fink v Fink and Another 1945 WLD 226. 
801Fink v Fink and Another 1945 WLD 226. 
802Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 34. 
803Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 34. 
804Enslin v Colonial Trust Corporation 1923 CPD 358. 
805Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
806Dickenson and Brown v Fisher's Executors 1915 AD 166. 
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ones. Furthermore, an agreement to exempt a partner from any losses is again only valid within the 
partnership, and creditors of the partnership can attach the assets of the protected partner.807   
 
Therefore, in determining whether a particular contract gives rise to a partnership, regard must be 
had both to the essentials of the partnership as evidenced in the agreement and the intention of the 
parties. The fact that a contract does contain the essentials of a partnership does not necessarily 
mean that the legal relationship created by the contract is that of a partnership.808 Henning and 
Delport state that upon a proper construction of the relationship, the true intention of the parties may 
well be that, notwithstanding the existence of the essentials of a partnership agreement, a contract 
other than a partnership has been created.809 The then Appellate Division in the case Bester v Van 
Niekerk810 accepted that the requirement that the contract be legitimate was strictly speaking not a 
particular essential of a partnership but a common requirement of all contracts.811 The essentials of 
a special contract of partnership were confirmed in the case of Pezzutto v Dreyer,812 where it was 
stated as follows:  
 
‘Our courts have accepted Pothier’s formulation813 of such essentials as a correct statement of 
the law … The three essentials are (1) that each of the partners bring something into the 
partnership, whether it be money, labour or skill; (2) that the business should be carried on for the 
joint benefit of the parties; and (3) that the object should be to make a profit ... A fourth requirement 
mentioned by Pothier is that the contract should be a legitimate one.’814 
 
Therefore the essentials of a partnership can be categorised as follows: there must be (1) a contract 
(2) usually between two or more persons (3) to contribute to a common stock (4) in order to carry on 
business with the object of making a profit (5) for their joint benefit.815  
 
                                                 
807Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
808Henning, J.J. and Delport, H.J. (1997), ‘Partnership’ in LAWSA volume 19 (revised in 2006 by Henning, J.J, 
assisted by Snyman-van Deventer), at 274. 
809Henning, J.J. and Delport, H.J. (1997), ‘Partnership’ in LAWSA volume 19 (revised in 2006 by Henning, J.J, 
assisted by Snyman-van Deventer), at 274. 
810Bester v Van Niekerk 1960 (2) SA 779 (A) at 783H-784A. See Butters v Mncora 2012 (2) All SA 485 (SCA) 
at paragraph 11. See Pothier, R.J. (1854), ‘A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership’, Translated from the 
French, with Notes Referring to the Decisions of the English Courts, by Tudor, O.D., Butterworths.  
811See also Butters v Mncora 2012 (2) All SA 485 (SCA) at paragraph 11. See also Pothier, R.J. (1854), ‘A 
Treatise on the Contract of Partnership’, Translated from the French, with Notes Referring to the Decisions of 
the English Courts, by Tudor, O.D., Butterworths Reprint Edition.  
812Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A). 
813Pothier, R.J. (1854), ‘A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership’, Translated from the French, with Notes 
Referring to the Decisions of the English Courts, by Tudor, O.D., Butterworths Reprint Edition. The French 
jurist, Pothier was regarded as an authority of great importance in the Netherlands toward the eighteenth 
century. His treatise was translated to English and Dutch and regarded by the courts as an important authority 
on this branch of the law. 
814Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) at 390. 
815Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 240. 
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It is evident from the analysis above that the most apparent weakness of the partnership lies in the 
fact that the liability of the partners for the debts of the partnership business in unlimited. It was 
stated above that the liability of the partners is joint and several, therefore any of the partners can 
be called upon to settle the total debts of the partnership once a partnership is insolvent.816 The 
partner that had been called upon in such an instance can then proceed against his fellow partners 
for recovery of their pro rata part of the debt.817 However, such proceedings can only be instituted 
against individual partners once the partnership has ceased to exist. Proceedings can only be 
instituted against the partnership as a whole while the partnership is still in existence, despite the 
fact that the partnership has no legal personality.818 If a creditor obtains a judgment against the 
partnership and the assets of the partnership are insufficient to settle his claim he can proceed 
against the assets of the individual partners.819 A complicating factor is the position of the partnership 
in cases where one of the partners has a judgment taken against him in his personal capacity.820 If 
court judgment is obtained, the partner’s creditors can attach his individual share in the partnership 
and sell this for the satisfaction of the judgment, which can have negative consequences for the 
partnership as a whole.821 The position is even worse where one of the partners is declared bankrupt 
in his personal capacity. This insolvency immediately leads to the dissolution of the partnership and 
calls for the distribution of the assets among the partners so that the creditors of the insolvent partner 
may attach his share of the partnership assets.822 To prevent this attachment, which may result in 
serious financial loss to the remaining partners, the other partners may undertake to settle the 
insolvent partner’s share of the undertaking out of their personal estates.823 Should the partnership 
be declared insolvent, the personal estates of each of the partners will also be sequestrated unless 
one (or more) of the partners undertakes to pay the debts of the partnership and provides satisfactory 
surety within a time stipulated by the court.824  
 
However, there are certain types of partnership, referred to as extraordinary partnerships, in which 
some of the members of the partnership are protected in respect of partnership debts.825 The 
distinction between these types of partnerships is not significant because both involve silent partners 
                                                 
816Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
817Havenga, M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 115-123. 
818Havenga, M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 115-123. 
819Havenga, M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 115-123. 
820Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
821Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at pages 255-258. 
822Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at pages 255-258. 
823Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
824Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 35. 
825Sharrock, R. (2011), ‘Business Transactions Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, Eighth Edition, at pages 503-
520. 
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with limited liability for partnership debts in relation to outside creditors.826 An extraordinary 
partnership requires a specific partnership agreement setting out the position of the various partners, 
or classes of partners in relation to each other.827 This specific partnership agreement is not 
registered in any public registry. This leads to an important part of the analysis to follow, namely the 
distinguishing features of an en commandite partnership as an extraordinary partnership. 
 
(a) The Distinguishing Features of an En Commandite Partnership 
 
The biggest distinction between various types of partnerships for the current purpose is between 
ordinary and extraordinary partnerships. In the case of an ordinary partnership, the partners are 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership.828 Three forms of extraordinary 
partnerships existed in South Africa. Two of the three forms of extraordinary partnerships, namely 
the en commandite and anonymous partnerships may still be formed, while the third form was 
created in terms of legislation in the old Cape Province and in Natal no longer exist.829 It is distinct 
from an ordinary partnership in that the liability of certain partners to third parties is limited.830 The 
two forms of extraordinary partnerships are very similar.831 The only difference between the two is 
that in the case of an anonymous partnership, the anonymous partner is liable for his proportionate 
share of all partnership debts, whereas the en commandite partner is only liable insofar, and limited 
to, the amount of his or her agreed capital contribution.832 In terms of a partnership en commandite, 
the partners agree that the undisclosed partner is to have a share of the profits, if any, and to take 
losses, if any, but in no circumstance is his liability to exceed his specific contribution.833 Therefore 
an anonymous partner’s liability is not limited to any sum unlike the en commandite partner. Gibson 
et al quotes Pothier834 stating that the anonymous partner is liable only to his partner, but to the full 
extent of his share in the partnership’s deficiency.835 For a partnership to either be an en commandite 
                                                 
826Sharrock, R. (2011), ‘Business Transactions Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, Eighth Edition, at pages 503-
520. 
827Sharrock, R. (2011), ‘Business Transactions Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, Eighth Edition, at pages 503-
520. 
828Sharrock, R. (2011), ‘Business Transactions Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, Eighth Edition, at pages 503-
520. 
829In the Cape it was created in terms of the Special Partnership’s Liability Act 24 1861 as amended by the 
Special Partnership’s Limited Liability Amendment Act 12 1906 (Cape). In Natal it was created in terms of the 
Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act 1 1865 (Natal). However, these Acts were both repealed by the Pre-
Union Statute Law Revision Act 36 1976 (not with retroactive effect) as a result of the provisions rarely being 
used. Until 1958, only 70 limited partnerships had been registered in the Cape and 240 in Natal. 
830Sharrock, R. (2011), ‘Business Transactions Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, Eighth Edition, at pages 503-
520. 
831Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bros 1905 (26) NLR 589. 
832Mmabatho Fruit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Fourie en Andere 1985 (1) SA 318 (T). 
833See Pothier, R.J. (1854), ‘A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership’, Translated from the French, with Notes 
Referring to the Decisions of the English Courts, by Tudor, O.D., Butterworths reprint edition, at 2.60. 
834Pothier, R.J. (1854), ‘A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership’, Translated from the French, with Notes 
Referring to the Decisions of the English Courts, by Tudor, O.D., Butterworths reprint edition, at 2.63. 
835Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 252. See also Henning, J.J. 
(2015), ‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
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partnership or anonymous partnership, it must be expressly stated so by way of agreement between 
the partners, because case law indicates that the courts will lean to the view that an ordinary 
partnership was created instead of an extraordinary partnership when called upon to interpret a deed 
of partnership.836 
 
The en commandite partner and anonymous partner are both undisclosed837 and both are not liable 
for partnership debts to creditors of the partnership, but only to their partners in as much as they 
contributed to the partnership.838 In Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd,839 Munnik AJ 
stated the following: 
 
‘… The anonymous (or sleeping) partnership is created where parties agree to share the profits 
of a business which is to be carried on by one or more of the partners in his or their name while 
the partners whose names are not disclosed remain anonymous partners … Although the 
anonymous partner may be described as a partner the essence of the arrangement is that this 
fact must be carefully concealed from the outside world.’840 
 
The court in Butcher and Sons v Baranov Brothers841 held that the fact that an undisclosed partner 
may become known to outsiders does not change the form of the partnership, but if such a partner 
was held out as having acted as an ordinary partner, he or she will lose such protection. According 
to Mcleary, the aim behind this protection is to protect the undisclosed partner from a person who 
has entered into a contract with a partnership with the view that in the case of default by the 
partnership, he can rely on the private estates of the individual partners and may rely on this to the 
extent he would not have entered into the contract with the partnership if he had not had this 
assurance of security.842 Mcleary states as follows:    
 
‘If he enters into an agreement with a partnership and is not aware of the existence of silent 
partners, he is obviously not relying on the private estates of those partners at the time of entering 
into the agreement and can therefore not claim against those estates later on. It follows that the 
silent partner must take care not to allow himself to be seen as a partner by his actions or words; 
his name must not appear on any documents such as letterheads which are available for general 
perusal and he must not participate in the management of the business.’843 
  
                                                 
836Barker and Co v Blore 1908 TS 1156 at 1160-1161. 
837Which means they are not held out to the public as partners. 
838Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 251. 
839Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 4 SA 233 (T). 
840Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 4 SA 233 (T), at 239. 
841Butcher and Sons v Baranov Brothers 1905 (26) NLR 589.  
842Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 36. 
843Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 36. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129 
 
In addition, the logic behind keeping the names of such partners secret is to avoid persons dealing 
with the partnership to have the impression that they are entitled to rely on the credit of the en 
commandite or anonymous partner. In Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank Ltd,844 Wallis JA stated the 
following: 
 
‘Whilst it is so that in general the foundation for a partnership en commandite is that the existence 
of the partnership and the identity of the partners, save the disclosed or managing partner, should 
not be disclosed, the mere fact of disclosure does not serve to render the partnership or the 
individual partners, as opposed to the disclosed or managing partner, liable on contracts 
concluded with that partner. Such disclosure may be forced upon the managing partner in the 
course of performing its functions. Thus a request for finance addressed to a financial institution 
is unlikely to be successful when made in the name of a shelf company, without disclosure of the 
financial worth and commitments of those standing behind it. That is what happened here. Such 
disclosure does not infringe upon the reason for anonymity, namely that third parties should not 
be induced to deal with the managing partner in reliance on the credit of the other members of 
the partnership as members of the partnership.845 In the result the mere fact of disclosure does 
not serve to render either the partnership or the undisclosed partners liable on the contracts 
concluded by the managing or disclosed partner.’846 
 
It was held in Mmabatho Fruit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Fourie en Andere847 that the very nature of the 
en commandite partner is that his name must be kept secret, so as to not create expectations with 
creditors which will not be realized. In Lamb Brothers v Brenner and Co,848 the court held that the 
undisclosed partner whose credit has not been relied upon by third parties dealing with the 
partnership, has no general liability as an ‘undisclosed principal’ beyond that fixed by the limited 
agreement of the parties. However, the en commandite partner and anonymous partner both cannot 
claim repayment of their contributions or payment of their share of the partnership profits until the 
creditors of the partnership have been settled and while the partnership is still in existence.849 In 
Sabatelli v St. Andrew’s Building Society and Ors,850 it was stated: 
 
‘as an anonymous partner … had no right to claim possession of assets while the partnership 
remained in existence.’851 
 
                                                 
844Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank Ltd 2011 SA 205 SCA. 
845Wallis JA referenced: Mmabatho Food Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Fourie en ŉ Andere 1985 (1) SA 318 (T) at 
322G-I. R v Siegel & Frenkel 1943 SR 13 at 15 
846Wallis JA referenced: R v Siegel and Frenkel 1943 SR 13 at 15. 
847Mmabatho Fruit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Fourie en Andere 1985 (1) SA 318 (T). 
848Lamb Brothers v Brenner and Co 1886 (5) EDC 152 at 165. 
849Sabatelli v St. Andrew’s Building Society and Ors 1933 WLD 55. 
850Sabatelli v St. Andrew’s Building Society and Ors 1933 WLD 55. 
851Sabatelli v St. Andrew’s Building Society and Ors 1933 WLD 55. 
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The further similarity between an en commandite partner and anonymous partner is that both may 
not participate actively in the business of the partnership. Therefore, the immunity from liability of the 
en commandite partner and anonymous partner to creditors for partnership debts flows from the fact 
that the disclosed partner has neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the undisclosed partner. 
In Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd,852 Munnik AJ stated the following: 
 
‘…Furthermore, the anonymous partner may not participate actively in the business of the 
partnership … The partnership en commandite  has the same features as the anonymous 
partnership save that the anonymous or undisclosed partner, while sharing in the profits, is not 
liable for the losses of the fixed sum contributed by him to the partnership as capital.’853 
 
In both the en commandite partnership and anonymous partnership, the business of the partnership 
is carried out in the name of the disclosed partners. The rules by which a partnership in which the 
liability of certain partners (undisclosed partners) are expressly limited are set out in Siegel and 
Frenkel v R.854 These rules are summarised as follows (i) the undisclosed partner must be carefully 
concealed from the world; (ii) the undisclosed partner has no right to interfere in the partnership 
business; and (iii) the undisclosed partner cannot claim his capital until creditors have been paid.855 
However creditors do not look to the undisclosed partner for their claims as he is unknown to them, 
therefore the undisclosed partner must not be held out as a partner. If there is a breach of anonymity 
he becomes an ordinary partner.856 
 
The en commandite partnership is widely used to structure private equity funds in South Africa, as 
opposed to the anonymous partnership because the en commandite partner (for example an 
investor such as a pension fund) is only liable insofar, and limited to, the amount of  its agreed capital 
contribution. In practice, the investor participants contribute capital to an en commandite partnership 
for a share in the profits or losses of the partnership.857 The private equity firm or a related entity 
could be appointed as the general partner (the disclosed partner) for the en commandite partnership. 
In the case of en commandite partnership, only the general partner is known to the outside world 
and contracts with the outside world.  The other partners, namely the en commandite partners are 
called limited partners or simply investors and do not participate in the active affairs of the 
partnership. They are only liable to the extent of their capital contributed and/or profits derived by 
                                                 
852Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 4 SA 233 (T). 
853Eaton and Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 4 SA 233 (T), at 239-240. See also Sabatelli v St 
Andrew’s Building Society 1933 WLD 55. 
854Siegel and Frenkel v R 1943 SR. 
855Siegel and Frenkel v R 1943 SR. 
856Havenga, M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 109-118. 
857As discussed earlier in this paragraph, a partnership is not a legal person distinct from the persons 
comprising the partnership including for tax purposes, therefore a partnership must keep proper books and 
records and submit a copy of the partnership balance sheet and income statements in support of each 
individual partner's annual tax return.  
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the partnership.858 In the current context, the main risk for an investor is that it is held out to the world 
as an ordinary partner or acts as such. It is therefore important that they not advertise their 
involvement in a private equity fund (partnership), or seek to engage with third parties in respect of 
the partnership. Private equity funds commonly establish investment committees to which investors 
may nominate representatives (depending on the size of their investment). The investment 
committee will typically assess potential investments identified by the private equity firm. This would 
not of itself render the investors ordinary partners, provided the committee does not participate in 
the business or affairs of the partnership. For example by attending meetings or negotiations with 
potential portfolio companies, a third party could consider them to be ordinary partners.  
 
(b) The General Taxation Provisions 
 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter will not discuss the taxation of private equity funds.859 Such a 
discussion is beyond the scope of this analysis; however the next paragraph will mention the key tax 
principles aimed at highlighting an important structural feature of an en commandite partnership. 
This being: to eliminate entity-level tax while protecting the investors in the fund from personal liability 
for the debts and obligations of the fund. An advantage of using an en commandite partnership, as 
previously stated, was that it serves as a ‘pass-through’ entity for income tax purposes and, 
therefore, is not subject to corporate income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. A 
partnership is not a ‘person’ as defined in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and therefore is not 
regarded as a taxpaying entity.860 A partnership is not subject to tax and the partners are taxable in 
their individual capacities.861 As a partnership does not form a separate taxable entity for normal tax 
purposes, the partners are taxed on the profits accruing to them in terms of the partnership 
agreement in their personal capacities, whether or not there has been a distribution. In addition, they 
are able to claim deductions and allowances in their personal capacities.862 Therefore, the en 
commandite partnership’s income, gains, losses and deductions are passed through to the investors 
and taxed only once at the investor level.  
                                                 
858As discussed earlier in this paragraph 3.1.1(a) of this chapter, these limited partners or investors may not 
participate in the management of the partnership or hold themselves out to the public as partners. 
859Including the tax treatment of underlying portfolio interests. However, in the context of a private equity fund, 
brief reference is made in paragraph 3.1.3(e) of this chapter two to African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd v SIR (1969) 4 SA 259 (A), CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283, 1996 Taxpayer 150, 
and ITC 1412 (1983) 48 SATC 157. The brief discussion relates to the proceeds from the realisation of the 
shares in the investee company which can be said to be of a capital nature resulting in the return to the 
investors being liable to the lower capital gains tax. 
860Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 475. There are certain sections 
in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 which deal with partnerships, such as section 66(15), which require that the 
partnership makes a joint return (the respective investors/partners collectively) and each partner is separately 
and individually liable for rendering such a return. 
861Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at pages 475-488. 
862Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at pages 475-488. 




The en commandite partnership involves an undisclosed partner who contributes a specified amount 
of capital and in return receives a percentage of the profits.863 In practice the South African Revenue 
Service (‘SARS’) apportions the taxable income from the partnership amongst the partners in their 
profit-sharing ratio and each partner is taxed on his share of the profits.864 Losses are restricted to 
the amount of capital contributed by the limited partner. Section 24H of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 regulates the tax treatment of en commandite partners and clarifies the question of accruals to 
individual partners in general. Section 24H(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 defines the term 
‘limited partners’. It reads as follows: 
  
‘ ‘limited partner’ means any member of a partnership en commandite, an anonymous 
partnership, any similar partnership or a foreign partnership, if such member's liability towards a 
creditor of the partnership is limited to the amount which the member has contributed or 
undertaken to contribute to the partnership or is in any other way limited.’ 
 
In terms of section 24H(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, each partner is deemed to be carrying 
on the trade or business of the partnership whether or not it is en commandite partnership. Section 
24H(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, reads as follows: 
 
‘Where any trade or business is carried on in partnership, each member of such partnership 
shall, notwithstanding the fact that he may be a limited partner, be deemed for the purposes 
of this Act to be carrying on such trade or business.’ 
 
The impact of section 24H(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is that all partners, even en 
commandite partners, of a partnership that is carrying on a trade or business, are deemed to be 
carrying on that trade or business. Furthermore, the introduction of section 23H(3) of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 is aimed at discouraging the use of limited partnerships in tax-avoidance schemes, 
by limiting claimable deductions and allowances.865 Section 24H(3)(a) and (b) of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 is the most important part of section 24H. It reads as follows: 
 
‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the amount of any allowance or 
deduction which may be granted to any taxpayer under any provision of this Act in respect of or 
in connection with any trade or business carried on by him in a partnership in relation to which he 
is a limited partner shall not in the aggregate exceed the sum of — 
                                                 
863Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 485.  
864Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 485.  
865Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 486.  




(a) the amount, whether it consists of the taxpayer's contribution to the partnership or of any 
other amount, for which the taxpayer is or may be held liable to any creditor of the 
partnership; and 
(b) any income received by or accrued to the taxpayer from such trade or business.’ 
 
Section 24H(3) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 restricts any allowance or deduction which en 
commandite partners may claim. The total which may be deducted or subject to an allowance is; the 
amount for which the en commandite partner is or may be held liable to creditors,866 plus any income 
received by or accrued to the en commandite partner from the partnership.867  
 
As mentioned above, a partnership is not a taxable entity rather it is the individual partners who are 
liable for normal tax on their portion of the partner’s profits.868 Section 24H(5) of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 states that any income received by or accrued to the partners in common, namely to the 
partnership, is deemed to accrue to the partners in their profit-sharing ratios on the same date on 
which it is received by or accrues to the partnership. Expenses and allowances relating to such 
amounts are also deemed to be those of the individual partners in this ratio. Section 24H(5)(a) and 
(b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 reads: 
 
‘(a) Where any income has in common been received by or accrued to the members of any 
partnership or foreign partnership, a portion (determined in accordance with any agreement 
between such members as to the ratio in which the profits or losses of the partnership are to 
be shared) of such income shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any 
law or the relevant agreement of partnership, be deemed to have been received by or to have 
accrued to each such member individually on the date upon which such income was received 
by or accrued to them in common. 
 
(b) Where a portion of any income is under the provisions of paragraph (a) deemed to have been 
received by or to have accrued to a taxpayer, a portion (determined as aforesaid) of any 
deduction or allowance which may be granted under the provisions of this Act in the 
determination of the taxable income derived from such income shall be granted in the 
determination of the taxpayer's taxable income so derived.’ 
 
                                                 
866Section 24H(3)(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
867Section 24H(3)(b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
868Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 476.  
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The purpose of Section 24H(5)(a) and (b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is to override a legal 
principle which arose in the case Sacks v CIR869 where it was held that the taxpayer’s share of profits 
only accrued to him at the end of the partnership’s financial year, when the profits were brought to 
account.870 The facts of this case involved a change in the partnership agreement prior to dissolution, 
which provided for the payment of a lump sum to any outgoing partner in respect of his portion of 
the profits earned by the partnership during the period of assessment until the date of dissolution. 
The arrangement was made for administrative reasons, such as escaping the need to prepare a 
balance sheet and doing a stock-take.871 Had the accounts been prepared as at the date of the 
partner’s retirement, the outgoing partner’s profit share would have been considerably larger than 
the amount of the lump sum he received. In Sacks v CIR, Watermeyer CJ held that that any amount 
that accrued to the partnership, namely the partners in common, only accrued to the individual 
partners in their profit-sharing ratio at the end of the period established in the partnership agreement, 
when account of the profits would be taken.872 According to Meyerowitz, this view was in contrast to 
the Commissioner’s contention that each partner became entitled to his share of any partnership 
accrual on the day that it accrued to the partnership.873 In ITC 75152874 the court did not refer to the 
judgment in Sacks v CIR875 and the judgment was in favour of the Commissioner, while in ITC 1042876 
tax court decision court followed the precedent set in Sacks v CIR877 and decided against the 
Commissioner.878 
 
It was for this reason that section 24H(5) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 was introduced to end 
the confusion noted above. According to Williams, the implementation of section 24H(5) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is also a preventative measure against partnerships being used as tax 
avoidance mechanisms.879 Williams argues that in terms of judgment in Sacks v CIR,880 partners had 
                                                 
869Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343. 
870Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 476. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at page 272. 
871Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343. 
872Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343, at 40-41. 
873Meyerowitz, D. (2004), ‘Meyerowitz on Income Tax [2003-2004]’, Cape Town: The Taxpayer, at 16-27. 
874ITC 751 1952 (18) SATC 416. 
875Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343. 
876ITC 1042 1964 (26) SATC 189. 
877Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343. 
878Meyerowitz, D. (2004), ‘Meyerowitz on Income Tax [2003-2004]’, Cape Town: The Taxpayer, at pages 16-
27. See also Bamford, B.R. (1982), ‘The Law of Partnerships and Voluntary Associations in South Africa’, Juta 
and Company Ltd, Third Edition. 
879Williams, R.C. (1996), ‘Income tax in South Africa Law and Practice’, Third Edition, Butterworths Publishers, 
at 389. See also Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: 
South African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at pages 475-488. 
880Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 343. 
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the possibility of postponing income from accruing to them; as well as the freedom to manipulate 
their profit-share percentages, provided all partners agree, before the end of the period of account.881  
 
Insofar as a partnership conducts share trading,882 the revenue resulting from the sale of shares will 
constitute ‘income’ for purposes of section 24H(5)(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 in the hands 
of the partners; and the cost of purchasing shares,883 will result in an allowable deduction for each 
of the partners. Dividends received on shares will be apportioned among the partners in accordance 
with the respective participation interests, and will not attract income tax.884 Concomitantly, as 
mentioned above, there is a deeming provision in section 24H(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 that in each such instance of a deemed receipt by or accrual to each partner, each partner is 
entitled to claim as a deduction, a portion of the allowed deductions (and allowances) pertaining to 
the business that is carried on in partnership.885  
 
Certain private equity funds, such as leveraged buyout funds discussed in paragrapgh 3.1 of chapter 
one, include gearing-up as a fundamental part of their strategy. However, as discussed in chapter 
one, such gearing is typically undertaken at the underlying portfolio/target company level and not at 
the private equity fund level. Therefore the liability for the interest bearing debt is generally restricted 
at the target company level and remains the responsibility of the underlying portfolio company. 
However, should a private equity fund incur interest bearing debt, each partner must deduct from its 
income, for each year of assessment in terms of section 24J(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, 
its proportional share of the interest amount incurred.886 However, in terms of section 24H(3) of the 
                                                 
881Williams, R.C. (1996), ‘Income tax in South Africa Law and Practice’, 3rd Edition, Butterworths Publishers, 
at 389. See also Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: 
South African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at pages 475-488. 
882For example, a private equity fund structured as an en commandite partnership that acquires shares in 
underlying portfolio investee companies. 
883The cost of purchasing the shares will be subject to the provisions in section 22 of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962, which deals with trading stock adjustments. Section 22(1)(a) and (b) of the reads as follows: ‘The 
amount which shall, in the determination of the taxable income derived by any person during any year of 
assessment from carrying on any trade (other than farming), be taken into account in respect of the value of 
any trading stock held and not disposed of by him at the end of such year of assessment, shall be (a) in the 
case of trading stock other than trading stock contemplated in paragraph (b), the cost price to such person of 
such trading stock, less such amount as the Commissioner may think just and reasonable as representing the 
amount by which the value of such trading stock, not being any financial instrument, have been diminished by 
reason of damage, deterioration, change of fashion, decrease in the market value or for any other reason 
satisfactory to the Commissioner; and (b) in the case of any trading stock which consists of any instrument, 
interest rate agreement or option contract in respect of which a company have made an election which have 
taken effect as contemplated in section 24J(9), the market value of such trading stock as contemplated in such 
section.’ 
884Each partner must include in his gross income for each year of assessment as required by section 24J(3), 
a proportional part of the interest amount accrued  by the partnership at any stage during the year of 
assessment. 
885See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragragraph 15, at page 476.  
886Section 24J(2)(a) and (b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 reads as follows: ‘Where any person is the 
issuer in relation to an instrument during any year of assessment, such person shall for the purposes of this 
Act be deemed to have incurred an amount of interest during such year of assessment, which is equal to (a) 
the sum of all accrual amounts in relation to all accrual periods falling, whether in whole or in part, within such 
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Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 discussed above, the allowed deductions of an en commandite partner 
would be capped at the sum of (a) the amount for which such partner is or may be held liable to any 
creditor of the partnership; and (b) any income received by or accrued to such partner from the trade 
or business that is carried on in partnership. 
 
(c) The Termination of a Partnership 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, a critical characteristic of the private equity business model is the pre-
determined, fixed life period of a private equity fund. Therefore, a private equity fund structured as 
an en commandite partnership will be terminated at some point. A partnership relationship may be 
terminated or dissolved in several ways, for instance by mutual agreement (express or implied) 
between partners; unilateral action of a partner; court order; insolvency of the partnership or partner; 
mental incapacity and death; and the happening of some other event or a supervening 
impossibility.887 For the purpose of the current discussion, it is important to emphasize that a 
partnership has a contractual basis and therefore it is important for the partnership agreement itself 
to provide express terms as to when the partnership can be terminated. For instance, a private equity 
fund en commandite partnership agreement may contain early termination provisions that allow the 
investors to remove and replace the private equity firm or elect to liquidate the fund, for example, on 
the grounds of fraud, regulatory breaches and/or gross negligence committed on the part of the 
private equity firm. It makes perfect sense that while the law does not require a written partnership 
agreement; it is obviously advisable that the partnership agreement be in writing. According to 
Gibson et al, a partnership relationship may be terminated by agreement between the parties, 
whether express or implied in accordance with the ordinary rules of contract.888  
 
In the case of a private equity fund, the en commandite partnership agreement is entered into for a 
fixed term and the dissolution of the partnership will come about by the expiration of that term. 
Typically in such partnership agreements, there will be many examples of express dissolution 
clauses which expand the available grounds for dissolution. However, in theory there seems to be a 
limitation in the transferability of investor’s interests in the private equity partnership structure despite 
the numerous dissolution clauses contained in such partnership agreements. For example, every 
instance a new partner joins or an existing partner leaves a partnership, a new partnership is formed. 
                                                 
year of assessment in respect of such instrument or (b) an amount determined in accordance with an 
alternative method in relation to such year of assessment in respect of such instrument; which must be 
deducted from the income of that person derived from carrying on any trade, if that amount is incurred in the 
production of the income.’  
887Havenga, M.K. and Locke, N. (2010), ‘Corporations and Partnerships in South Africa’, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 119-123. 
888Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 253. See also Henning, J.J. (2015), 
‘Perspectives on the Law of Partnership in South Africa’, Juta and Company Limited, 1st Edition. 
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In Standard Bank v Wentzel and Lombard889 the court held that even if there is an agreement 
amongst the partners to change the membership of the partnership, the result will be that the original 
partnership has been terminated. Therefore if a new partner is introduced into a partnership, the old 
partnership is put to an end and new partnership is constituted.890 Similarly, if the agreement between 
the partners at the time of entering into the agreement, states the period for which the partnership 
will last, the partnership will terminate at the end of that period.891 In practice, the partnership 
agreement of a private equity fund will at the time of concluding the agreement between the en 
commandite (investors) and disclosed (private equity firm) partners, expressly provide for the period 
for which the partnership will last. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these private equity funds are 
closed-end funds which have a specific term, typically ten years, and which may be extended by one 
to two year periods. However, these extension periods would require the consent of all the partners, 
namely the en commandite (investors) and disclosed (private equity firm) partners. A further 
theoretical limitation is that any partner can, generally speaking, freely terminate a partnership. A 
partner may terminate a partnership by his unilateral act in giving notice of renunciation, if a definite 
time for the partnership has not been fixed.892 Despite private equity funds being structured with a 
definite time period, one partner893 may still terminate the partnership by notice before the fixed term 
has expired. This was held to be case by the court in Wiehahn and Others v Marias. 894 However, 
the court in this case noted that if a partner unilaterally terminates the partnership before the expiry 
of the fixed term, he will be in breach of contract and will be liable for damages, but the partnership 
is still terminated.895  
 
Nevertheless, after the termination of the partnership relationship, liquidation is necessary.896 In 
Bosman NO v The Registrar of Deeds and The Master897 it was held that liquidation of a partnership 
entails the payment of the debts of the partnership, the realisation of the assets, and a division of 
the surplus; and for this purpose the mutual mandate of the partners continues even after 
termination. In terms of a private equity fund structured as a partnership, the liquidation process 
would be expressly agreed at the time of the formation of the partnership. In practice, there are often 
unforeseen circumstances that may warrant a change in the manner of liquidation, in such 
circumstances the partners will usually agree amongst themselves, at least at the time of termination, 
to an appropriate alternative manner of liquidation. In Meissner v Joubert898 the court held that once 
                                                 
889Standard Bank v Wentzel and Lombard 1904 TS 828 at 385. 
890Standard Bank v Wentzel and Lombard 1904 TS 828 at 385. 
891Van der Linden, J. (1806), ‘Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek’, Unkown Publisher, at 4.1.14. 
892Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 253. 
893May be an en commandite (investor) or disclosed (private equity firm) partner. 
894Wiehahn and Others v Marias 1965 (1) SA 398. 
895Wiehahn and Others v Marias 1965 (1) SA 398. 
896Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 256. 
897Bosman NO v The Registrar of deeds and The Master 1942 CPD 303 at 307. 
898Meissner v Joubert 1946 CPD 618. 
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the partners have agreed to a process of termination albeit expressly in terms of the original 
partnership agreement or amongst the partners at the time of termination, if no express agreement 
was originally concluded or in terms of an agreed variation subsequent to the original agreement; 
then the liquidation simply takes place along the agreed lines. In Gibson et al, quoting the cases of 
Ferreira v Fouche,899 Vigne’s Executor v MacKenzie,900 Simon v Cramb,901 and Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Estate Whiteway902 stated the following with regard to the liquidation of a 
partnership agreement: 
  
‘… A liquidator is appointed by the partners…. Such liquidator then collects what is due to the 
partnership if anything, by each partner, pays the debts of the partnership, realizing certain of the 
assets, if necessary, for this purpose, and distributes the balance, with or without realisation; in 
the manner expressly agreed between the partners … If the partners cannot agree upon a 
liquidator the Court may be approached to appoint one, but only if good cause is shown…. Such 
good cause will be shown if the partners ‘are at arm’s length’ … After satisfaction of the 
partnership debts, the assets are distributed between the partners, in the absence of agreement 
in the same proportions as the value of their contribution to the common stock ... But if one 
partner’s contribution has no value placed upon it or no clearly ascertainable value (such as where 
the partner has contributed labour or skill), the same proportion as their share in the profits.’903 
 
Termination can cause considerable disruption and problems, especially in the case of an ongoing 
business such as a private equity fund. In practise this rarely occurs, because investors in private 
equity funds are typically sophisticated investors that fully understand the risks and structural 
features of private equity funds such as it being ten year, fixed life, and illiquid investment vehicle. 
As mentioned above, while the law does not require a written partnership agreement; it is obviously 
advisable that the partnership agreement be in writing. In this regard, Mcleary aptly states that the 
partnership agreement: 
 
‘ … should specify the method of division of profits and losses; provide for the carrying on of the 
business of the partnership in the case of the death of one of the partners; provide for the carrying 
of insurance policies on the lives of the partners to enable surviving partners to have the cash 
available to settle claims by the deceased estate; provide a mechanism for the easy dissolution 
of the partnership and distribution of the assets; and include any limitations on the powers to act 
                                                 
899Ferreira v Fouche 1949 (1) SA 67 (T). 
900Vigne’s Executor v MacKenzie 1913 TPD 42. 
901Simon v Cramb 1926 TPD 37. 
902Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Whiteway (1933) TPD 486, at 501. 
903Gibson, J.T.R., Visser, C., Pretorius, J.T., Sharrock, R. and Van Jaarsveld, M. (2003), ‘South African 
Mercantile and Company Law’, Juta and Company Ltd, 8th Edition, at page 257. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 139 
 
of any of the partners and any other matters which are relevant to the particular partnership 
concerned.’904 
 
It is submitted in conclusion of this part of the discussion, that there are several reasons why en 
commandite partnership has become one of the dominant legal structures that are used in the private 
equity industry in South Africa. For instance, the popularity of such vehicles is due to its contractual 
nature which allows for the alignment of interest between the private equity firm and investors. The 
en commandite partnership structure permits the private equity firm to achieve extensive control over 
the operation of the private equity fund subject to the terms and conditions of the partnership 
agreements. In addition, this type of structure includes the tax benefits it affords, the flexibility 
surrounding its conditions and terms and its fixed life. The flexibility of the limited partnership allows 
the internal and external participants to enter into schemes and express contractual terms that align 
the incentives of the private equity firm with those of outside investors. 
 
3.1.2 Use of a Trust 
 
This paragraph will introduce a cursory discussion on the salient aspects of the law of trusts. The 
purpose is to provide a context for the critical analysis of the distinguishing features of a bewind trust 
as a vehicle used to structure private equity funds in South Africa. The trust concept was established 
in South Africa during the early 1800’s as a result of court judgments and through legislation.905 
However, it must be noted that this paragraph will not discuss the historical development and treatise 
of the law of trusts in South Africa because the subject is extensive and is beyond the scope of this 
discussion.906 However, the aim is to introduce the salient aspects of the law of trusts as part of the 
discussion of the appropriate legal vehicles used to structure private equity funds in South Africa. 
According to Geach and Yeats, the law of trusts in South Africa is not contained in a single statue.907 
According to Honiball and Olivier, the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 regulates administrative 
aspects relating to trusts, but is not a codification of the law regulating trusts.908 Therefore, the next 
paragraph on the definition of a trust will canvass the statutory and judicial definitions of trusts.  
 
                                                 
904Mcleary, F. (2000), ‘Accounting and Its Business Environment’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 37. 
905Olivier, P.A., Strydom, S. and Van den Berg, G.P. (2009), ‘Trusts Law and Practice Service Issue 2’, 
LexisNexis: Durban. 
906In this regard see Braun v Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 858(H)-866 (D). See 
also De Bruin, J.H., Snyman, E. and Henning, J.J. (2003), ‘Die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg in historiese 
perspektief’, Journal for Estate Planning Law, 1-25, at 5. See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., 
Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at 
pages 1-30. 
907Geach, W.D. and Yeats, J. (2007), ‘Trusts: Law and Practice’, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 4. 
908Honiball, M. And Olivier, L. (2009), ‘The Taxation of Trusts in South Africa’, First Edition, Siber Ink, at 10. 
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According to Van der Merwe and Rowland, the word ‘trust’ can be used in both a wide and narrow 
sense.909 Olivier describes trust in the wide sense as a relationship of confidence or good faith with 
respect to property and beneficiaries.910 The author states that such a relationship could, for instance 
arise in the case of an appointee who is the executor of a deceased estate, the curator of a mentally 
ill person or the trustee of an insolvent estate.911 The important point to bear in mind is that these 
functionaries never become the owners of the property; instead they merely hold or administer the 
property for the benefit of a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries.912 Similar to the relationship between 
partners having to display uberrimae fides,913 this requirement must also be present in relation to 
trusts.914 In Doyle v Board of Executors,915 the court held that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office, 
which imposes upon such trustee the duty of utmost good faith all towards beneficiaries. 
Nevertheless, Du Toit argues that the duty of care is the most important aspect of the fiduciary nature 
of a trustee’s office, and therefore must exercise his/her duties and powers in utmost good faith, 
which in essence implies compliance with the duty of care.916  
 
Du Toit argues that in the narrow sense, ‘trust’ refers to the trust as a legal institution.917 Cameron et 
al,918 made reference to the case Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others,919 
where Cameron JA stated that this type of trust is a species of the trust in the wide sense; the core 
idea behind which is the separation of ownership and control from the enjoyment of the trust benefits 
so derived.920 This type of trust is defined by Cameron et al as being: 
 
                                                 
909Van Der Merwe, N.J. and Rowland, C.J. (1990), ‘Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg’, 6th Edition, Van der Walt, 
Pretoria at 343. Van der Merwe and Rowland states that the word ‘trust’ must be used with caution ‘omdat die 
woord soms in ‘n wye sin gebruik kan word en ander kere weer in ‘n enge of juridies-tegniese sin’. See Zinn 
NO v Westminster Bank Ltd NO 1936 AD 89, at 96-97 and Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 1996(3) SA 786(C) at 794(D)-(E). 
910Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 2. 
911Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 2. See also 
Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at page 2. 
912Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 2. See also 
Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at page 2. 
913The Latin expression meaning utmost good faith. See paragraph 3.1.1(a)-(c) of this chapter. 
914Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘The Fiduciary Office of Trustee and the Protection of Contingent Trust Beneficiaries’, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, 3, at pages 469-482. See also Du Toit, F., (2002), ‘South African trust law and 
practice’, Butterworths. See also paragraph 3.1.1(a)-(c) of this chapter. 
915Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
916Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘The Fiduciary Office of Trustee and the Protection of Contingent Trust Beneficiaries’, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, 3, at pages 469-482. See also Du Toit, F., (2002), ‘South African trust law and 
practice’, Butterworths. This theoretical framework of the law of trusts will be contextualised to its practical 
aspects with regard to the relationship between the private equity fund manager and the investors, as well as 
the private equity funds’ assets/underlying portfolio investee company(ies) in paragraph 4 of chapter 3. 
917Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at page 2. 
918Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 4-5. 
919Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
920Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at para. 19 and 22. 
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‘a legal institution in which a person, the trustee, subject to public supervision, holds or 
administers property separately from his or her own, for the benefit of another person or persons 
or for the furtherance of a charitable or other purpose.’921 
 
In this form, the founder of the trust transfers the ownership of certain assets to a trustee (or trustees) 
who are to administer those trust assets for the benefit of certain named beneficiaries, or for the 
achievement of some purpose.922 Both the ownership and the control of the trust assets are vested 
in the trustee, not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as trustee.923 The trust assets must be 
kept separate from the personal assets of the trustee, and thus form a separate ‘trust estate’, even 
though the trust is not regarded as a separate legal person in its own right.924 The trustee enters into 
contracts in his capacity as trustee, and creditors of the trust look to the assets of the trust for 
satisfaction of their claims.925 Should the trust go insolvent, the creditors cannot execute against the 
personal estates of either the trustee or the beneficiaries, who accordingly enjoy a form of limited 
liability.926 Nevertheless, one of the main differences between ‘trust’ in the wide and the ‘trust’ in the 
narrow sense is the fact that in the narrow sense the person so entrusted (the trustee) generally 
becomes the owner, but not for his own personal benefit.927 In the case Conze v Masterbond 
Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others,928 the court held that this type of trust, namely 
one where the trustee becomes the owner of the trust property, can be termed an ‘ownership’ trust. 
In the narrow sense, all the benefits which accrue or arise as a consequence of this ownership are 
passed on to the trust beneficiaries.929 Furthermore, in the case of the trust in the narrow sense, the 
trustee holds an office, while this is not necessarily the case with the trust in the wide sense.930 In 
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others,931 Cameron JA stated: 
 
‘ ... the trustee is appointed and accepts office to exercise fiduciary responsibility over property 
on behalf of and in the interests of another.’932 
 
                                                 
921Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 1. 
922Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 1-30. See also Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: 
Principles and Practice’, Second Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths. 
923Cameron, E, De Waal, M., Wunsh, B, Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta & Co., at 1-30. See also Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, De 
Jager-Haum Publishers. 
924Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 1-30.  
925Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths. 
926Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers. 
927Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1996 (3) SA 786(C) at 794D-E. 
928Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1996 (3) SA 786(C) at 794D-G. 
929Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1996 (3) SA 786(C) at 794D-E. 
930Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at paragraph 20. 
931Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
932Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at paragraph 20. 
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Furthermore, in the exceptional case of the trustee of a trust in the wide sense actually holding an 
office, this office is subject to different legal rules.933  
 
(a) The Definition of a Trust 
 
The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 introduced a statutory definition of trust into South African 
law.934 It defines a trust as a contract whereby a donor, or settlor, transfers assets to a trustee or 
trustees. No trust can exist without the settlor handing over control of the trust property or having 
bound himself or herself to hand over control of the trust property.935 Usually the handing over of 
control of the trust property means that ownership of the trust assets is transferred by the settlor to 
the trustee.936 The settlor may be a co-trustee and therefore co-owner of the trust property.937 
Furthermore, there can be no objection to the settlor being the only trustee, provided he/she is not 
also the only beneficiary.938 In South African law it is also possible for a settlor to transfer ownership 
of trust property directly to the beneficiary, in which case the trustee will then simply administer the 
property for the benefit of the beneficiary.939 Therefore, the trustee controls the trust property on 
behalf of the beneficiary who is the owner.940 This type of trust is known as a ‘bewind’ trust, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
As mentioned above, the administration of trusts is governed by the provisions of the Trust Property 
Control Act 57 of 1988.  There are two types of trust, namely an inter-vivos trust and a testamentary 
trust: (a) an inter-vivos trust is created between living persons; and (b) a testamentary trust derives 
from a valid will of a deceased.941 An important distinction must be drawn between these two 
concepts. Firstly, the testamentary trust or the trust mortis causa, is created by a will during the 
testator’s lifetime, but it only becomes effective on his or her death.942 On the other hand, the trust 
inter vivos is created between living persons in the form of a contract.943 This trust is thus established 
                                                 
933Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at pages 2-
3. 
934Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths. 
935Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at page 9. 
936Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 6. 
937Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 6. See also Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: 
Principles and Practice’, Second Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths, at page 9. 
938Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 6. 
939Section 1(b) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
940Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, at page 4. 
941Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 920. 
942Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 25-26. 
943Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths, 
at page 7. See also Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, 1st dition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at 
page 26. 
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during the founder’s lifetime and exists from the moment of execution of the founding contract or 
agreement.944 In terms of both of these trusts, there are two types of rights a beneficiary can have.945 
Firstly, either a vested right in terms of which either the income or the capital of the trust must be 
paid to the particular beneficiary; or secondly, a contingent right in terms of which no particular 
beneficiary is entitled to any income or capital unless the trustees decide to make a distribution to 
him/her.946 If the beneficiary has a vested right, this means that the trustees are merely administering 
the capital or the income,947 for that beneficiary only.948 The author states that if the beneficiary has 
a contingent right, this means that the trust is a discretionary trust and there is a chance that the 
beneficiary will never receive any portion of the income or capital in the trust.949 Kourie and Ryder 
defines a discretionary trust, as a trust where the ownership and control vest in the trustees in their 
representative capacity, however, the trust beneficiaries have no right to claim the trust benefits, 
except and until the trustees have exercised their discretion.950  
 
There is a third type of trust, which was previously mentioned, known as the bewind trust.951 The 
bewind trust is a legal construction which has its origins in Dutch Law.952 In terms of a bewind trust, 
the trust does not own the assets, but it is the beneficiaries that have ownership of the asset(s)s.953 
The trust has the power to manage and control the asset(s) on behalf of the beneficiary who owns 
it. Therefore, the bewind trust occurs when ownership of the trust property is conferred on the trust 
beneficiary, while control over and administration of the same trust property is vested in the trustee(s) 
of the trust.954 Since the beneficiary owns the asset, any income or capital gain arising on the use or 
                                                 
944De Waal, M.J. (2000), ‘The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South African 
Trusts compared’, The South African Law Journal, at page 548. 
945Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 920. 
946Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 920. 
947Which have vested in the beneficiary. 
948Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 920. 
949Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 920. The trustees in this case are 
administering the capital and income for the beneficiaries as a group, with no certainty as to which beneficiaries 
will ultimately benefit from the funds in the trust, and to what extent. 
950Kourie, M.A. and Ryder, K. (1997), ‘Law and Estate Planning’, Easiguide, Butterworths, at page 225. 
951Section 1(b) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 defines the bewind trust. See below. 
952Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See Haupt, P. (2015), 
‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 921. See also De Waal, M.J. and 
Schoeman-Malan, M.C. (2003), ‘Introduction to the Law of Succession’, Third Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, 
at page 159. 
953Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 6-7. See also Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust 
Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1996 (3) SA 786 (C) at 794(D) -(E). 
954Honoré, T and Cameron, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at 
pages 6-7. 
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disposal of the asset vests in the beneficiary.955 Du Plessis, quoting De Waal,956 Koppenol-Laforce 
and Kottenhagen,957 and Kortmann and Verhagen958 states: 
 
‘The bewind is a form of fiduciary administration … The bewindvoerder manages the assets for 
the benefit of a beneficiary, but it is the beneficiary and not the bewindvoerder who is the owner 
of the assets. Thus the bewind differs from the trust in the sense that in a trust the trustee is the 
owner of the trust assets. In a bewind the beneficiary is protected in the case of the insolvency of 
the bewindvoerder, as the assets do not form part of the latter’s estate.’959 
 
In Braun v Blann and Botha NNO and Another,960 Joubert JA described the 
‘bewindhebber/bewindvoerder (administrator)’ as follows: 
 
‘In Roman-Dutch law it is possible to couple a fideicommissum with bewind (administratio) by 
appointing a bewindhebber/bewindvoerder (administrator) to administer the fideicommissary 
property. The legal ownership of the latter, however, does not vest in the bewindvoerder who has 
mere control over res aliena for purposes of administration.’961 
 
Kourie and Ryder defines a bewind trust, as a trust in which the real right of ownership of the trust 
assets vests in the trust beneficiaries but the management and control over these assets vest in the 
trustees, but because the trustees do not hold title to the benefits in their own names, their capacity 
is that of an agent in relation to the trust assets.962 Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 
1988, contains the definition of a trust and distinguishes between trusts where the trustee owns trust 
property (which includes discretionary and vested trusts) and bewind trusts. It reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
955Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African 
Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See also Haupt, P. 
(2015), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, at page 921. See also Lupoi, M. (2000), 
‘Trusts: A Comparative Study’, Cambridge University Press, at page 298. 
956De Waal, M.J. (2006), ‘Comparative Succession Law’, in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (2006), ‘The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law’, Oxford University Press, 1088, at page 1092. 
957Koppenol-Laforce, M.E. and Kottenhagen, R.J.P. (1998), ‘The Institution of the Trust and Dutch Law’, in 
Hondius, E. (1998), ‘Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative Law’, 
Intersentia Rechtswetenschappen, 137, at page 143. 
958Kortmann, S. and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘National Report for the Netherlands’, in Hayton, D., Kortmann, S. 
and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘Principles of European Trust Law’, Kluwer Law International, 195, at pages 199-
200. 
959Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws Degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 53. 
960Braun v Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
961Braun v Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 864(G)-(H). See Cameron, E., De Waal, 
M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta 
and Co. Ltd, at pages 6-7. See Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, De Jager-Haum 
Publishers, at page 107. 
962Kourie, M.A. and Ryder, K. (1997), ‘Law and Estate Planning’, Easiguide, Butterworths, at page 224. 
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‘arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is by virtue of a trust 
instrument made over or bequeathed:  
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of according 
to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust 
instrument;  
(b) or to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the 
control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the 
provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated 
in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, but 
does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person 
as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 
1965 (Act 66 of 1965).’963 
 
According to Cameron et al, even before the definition of ‘trustee’ was inserted into section 1 of the 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, the word ‘trustee’ was found by the Courts to be wide enough 
to include the trustee of a bewind trust.964 These authors965 referred to Estate Kemp and Others v 
McDonald’s Trustee966 where Innes CJ states: 
 
‘And the trustees’ designation in its English meaning denotes persons entrusted (as owners or 
otherwise) with the control of property with which they are bound to deal for the benefit of 
others.’967 
 
From the above definition, Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 makes a clear 
distinction where ownership in property is made over to the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries 
and where the property is made over to the beneficiaries, but the control thereof to the trustees. It is 
apparent that the bewind trust falls within the latter part. Furthermore, Section 1 of the Trust Property 
Control Act 57 of 1988 defines ‘trust property’ or ‘property’ as follows: 
 
‘Trust property or property means movable or immovable property, and includes contingent 
interests in property which in accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be 
administered or disposed of by a trustee.’ 
 
                                                 
963Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
964Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 6-7.  
965Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 6-7. 
966Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491. 
967Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 at 499. 
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This indicates that the bewind trust is properly covered by trust property, although neither the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937 nor the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 makes specific reference to 
a bewind trust. However, in CIR v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd,968 it was held that the trust in question 
was a: 
 
‘trust property so called, where the assets of the trust vested in the trustees, as opposed to a 
‘bewind trust’, where the founder made a gift or bequest directly to the beneficiary but vested 
the control of the assets in a trustee or administrator.’969 
 
According to Van der Westhuizen, the trust defined in section 1(a) of the Trust Property Control Act 
57 of 1988 is the trust in the narrow sense as discussed above.970 The trust defined in section 1(b) 
of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 is the trust in the wide sense and would include a bewind 
trust discussed above.971 Van der Westhuizen states that a trust will have the bewind structure when 
the beneficiaries provide the trust capital themselves or by guaranteeing the loans made against the 
security of their own property, in return for which they receive share certificates as proof of their pro 
rata interest in the venture, and as proof of their vested rights in the trust capital.972 Once the capital 
has been repaid, they cease to be the beneficiaries.973 
 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 defines a trust as meaning: 
 
‘any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered and controlled by a 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed under a deed of trust or by 
agreement or under the will of a deceased person’974  
 
In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker,975 Cameron JA described a trust as:  
 
                                                 
968CIR v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd 2002(4) SA 606 (N). 
969CIR v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd 2002(4) SA 606 (N) at 611. 
970Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at 6.  A trust will 
have a narrow sense when the beneficiaries do not have a vested right in the income and capital of the trust 
and the trustee have discretionary powers to deal in the income and capital of the trust in a manner he deems 
fit for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 
971Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at 6.   
972Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 6.  
973Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 6. 
974See Du Plessis, I. (2009), ‘The residence of a trust for South African income tax purposes’, South African 
Mercantile Law Journal, 21, at 322-343. According Du Plessis (at pages 322-324), the definition of ‘trust’ in 
terms of section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, is broader than the definitions offered, for instance, in 
terms of section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988; by academics such as Kourie, M.A. and Ryder, 
K. (1997), ‘Law and Estate Planning’, Easiguide, Butterworths, at page 224; Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, 
B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, 
at pages 6-7; and in terms of case law such as Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 
at 499; and Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at paragraph 
10.  
975Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
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‘ … an accumulation of assets and liabilities. These constitute the trust estate, which is a separate 
entity. But though separate, the accumulation of rights and obligations comprising the trust estate 
does not have legal personality. It vests in the trustees, and must be administered by them - and 
it is only through the trustees, specified as in the trust instrument, that the trust can act.’976 
 
According to Olivier the trust in the narrow sense refers to the legal institution where an intermediate 
person, the trustee, holds property as owner thereof in accordance with the expressed wishes of 
another person, the settlor or founder, not for his personal benefit but for the benefit of named or 
ascertainable beneficiaries or for an impersonal object.977 While Honoré and Cameron states as 
follows:  
 
‘In the narrow or strict sense a trust exists when the creator of the trust, hands over the control of 
an asset which, or the proceeds of which, is to be administered by another (the trustee or 
administrator) in his capacity as such for the benefit of some person (beneficiary) other than the 
trustee or for some impersonal object.’978 
 
It is submitted that the discretionary trust is more commonly used for estate planning purposes and 
in particular in family trusts established for these purposes. The bewind trust is rarely used in South 
Africa other than for the structuring of investment funds, more specifically third party private equity 
funds. In addition, it is important to note that the discussions below in this chapter with regard to the 
legal nature (paragraph 3.1.2(b)) and essentials of the generic trust (paragraph 3.1.2(c)) are 
important, even though it has already been established that the bewind trust is predominantly used 
to structure third party private equity funds in South Africa; because it is aimed at providing greater 
context for the analysis in paragraph 3.1.2(d) (distinguishing features of a bewind trust). Similarly 
paragraph 3.1.2(f) (the termination, variation and revocation of a trust) has been included below.  
(b) The Legal Nature of a Trust 
 
The legal nature of the trust has been the subject of much legal debate in South Africa.979 In CIR v 
MacNeillie’s Estate980 the court held that neither the inter vivos nor the testamentary trust possesses 
legal personality.981 Cameron et al states that although the common law does not recognise the trust 
as a legal person, the trustee in his official capacity is regarded in civil procedure as a separate 
                                                 
976Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at paragraph 10. 
977Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at 4 and 108. 
978Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ 4th Edition, Juta and Company, 
at page 3. 
979South African Law Commission (‘SALC’), ‘Report on the Review of the Law of Trusts’, Project 9, June 1987.  
980CIR v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 3 SA 833 (A) at 840.  
981See also Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 2 SA 850 (A). See also Kohlberg v Burnett 1986 3 SA 12 (A) at 
25C. See also CIR v Friedman NNO 1993 1 SA 353 (A) at 370. See also Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) at 83(F)-(I).  
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entity.982  Therefore, the court in Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply983 held that the trustee ex 
officio is regarded in civil procedure as different from the trustee in his private capacity, and that trust 
creditors cannot take the trustee’s private property in execution. Rather, the trust creditors must 
proceed against the trustee in his/her capacity as trustee.984 On the other hand, a trustee, if the 
action relates to trust assets, must sue in an official, not private capacity.985 In Magnum Financial 
Holdings v Summerly NO,986 the trustees had the power to incur debts and the assets were shares 
and corporeal movables. In this case the court held that the trust estate is a ‘debtor’ but not a ‘body 
corporate’ for insolvency purposes.987 This means that a trust is to be sequestrated and not 
liquidated.988 In Ex parte Milton NO,989 immovable property was registered in the name of the trustee 
for the time being of the Milton Children’s Trust. The court in Ex parte Milton NO,990 held that this 
trust estate might be sequestrated; and the decision as to whether or not the trust estate might be 
sequestered, does not depend on the fact that the trust was registered against the title deeds of the 
property. In BOE Bank v Trustees, Knox Property Trust,991 the court rejected the proposition that a 
suretyship undertaken for the debts of a trust could not be valid since the trust was not a legal entity. 
Cameron et al992 refers to the remarks of McCall J in BOE Bank v Trustees, Knox Property Trust,993 
where the learned Judge states: 
 
‘… in the developing law of trusts in South Africa, it is recognised that a trust has a legal existence, 
whether it be called ‘an entity’, ‘an institution’ or ‘an arrangement’.’994 
 
Furthermore, Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 stipulates that trust property 
does not form part of the personal estate of the trustee, except in so far as he is entitled to it as a 
trust beneficiary. Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 reads as follows: 
 
‘Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as he as 
the trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property.’ 
 
                                                 
982Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 70. See also Rosner v Lydia Swanepoel Trust 1998 (2) 
SA 123 (W) at 127B-C. 
983Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply 1911 TPD 170. See also Zinn NO v Westminster Bank NO 1936 AD 
89, at 98. 
984Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply 1911 TPD 170.  
985Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply 1911 TPD 170. 
986Magnum Financial Holdings v Summerly NO 1984 1 SA 160 (W). 
987Magnum Financial Holdings v Summerly NO 1984 1 SA 160 (W) at 163. 
988Magnum Financial Holdings v Summerly NO 1984 1 SA 160 (W) at 163. 
989Ex parte Milton NO 1959 (3) SA 347 (SR). 
990Ex parte Milton NO 1959 (3) SA 347 (SR), at 350. 
991BOE Bank v Trustees, Knox Property Trust 1999 (1) All SA 425 (D) at 432-437. 
992Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 71. 
993BOE Bank v Trustees, Knox Property Trust 1999 (1) All SA 425 (D). 
994BOE Bank v Trustees, Knox Property Trust 1999 (1) All SA 425 (D) at 436. 
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In addition, section 1 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 defines a ‘juristic person’ as follows: 
 
‘ ‘juristic person’ includes a partnership, association or other body of persons, corporate or 
unincorporated, or a trust if –  
(a) there are three or more individual trustees; or  
(b) the trustee is itself a juristic person ...’ 
 
Section 1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, defines a ‘juristic person’ to include a trust.995 The 
court decisions in Joubert v Van Rensburg996 and Mkangeli v Joubert,997 led to the amendment of 
the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, whereby section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 
included a definition of ‘person’ to include a trust. Furthermore, section 1 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 includes in its definition of a ‘juristic person’ a trust. It reads as follows: 
 
‘ ‘juristic person’ includes – 
(a) a foreign company; and 
(b) a trust, irrespective of whether or not it was established within or outside the Republic.’ 
 
In addition, sections 2(1)(b) and 2(2)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 reads: 
 
‘(1) For all purposes of this Act – 
(b) an individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly controls the 
juristic person, as determined in accordance with subsection (2) ... 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person controls a juristic person, or its business, if– 
(c) in the case of a juristic person that is a trust, that first person has the ability to control the 
majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of the trustees, or to appoint or 
change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust ...’ 
 
The significance of sections 1 and 2 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is that it does not impose upon 
the trust a general legal personality, particularly in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 where trusts and companies are involved and where they are ‘related’. Section 1 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, defines the term ‘related’ as follows: 
 
‘when used in respect of two persons, means persons who are connected to one another in any 
manner contemplated in section 2(1)(a) to (c).’ 
                                                 
995Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 now also includes a ‘trust’. Section 1 of the Firearms Control Amendment 
Act 28 of 2006 amends section 1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. Definition substituted by section 1(h) 
of the Firearms Control Amendment Act 28 of 2006. 
996Joubert v Van Rensburg 2001 1 SA 753 (W). 
997Mkangeli v Joubert 2002 4 SA 36 (SCA). 




It is evident from the above discussion that the trust has acquired legal personality in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. One of the implications of the trust being a juristic person in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 could for instance be where a trust controls a company by holding its 
majority shareholding, to declare such trustees who are also directors of the related company to be 
delinquent or under probation in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and to regulate such 
delinquency in terms of section 162 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.998   
 
As mentioned above, section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 provides that trust 
property does not form part of the personal estate of the trustee, except in so far as he or she is 
entitled to it as a trust beneficiary.999 In Shahmahomed v Hendricks1000 the court held that a trustee 
may also in a private capacity make a gift to the trust, namely to himself/herself in an official capacity. 
Cameron et al takes the view that no unilateral segregation of assets is possible, and a landowner 
who wishes to transfer his or her land into a trust should do so by agreement with at least one fellow 
trustee.1001 On the other hand, Olivier argues that it is actually the founder who acts unilaterally and 
that there is no consensus ad idem between the founder and trustee.1002 The court held in Vaal Reefs 
Exploration and Mining Co Ltd v Burger1003 that the proposition, that a contract whereby a person as 
a representative of another had concluded with himself was legally impermissible, was not a correct 
reflection of South African law.1004   
 
The South African trust created by means of an agreement between the founder and the trustees, 
namely the inter vivos trust, has the structure of a contract for the benefit of a third party.1005  This 
has been referred to by the majority of the court in Crookes NO v Watson1006 as a trust that is created 
by means of a stipulatio alteri. According to Du Toit, a contract is entered into between the trust 
settler/stipulans and the trustee/promittens for the benefit of the trust beneficiary, being the third 
                                                 
998It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the provisions of section 162 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008. 
999See Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply 1911 TPD 170, at 186-7, where Bristow J stated that creditors 
are obliged to sue the trustee in his/her capacity as trustee, and if they obtain judgment, they are confined to 
executing against the trust property. In this respect the trust estate alone is liable to the trust creditors and not 
the private estate of the trustee. However, if the trustee holds himself/herself out as undertaking personal 
responsibility for the dealings, he/she may be personally liable to trust creditors. In addition, De Villiers JP in 
Erlich v Rand Cold Storage and Supply 1911 TPD 170, at 186, stated that if the trustee is guilty of bad faith or 
negligence, then the beneficiaries may also sue the trustee personally. 
1000Shahmahomed v Hendricks 1920 AD 151.  
1001Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 6 and 146. 
1002Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at 19 and 29. 
1003Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining Co Ltd v Burger 1999 4 SA 1161 (SCA). 
1004Also confirmed in Van der Merwe v Nedcor Bank Bpk 2003 1 SA 169 (SCA). 
1005Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A). 
1006Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A). 
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party.1007 The majority of the court in Crookes NO v Watson1008 held that the acceptance by the 
trustees of the donation and the trust does not amount to an acceptance by them on behalf of the 
beneficiaries, rather their acceptance could simply be seen as an agreement to carry out the 
provisions of the trust deed. The court held that on execution of the agreement between the trust 
settlor and the trustee, the beneficiary obtains no right and that the agreement constitutes an offer 
of a donation by the settlor to the beneficiary, through the acceptance of which the beneficiary obtains 
a jus perfectum against the trustees.1009 Du Plessis refers to the remarks of Steyn JA in Crookes NO 
v Watson,1010 where he stated that a trust is brought into operation by the contract between the settlor 
and the trustees; and that up to the stage of acceptance by the beneficiary, there is no vinculum juris 
between the beneficiary and the settlor or trustees. 
 
The authoritative decision in Crookes NO v Watson,1011 which held that an inter vivos trust is simply 
a contract and the law applicable to inter vivos trusts is therefore the law relating to contracts, was 
reconfirmed in Hofer v Kevitt NO.1012 In Hofer v Kevitt NO,1013 the court held that unless the 
beneficiaries have accepted the benefit stipulated for them in terms of the provisions of the trust 
deed, a trust deed can be varied by agreement between the founder and the trustees because these 
two parties are the contracting parties that formed the trust. In Hofer v Kevitt NO,1014 an inter vivos 
trust had been amended, the amendments having been initiated by the founder and consented to by 
the trustees, however these amendments had prejudiced the beneficiaries and their descendents. It 
is important to note that in this case the beneficiaries had not accepted any benefits under the trust 
and the beneficiaries argued that the rights of trustees to vary the deed were not unfettered and if 
the proposed variations were not in the interests of both the founder and the potential beneficiaries, 
then it was the duty of the trustees not to agree thereto.1015 It was argued in this case that the trustees 
had not even considered the interest of the potential beneficiaries and had acted directly on the 
founder’s request for the amendment.1016 The decision of the court was based on the principle that 
an inter vivos trust is a contract and can therefore be amended by agreement between the parties 
to the contract, but if the beneficiaries accepted any benefits conferred on them in terms of the 
contract, then the beneficiaries would became party to that contract.1017 Therefore, in Hofer v Kevitt 
                                                 
1007Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths, 
at page 18. 
1008Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A), at 284. 
1009Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A), at 286. 
1010Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A), at 305. 
1011Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A). 
1012Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1013Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1014Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1015Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). See also Geach, W.D. and Yeats, J. (2007), ‘Trusts: Law and 
Practice’, First Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 149-150. 
1016Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). See also Geach, W.D. and Yeats, J. (2007), ‘Trusts: Law and 
Practice’, First Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 149-150. 
1017Geach, W.D and Yeats, J (2007), ‘Trusts: Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, Juta and Company, at 149-150. 
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NO,1018 Van Coller AJA held that any amendments following acceptance by the beneficiaries of their 
contract could only be made with the consent of all parties to the contract and the parties now 
included the beneficiaries. Geach and Yeats comments on the case Hofer v Kevitt NO1019 and states 
the following: 
 
‘This decision could be interpreted to mean that the founder of an inter vivos trust is free to make 
changes to an inter vivos trust at any time by agreement with the trustees. But if the beneficiaries, 
either vested or discretionary, have accepted the benefits that have or may accrue to them in 
terms of the trust deed then the beneficiaries become part of that contract … and any variations 
or amendments thereto can only be made with their approval.’1020 
 
The next question to consider is whether the inter vivos trust can be described as having a legal 
nature sui generis. In Badenhorst v Badenhorst,1021 Combrinck AJA referred to Braun v Blann and 
Botha NNO1022 with approval in identifying the inter vivos trust as an institution sui generis. As 
mentioned above, the inter vivos trust is an agreement and all the rules of the law of contract are 
applicable. In Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustees1023 the court accepted the testamentary trust in 
South Africa, but identified it with a fideicommissum and equated a trustee with a fiduciary.  It was 
only with the authoritative judgment in Braun v Blann and Botha NNO,1024 that the inter vivos trust 
was regarded as a legal institution sui generis. Olivier states that it is still not clear whether the 
testamentary trust is regulated by the trust law or by the law of succession, particularly when it comes 
to the rules of interpretation and the amendment of the trust document.1025    
 
The ownership and control of trust property may provide further insight into the legal nature of the 
trust. The ownership, control and management of the trust property and the vesting of it, will depend 
on the trust structure applicable and the powers given to the trustees.1026 In this regard, if the 
structure corresponds with that of the bewind trust, the ownership of the trust property is vested in 
the beneficiaries.1027 However, the same does not apply to control and management.1028 In terms of 
a bewind trust, the fact that all the beneficiaries hold all the shares, and therefore the ownership, 
does not mean that the control also vests in them.1029 In terms of a bewind trust, the trustees are 
                                                 
1018Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1019Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1020Geach, W.D. and Yeats, J. (2007), ‘Trusts: Law and Practice’, 1st Edition, Juta and Company, at 150. 
1021Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 255 (SCA), at paragraph 8. 
1022Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) at 859E–H. 
1023Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustees 1915 AD 491, at 494. 
1024Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 2 SA 850 (A) at 859E. 
1025Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 20-38. 
1026Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 6 and 9. 
1027Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 108. 
1028Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, Second Edition, LexisNexis, 
Butterworths, at page 4. 
1029Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 108. 
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administrators of the trust and in that capacity they also have control.1030 On the other hand, in terms 
of the trust in the narrow sense, ownership and management of the trust property are vested in the 
trustees for purposes of administration, but the trustees have no beneficial interest in it.1031  In 
addition, depending on any conditions imposed or rights reserved by the founder, control will 
normally vest with the trustees.1032 In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker,1033 
Cameron JA refers to certain types of business trusts which have developed in which functional 
separation between control and enjoyment is entirely lacking, and stated that where ownership and 
control vest with the trustees, the beneficiaries only have a right in persona against the trustees to 
claim the income or capital due to them under the trust. The court held that what is due to them will 
depend on whether  they have vested rights, and in most of the private business trusts of this kind, 
the beneficiaries will have vested rights.1034 However, it is possible to create a business trust where 
the rights of beneficiaries are not vested but merely contingent, for example where the trustees have 
discretionary powers to decide not only how, but also whether to pay income or distribute capital to 
the beneficiaries.1035 
 
It is submitted, with reference to Cameron et al, that a trust ‘as a discrete legal institution,1036 is a 
legal entity’ that persists in time for two reasons.1037 Cameron et al states the following: 
 
‘First, by rule of real subrogation when trust assets earn income or are exchanged for other assets, 
whatever is acquired with the trust property or its proceeds becomes itself trust property. 
Secondly, the principle of succession in trusteeship ensures continuity in administration be 
effecting a mechanism for replacing trustees. But though the trust is a persistent entity, neither 
the separation of trust assets from the trustee’s personal property nor the other rules mentioned 
make the trust a juristic person.’1038 
 
                                                 
1030Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 6-9 and 106 and 272. 
1031See Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491. See also SIR v Rosen 1971 1 SA 172 (A). 
1032Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 141 and 579-580. 
1033Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) at 88A–B. 
1034Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 77 (SCA) at 88A–B. 
1035Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 141 and 579-580. 
1036Rosner v Lydia Swanepoel Trust 1998 (2) SA 123 (W) at 128D-E, as per Goldstein J. 
1037Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Company, at page 72. See CIR v Friedman NO 1993 (1) SA 353 (A) at 370-371. 
1038Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company, at page 72. See CIR v Friedman NO 1993 (1) SA 353 (A) at 370-
371. 
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Du Plessis states that several theorists have argued that the trust property is owned by the trust 
estate itself, which would mean that the trust was a juristic person.1039 However, this has been 
rejected by South African courts which have confirmed that a trust is not a juristic person and does 
not have juristic personality, except as provided for in statute.1040  
 
(c) The Essentials of a Valid Trust 
 
According to Oguttu, in South African law there are five basic essentials for the formation of 
a valid trust.1041 Cameron et al summarises these five essential requirements by stating that for a 
valid trust to be created the founder must intend to create one, he must express his intention in a 
mode appropriate to create an obligation, the property subject to the trust must be defined with 
reasonable certainty, the trust object, which may either be personal or impersonal must be defined 
with reasonable certainty and finally, the trust object must be lawful.1042   
 
Firstly, the founder must intend to create a trust. However, a distinction should be drawn between 
the intention to create a trust in the strict or narrow sense and the intention to create a bewind 
trust.1043 In Goodricke and Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal1044 and Pezzutto v Dreyer,1045 
the court in both cases held that intention is one of the determining factors to distinguish between a 
business trust and an ordinary partnership.1046 The intention to create an inter vivos trust must be 
shared by the founder and the prospective trustee.1047  As mentioned in paragraphs 3.1.2(a) and 
3.1.2(b) of this chapter, an inter vivos trust is one created during the lifetime of the founder and is 
usually created by way of an agreement between the founder and the trustees. This is usually clear 
from the trust deed signed by the parties. However, the mere use of the words ‘trust or ‘trustee’ are 
not conclusive and the intention to create a trust has to be inferred from the circumstances and all 
the words used.1048 It was also discussed above that an inter vivos trust may also take the form of 
                                                 
1039Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 18. 
1040Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 18. 
1041Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. 
1042Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 117-118. See also Oosthuisen, M.J. (1988), ‘Suid-
Afrikaanse Handelsreg’, 3rd Edition, Volume 2, Perskor Publishers, Pretoria, at 601. 
1043Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 118. 
1044Goodricke and Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 1 SA 404 (N). 
1045Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 3 SA 379 (A). 
1046See also Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) at 177C–E. 
1047Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 119. 
1048Cameron, E, De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Company, at pages 119-120. Coetzee NO v Universiteit Stellenbosch 1959 (2) 
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an oral agreement, but that such an oral trust will not be regarded as a trust for purposes of the Trust 
Property Control Act 57 of 1988 and will be governed by the common law.1049 According to Du Toit, 
an inter vivos trust may be contrasted with a testamentary trust which is created in the will of the 
testator; and the will must comply with all the requirements for a valid will.1050 Oosthuizen1051 and 
Cameron et al1052 both argue that In the case of a testamentary trust, it is not always that easy to 
determine the founder’s intention, especially when it becomes necessary to distinguish between a 
bewind trust and a trust in the narrow sense; and that the all the rules for the interpretation would 
apply in this regard.1053 In this regard, Cameron et al states the following:1054 
 
‘When ... donor uses words that are held to be merely precatory, so that an intention to create a 
trust is lacking, the effect depends on whether the testator or donor intended to benefit the person 
to whom the property was given. If the intention to benefit was present, the supposed trust is 
disregarded and the legatee or donee takes free of any burden.1055 If, on the other hand, the 
person to whom the property is given is not intended to be a beneficiary, the gift is invalid and 
may be recovered by the founder or his estate.1056 If the intention to create a trust is lacking 
because the trustee is insufficiently independent, the maxim that the real transaction prevails over 
the apparent one (plus valet quod agitur) applies1057 and the transaction is construed as agency, 
partnership, sale, innominate contract, etc, according to the intention of the parties.’1058 
 
Secondly, the founder’s intention must be expressed appropriately to create an obligation.1059 
According to Cameron et al, the relevant obligation is either the obligation on the trustee to administer 
the trust property for the trust object, or the obligation on the founder to do what is needed so that 
the property is administered by the trustee.1060 In the case where a trustee has not been appointed, 
has not accepted office, or has been appointed, but has not yet taken control of the trust property, 
                                                 
SA 172 (C) at 175E-F. See Cowen v Estate Cowen 1932 CPD 39. Harter v  Epstein 1953 (1) SA 287 (A) at 
297. 
1049Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 defines a trust as: ‘an arrangement … by virtue of a 
trust instrument … A trust instrument is, in turn, defined as a written agreement or a testamentary writing or a 
court order according to which a trust was created’. See also Deedat v The Master 1995 2 SA 337 (A) at 384. 
1050Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, Second Edition, Butterworths, at 8. 
1051Oosthuisen, M.J. (1988), ‘Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg’, 3rd Edition, Volume 2, Perskor Publishers, at 602. 
1052Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 118-120. 
1053See also Coetzee NO v Universiteit Stellenbosch 1959 (2) SA 172 (C) at 175E-F. See also Cowen v Estate 
Cowen 1932 CPD 39. See also Harter v  Epstein 1953 (1) SA 287 (A) at 297. 
1054Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 137. 
1055Ex parte Bruton NO 1970 4 SA 154 (E) at 158. See also Ex parte Kemp 1940 WLD 26 at 33. See also 
Arkell v Carter 1971 3 SA 243 (R).  
1056Re Estate Grayson 1937 AD 96, at 99-100. See also Harter v Epstein 1953 1 SA 287 (A).  
1057Commonly referred to the ‘substance over form’ principle. 
1058See Pretorius v CIR 1986 1 SA 238 (A). 
1059Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. 
1060Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 138.  
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the relevant obligation is the one on the founder to enable the trustee to administer the trust property. 
For example, the founder may be obliged to transfer property to the trustees.1061 Furthermore, a trust 
created inter vivos by contract will not be valid unless it is bilateral and the contract creating the 
obligation is valid.1062 In addition, it has to comply with all the requirements of a valid contract. For a 
trust to exist, the founder must either have handed over control of the trust property by a legally valid 
mode of transfer, which creates an obligation or have obliged him/herself, for instance, by contract 
to hand it over or he must be bound in some other way, for instance, by statute or court order to do 
so.1063 In the absence of a juristic act that imposes an obligation of the appropriate kind, no trust is 
created and the purported disposition has no legal effect.1064 Therefore, the requirements for the 
creation of a trust are those necessary for the creation of the obligation on which the existence of 
the trust depends.1065  
 
Thirdly, the trust property must be defined with sufficient certainty, otherwise no trust is created.1066 
It may consist of any asset or group of assets, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, such 
as a farm, furniture, shares, a copyright or the assets of a business.1067 However, if no property is 
located in the trustee, then only a trust in the wide sense occurs.1068 According to Cameron et al, if 
the description of the property is ambiguous, the ambiguity is, in the case of a contract, resolved by 
recourse to such extrinsic evidence as is admissible for the purpose.1069 In these matters the intention 
                                                 
1061Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, Second Edition, LexisNexis, 
Butterworths, at 29. 
1062Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 143 and 673.  
1063Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 6.  
1064See Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South 
African perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. See also Coetzee, J.P. 
(2006), ‘'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg’, Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Africa, April 2006. Translated: ‘A Critical 
Investigation into the Nature and Content of Rights of Beneficiaries in terms of the South African Law of Trusts’, 
at pages 135-143. 
1065De Waal, M.J. (2000), ‘The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South African 
Trusts compared’, The South African Law Journal, at pages 548-571. Also, if the trust is created by will, codicil 
or other testamentary writing, the formalities prescribed by the Wills Act 7 of 1953 must be complied with. If it 
is created by antenuptial contract, registration in terms of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 are relevant. 
1066Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. 
1067Oosthuisen, M.J. (1988), ‘Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg’, 3rd Edition, Volume 2, Perskor Publishers, at 603. 
1068Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 146-147. See also Coetzee, J.P. (2006), ‘'n Kritiese 
Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’, 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Africa, April 2006. Translated: ‘A Critical Investigation into the Nature 
and Content of Rights of Beneficiaries in terms of the South African Law of Trusts’, at pages 135-143. 
1069Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 146-147. See also Coetzee, J.P. (2006), ‘'n Kritiese 
Ondersoek na die Aard en Inhoud van Trustbegunstigdes se Regte ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’, 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Africa, April 2006. Translated: ‘A Critical Investigation into the Nature 
and Content of Rights of Beneficiaries in terms of the South African Law of Trusts’, at pages 135-143. 
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of the founder is decisive.1070 However, it is still a requirement that the founder should actually be 
divested or be bound to divest himself at least of the legal proprietary power over the trust 
property.1071  
 
Fourthly, the trust object must be defined with reasonable certainty and it must be lawful.1072 In 
Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others,1073 Bozalek J distinguishers between the object 
and the purpose of a trust and states the following:  
 
‘Whilst it is correct that one of the essentials for the creation of a valid trust is that the trust object 
must be lawful, it does not follow, however, in my view, that a trust is void if it is created with a 
fraudulent, illegal or immoral purpose … There is, in my view, a material difference between the 
object of a trust and the purpose thereof.’1074 
 
According to Oosthuizen, the object can be personal or impersonal1075 and may consist in the benefit 
of one or more named or ascertainable persons or classes of person, including juristic persons and 
trustees on behalf of other trusts and/or for one or more impersonal objects such as the education 
or the development of the community at large or a specific group of individuals.1076 In Deedat v The 
Master,1077 it was held that if the person or class for whose benefit the trust is intended is not named 
or determinable, the trust fails for want of a certain object. Furthermore, in the case of a bewind trust, 
the object has to be the benefit of the beneficiaries and not, for example, the acquiring of a piece of 
land as is required for the object of a company.1078 Cameron et al argues that the latter could for the 
purposes of the bewind trust only form an ancillary object or specific power given to the trustees.1079 
In Marks v Estate Gluckman,1080 it was held that if the trust object fails or because the object is 
                                                 
1070Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. 
1071Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 147-148 and 268-269. Also, a mistake in the description 
of trust property can be corrected on the principle that a mistaken description does not prejudice. See also De 
Waal, M.J. (2000), ‘The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, Scottish and South African Trusts 
compared’, The South African Law Journal, at pages 6 and 548-571. 
1072Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. See also Peterson and Another 
NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 5 SA 191 (CPD) at 196G. 
1073Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 5 SA 191 (CPD). 
1074Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 5 SA 191 (CPD) at 197B. 
1075A trust for an impersonal object can be valid only if it is charitable or for the public benefit. In this regard, 
the object need not be expressed with the precision otherwise required for a trust with a personal object See 
Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 161-177. 
1076Oosthuisen, M.J. (1988), ‘Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg’, 3rd Edition, Vol 2, Perskor Publishers, at 604-605. 
1077Deedat v The Master 1995 2 SA 377 (A) at 383E–384B. 
1078Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 151. 
1079Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 151. 
1080Marks v Estate Gluckman 1946 AD 289, at 301. 
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insufficiently defined, the trust itself falls away.1081 In Die Meester v Meyer,1082 it was held that if only 
part of the trust object fails, the remainder, if separable, is nevertheless valid. Furthermore, the trust 
object of a personal trust is also determined by the specific power of appointment conferred on the 
trustees.1083 Therefore, if the trust derogates from the rights of the owner of the trust property, as in 
the case of a bewind trust, the restrictions it contains must be imposed in the interest of a person 
other than the owner otherwise it constitutes a nude prohibition,1084  in which case the restrictions 
are unenforceable and the beneficiaries may insist on administering the property themselves to the 
exclusion of the trustee.1085 For example, in the case of a bewind trust where all the beneficiaries 
contribute to the trust fund and also hold a vested right in it.1086  
 
Finally, the trust object must be lawful. In Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol,1087 the court 
confirmed the essential requirements for the formation of a valid trust. In Peterson and Another NNO 
v Claassen and Others,1088 Bozalek J stated as follows: 
 
‘Whilst it is correct that one of the essentials for the creation of a valid trust is that the trust object 
must be lawful, it does not follow, however, in my view, that a trust is void if it is created with a 
fraudulent, illegal or immoral purpose … There is, in my view, a material difference between the 
object of a trust and the purpose thereof. The object is openly proclaimed and ascertainable and 
all parties who have dealings with that trust will be held to have knowledge of the trust’s object. 
In the present case, the objects of the three new trusts … were entirely lawful, the primary object 
being in each case ‘om bates en inkomste te bekom en aan te wend tot uiteindelike voordeel van 
die begunstigde’. By contrast, where a trust is formed for an illegal or unlawful purpose, this 
knowledge is jealously guarded by those who harbour such purpose. This is but one reason, 
although an important one, why the purpose of a trust, where it is an illegal or immoral purpose 
but is known only to the founder and to the trustees, cannot be equated, in all circumstances, with 
that trust’s (lawful) object.’1089 
 
Du Plessis refers to Du Toit1090 where the latter argues that there are two further ‘elements’ which 
are auxiliary to the five requirements listed above.1091 According to Du Plesiss, these elements are:  
                                                 
1081See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African 
Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 171. 
1082Die Meester v Meyer 1975 2 SA 1 (T). 
1083Oguttu, A.W. (2012), ‘Offshore trusts and income tax avoidance: the lures and pitfalls from a South African 
perspective’, International Journal of Private Law, 5(4), at pages 406-438. 
1084Referred to as a nudum praeceptum, which was earlier mentioned in paragraph (c) above. 
1085Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at 109. 
1086Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at 109. 
1087Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (C). 
1088Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 5 SA 191 (CPD). 
1089Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 5 SA 191 (CPD) at 197B-E. 
1090Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths. 
1091Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 




‘(i) If the settlor makes over trust property to the trust, the settlor must divest himself or herself of 
control over the trust property in favour of the trustee and the trustee should function free from 
any control by the settler … (ii) There must be a separation between control over the trust property 
by the trustee and enjoyment of the benefits associated with the trust by the beneficiaries.’1092 
 
Du Plessis also refers to Cameron et al,1093 by stating that the latter authors refer to element (i) 
mentioned by Du Toit1094 as forming part of requirement (i) discussed above, namely the intention to 
create a trust.1095 According to Cameron et al, if the founder fails to confer the required independence 
on the trustee, or does not have the intention to vest property in the trustee, the intention to create a 
trust may be absent.1096 Nevertheless, these auxiliary elements mentioned by Du Plessis will not be 
discussed, other than to note that Du Plesssis argues that although these elements are not 
requirements for the formation of a valid trust, a failure to comply with these elements may lead to 





(d) The Distinguishing Features of a Bewind Trust  
 
The bewind trust, as mentioned in 3.1.2(a) above, is derived from Roman-Dutch law. The term 
‘bewind’ arrives from Dutch law (bewind) and Roman-Dutch law (bewindhebber).1098 Its practical 
application in the Netherlands arose when the ownership of property was disposed of (usually by 
will) to a named beneficiary, but the control of that property was vested in the hands of a 
bewindvoerder usually because the beneficiary was considered too young or otherwise incompetent 
                                                 
presented for the degree of Doctor of Laws in the Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, 
at pages 22-23. 
1092Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 22. 
1093Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 118. 
1094Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice’, 2nd Edition, Butterworths. 
1095Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 22. 
1096Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 118. 
1097Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 22. 
1098Shawe, T. (2013), ‘Vesting in a bewind trust’, Ghostdigest, 17th October 2013, Pretoria. Available at 
www.ghostdigest.co.za/articles/vesting-in-a-bewind-trust/54437, accessed in May 2015. 
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to administer it him/herself.1099 The bewindvoerder manages the assets for the benefit of a 
beneficiary, but it is the beneficiary and not the bewindvoerder who is the owner of the assets.1100 
Therefore, a bewind trust is a trust where the founder makes a bequest to the beneficiaries and vests 
the administration of the assets in the trustees. The beneficiaries acquire ownership of the assets, 
while the trustees only have the administrative control thereof. In a bewind trust the beneficiary is 
protected in the case of the insolvency of the bewindvoerder, as the assets do not form part of the 
latter’s estate.1101  
 
It must be noted that this paragraph will simply highlight the salient features of a bewind trust.1102 
Nevertheless, Du Plessis refers to Koppenol-Laforce and Kottenhagen1103 and states that: 
 
‘the bewind is a form of fiduciary administration, but it may only be used in certain limited family-
related situations’.1104 
 
It is submitted that this is not the case in South Africa, as the bewind form is not limited to certain 
family-related matters, but also applied as a legal vehicle to conduct business, for instance it is used 
to structure private equity funds in South Africa. For example, Davis describes the private business 
trust in South Africa, as a small, closely knit group of individuals carrying on business, albeit by way 
of investment or more active trading, through the medium of a trading trust.1105 According to Davis, 
this type of business trust has as its basic structure, either a bewind or the trust in the narrow 
sense.1106 According to Van der Westhuizen, it will have the bewind structure when the beneficiaries 
provide the trust capital themselves, either in cash or by the guaranteeing of loans made against the 
security of their own property, in return for which each of them receives a share certificate as proof 
of his pro rata interest in the venture, and as proof of his vested right in the trust capital.1107 Van der 
Westhuizen further points out that where the beneficiaries have vested rights and the same persons 
who are beneficiaries are also controlling the trust as trustees, there are very little, if any, differences 
                                                 
1099See De Waal, M.J. (2006), ‘Comparative Succession Law’, in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (2006), 
‘The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law’, Oxford University Press, 1088, at page 1092. 
1100See De Waal, M.J. (2006), ‘Comparative Succession Law’, in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (2006), 
‘The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law’, Oxford University Press, 1088, at page 1092. 
1101Kortmann, S. and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘National Report for the Netherlands’, in Hayton, D., Kortmann, S. 
and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘Principles of European Trust Law’, Kluwer Law International, 195, at pages 199. 
1102Some of the salient features of the bewind trust have already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. 
1103Koppenol-Laforce, M.E. and Kottenhagen, R.J.P. (1998), ‘The Institution of the Trust and Dutch Law’, in 
Hondius, E. (1998), ‘Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth International Congress of Comparative Law’, 
Intersentia Rechtswetenschappen, 137, at page 200. 
1104Du Plessis, I. (2014), ‘A South African Perspective On Some Critical Issues Regarding The OECD Model 
Tax Convention On Income And On Capital, With Special Emphasis On Its Application To Trusts’, Dissertation 
presented for Doctor of Laws degree: Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, December 2014, at page 53. 
1105Davis, D.M. (1986), ‘Trading Trust: Its Validity and Use in South Africa’, The Taxpayer, April 1986, at 70. 
1106Davis, D.M. (1986), ‘Trading Trust: Its Validity and Use in South Africa’, The Taxpayer, April 1986, at 70. 
1107Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 8. 
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between this kind of venture and the ordinary partnership.1108 In Pezzutto v Dreyer,1109 Smalberger 
JA held that: 
 
‘In essence ... a partnership is carrying on a business (to which each of the partners contributes) 
in common for the joint benefit of the parties with a view to making a profit.’1110 
 
In Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustees,1111 the court held that the trust structure 
determines the ownership, control and management of the trust property and the vesting of it. In 
addition, the court held that if the structure corresponds with that of the trust in the narrow sense, 
ownership, management and control of the trust property are vested in the trustees for administration 
purposes, but the trustees have no beneficial interest in it.1112 However, this depends on any 
conditions imposed or rights reserved by the founder.1113 According to Honoré et al and Olivier, if the 
trust structure corresponds with that of the bewind form, namely where contributing beneficiaries are 
involved, the ownership of the trust property is vested in the beneficiaries.1114 However, the same 
does not apply to control and management. The fact that the whole body of beneficiaries holds all 
the assets, and therefore the ownership, does not of necessity mean that the full control also vests 
in them.1115 In this regard, the trustees are only administrators of the trust and in that capacity they 
also have control. In the bewind trust the ownership is conferred upon the beneficiaries and a trustee 
is appointed merely to administer the trust property; and the wording of the conferment in the trust 
deed is usually indicative of the ownership of the trust property.1116 Therefore, the provisions 
contained in the trust deed with regard to the aspects of vesting, vested rights, suspensive and 
resolutive conditions are critical in determining the dominium of the trust property.1117  
 
As mentioned above, the ownership of the assets in a bewind trust vests in the beneficiaries and 
such assets do not form part of the trustee’s estate. As the person vested with the control of the 
assets, on the other hand, the trustee(s) have the power to dispose of them, but owe fiduciary duties 
to the beneficiaries.1118 Where a private equity fund is structured as a bewind trust, the investor 
                                                 
1108Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at pages 8-9. 
1109Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 3 SA 379 (AD). 
1110Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 3 SA 379 (AD) at paragraph 33. 
1111Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald's Trustee, 1915 AD 491, at 498-499. 
1112Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald's Trustee, 1915 AD 491, at 498-499. 
1113Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 4-6 and 158. See also Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First 
Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 108. 
1114 Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 4-6 and 158. See also Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First 
Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at page 108. 
1115See Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 14. 
1116Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 11. 
1117Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 11. 
1118Du Toit, F. (2007), ‘The Fiduciary Office of Trustee and the Protection of Contingent Trust Beneficiaries’, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, 3, at pages 469-482. 
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participants as beneficiaries will directly own the assets held by the trust in undivided shares, 
according to the participation ratio in which they participate in the trust assets. In a bewind trust, the 
beneficiaries remain the direct co-owners of the underlying assets of the trust as opposed to having 
the rights to share in a proportionate part of the income or capital of the trust.1119 The benefit of using 
a bewind trust is ostensibly that gains and losses arise directly in the hands of the beneficiaries. This 
follows from the fact that they actually own the underlying assets of the trust.   
 
In SARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd,1120 the court held that the trust in question bore all the hallmarks 
of a trust, properly called, where the assets of the trust vest in the trustees rather than the case of a 
bewind trust where the founder of the trust makes a gift or bequest directly to a beneficiary but vests 
the control of the assets in a trustee or administrator.1121 Furthermore, the court held that the essence 
of a trust was that the trustees undertook the obligations of administering the assets and certain 
discretionary powers were conferred upon them, including the power to terminate the trust and 
distribute its assets.1122 Based on the facts of the case the court held that the trustees did not have 
the beneficial ownership of the assets in respondent but nevertheless they were under an obligation 
to hold them and transfer them to a third party if directed to do so by respondent’s directors, which 
did not imply that at all material times respondent was in reality the beneficial owner of the shares.1123  
 
The operation of a bewind trust was described more fully in the matter of Bafokeng Tribe v Impala 
Platinum Limited as follows:1124  
 
‘A bewind trust was created in terms whereof the ownership of the land vested in the Tribe, but 
control in the trustee. The trustee acts as nominee of the Tribe for the function of acquiring 
ownership for it, and as trustee for the object of acquiring control’.1125  
 
The law with regard to trust does not therefore impede the bewind trust structure. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in paragrapgh 3.1.2(a) above, private equity funds that are structured as trusts typically 
use bewind and not discretionary trusts.   
 
                                                 
1119Kortmann, S. and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘National Report for the Netherlands’, in Hayton, D., Kortmann, S. 
and Verhagen, H. (1999), ‘Principles of European Trust Law’, Kluwer Law International, 195, at pages 199. 
1120SARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd, 2002 (4) SA 606 (N) at 611.  
1121During the tax years 1994 and 1995 ending on 30 June of each year the taxpayer made unsecured long-
term loans to one of its shareholders, namely the Dyefin Share Trust (‘the Trust’). These loans remained unpaid 
at the end of the taxpayer’s subsequent respective tax year-ends. In terms of sections 64C(2) and 64C(3)(a) 
of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the Commissioner deemed these loans to have been dividends distributed 
to the Trust and thus attracting liability for secondary tax on companies (‘STC’). The taxpayer objected. 
1122SARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd, 2002 (4) SA 606 (N) at 611.  
1123SARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd, 2002 (4) SA 606 (N) at 611.  
1124Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Limited, 1999 (3) SA 517 (BH) at 541-542. 
1125The court cited Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, 
Lansdowne, Juta and Company Ltd, at 166; and Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 864 
G-H. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 163 
 
(e) Tax Considerations  
 
At the outset it is noted that it is not the intention of this paragraph to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of the taxation of trusts, as well as the tax treatment of underlying portfolio interests because 
such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.1126 The purpose of this paragraph is twofold. 
Firstly it will highlight the general taxation principles relating to the bewind trust. Secondly, it will 
discuss the view taken by the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) that the acquisition of the 
beneficial rights in a trust is subject to transfer duty.  
 
General Taxation Provisions 
 
All South African residents are taxed on their worldwide income and non-residents are subject to 
income tax on income derived from a South African source.1127 In the context of a bewind trust this 
means that the income is taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries, while the income of discretionary 
trusts is taxed in the hands of the trust. The reason for this distinction is that in the case of the bewind 
trust, as discussed above, the trust has the power to manage the assets(s) on behalf of the 
beneficiary who owns it. Since the beneficiary owns the asset(s), any income or capital gain arising 
on the use or disposal of the asset(s) vests in the beneficiary.1128 Therefore, the investors 
(beneficiaries) in a bewind trust are taxed in their hands individually.1129  
 
South African investors will be required to include income generated in respect of the underlying 
assets of the private equity fund in their gross income and will be taxed in accordance with the tax 
regime applicable to such investors.1130 In addition, in terms of Section 10(1)(k)(i) of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962, dividend income on shares in South African companies will be exempt from income 
tax in both South African and non-South African investors’ hands, subject to the deeming provisions 
contained in sections 8E and 8EA of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962.1131 In terms of section 1 of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, non-South African investors will only be required to include income 
generated in respect of the underlying assets in their gross income if the income is from a South 
                                                 
1126With regard to the latter (in the context of a private equity fund), brief reference is made later in this paragraph 
to African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1969) 4 SA 259 (A), CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 
(A), 58 SATC 283, 1996 Taxpayer 150, and ITC 1412 (1983) 48 SATC 157. The brief discussion relates to the 
proceeds from the realisation of the shares in the investee company which can be said to be of a capital nature 
resulting in the return to the investors being liable to the lower capital gains tax.  
1127Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at page 870. 
1128See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1129See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1130See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1131Sections 8E and 8EA of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, deems the dividends on certain shares containing 
debt-like characteristics to be income in the hands of the recipient. 
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African source, such as  interest on loans applied in South Africa and dividends on shares in South 
African companies.1132 In terms of section 10(1)(h) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, any interest 
income should be exempt from income tax in the non-South African investors’ hands, unless it is a 
natural person investor who has been physically present in South Africa for more than one hundred 
and eighty three days in the twelve-month period during which the interest was received, or if the 
non-South African investor has a permanent establishment in South Africa.1133 Any dividends 
declared by a South African company or interest from a South African source that is paid to a non-
South African resident investor will be subject to dividends withholding tax and interest withholding 
tax.1134 
 
In terms of section 25B of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, subject to section 7, read together with 
relevant revenue practice notes, SARS accepts that where there is a bewind trust the allowances 
flow through and can be set off against other income.1135 Section 25B is the predominant section in 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 relating to the taxation of trusts.1136 Section 25B provides that the 
income of the trust is taxed either in the trust or in the hands of the beneficiaries. Thus, if the income 
does not vest in the beneficiaries the trust is taxed on it; and if the income does vest in the 
beneficiaries, they (the beneficiaries) are taxed on it.1137 There is no ring-fencing and the investor in 
the trust will enjoy the tax benefits directly. There is effectively a tax at source and a measure of 
limited liability.1138 In addition, there are no adverse tax accrual consequences for the investors 
(provided that the income earned by the trust is declared within the year in which it is earned).1139 In 
addition, the general principles of South African tax law applicable to a trust provide that the trust 
                                                 
1132See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1133See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1134This will be subject to certain exemptions and any available treaty relief. Both dividends withholding tax and 
interest withholding tax will be levied at a rate of fifteen percent.  See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, 
L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, 
January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. See also Haupt, P. (2015), ‘Notes on South African Income 
Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 592-661. 
1135Section 25B is subject to section 7, where section 7 applies it prevails over section 25B. Section 7 is an 
anti-avoidance provision aimed at taxing, in the hands of the donor, any income which have resulted from a 
donation or similar disposition. 
1136Section 25B of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, read together with section 7(1), essentially codified the 
conduit-pipe principle first articulated in South African common law. 
1137See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1138See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1139These income tax consequences may, however, be superseded by the deeming provisions relating to trust 
income as set out in section 7 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. In this regard, if a resident makes a gratuitous 
disposal to either a local or offshore trust, section 7 may attribute the retained income derived by the trust from 
such gratuitous disposition to that resident. Section 7 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 provides several anti-
avoidance measures, which deem someone other than the person who receives income or to whom income 
accrues, to be entitled to the income. See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De 
Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, 
at pages 870-894. 
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income paid by the trust to an investor in the year it is accrued retains its original character in the 
hands of the beneficiary, and is thus taxed in the investors hands in accordance with the principles 
applicable to that character of income.1140 Section 25B(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 states 
that any amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during any year of assessment 
in his/her capacity as a trustee of a trust, to the extent to which such amount has been received for 
the immediate or future benefit any ascertained beneficiary who has a vested interest to that amount 
during that year, this shall be deemed to be an amount that has accrued to the beneficiary of the 
trust.1141  
 
Furthermore, section 25B(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 provides that where a beneficiary has 
acquired a vested right to any amount in consequence of the exercise by the trustee of a discretion 
vested in him/her in terms of the trust deed of the trust, agreement or will of a deceased person, that 
amount would be deemed to have been derived for the benefit of that beneficiary.1142 Therefore, in 
terms of section 25B of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the trust would be transparent for tax 
purposes, with any amounts to which the beneficiary have a vested interest, or amounts to which 
the beneficiary acquires a vested interest as a result of the exercise by the trustee of the discretion 
to vest the amount in the beneficiary, deemed to be amounts that accrue directly to the 
beneficiaries.1143 
 
Nevertheless, if the private equity fund's investment activities are liable to income tax, the realisation 
of gains on the disposal of shares will be subject to tax in South Africa, provided the investors in the 
fund and the investments by the fund are all local. In the context of a private equity fund, realisation 
gains are usually treated as being of a capital nature even where the relevant shares were not held 
for a period of three years before the date of disposal and therefore do not qualify for the deemed 
capital treatment.1144 Capital Gains Tax (‘CGT’) was introduced into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
on October 2001. It applies to all sales of capital assets on or after that date.1145 The basic principle 
is that if a capital gain asset is sold at a profit, the profit is subject to CGT, and if it is sold at a loss, 
the capital loss can be set off against other capital profits. If there are no other capital profits in the 
year, the capital loss is carried forward to the next year.1146 Except for shares sold after being held 
                                                 
1140Section 25B read together with section 7(5) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. See also Stiglingh, M., 
Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South African Income Tax’, 
LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1141See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1142See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1143See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1144See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1145See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
1146See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
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for three years, in which case section 9C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 applies, there are no 
rules for when the sale of an asset is subject to normal tax and when it is subject to the tax on capital 
gains.1147 If the sale of an asset is subject to normal tax, namely it is a sale in the course of a scheme 
of profit-making, then the CGT rules do not apply.1148 In addition, paragraph 80 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 provides that where a capital gain is determined in 
respect of the vesting by a trust of an asset in a beneficiary who is a resident,1149 the gain must be 
disregarded for purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or loss of the trust, and must be 
taken into account for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or loss of the beneficiary 
to whom that asset was so disposed.1150 Paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 has the effect of making the trust tax transparent and attributing capital gains and 
losses directly in the beneficiaries.1151 
 
In the context of a private equity fund, a further consideration with regard to CGT is when investors 
leave or new investors enter a private equity fund structured as a bewind trust. As discussed above 
in detail, the investors in the private equity fund set up as a bewind trust are the trust beneficiaries, 
who own the underlying trust assets but relinquish control of the assets to the trustees who, in turn, 
appoint a private equity firm to identify and make investments.1152 As the investors are direct part 
owners of the trust assets, if new investors are introduced after the fund has already made 
investments, the old investors will dispose of a portion of their interest in the fund assets. As the 
disposal will be to a new investor and a beneficiary of the trust, it will be to a connected person, 
which means that it will be deemed to take place at market value on the date that the new investor 
becomes a beneficiary of the trust.1153 Again, where an investor enters the fund as a beneficiary of 
the trust, the old investors may have a CGT liability even though they do not receive any proceeds 
from the new investor joining the fund, but only in respect of the part of the trust assets disposed 
of.1154 Nevertheless, the SARS approach stated in the CGT Guide is not law and a court could 
choose not to follow this approach. 
 
                                                 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
1147See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
1148See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
1149Other than persons contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e) of the Eighth Schedule, or a person who 
acquires the asset as an equity instrument as contemplated in section 8C(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
1150See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1151See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1152See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
1153See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2012), ‘Interpretation Note No: 67 on the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962’, 1st November 2012. 
1154See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2012), ‘Interpretation Note No: 67 on the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962’, 1st November 2012. 
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In the context of a private equity fund, the proceeds from the realisation of the shares in the investee 
company can be said to be of a capital nature resulting in the return to the investors being liable to 
the lower capital gains tax. In this regard, African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR1155 
established the general principal that shares should be acquired for better or for worse or, relatively 
speaking, for keeps that is only to be disposed of if some unusual, unexpected or some special 
circumstance warranting or inducing disposal, intervenes. In CIR v Nussbaum1156 the court 
acknowledged the fact that a taxpayer would be saddled with a ‘formidable and difficult onus’. This 
would especially be the case if, in addition to the main purpose of receiving income from dividends, 
there would be a secondary intention of disposing of the shares with a view to yielding a profit 
whenever it is deemed expedient. However, in ITC 14121157 it was held that the fact that a taxpayer 
may foresee the possibility of eventually disposing of the shares will not in itself render the asset 
something other than capital. In this context, the most important test employed by the courts in 
deciding whether or not the proceeds arising from the disposal of shares or income or capital is the 
intention with which the shares were acquired.1158   
 
Nevertheless, trusts may essentially be transparent for tax purposes and where the beneficiaries of 
the trust have a vested interest in the trust, or where the trustees distribute the capital of the trust or 
the income generated by the trust assets to the beneficiaries, the provisions of section 25B of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 






Transfer Duty  
 
In terms of section 2(1) of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949, transfer duty is payable on the value of 
any property acquired by any person by way of a transaction or in any other manner. Section 2(1) of 
the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949, reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of section 9, there shall be levied for the benefit of the National 
Revenue Fund a transfer duty (hereinafter referred to as the duty) on the value of 
any property (which value shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 
5, 6, 7 and 8) acquired by any person on or after the date of commencement of this Act by way 
of a transaction or in any other manner, or on the amount by which the value of any property 
                                                 
1155African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1969) 4 SA 259 (A). 
1156CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A), 58 SATC 283, 1996 Taxpayer 150. 
1157ITC 1412 (1983) 48 SATC 157. 
1158Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See Haupt, P. 
(2015), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 34th edition, at pages 693-694. 
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is enhanced by the renunciation, on or after the said date, of an interest in or restriction upon 
the use or disposal of that property, at the rate of.’ 
 
A ‘transaction’ is defined in terms of section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 as: 
 
'(a) ... an agreement whereby one party thereto agrees to sell, grant, donate, cede, exchange, 
lease or otherwise dispose of property to another, or any act whereby any person renounces 
any interest or restriction in his favour upon the use or disposal of property'.  
 
According to Divaris and Stein, the term 'property' in terms of section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act 40 
of 1949 means any right in or to property, whether it is movable or immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal and embraces only rights that are vested in the taxpayer and would not include 
contingent rights or rights in which the taxpayer does not have ownership or that may accrue upon 
the happening of certain events.1159 Both Louro and Green are of the view that a disposal of these 
rights and the acquiring of same by a person falls within the definitions of 'transaction' and 'property', 
causing transfer duty to be levied on the acquisition of these rights.1160 In SIR v Estate Rhode-
Knight,1161 it was held that in order to determine whether transfer duty is payable on the disposal of 
an interest in the trust is whether a beneficiary has acquired a right in the trust property or not. This 
court held that the word 'acquired' in section 2(1) of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 does not refer 
to the acquisition of ownership, but rather to the right to obtain ownership.1162 The consequence is 
that transfer duty is payable when a person obtains an enforceable right to acquire ownership in 
future and not when the ownership is obtained.1163  
 
According to Van Der Westhuizen, the nature of a trust and the rights of the beneficiaries determine 
whether a person purchasing an interest in a trading trust is liable for transfer duty.1164 For instance, 
in the trust in a narrow sense, the ownership and control of the trust property vests in the trustees in 
their capacity as trustees whereas in the trust in a wide sense (bewind trust), ownership vests in the 
beneficiaries, but control vests in the trustees. When a person acquires the rights of a beneficiary in 
a trust the liability for transfer duty depends on whether the beneficiaries have a real right; a right to 
acquire the ownership of property; or a personal right.1165 If it is the latter, then it appears as if no 
transfer duty is payable, but the possibility of donations tax does exist.1166 When ownership vests in 
                                                 
1159Divaris, C. and Stein, M. (2003), ‘Silke on South African Income Tax’, 11th Memorial Edition, Juta and 
Company, at 23.3. 
1160Louro, J. (1986), ‘Don’t trust the trust when you buy it’, Butterworths Property Law Digest, 1/1986, at 23. 
Green, R. (1997), ‘The cession of an interest in a trust and transfer duty’, De Rebus 763. 
1161SIR v Estate Rhode-Knight 1974 (1) SA 253 (A). 
1162SIR v Estate Rhode-Knight 1974 (1) SA 253 (A). 
1163Green, R. (1997), ‘The cession of an interest in a trust and transfer duty’, De Rebus 763. 
1164Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 75. 
1165SIR v Estate Rhode-Knight 1974 (1) SA 253 (A). 
1166Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 27, at pages 870-894. 
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the trustees the beneficiaries do not have an immediate right to the trust property itself, or to acquire 
ownership of the property in future, and merely have a personal right against the trustee that the 
trust be properly managed for their benefit.1167 The result is that when beneficiaries under a trust in 
a narrow sense transfer their interests in the trust, the right to obtain property is not disposed of to 
the purchaser; while on the other hand, such a transfer by beneficiaries under a bewind trust will 
constitute a disposal of property thus attracting transfer duty.1168 It is submitted, that it terms of a 
bewind trust, the beneficiaries are the owners of the immovable property and therefore have a real 
right in the property as defined in terms of section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949, which will 
attract transfer duty when a beneficiary disposes of his/her interest. 
 
(f) The Termination, Variation and Revocation of a Trust 
 
As previously mentioned, a critical characteristic of the private equity business model is the pre-
determined, fixed life period of a private equity fund. Therefore, a private equity fund structured as a 
trust will be terminated at some point. According to Cameron et al, the revocation of a trust is the 
process by which the founder with or without the concurrence of the trustees and beneficiaries brings 
to an end a trust which has already been set up.1169 Cameron et al, also defines variation as 
consisting in the alteration of the terms of a trust by the founder, the trustees, the beneficiaries, the 
court or some combination of these.1170 Furthermore, termination is the discharge of a trust by one 
of these agencies or by statute or operation of law.1171 The statutory powers conferred upon the court 
is in terms of the provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, which empowers the court 
to order the variation or termination of a trust if the court is of the opinion that the facts comply with 
the stipulations of section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. Section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act 57 of 1988 reads as follows: 
 
‘If a trust instrument contains any provision which brings about consequences which in the 
opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee and which- 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
(b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest, 
                                                 
1167Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 486-489. 
1168Van Der Westhuizen, W.M. (1997), ‘Wills and Trusts’, Service Issue Two, Butterworths, at page 75. 
1169Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 491. See also Van Der Merwe, N.J. and Rowland, C.J. (1990), 
‘Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg’, Sixth Edition, Van der Walt, Pretoria, at pages 376-377. 
1170Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 491. See also Van Der Merwe, N.J. and Rowland, C.J. (1990), 
‘Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg’, Sixth Edition, Van der Walt, Pretoria, at pages 376-377. 
1171Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 491.  
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the court may, on application of the trustee or any person who in the opinion of the court has a 
sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or vary any such provision or make in respect thereof 
any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby particular trust property is 
substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust.’ 
 
In terms of the definition above, if a trust instrument contains any provision which brings about 
consequences which in the opinion of the court the founder of the trust did not contemplate or foresee 
and which (a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or (b) prejudices the interest 
of beneficiaries; or (c) is in conflict with the public interest,  the court may, on application of the trustee 
or any person who in the opinion of the court has a sufficient interest in the trust property, make in 
respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order terminating the trust.1172 
According to Cameron et al, section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 increased the 
court’s power to vary trust provisions and includes a power not merely to vary the trust but to bring 
it to an end.1173  Cameron et al states that:  
 
‘Under s 13 criteria both subjective … and objective … must be satisfied before the court can 
intervene. The legislature has set a middle course between two extremes. It might have dispensed 
with the subjective criterion. The court might have been given power to vary trust provisions 
whenever it considered it in the public interest or that of the beneficiaries to do so, even if the 
founder foresaw or contemplated the circumstances that made it undesirable to adhere to the 
original provisions … At the other extreme the legislature might have kept closely to the common 
law and insisted that necessity or something akin to it should be present before the court has 
jurisdiction to vary the trust.’1174 
 
Furthermore, the South African Law Commission’s Report on the Review of the Law of Trusts did 
not recommend that wide powers to vary trust provisions be given to the court; nor the right of the 
founder, the trustee and beneficiaries to vary a trust be changed.1175 In this regard, the Report stated 
the following: 
 
‘The Court already has a common-law power to vary the trust provisions if a change in 
circumstances not foreseen by the founder has made the carrying out of the purpose of the trust 
‘practically impossible or utterly unreasonable’. The Commission recommends that this power be 
                                                 
1172Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 517. 
1173Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 517. 
1174Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ 5th Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 517-518. 
1175South African Law Commission, ‘Report on the Review of the Law of Trusts’, Project 9, June 1987, at 43-
48. 
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extended to all cases where the provisions of a trust instrument bring about consequences which 
the founder did not contemplate or foresee and which hamper the achievement of the objects of 
the founder or prejudice the interests of beneficiaries or are in conflict with the public interest.’1176 
 
Section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 was applied in In re Heydenrych 
Testamentary Trust and Others.1177 In this case the applicant, in its capacity as administrator of three 
charitable testamentary trust instruments, brought an ex parte application for the deletion of 
discriminatory provisions regarding the potential beneficiaries of such trust funds. The provisions in 
question discriminated directly on the grounds of race and gender insofar as they restricted the 
allocation of scholarships to boys from the white population group and by requiring that at least fifty 
percent of the recipients of the scholarships were boys of British descent.1178 In this case, Goliath J 
held that section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 empowers a court to delete or vary 
provisions in a trust instrument that bring about consequences that the founder of the trust did not 
contemplate or foresee and which either (a) hamper the achievements of the objects of the founder; 
(b) prejudice the interests of the beneficiaries; or (c) are in conflict with the public interest.1179 In In 
re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others,1180 the testators had executed the relevant wills 
before the advent of democracy and the introduction of the South African Constitution and, therefore, 
the court reasoned, they would not have foreseen that the allocation of scholarships by the trusts on 
a discriminatory basis would be rendered unconstitutional and unlawful, or that the charitable 
purpose of the trusts would be hampered by the discriminatory conditions imposed. The court in In 
re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others1181 referred with approval to earlier decisions in which 
similar discriminatory provisions in testamentary trusts were declared invalid. One of these decisions 
was Ex Parte President of the Conference of The Methodist Church of Southern Africa NO: In re 
William Marsh Will Trust,1182 in which the court held that a clause in a trust deed that restricted the 
benefits of a home for destitute children to white children was contrary to the public interest. Another 
such decision was Minister of Education and Another v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO and Another,1183 in 
which the court considered the limitation of bursaries to candidates of European descent and found 
that this constituted indirect discrimination based on race and colour. Accordingly, Goliath J 
concluded, the terms of the testamentary trusts had to be varied to remove the discriminatory 
provisions.1184 Nevertheless, Cameron et al argues that the court’s common law powers remain 
                                                 
1176South African Law Commission, ‘Report on the Review of the Law of Trusts’, Project 9, June 1987, at 
paragraph 12.19. See also Ex parte Watling 1982 1 SA 936 (C) at 940H. See Ex parte Sidelsky 1983 4 SA 
598 (C) at 601E. 
1177In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
1178In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
1179In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
1180In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
1181In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
1182Ex Parte President of the Conference of The Methodist Church of Southern Africa NO: In re William Marsh 
Will Trust 1993 2 SA 697 (C). 
1183Minister of Education and Another v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO and Another 2006 4 SA 205 (C). 
1184In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust and Others 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC). 
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intact, despite the statutory powers given by section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 
1988.1185  
 
In terms of common law, an inter vivos trust will terminate when the trust deed stipulates it will 
terminate.1186 This can be after the lapse of time or at the happening of a future event or it can be 
left to the discretion of the trustees to terminate the trust.1187 An inter vivos trust is in any case 
regulated by the law of contract as discussed above; therefore it is advisable not to limit the discretion 
of the trustees regarding the termination of a trust.1188 When a trust is terminated the destination of 
the remaining trust property, if any, depends on the mode of termination.1189 If the beneficiaries have 
brought it to an end they are entitled to direct how the property should be distributed.1190 If the founder 
has revoked the trust by virtue of a unilateral power of revocation or with the concurrence of the 
trustee, he/she is entitled to recover the trust property by condictio.1191 Nevertheless, in any other 
case of termination of a trust inter vivos the provisions, if any, of the trust instrument apply, but in 
default of such provisions the founder or his successors may recover the trust property by condictio, 
unless the founder intended to part permanently with any claim to the property, or he or his 
successors have since the commencement of the trust waived any such claim, in which case the 
property vests in the state as bona vacantia.1192  
 
The revocation of the trust is usually dependent on one or more events as defined in the trust 
instrument.1193 For example, such an event can be the death of a named person, the attainment of 
a specified age by a beneficiary, a fixed date mentioned in the trust deed, or a provision that the trust 
is to continue indefinitely until the trustees resolve to terminate it.1194 In Ex parte Estate Vincent,1195 
                                                 
1185Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 519. 
1186Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 264-277. 
1187Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 264-277. 
The rule against perpetuities in Anglo-American law, which limits the duration of a trust, is not applicable in 
South African law where a trust can continue indefinitely. South African courts and authorities on the topic 
have not made a clear distinction between the inter vivos trust and the testamentary trust as far as the 
perpetuity of the trust is concerned. See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, 
E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 55, 125–127, 170, 
587–588. See also Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, 
Lansdowne, Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 42, 102–104, 513–514. 
1188Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 264-277. 
See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African 
Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 55, 125–127, 170, 587–588.  
1189Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at page 491. 
1190Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 506-512. 
1191Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 492-503. 
1192Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at page 467. 
1193Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 264-277. 
1194Olivier, P.A. (1990), ‘Trust Law and Practice’, First Edition, De Jager-Haum Publishers, at pages 264-277. 
1195Ex parte Estate Vincent 1964 2 SA 99 (C). 
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the court highlighted that as far as the testamentary trust is concerned, there is also no limit to the 
time at which an interest in the capital of the trust fund may be made to vest in the beneficiaries. 
Therefore, in Ex parte Estate Vincent1196 the court held that the founder of a trust was entitled to give 
capital to his great-grandchildren. In addition, the principle of perpetuity was affirmed in the majority 
decision in CIR v Sive’s Estate.1197 In this case the testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to 
his children in equal shares, provided that as regard half of each share the trustees had the entire 
discretion to decide whether the whole or any portion should be paid to a child entitled thereto and, 
if the trustees decided to make payments to them, when they were to be made.1198 In the same 
manner the trustees were to pay each child so much of the income derived from his share as they 
might deem fit.1199 The court held that the testator did not intend to vest any portion of capital or 
income in his children, so that they did not have a vested interest on which estate duty was 
payable.1200 The decision also implies that a trust can be valid though the trustees have a discretion 
indefinitely to postpone the distribution of both income and capital.1201  
 
The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 does not provide for any formalities or specific control 
measures to be complied with when a trust is terminated.1202 Termination itself does not also 
terminate the trusteeship.1203 The duties to the trustees’ office may continue to exist and prior to 
termination, all liabilities will have to be paid and trust property distributed according to the trust 
instrument.1204 Furthermore, the office comes to an end only when the trustee has duly disposed of 
all the trust property.1205  It is only after the Master of the High Court is satisfied and confirms that 
the trustee has duly disposed of all the trust property, will the trustees really have discharged their 
obligations.1206 In this regard, the Master of the High Court may require reasons for termination or 
the original resolutions terminating the trust by the trustees, as well as the original letters of authority 
together with confirmation that the beneficiaries under trust have received their benefits.1207 
                                                 
1196Ex parte Estate Vincent 1964 2 SA 99 (C). See also Ex parte Heyman 1937 CPD 282. See also Ex parte 
Estate Graaff 1947 4 SA 496 (C). 
1197CIR v Sive’s Estate 1955 1 SA 249 (A). 
1198CIR v Sive’s Estate 1955 1 SA 249 (A). 
1199CIR v Sive’s Estate 1955 1 SA 249 (A). 
1200CIR v Sive’s Estate 1955 1 SA 249 (A). 
1201CIR v Sive’s Estate 1955 1 SA 249 (A). As mentioned in earlier, the rule against perpetuities in Anglo-
American law, which limits the duration of a trust, is not applicable in South African law where a trust can 
continue indefinitely. See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), 
‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 125–126, 599 and 601. 
1202Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at page 183. 
1203Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at page 183. 
1204Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at page 183. 
1205Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of 
Trusts,’ Fifth Edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at pages 226-227. 
1206Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 183 and 467. 
1207Honoré, T. and Cameron, E. (1992), ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ Fourth Edition, Lansdowne, 
Juta and Company Ltd, at pages 183 and 467. 
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Furthermore, in Crookes NO v Watson,1208 the court held that where the beneficiaries have accepted 
any benefit prior to the termination of the trust, they have to be a party to the resolution to terminate 
the trust, despite the trust deed stipulating otherwise. Nevertheless, in the case of a private equity 
fund, the trust is established for a fixed term and the termination of the trust will come about by the 
expiration of that term. Typically in such trust agreements, there will be many examples of express 




It is submitted that there are no major advantages or disadvantages of the bewind trust structure 
over the en commandite partnership structure for private equity funds, where the investors and 
investments are all South Africans. The preferred private equity fund structure will depend more on 
the commercial and other legal considerations. As for bewind trusts, it appears that the critical factor 
separating a trust from a partnership is the degree of independence that the trustees enjoy. The 
analysis of bewind trusts identifies certain matters which a court would take into account in any such 
analysis. Among them are (a) do the beneficiaries have the right to elect the trustees?; (b) may the 
beneficiaries remove the trustees from office at any time without cause, and fill the vacancies caused 
by such removal?; (c) do the beneficiaries have the right to amend or terminate the trust?; and (d) 
do the beneficiaries have the right to direct the actions of the trustees?1209 While an affirmative 
answer to any one of these questions would not necessarily undo a trust, it is important that the 
principle of trustee independence not be eroded, whether directly or indirectly (for example, through 
an investment committee). Both the internal and external conduct of the trust should be carefully 
regulated to avoid the erosion of trustee independence. In this regard, the presence of at least one 
experienced independent trustee who has the respect and trust of the investors is critical. As 
mentioned earlier, paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5 of this chapter will provide a comparison of the private 
equity fund structures used in the US, UK, Australia, and Canada. 
 
3.2. Organisational Form in the US 
 
In chapter one it was mentioned that private equity funds in the US are structured as closed-end 
investment vehicles, which are typically organised as limited partnerships or limited liability 
companies.1210 According to Black, Delaware law is preferred amongst the private equity industry 
participants in the US to organise private equity funds because limited partnerships and limited 
liability companies for large, complex transactions are often formed in Delaware and fund investors 
                                                 
1208Crookes NO v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A). See also Hofer v Kevitt NO 1998 1 SA 382 (SCA). 
1209See Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust and Other 2003 (5) SA 674 (T); and SARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd 2002 
(4) SA 606 (N) at 611; See also Cameron, E., De Waal, M., Wunsh, B., Solomon, P and Kahn, E. (2002), 
‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts,’ 5th edition, Juta and Co. Ltd, at paragraph 3.3.2. 
1210Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at pages 1-5.  
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are familiar with the jurisdiction.1211 A further reason why private equity industry participants prefer 
Delaware is because it has specialized courts for business entities, which have the relevant expertise 
in economic and governance issues.1212 In addition, Delaware has a well developed common-law 
regime governing limited partnerships and limited liability companies, which is generally considered 
the more sophisticated of the US States.1213 More importantly though, is that Delaware has an 
efficient administrative process; and Delaware statutory and common law provides for extensive 
freedom of contract.1214 This contractual flexibility will be discussed below as one of the key features 
of limited partnerships and limited liability companies.  
 
The nature and structure of each individual limited partnership and limited liability company are 
largely dependent on the contents of the operating agreement which affords the parties to such an 
agreement a wide discretion in drafting such an agreements.1215 It must be noted that this discussion 
will not consider all US state and federal regulations, including securities law issues, tax, liability, 
and other issues required for the structuring of a private equity fund in the US. Such a discussion is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this discussion will in addition include a brief analysis of 
the application of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships and limited liability companies in the US. 
The legal principle of fiduciary duties will be discussed more fully in chapter three as part of the 
importance of corporate governance in relation to the private equity participants. The purpose of 
introducing such an analysis in this paragraph is to highlight that statutes, for example the Delaware 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,  imposes duties on the private equity firm to act efficiently, 
honestly and fairly, effectively extending duties of a fiduciary nature from the private equity firm to 
investors. However, while the legal fiduciary duties cannot be contracted out of, the terms of the 
relevant trust deed or partnership deed may amend or modify such duties to provide for terms agreed 
between the investors and the private equity firm. Nevertheless, this paragraph will primarily provide 
a broad analysis of the salient features of the limited partnership and limited liability company as the 




                                                 
1211Black, L.S. (2007), ‘Why Corporations Choose Delaware’, Delaware Department of State Division of 
Corporations, at pages 1-10.  
1212Black, L.S. (2007), ‘Why Corporations Choose Delaware’, Delaware Department of State Division of 
Corporations, at pages 1-10. See also Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second 
Edition, OUP Oxford, at chapter 3, paragraph D and chapter 6, paragraph D. 
1213Black, L.S. (2007), ‘Why Corporations Choose Delaware’, Delaware Department of State Division of 
Corporations, at pages 1-10.  
1214Black, L.S. (2007), ‘Why Corporations Choose Delaware’, Delaware Department of State Division of 
Corporations, at pages 1-10. See also Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: 
Chadbourne and Parke LLP, published by Practical Law Company, at pages 1-5. 
1215Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1027-1028. 
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Limited partnerships in the US are governed by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976.1216 The 
federal government of the US does not have specific statutory law governing the establishment of 
partnerships.1217 Instead, each of the fifty states as well as the District of Columbia has its own 
statutes and common law that govern partnerships.1218 These states largely follow common-law 
principles of partnerships whether a general partnership or a limited partnership.1219 In the absence 
of applicable federal law, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issues 
non-binding model laws, referred to as the Uniform Act, in which to encourage the adoption of 
uniformity of partnership law into the states by their respective legislatures.1220 This includes the 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1976 and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.1221 Despite the US Federal 
Government not having a specific statutory law for establishing partnerships, it has an extensive 
statutory scheme for the taxation of partnerships in terms of the Internal Revenue Code.1222 The 
Delaware statute governing limited partnerships is Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act which the can be found in Chapter 17 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code.1223 In terms of section 15-
101(11) of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partnership is 
a partnership having two or more persons, including one or more general partners and one or more 
limited partners. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act covers, inter alia laws 
relating to the formation, and relationship among the partners of a limited partnership and 
distributions and withdrawal.1224 
 
As stated previously in chapter one, a large proportion of private equity funds in the US are organised 
as partnerships because of the tax benefits associated with pass-through entities.1225 According to 
Altman and Raju, the only significant benefit of the corporate form as a private equity vehicle is the 
                                                 
1216The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which includes its 1976 revision called the Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, is a uniform act that regulates business partnerships in US States. The Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act was promulgated in 1916 and the most recent revision in 2001. 
1217See Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from 
Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-619. See also Altman, P.M. 
and Raju, S.M. (2005), ‘Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law’, The Business Lawyer, at pages 1469-1485. 
1218Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028. 
1219Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028. 
1220Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028. 
1221Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028. 
1222The Internal Revenue Code is Title 26 of the United States Code wherein Subchapter K of Chapter 1 
creates tax consequences for partnerships. 
1223The Delaware Administrative Code is the official version of the regulations for the State of Delaware. 
1224Available at  http://delcode.delaware.gov/title6/c015/, accessed in June 2015. 
1225Callison, J.W. and Sullivan, M.A. (2012), ‘Partnership Law and Practice: General and Limited Partnerships’, 
Clark Boardman Callaghan, at 1:2. See also Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual 
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law 
Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242. 
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limited liability it provides the private equity fund’s investors.1226 Limited liability is also achieved 
through the use of a limited partnership with a general partner (private equity firm) that is also 
organised as a limited partnership or a limited liability entity.1227 The primary benefit of the partnership 
form is that there is no federal income tax at the entity level; that is, the fund as an entity pays no 
federal income taxes on capital gains or other income.1228 A partnership generally is treated for tax 
purposes as a pass-through entity, which means that the general partner and the limited partners 
will be allocated their proportionate share of the fund’s income, gains, losses and expenses for 
reporting on their own income tax returns based upon the characterisation of the items at the fund 
level, for example, ordinary income or capital gain.1229 If the private equity fund is organized as a 
limited partnership, gains from the sale of the fund’s portfolio investments are taxed only once and, 
if the fund’s partners are individuals and the portfolio investment has been held for more than one 
year, at preferential long-term capital gain tax rates.1230 On the other hand, the fund had been 
organised as a corporation rather than as a partnership or treated as a corporation for tax purposes, 
the gains would be taxed twice.1231 For example, upon the realisation of a portfolio investment, the 
fund, if organized as a corporation, would pay federal income taxes on capital gains at the applicable 
corporate tax rate, followed by taxation at the shareholder level upon the distribution of the net gains 
as a dividend.1232 
 
In the US the limited liability of the limited partners in a limited partnership is predominantly based 
on the premise that such limited partners should not be in the control of the business. The control of 
the business is the function of the general partner and should the limited partners be engaged in the 
control of the business then the limited partners could be subject to the general liability of a general 
                                                 
1226Altman, P.M. and Raju, S.M. (2005), ‘Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law’, The Business Lawyer, at pages 1469-1485. 
1227Smith, C.B. and Anderson, R.D. (2006), ‘Limited partnerships: legal aspects of organization, operation, and 
dissolution’, Arlington, VA: Bureau of National Affairs, Corporate practice series, No 24-4th. 
1228Section 7704(b) of the US Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is the 
domestic portion of federal statutory tax law in the United States, published in various volumes of the United 
States Statutes at large, and separately as Title 26 of the United States Code (‘USC’). Other federal tax law is 
contained in other titles of the United States Code, such as Title 11 (relating to bankruptcy) and Title 19 
(Customs Duties). It is organized topically, into subtitles and sections, covering income tax, payroll 
taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and excise taxes; as well as procedure and administration. Its implementing 
agency is the Internal Revenue Service. 
1229Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-10. 
1230Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-10. 
1231Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-11. 
1232Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, 82(2), Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028. See also Ribstein, L.E. 
(2004), ‘Fiduciary duties and limited partnership agreements’, Suffolk University Law Review, 37, at 927. 
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partner.1233 Steele states that what constituted control for this purpose was largely interpreted by the 
courts based on very specific facts.1234 Specific provisions were included in state statutes specifying 
activities in which limited partners could engage without being deemed to participate in the control 
of the business.1235 For example, section 17-303(b)(1) and (2) of the Delaware Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, Chapter 17 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code includes specific provisions for 
activities by a limited partner which do not constitute control.1236 It reads as follows: 
 
‘(b)  A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the meaning of 
subsection (a) of this section by virtue of possessing or, regardless of whether or not the 
limited partner has the rights or powers, exercising or attempting to exercise 1 or more of the 
following rights or powers or having or, regardless of whether or not the limited partner has 
the rights or powers, acting or attempting to act in 1 or more of the following capacities: 
(1)  To be an independent contractor for or to transact business with, including being a 
contractor for, or to be an agent or employee of, the limited partnership or a general 
partner, or to be an officer, director or stockholder of a corporate general partner, or to 
be a partner of a partnership that is a general partner of the limited partnership, or to be 
a trustee, administrator, executor, custodian or other fiduciary or beneficiary of an estate 
or trust which is a general partner, or to be a trustee, officer, advisor, stockholder or 
beneficiary of a business trust or a statutory trust which is a general partner or to be a 
member, manager, agent or employee of a limited liability company which is a general 
partner; 
(2)  To consult with or advise a general partner or any other person with respect to any 
matter, including the business of the limited partnership, or to act or cause a general 
partner or any other person to take or refrain from taking any action, including by 
proposing, approving, consenting or disapproving, by voting or otherwise, with respect 
to any matter, including the business of the limited partnership.’ 
 
The Delaware statute contains provisions specifically designed to protect the limited liability of the 
limited partner interests held by persons having interests in or operating the general partner.1237 In 
effect, the Delaware statute reduces the liability of limited partners to an extent approaching the 
                                                 
1233Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242.  
1234Steele, M.T. (2007), ‘Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 32(1), at pages 1-32. 
1235Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242.  
1236Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242.  
1237See section 17-303(b)(1) and (2) of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Chapter 17 of 
Title 6 of the Delaware Code. See also Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative 
Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-
619. 
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limited liability of shareholders in the corporate form.1238 According to Persuad, in a limited 
partnership the general partner, as a rule, remains personally liable to third parties for the debts and 
obligations of the limited partnership.1239 However, private equity fund partnership agreements 
typically provide for indemnification of the general partner by the partnership. Accordingly, the value 
of the indemnity is limited to partnership assets, although generally fund agreements permit 
commitments to be drawn down, and often obligate limited partners to return some or all distributions 
received from the fund to fund the indemnity or other claims against the partnership.1240 The 
partnership agreement may also limit the general partner’s liability to claims by the limited partners 
or the partnership through exculpation provisions.1241 Typically, these provisions provide that the 
general partner will not be liable to the partnership or the other partners, except for fairly serious 
actions or omissions such as fraud, gross negligence, bad faith or intentional misconduct.1242 Such 
conduct will also, typically, prevent the general partner from obtaining indemnification under the 
terms of the partnership agreement.1243 The Delaware statute affords the parties broad authority by 
contract to define the liabilities of the general partner to the partnership and the other partners, to 
provide for indemnification, and to expand, restrict or eliminate the fiduciary duties of the general 
partner, the limited partners and other persons, except that the implied contractual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated. 1244 The general partner will also typically be organized 
using a limited liability entity, or a series of limited liability entities.1245 To further limit liability, the 
general partner will typically invest only a small portion of its funds as the general partner and will 
contribute the majority through a limited partner interest.1246 Liability may be further reduced where 
                                                 
1238Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly 
Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-619. 
1239Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-16. 
1240Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at pages 47:16- 47:19. 
1241Altman, P.M. and Raju, S.M. (2005), ‘Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law’, The Business Lawyer, at pages 1469-1485. See also 
Callison, J.W. and Sullivan, M.A. (2012), ‘Partnership Law and Practice: General and Limited Partnerships’, 
Clark Boardman Callaghan, at 1:2. 
1242Ribstein, L.E. (2004), ‘Fiduciary duties and limited partnership agreements’, Suffolk University Law 
Review, 37, at 927. See also Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity 
Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-619. 
1243Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242. 
1244See sections 17-403(b), 108, and 1101(d) and (f) of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act, Chapter 17 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code. 
1245Steele, M.T. (2009), ‘Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies’, American Business Law Journal, 46(2), at pages 221-242. 
1246See Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1025-1028.  
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a limited partner or a group of limited partners forms a corporation, a limited partnership, or a limited 
liability company to hold the limited partner interest in the fund.1247  
 
Limited Liability Company  
 
According to Lewis, the limited liability company is a hybrid form of organisation possessing some 
attributes of a partnership and some attributes of a corporation.1248 It combines the pass-through tax 
benefits of a partnership with the limited liability of a corporation.1249 Limited liability companies in 
the US are governed by the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which includes a 2006 revision 
called the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.1250 The Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act regulates limited liability companies  with regard to Delaware and can be found 
in Chapter 18 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code.1251 The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act 
provides laws relating to the formation, management, governance, mergers and dissolution of limited 
liability companies.1252 However, limited liability companies are largely governed by contract and 
Delaware allows a limited liability company to contract out of many of the statutory requirements by 
providing otherwise in the limited liability company agreement.1253  
 
According to Persuad, the attractiveness of limited liability companies was significantly enhanced by 
a favourable US Internal Revenue Service ruling in 1988 that allowed a limited liability company to 
be taxed as a partnership.1254 In terms of section 301.7701-3(b)(1) of the US Treasury,1255 a limited 
liability company with two or more members is, in general, automatically taxed as a partnership, 
                                                 
1247Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-16 to 47-19. 
1248Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1026. 
1249Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1026-1027. 
1250The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act was originally promulgated in 1995 and amended in 1996 and 
2006. By 1997, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had adopted a statute permitting the use of the 
limited liability company form. It is a uniform act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws for the governance of limited liability companies by US states. 
1251Balouziyeh, J.M. (2013), ‘A Legal Guide to United States Business Organizations: The Law of Partnerships, 
Corporations, and Limited Liability Companies’, Springer Science and Business Media, at pages 33-41; 99-
101. 
1252Balouziyeh, J.M. (2013), ‘A Legal Guide to United States Business Organizations: The Law of Partnerships, 
Corporations, and Limited Liability Companies’, Springer Science and Business Media, at pages 33-41; 99-
101. 
1253Balouziyeh, J.M. (2013), ‘A Legal Guide to United States Business Organizations: The Law of Partnerships, 
Corporations, and Limited Liability Companies’, Springer Science and Business Media, at pages 33-41; 99-
101. 
1254Persuad, A.N. and Atkinson, A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of Structural, ERISA, 
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues’, chapter 47 in Investment Adviser Regulation, 3rd Edition, by Kirsch, 
C.E., at page 47-19. 
1255Treasury Regulations are the tax regulations issued by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a bureau 
of the United States Department of the Treasury. These regulations are the Treasury Department’s official 
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code and are one source of US federal income tax law. 
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achieving pass-through status limited liability companies are designed, by statute, to be extremely 
flexible. For example, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act is modeled on the Delaware 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and the two statutes contain substantially identical 
wording.1256 A limited liability company can be structured to resemble a limited partnership in its 
operations, with management authority and control over the business of the company vested in a 
manager or managing member who plays an operational role similar to that of a general partner in 
a limited partnership, while the non-managing members can be given rights and obligations similar 
to those of limited partners.1257 However, neither managers nor members of a limited liability 
company are personally liable for the debts of the limited liability company, unless they otherwise 
agree, unlike the limited partnership, which requires at least one general partner who will be 
personally liable for the obligations of the partnership.1258 Therefore, the primary characteristics of 
limited liability companies are that they are taxed as partnerships, members and managers all enjoy 
limited liability, and the relationship of the members, managers, and entity is governed by the 
operating agreement.1259 According to Ribstein and Keatinge, limited liability companies combine 
corporate limited liability with partnership tax and governance flexibility.1260  
 
As stated above the primary advantage of using a limited partnership or limited liability company as 
a fund vehicle is that they both are ‘pass-through’ entities for US federal income tax purposes. 
Secondly, both these legal forms provide investors in the private equity fund, with limited liability. 
Thirdly, both these legal vehicles are generally very flexible business entities. According to Naidech, 
the US state limited partnership and limited liability company statutes mentioned above are typically 
default statutes, which allow many of the statutory provisions that would otherwise apply to be 
overridden, modified or supplemented by the specific terms of the limited partnerships or limited 
liability company agreement.1261 This flexibility allows partners in a limited partnerships and members 
of a limited liability company to structure a wide variety of economic and governing arrangements.1262 
According to Lewis, the nature and structure of each individual limited partnerships and limited 
liability companies are largely dependent on the operating agreement.1263  
                                                 
1256Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1026-1027. 
1257Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1026-1027. 
1258Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly 
Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-619. 
1259Manesh, M. (2012), ‘Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly 
Traded LPs and LLCs’, Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3), at pages 555-619. 
1260Ribstein, L.E. and Keatinge, R.R. (2004), ‘Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies’, Volume 
2, Thomson West Publishers, at 2.02. 
1261Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at pages 1-5.  
1262Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at pages 1-5.  
1263Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1027-1028. 




A case that deals with the application of the operating agreement and fiduciary duties in such limited 
liability vehicles is Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation.1264 In Gatz Properties LLC v 
Auriga Capital Corporation,1265 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s decision in Auriga Capital Corporation v Gatz Properties.1266 In Auriga Capital 
Corporation v Gatz Properties, the Court of Chancery held that a controlling member and manager 
of a limited liability company breached his fiduciary duties to the company’s minority members 
because the process by which he purchased the limited liability company from the minority members 
did not result in the payment of a fair price under the fairness standard of review.1267 In Gatz 
Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation, the Supreme Court stated that the question of whether 
the default standard under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act is that a manager owes 
fiduciary duties to the members of a limited liability company remains unanswered and should not 
have been addressed by the lower court.1268 Furthermore, until this question is answered definitively, 
members of limited liability companies should clearly state in the limited liability company agreement 
whether and to what extent the company managers or controlling persons should have any fiduciary 
duties to the members.1269 
 
This case arose out of the 2009 sale of Peconic Bay LLC. Peconic Bay LLC was a Delaware limited 
liability company, owned by Gatz Proprties LLC and a number of minority shareholders. Peconic Bay 
LLC was formed by the Gatz Properties LLC for the purpose of leasing and developing a golf course 
on property owned by the Gatz family.1270 The limited liability company agreement for Peconic Bay 
designated Gatz Properties as the manager. Gatz Properties was in turn managed and controlled 
by William Gatz. In 1998, Peconic Bay entered into a long-term sublease with a national golf course 
operator. By 2005, Gatz was aware that the golf course operator intended to exercise its early 
termination right in 2010 and hired an appraiser who valued the land at $10.1 million with golf course 
improvements and at $15 million as vacant land available for development. In 2007, Gatz was 
approached by RDC Golf Group with an offer to acquire the long-term sublease. Although Gatz 
                                                 
1264Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
1265Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
1266Auriga Capital Corporation v Gatz Properties, 2012, 40 A.3d 839, Delaware Court of Chancery. 
1267Auriga Capital Corporation v Gatz Properties, 2012, 40 A.3d 839, Delaware Court of Chancery. See also 
Strine, L.E. and Travis, L.J. (2014), ‘The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom’, Harvard Law School 
John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 789, 1st August 2014. 
1268Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. See also 
Strine, L.E. and Travis, L.J. (2014), ‘The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom’, Harvard Law School 
John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 789, 1st August 2014. 
1269Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. See also 
Strine, L.E. and Travis, L.J. (2014), ‘The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom’, Harvard Law School 
John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 789, 1st August 2014. 
1270Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. Available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/22/fiduciary-duties-as-default-standard-under-limited-liability-
company-act/, accessed in June 2015. 
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refused to provide due diligence materials to RDC Golf Group, RDC Golf Group submitted two 
proposals, each of which was rejected by the Peconic Bay members. In response to a request from 
the minority members that Gatz determine RDC Golf Group’s interest in a deal at $6 million, Gatz 
told RDC Golf Group that an offer ‘well north of $6 million’ would be required to continue 
discussions.1271 RDC Golf Group indicated it was willing to proceed on those terms, but Gatz failed 
to respond and told the minority members that negotiations had broken off without informing them of 
RDC Golf Group’s continued interest. Gatz then offered the minority members approximately 
$700,000 for their interests in Peconic Bay, which the minority members rejected. For the next year, 
Gatz pursued a course of action that led to a sale of Peconic Bay as a distressed asset in a poorly 
run auction. Gatz was the only bidder at the auction and purchased Peconic Bay for $50,000 cash 
plus assumption of its debt, yielding proceeds to the minority members well below what they would 
have received had Peconic Bay been sold to RDC Golf Group in the previously proposed 
transactions. The minority members sued for money damages based on, among other things, breach 
of fiduciary and contractual duties.1272 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the Chancery Court’s decision regarding Gatz’s liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty; however, it based its decision solely on contractual grounds and not on the existence 
of any default fiduciary duties under Delaware’s limited liability company statute.1273 In determining 
that Gatz owed fiduciary duties to the minority members of Peconic Bay, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the contract interpretation issues.1274 The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant limited 
liability company agreement provision, which required agreements between Peconic Bay and related 
parties to be on terms and conditions no less favourable than those that could be obtained from 
‘arms-length third parties’, to be the ‘contractual equivalent of the entire fairness equitable standard 
of conduct’.1275 Under this standard, Gatz was required to establish the fairness of the transaction 
since his acquisition of Peconic Bay had not been approved by the informed vote of the holders of 
two-thirds of the interests in Peconic Bay held by unconflicted members, as required in terms of the 
limited liability company agreement.1276 After reviewing the Chancery Court’s factual findings, the 
Supreme Court was satisfied that Gatz had failed to carry his burden of proof and held that Gatz had 
violated his contractual fiduciary duties based on, among other things, his refusal to negotiate with 
                                                 
1271Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
1272Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. See also 
Coetzee, L. and Van Tonder, J.L. (2014), ‘The fiduciary relationship between a company and its directors’, 
Obiter, 35(2), at 285-315. 
1273Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court.  
1274See also Marks, C.P. (2014), ‘Piercing the Fiduciary Veil’, Lewis and Clark Law Review, 19. 
1275Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. Available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/22/fiduciary-duties-as-default-standard-under-limited-liability-
company-act/, accessed in June 2015. 
1276Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
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RDC Golf Group and his subsequent sale of Peconic Bay to himself at an unfair price in a flawed 
auction.1277 The Supreme Court also upheld the Chancery Court’s finding that Gatz was not entitled 
to the benefit of the exculpation and indemnification provisions in the limited liability company 
agreement because he acted in bad faith and made wilful misrepresentations to the minority 
members.1278 Nevertheless, the key issue at hand as stated by the Supreme Court was that whether 
the managers and controllers of a limited liability company are subject to default fiduciary duties 
under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act is an issue about which ‘reasonable minds could 
differ’.1279 The Supreme Court also noted that it was unnecessary for the Chancery Court to decide 
‘sua sponte the default fiduciary duty issue’ because the dispute over the application of fiduciary 
standards was determinable solely by reference to the limited liability company agreement and no 
litigant had asked the Chancery Court to decide this issue as a matter of statutory law.1280 Condon 
states that for these reasons, among others, the Supreme Court in Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga 
Capital Corporation,1281 held that the Chancery Court’s ‘statutory pronouncements must be regarded 
as dictum without any precedential value’.1282 Lewis argues as follows:  
 
‘Both statutes provide only the contours of the entities, giving parties the ‘broadest possible 
discretion in drafting their ... agreements.’ In addition, both the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act and Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act explicitly incorporate the 
principle of freedom of contract. The statutes read, ‘It is the policy of [the LLC Act] to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability 
company agreements.’ This means that Delaware courts will enforce the product of the parties’ 
negotiations, as long as the provision does not conflict with statutory requirements. In other words, 
‘the operative document is the limited partnership [or limited liability company] agreement and the 
statute merely provides the ‘fall-back’ or default provisions where the partnership [or limited 
liability company] agreement is silent.’1283  
 
                                                 
1277Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012(59)(A) 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
1278Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012 (59)(A)3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
1279Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
1280Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. Condon, 
C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
1281Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
1282Condon, C. (2012), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Default Standard Under Limited Liability Company Act’, Harvard 
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 2012. 
1283Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1027-1028. 
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Therefore, where limited partnership or limited liability agreements are silent as to whether fiduciary 
duties apply, such duties will be presumed to apply.1284 That leaves three issues, which will be 
discussed more fully in paragraph 2 of chapter three, namely, what specific duties are owed; second, 
who is charged with such duties; and third, to whom are the duties owed.1285 Nevertheless, it is 
evident from the above discussion, that the choice of the organisational form for the investment entity 
in the US is a critical step in the formation of a successful private equity fund. Despite a fund being 
structured as a corporation, partnership or limited liability company in the US, corporations typically 
are not used because partnerships and limited liability companies provide a significant tax advantage 
by avoiding entity-level taxation.  
  
3.3 Organisational Form in the UK 
 
In the UK, there are three types of partnership available in terms of UK law; namely the general 
partnership;1286 the limited partnership;1287 and the limited liability partnership.1288 However, the 
limited partnership registered in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act of 1907 is the most commonly 
used legal vehicle for private equity funds.1289 A limited partnership established in terms of the 
Limited Partnerships Act of 1907 in the UK does not have legal personality separate from its 
partners.1290 Limited partnerships established in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act of 1907, 
should not be confused with limited liability partnerships, which are established in terms of the 
Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2000.1291 Such limited liability partnerships are not typically used 
to structure private equity funds in the UK because one key disadvantage is that income and capital 
gains derived from the underlying partnership investments are not tax exempt and do not possess 
the tax pass-through feature of the limited partnership registered in terms of the Limited Partnerships 
Act of 1907.1292 It must be noted that this paragraph will not discuss the differences between these 
two statutes, and will concentrate on the salient features of the predominant form which is registered 
                                                 
1284Coetzee, L. and Van Tonder, J.L. (2014), ‘The fiduciary relationship between a company and its directors’, 
Obiter, 35(2), at pages 285-315. 
1285Coetzee, L. and Van Tonder, J.L. (2014), ‘The fiduciary relationship between a company and its directors’, 
Obiter, 35(2), at pages 285-315. 
1286See Partnership Act of 1890. 
1287See Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
1288See Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000. 
1289Barry, B. (2011), ‘England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor 
Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 67. 
1290Barry, B. (2011), ‘England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor 
Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 67. 
1291Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-7. A ‘partnership’ in terms of section 11 of the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act of 2000 is now considered a separate legal person and is deemed to have legal 
personality. It allows limited liability for general trading debts, but individual partners cannot limit personal 
liability for negligence. It was introduced to allow some protection against large negligence actions, where the 
risks were felt to be excessive. 
1292Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-7. 
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in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act of 1907.1293 Nevertheless, the limited partnership is the 
predominant legal vehicle used by private equity firms to structure private equity funds because it 
affords investors’ limited liability; it is tax transparent; and  it offers a great deal of organisational 




A limited partner’s (investor) liability in a limited partnership is limited to the amount of capital 
contributed by such limited partner provided that it does not become involved in the management of 
the partnership.1295 If he does, he forfeits his limited liability status. In addition, a limited partner must 
make a contribution of capital of cash or property immediately upon entry into partnership in terms 
of section 4(2) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907, and it does not matter that the limited partner’s 
contribution is nominal.1296 However, once the capital is contributed to the partnership there is no 
requirement for it to be retained by the limited partners and it may be divided between some or all of 
the partners as agreed.1297 The partners are free to increase or decrease the partnership’s capital, 
subject to compliance with registration requirements in terms of section 9(1)(b) of the Limited 
Partnership Act 1907.1298 However, in terms of section 4(3) of the Limited Partnership Act 1907, a 
limited partner’s withdrawal of capital while he remains a member of the partnership renders him 
liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership up to the amount which he has received 
back.1299 Nevertheless, the freedom to agree the terms of a partnership for the limited partnership is 
                                                 
1293See The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 4 states: ‘The limited 
partnership performs a different role from that of the limited liability partnership … [Limited Liability Partnerships 
Act 2000] The LLP is designed as a business vehicle for professional or trading partnerships. It enables 
partners, who are actively involved in the business of their partnership, to limit their liability for the partnership’s 
debts and obligations. [Unlike the limited partnership, which offers limited liability only to the partners who are 
not actively involved in the business] Although it is treated as a partnership, it is subject to accounting and 
other rules closer to those of a company. The LLP was introduced in response to concerns by professional 
practitioners about their possible exposure to massive claims for damages arising from the alleged negligence 
of one or more of their partners. [See, for example, ADT Limited v Binder Hamlyn 1996 BCC 808] Following 
an initiative by two large accountancy firms to introduce a limited liability partnership based in Jersey, the DTI 
published a consultation paper on the LLP in 1997. The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 was enacted 
in July 2000.’ 
1294Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-2. 
1295In terms of section 6(1) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. 
1296In Dickson v MacGregor 1992 S.L.T. (Land Ct.) 83 and  MacFarlane v Falfield Investments Ltd 1996 SC 
14 it was £10. 
1297The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 11.  
1298The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 11.  
1299The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 11.  
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a key feature of the Limited Partnership Act 1907.1300 For instance, despite the restriction on the 
liability of limited partners, with respect to third parties, to the amount of his/her contribution, 
agreement may be reached between the partners that, as between themselves, any trading losses 
of the partnership will be divided without limitation.1301 
 
A limited partnership does, however, require the presence of at least one general partner who has, 
in terms of section 4(2) under the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 Act, unlimited exposure for the 
liabilities of the partnership. Section 4(2) of the Limited Partnerships Act of 1907 reads as follows: 
 
‘A limited partnership must consist of one or more persons called general partners, who shall be 
liable for all debts and obligations of the firm, and one or more persons to be called limited 
partners, who shall at the time of entering into such partnership contribute thereto a sum or sums 
as capital or property valued at a stated amount, and who shall not be liable for the debts or 
obligations of the firm beyond the amount so contributed.’ 
 
The investors will become limited partners and the general partner is typically a newly incorporated 
limited liability company or another limited partnership, in order to limit its liabilities as general 
partner, and delegates its investment management responsibilities to a private equity firm that is 
authorised by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’).1302 In the UK, like South Africa, a private 
equity firm that manages a private equity fund will require regulatory authorisation and/or licensing 
in order to be able to carry out its activities lawfully. In the UK, the private equity firm will typically 
need to apply to the FCA.1303 Therefore, a private equity firm that manages a private equity fund 
structured as a limited partnership is responsible for safeguarding and administering the limited 
partnership’s investments provided it has permission from the FCA to carry on that particular 
regulated activity.1304 Nevertheless, the duties of the private equity firm that manages the limited 
                                                 
1300The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 10.  
1301The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at page 10. The Commission Report 
made reference to case Reed v Young 1986 1 WLR 649, where the court gave effect to such an agreement, 
in a tax context. The House of Lords held that while the limited partner’s liability to creditors is limited to the 
amount of his contribution, the limited partner may incur greater trading losses for which tax relief could be 
claimed. Subsequently, the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, section 117 restricted loss relief to the 
amount which that partner have at risk in the partnership, thereby reversing Reed v Young 1986 1 WLR 649 
for tax purposes. 
1302See UK: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A 
Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission Consultation, The Stationery 
Office, at chapter 8. 
1303See discussion in paragraph 4 of this chapter regarding licensing and regulatory requirements of a private 
equity firm. 
1304Barry, B. (2011), ‘England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor 
Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 67. 
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partnership will be set out in a management contract/operating agreement, similar to that which was 
discussed in paragraph 3.2 of this chapter and which will be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
As mentioned above, the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 provides that a limited partner shall not be 
liable for the debts and obligations of the limited partnership beyond the amount of its capital 
contribution, unless the limited partner takes part in the management of the partnership’s business, 
in which event it will be liable for the debts and obligations incurred while he so takes part in the 
management as though he were a general partner. Section 6(1) of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 
reads as follows: 
 
‘A limited partner shall not take part in the management of the partnership business, and shall not 
have power to bind the firm: Provided that a limited partner may by himself or his agent at any 
time inspect the books of the firm and examine into the state and prospects of the partnership 
business, and may advise with the partners thereon. If a limited partner takes part in the 
management of the partnership business he shall be liable for all debts and obligations of the firm 
incurred while he so takes part in the management as though he were a general partner.’ 
 
The Limited Partnership Act of 1907 does not define what constitutes ‘management’ for this purpose, 
although there is a statutory right for limited partners to inspect the books of the partnership and 
examine into, and consult with the general partner on, the state and prospects of the partnership 
business.1305 It is generally accepted that a limited partner’s rights under a typical private equity 
limited partnership agreement, including participation by a representative of the limited partner on 
the limited partnership’s advisory committee or similar body, do not result in it taking part in the 
management, and in practice the private equity fund’s legal advisors will usually issue a legal opinion 
to this effect.1306 Without derogating from the discussion at hand, it is important to note that advisory 
boards composed of limited partner representatives are a common feature of many private equity 
funds in the UK. The positions on such advisory boards are usually occupied by limited partners 
making a significant capital commitment or having a strategic alignment with the private equity 
fund.1307 The role of the advisory board will vary from one private equity fund to another and will 
usually be set out in detail in the relevant limited partnership agreement.1308 According to Burdett et 
al, broadly speaking, advisory boards will typically review and approve conflicts of interest; waive 
restrictions incumbent on the private equity firm (general partner) in terms of the limited partnership 
                                                 
1305Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. 
1306Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 68. 
1307Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 3. 
1308Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 3. 
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agreement; consent to certain matters set out in the limited partnership agreement; and review 
valuation methodologies adopted by the private equity firm (general partner).1309 
 
It may be argued that by being on the advisory board, a limited partner will have greater access to 
more detailed information about the private equity fund and its management, which may have 
implications for its limited liability status. It was mentioned above that in terms of section 6(1) of the 
Limited Partnership Act of 1097, this limited liability can be lost if the investor participates in the 
management of the partnership. Therefore careful consideration needs to be applied to ensure that 
activities by limited partners are not considered ‘management’. A prudent approach would be to 
define the parameters of ‘management’ in order to understand what activities an investor can 
undertake without losing the crucial limited liability status.1310 The risk to the limited partner for losing 
its limited liability status is that it becomes liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership that 
are incurred while it takes part in the management. This includes all the partnership liabilities that 
arise during its period of management.1311  
 
According to Burdett et al, investors in a limited partnership must exercise caution because there are 
no clear rules in relation to what constitutes ‘management’ in terms of the Limited Partnership Act of 
1907.1312 The Limited Partnership Act of 1907 does not contain any express provisions as to what 
behaviour constitutes involvement in management.1313 Investors in a UK limited partnership have 
had to rely on common sense and limited guidance from court decisions on factors that will be taken 
into account.1314 In Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v 
Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LP (a firm) and Others, the court commented on what would 
constitute ‘management’ of the partnership by the limited partners.1315 This was also discussed in 
Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo Investors II LP and another, where Norris J held that 
merely seeking information about the partnership’s affairs is clearly not involvement in management 
and that the key issue is what the limited partners do with the information that it obtains.1316 In the 
situation where a limited partner examines information and confers with other limited partners or 
expresses to the general partner view about the performance of the partnership and/or future 
                                                 
1309Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 3. 
1310Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4.  
1311Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4.  
1312Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 6. 
1313Clark, G.L. and Monk, A.H. (2014), ‘The geography of investment management contracts: the UK, Europe, 
and the global financial services industry’, Environment and Planning A, 46(3), at pages 531-549. 
1314Clark, G.L. and Monk, A.H. (2014), ‘The geography of investment management contracts: the UK, Europe, 
and the global financial services industry’, Environment and Planning A, 46(3), at pages 531-549. 
1315Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1316Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo Investors II LP and another 2011 EWHC 1762 (Ch). 
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direction of the partnership, the limited partner does not become involved in management.1317 
However, if the limited partner intends to participate in the decision making process by requiring 
notice of individual decisions and the ability to make representations about individual decisions, or if 
it seeks to scrutinize and comment on the operational business decisions made by the general 
partner, then the limited partner risks becoming involved in the management.1318 
 
Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI 
Secondary Fund II LP (a firm) and Others,1319 was a UK High Court decision dealing with a pension 
fund’s action against a fund manager. In this case, the High Court has ruled largely against a group 
of institutional investors on preliminary issues in proceedings brought against the fund manager and 
general partner of an infrastructure fund alleging breach of investment mandate.1320 The ruling is of 
interest not only for its consideration of the investment mandate allegations but also for its 
acknowledgment that, in certain circumstances, investors in a partnership vehicle may be able to 
pursue claims against a fund manager by bringing an action on behalf of the fund itself.1321 In Certain 
Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP v Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II 
LP,1322 the fundamental allegation was that the fund did not invest exclusively or principally in private 
finance initiative concession companies, as the investors allege it was required to do, but instead 
acquired a corporate group which also held interests in other types of assets, exposing them to 
substantial losses. In a preliminary hearing, the court was called upon to rule on whether the 
investors could bring claims against the fund manager and general partner as derivative actions.1323 
This meant the investors standing in the place of the general partner to bring an action on behalf of 
the fund. At the preliminary hearing, the court was called upon to interpret the relevant 
contractual documents with respect to the scope of the investment mandate and the fund manager's 
liability. The court held against the general partner that the investors were not entitled to pursue 
derivative claims.1324 In this case, the court held that derivative claims will only be available where 
there are 'special circumstances'.1325 The categories of 'special circumstances' have never been 
defined but a claimant must be able to show that it has a legitimate interest in the relief being claimed 
                                                 
1317Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo Investors II LP and another 2011 EWHC 1762 (Ch). 
1318Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo Investors II LP and another 2011 EWHC 1762 (Ch). 
1319Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1320Clark, G.L. and Monk, A.H. (2014), ‘The geography of investment management contracts: the UK, Europe, 
and the global financial services industry’, Environment and Planning A, 46(3), at pages 531-549. 
1321De Dier, S. (2013), ‘Friends with Benefits?! A Comparative View on Legal Standing to Challenge Board 
Decisions’, European Company and Financial Law Review, 10(3). 
1322Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1323Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1324Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1325Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
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and that an injustice would arise if the relief was not able to be pursued.1326 Cooke J, in Certain 
Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP v Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LP, 
applied the test and refused to allow derivative claims against the general partner on the basis 
that there was no bar to the claimants suing the general partner under the partnership agreement in 
their individual capacities as the majority of them were in fact doing, alongside the derivative 
claims.1327 There was therefore 'no need and no room for a derivative claim’.1328  
 
With regard to the fund manager, the court ruled that there were sufficient ‘special circumstances’ to 
permit derivative claims.1329 The 'special circumstances' in this case arose from the general 
partner's conflict of interest in being a sister company of the fund manager, so that there was in 
reality no way the partnership would bring an action against the fund manager unless the existing 
general partner was replaced under the mechanism for doing so in the partnership agreement.1330 
Cooke J also rejected the defendants' argument that permitting derivative claims in a partnership 
context would run contrary to the statutory framework, given the prohibition in the Limited Partnership 
Act of 1907 on limited partners participating in the management of the partnership business.1331 
However, Cooke J accepted that, if the claimants did elect to bring such claims, section 6(1) of the 
Limited Partnership Act of 1907 would operate so as to require them to forfeit their limited liability 
status for as long as they were participating in the management of partnership business by pursuing 
the claims. In this regard, the claimants were unsuccessful in arguing that such liability should be 
limited to debts directly linked to the pursuit of the claims. Rather, it was held that they would be 
liable for all debts and obligations incurred by the partnership during the period in which they were 
pursuing the claims in the place of the general partner, in exactly the same way the general partner 
would have been.1332 Furthermore, all of the contractual interpretation issues were determined in 
favour of the defendant fund managers, including a finding that the relevant corporate acquisition 
was within the scope of permissible investments. Cooke J also rejected the defendants' argument 
that permitting derivative claims in a partnership context would run contrary to the statutory 
framework, given the prohibition in the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 on limited partners 
participating in the management of the partnership business. However, Cooke J accepted that, if the 
claimants did elect to bring such claims, section 6(1) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 would 
                                                 
1326Clark, G.L. and Monk, A.H. (2014), ‘The geography of investment management contracts: the UK, Europe, 
and the global financial services industry’, Environment and Planning A, 46(3), at pages 531-549. 
1327Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1328Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1329Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1330Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1331Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1332Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
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operate so as to require them to forfeit their limited liability status for as long as they were 
participating in the management of partnership business by pursuing the claims.1333 The court held 
that bringing proceedings constitutes ‘managing’ the business and its assets. In this regard, the 
claimants were unsuccessful in arguing that such liability should be limited to debts directly linked to 
the pursuit of the claims. Rather, it was held that they would be liable for all debts and obligations 
incurred by the partnership during the period in which they were pursuing the claims in the place of 
the general partner, in exactly the same way the general partner would have been.1334 The decision 
in Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP, highlights the difficulties in bringing derivative claims against fund managers where the 
investment vehicle is a limited partnership and the contractual relationship is between the fund 
manager and the general partner, particularly the loss of limited liability for a limited partner seeking 




The limited partnership is tax-transparent for UK tax purposes.1336 Tax transparency means that the 
limited partnership is not a taxable entity for the purposes of UK income tax, capital gains tax or 
corporation tax. The key feature is that there is no taxation at the fund level and instead, the partners 
are taxed on their individual income and capital gains derived from the underlying portfolio 
investments, thereby avoiding double taxation and ensuring that there is no penalty for investing via 
a fund vehicle.1337 The transparent treatment of partnerships means that tax exemptions will not 
apply to the private equity fund itself, however the partners may qualify for exemptions depending 
on their individual circumstances.1338 Furthermore, no organisational taxes are payable on the 
establishment of the private equity fund, although consideration should be had if an investor 
contributes an asset, rather than cash, to the limited partnership.1339 This does not often happen in 
practice, however if the  investor does make a taxable disposal on the contribution, the limited 
                                                 
1333Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1334Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LLP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and Others 2012 EWHC 3259 (Comm). 
1335Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 6. 
1336Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 
32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 
321-326. 
1337Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 
32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 
321-326. 
1338Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 3, paragraphs A-C. 
1339Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 3, paragraphs A-C. 
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partnership may be liable for Value Added Tax and stamp taxes, which will depend on the nature of 
the asset contributed and the structuring of the contribution.1340  
 
Limited Partnership’s Organisational Flexibility  
 
According to Burdett el al, the partnership offers organisational flexibility that allows the specific 
requirements of individual investors to be accommodated.1341 In a private company the shareholders 
of the same class have to be treated equally, however the partners in a partnership can set the rules 
on matters such as how the profits are shared, how interests in the partnership are transferred and 
how the business is to be conducted, which can be reflected in the limited partnership agreement.1342 
For example, section 6(2) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907, states that upon the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the limited partner there will be no automatic dissolution of the limited partnership.  
Section 6(2) of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 reads as follows: 
 
‘A limited partnership shall not be dissolved by the death or bankruptcy of a limited partner, and 
the lunacy of a limited partner shall not be a ground for dissolution of the partnership by the court 
unless the lunatic’s share cannot be otherwise ascertained and realised.’ 
 
Therefore, in practice the terms of the limited partnership agreement will usually provide that, upon 
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the general partner, a specified majority of limited partners can elect 
whether or to continue the limited partnership with a new general partner and therefore the terms of 
the limited partnership agreement are determinative.1343 A further example of the contractual 
flexibility of a limited partnership is in terms of the structuring of an investor’s commitment to the 
limited partnership.1344 Section 4(3) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 stipulates that an 
investor’s capital may not be returned prior to the termination of the limited partnership. Section 4(3) 
of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 reads as follows: 
 
‘A limited partner shall not during the continuance of the partnership, either directly or indirectly, 
draw out or receive back any part of his contribution, and if he does so draw out or receive back 
any such part shall be liable for the debts and obligations of the firm up to the amount so drawn 
out or received back.’ 
 
                                                 
1340Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 3, paragraphs A-C. 
1341Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 2. 
1342Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 2. 
1343Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4.  
1344Section 4(3) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 194 
 
For this reason, an investor’s commitment to the limited partnership is typically structured 
predominantly by way of a non-interest bearing loan, for example 99.99 percent of the commitment 
amount together with a small portion of capital 0.01 percent of the commitment amount, since loans 
repaid during the life of the partnership are not liable under the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 to 
be repaid.1345 In addition, the limited partnership agreement will also typically determine the rights of 
the investors to remove the general partner or any rights arising upon a change of control of the 
general partner.1346 According to Barry, the limited partnership agreement will also typically allow the 
general partner to assign its interest in the limited partnership to an entity in the same corporate 
group, for example to facilitate a restructuring.1347 However, an assignment outside its corporate 
group would generally require the approval of a specified majority of limited partners.1348 The position 
of any private equity firm that manages the private equity limited partnership will be determined in 
accordance with the terms of the management agreement.1349  
 
A further example of the contractual flexibility of a limited partnership relates to the circumstances in 
which a limited partner’s liability for future debts ends. The Limited Partnership Act 1907 does not 
make clear the circumstances in which a limited partner’s liability for future debts ends.1350 The 
provisions touching on this issue are the prohibition of withdrawal of the limited partner’s 
contribution,1351 and the provision that the death or bankruptcy of a limited partner does not dissolve 
the partnership,1352 neither of which is stated to be subject to agreement to the contrary.1353 The 
implication seems to be that the liability, up to the contribution, continues indefinitely. However, the 
better view may be that these matters, as between the partners, are subject to the general power to 
settle ‘mutual rights and duties’ by agreement.1354 Nevertheless, where the partners agree and as 
                                                 
1345Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 
32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 
321-326. 
1346Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4.  
1347Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 68.  
1348Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at page 68. See also Innes, D., Lewin-
Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 321-326. 
1349Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 68.  
1350The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at pages 12-13. 
1351Section 4(3) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. 
1352Section 6(2) of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. 
1353The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law 
Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), 
Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at pages 12-13. 
1354See section 7 of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. See also the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the 
Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 118), Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery 
Office, November 1997, at pages 12-13. 
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long as the change in the partnership is duly registered, the liability of a former limited partner for 
future debts and obligations may come to an end on his retirement, irrespective that he may have 
had his/her contribution returned, however he/she and will remain liable for debts incurred before 
his/her retirement.1355 
 
In order to better understand the legal relationship between the investors and the managers, it is 
important to look at the rights and duties of the partners in a limited partnership.1356 According to 
Burdett et al, there are three basic sources of the rights and duties of partners in a limited partnership; 
namely, common law duties;1357 statutory duties;1358 and contractual duties in terms of the limited 
partnership agreement.1359 However, it must be noted that it is beyond the scope of this paragraph 
to undertake a legal analysis of the three sources of rights and duties of partners in a limited 
partnership. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that statutory duties arise not only under UK partnership 
law, but also as a result of other applicable laws that may be imposed on partners as a result of the 
activities they undertake for the partnership. For example the FCA Principles for Businesses, which 
are mentioned below and more fully discussed in paragraph 4 of this chapter.1360 The important 
consideration though is that the general partner has an obligation to manage the partnership 
business and will be subject to various fiduciary obligations, mostly notably the duty to act in good 
faith.1361 According to Spangler, such duties may be expanded or restricted by contract in accordance 
with the terms of the limited partnership agreement.1362 According to Hudson, any contractual 
                                                 
1355See also the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, (1997), ‘Limited Partnership Act’, The 
Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 161) and the Scottish Law Commission (Consultation Paper No 
118), Joint Consultation Paper, London: The Stationery Office, November 1997, at pages 12-13. 
1356United Kingdom: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries: A Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission 
Consultation, The Stationery Office, at chapter 8. 
1357Partnership Act of 1890 and the rules of equity and of common law apply to limited partnerships, except as 
they are inconsistent with the express provisions of the Limited Partnership Act of 1907. Chapter 3 of this 
thesis will submit that a fiduciary relationship arises under common law where A and B agree that A will act on 
behalf of, or for the benefit of, B in circumstances that give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence, with 
reference to Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew 1996 All ER 698. See also O’Donnell v Shanahan 
2009 EWCA Civ 751. See also United Kingdom: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties 
of Investment Intermediaries: A Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law 
Commission Consultation, The Stationery Office. See also Armitage v Nurse 1997 2 All ER 705. See also 
BBGP Managing General Partner Ltd v Babcock & Brown Global Partners 2010 EWHC 2176 (Ch). 
1358The Partnership Act of 1890 codifies certain of the common law fiduciary duties applicable to partners. 
These provisions apply by default unless varied by the consent of all partners, either expressly or implied from 
a course of dealing. In relation to limited partnerships, the scope of common law duties of the Partnership Act 
of 1890 and the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 can be successfully limited in the limited partnership 
agreement. 
1359Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at page 3. 
1360Also in terms of many securities laws and regulations, for example, the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers’ Directive (2011/61/EU) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC), there are 
further requirements for entities in management roles, whether as manager or general partner, to act honestly, 
fairly and in the interests of the fund, and to manage conflicts of interest. 
1361Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 6, paragraphs A-I. 
1362Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 6, paragraphs A-I. 
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narrowing of the fiduciary duties of the general partner must be clearly expressed and will be narrowly 
construed by the English courts.1363 Hudson further states that the duties and obligations of the 
private equity firm the manages the private equity limited partnership will be set out in its 
management agreement; and where the private equity firm is FCA authorised, it must comply with 
the FCA Principles for Businesses, which are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of 
such persons under the UK regulatory system.1364 The Principles cover, for example, integrity, skill, 
care and diligence, management and control, financial prudence, customers’ interests and conflicts 
of interest.1365 Nevertheless, according to Burdett et al, the organisational flexibility, together with tax 
transparency and limited liability have contributed to the limited partnership’s popularity as the 
predominant form for structuring private equity funds in the UK. 
 
3.4 Organisational Form in Australia 
 
The most common legal structure used in Australia to structure private equity funds is the closed-
ended Collective Investment Vehicle (‘CIV’) or more commonly referred to as a unit trust.1366 It takes 
the legal form of a trust and is typically used by funds targeting buyouts of companies or businesses 
with assets exceeding A$250 million.1367 This vehicle is not commonly used in any of the jurisdictions 
discussed in this chapter, and in particular, contains concepts foreign to many South African 
investors.1368 In an attempt to attract more foreign investors, Australian policy makers have 
introduced the venture capital limited partnership (‘VCLP’) regime1369 and the early stage venture 
capital limited partnership (‘ESVCLP’) regime.1370 A VCLP is used by private equity funds targeting 
smaller investments with assets of up to A$250 million whereas a ESVCLP is used by private equity 
funds targeting smaller investments with assets of up to A$50 million.1371 In Australia, either of the 
                                                 
1363Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. 
1364Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at chapter 12. 
1365Accessed at https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN/2/1, at June 2015. It must also be noted at this 
point of the discussion, that English law recognises the concept of negligence; however it have no concept of 
gross negligence as distinct from ordinary negligence. Despite English courts having on various occasions 
been required to construe contracts that include the phrase gross negligence, the contractual test for excluding 
the exculpation and indemnification of a general partner in the limited partnership agreement for a UK private 
equity fund will typically be based on gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence. 
1366Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Private Equity: Fund Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation’, Kolb Series in 
Finance, Essential Perspectives, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010. 
1367Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), (2014), ‘Financial System 
Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Ltd Report, April 2014. 
1368Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at page 6. 
1369Venture Capital Limited Partnerships regime was introduced in 2002 under the Venture Capital Act 2002 
and Taxation Laws Amendment (Venture Capital) Act 2002. 
1370Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships regime was introduced in 2007 under the Tax Laws 
Amendment (2007 Measures No. 2) Act 2007. 
1371Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed at May 2015. 
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above structures may be used for structuring a private equity fund, and choosing the most 
appropriate fund structure will depend upon a number of factors, such as the size of the fund; the 
investment strategy; the sector, industry and stage of development of target portfolio entities; and 
the tax resident status and level of sophistication of the target investor group.1372 The Australian laws 
that regulate fund structures in Australia are complex and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
comprehensively detail all material aspects of the relevant laws. This discussion will provide a broad 
analysis of the available fund structures and paragraph 2.1.(c) of chapter four will highlight the key 
legislated tax concessions that are available to investors and fund managers of each of these fund 
structure types. 
 
Collective Investment Vehicle  
 
As mentioned above, the most common legal structure to house a private equity fund in Australia is 
the CIV structured as a closed-ended unit trust. Private equity funds structured as CIV unit trusts are 
either managed by the trustee or have the investment management functions outsourced to a private 
equity firm, which is done in terms of a contractual relationship created between the unitholders 
(investors and beneficiaries) and the trustee (legal holder of the property and manager) under a trust 
deed or constitution.1373 The trustee generally has the right to deal with the assets of the trust on a 
discretionary basis for the benefit of investors, and often appoints a management entity within the 
structure, such as a private equity firm, to advise the trustee. Investors in the unit trust obtain units 
and have rights and obligations governed by the unit trust deed.1374 The unit trust is not a separate 
legal entity and the trustee contracts on behalf of the trust, subject to a contractual term generally 
limiting liability of the trustee to the assets of the trust.1375  
 
It is important to note that Australian trust law is derived from, and largely continues to follow, English 
trust law, as modified by State and Commonwealth legislation.1376 CIV unit trusts are generally fixed 
trusts where the beneficiaries and their respective interests are identified by their holding units much 
in the same way as shares are issued to shareholders of a company.1377 The beneficiaries are usually 
called unitholders. 1378 Fixed trusts are in essence trusts where the trustee holds the trust assets for 
                                                 
1372Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), (2014), ‘Financial System 
Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Ltd Report, April 2014. 
1373Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1374Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1375Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1376Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1377Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1378Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
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the benefit of specific beneficiaries in certain fixed proportions. 1379 In such a case the trustee does 
not have to exercise a discretion since each beneficiary is entitled to his or her fixed share of the 
capital and income of the trust.1380 Beneficiaries/investors can transfer their interests in the trust by 
transferring their units to a buyer.1381 There are no limits in terms of Australian trust law on the number 
of units/unitholders, however, for tax purposes the tax treatment can vary depending on the size and 
activities of the trust.1382 Furthermore, in the case of trusts, it is typical to provide in the trust deed 
that beneficiaries will not be liable for any amount beyond the amount subscribed to the trust or 
which they are legally obliged to subscribe.1383 There is Australian case law that suggests that the 
liability of beneficiaries may be excluded by express provision in the trust deed, provided the loss 
did not arise from a breach of trust committed by the trustee at the request or instigation of the 
beneficiary in circumstances that would entitle the trustee to hold the interest of that beneficiary as 
security against personal liability of the trustee for that loss.1384 In McLean v Burns Philp Trustee 
Company Pty Ltd, the court confirmed that the potential personal liability of beneficiaries for the debts 
of a trust could be excluded by a clause which limited the trustee’s right of recourse to assets of the 
trust, except where this would be contrary to public policy.1385 However, the court held that a clause 
in the deed of a public unit trust which excluded the trustee’s right of indemnity against the 
beneficiaries was not contrary to public policy.1386  
 
Nevertheless, a trustee is personally liable for the debts of the trust as the trust assets and liabilities 
are legally those of the trustee.1387 For this reason if there are significant liabilities that could arise, a 
limited liability (private) company is often used as trustee.1388 However, the trustee is entitled to use 
the trust assets to satisfy those liabilities as the trustee has a right of indemnity and a lien over them 
for this purpose.1389 A trustee must act in the best interests of beneficiaries and must avoid conflicts 
of interest.1390 The trust deed will inter alia set out in detail the type of investments the trustee can 
                                                 
1379Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1380Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1381Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1382Bryan, M. and Vann, V. (2012), ‘Equity and Trusts in Australia’, 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 
208-337. 
1383See Cassidy, J. (2006), ‘Concise Corporations Law’, 1st Edition, Federation Press, at pages 21-23. 
1384See Cassidy, J. (2006), ‘Concise Corporations Law’, 1st Edition, Federation Press, at pages 21-23. 
1385McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Company Pty Ltd 1985 9 ACLR 926. 
1386McLean v Burns Philp Trustee Company Pty Ltd 1985 9 ACLR 926. See also Cassidy, J. (2006), ‘Concise 
Corporations Law’, Fifth Edition, Federation Press, at pages 21-23. 
1387Latimer, P. (2012), ‘Australian Business Law 2012’, CCH Australian business law series, 31st Edition, at 
pages 659-764. 
1388Latimer, P. (2012), ‘Australian Business Law 2012’, CCH Australian business law series, 31st Edition, at 
pages 659-764. 
1389Latimer, P. (2012), ‘Australian Business Law 2012’, CCH Australian business law series, 31st Edition, at 
pages 659-764. 
1390Moffat, G, Bean, G, Probert, R. (2009), ‘Trusts Law: Text & Materials, 5th Edition Cambridge University 
Press at 1-115. 
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make and the type of businesses the trustee can invest in.1391 The trustee must exercise powers in 
accordance with the deed and this is why deeds tend to be lengthy and complex so that the trustee 
has maximum flexibility.1392 Any legally competent person, including a company, can act as a 
trustee.1393 Two or more entities can be trustees of the same trust and a company can act as trustee, 
provided that its constitution allows it; and can therefore assist with limited liability and perpetual 
succession.1394 There are strengths and weaknesses associated with trusts in the current context, 
however, at this point it must be noted that it is not the intention of this part to provide a legal analysis 
of the Australian law of trusts, but rather to provide an analysis of the salient features of the various 
legal vehicles used to structure private equity funds in Australia.   
 
Private equity funds structured as CIV unit trusts are not subject to restrictions on the class of asset 
in which the fund may make an investment, restrictions on the amount of such investments, any 
rules regarding compulsory diversification of the investment portfolio or the total fund size.1395 CIV 
unit trusts are tax flow-through vehicles, which mean that income, profits, gains and losses of the 
trust flow-through to the unit holders who are then taxed according to their respective tax status.1396 
However, certain of the key legislated tax concessions that are available to investors and the fund 
manager of an ESVCLP or a VCLP, are not available in respect of a CIV.1397 In this regard, on 11th 
May 2010 the Australian Tax Authority (‘ATO’) released rulings indicating it will treat income from 
the disposal of assets by private equity funds on revenue account, namely taxing it as ordinary 
income.1398 However, the ATO ruled that if the CIV qualifies as a Managed Investment Trust (‘MIT’) 
then it can elect to treat qualifying assets on capital account, namely taxing it as capital gains.1399 
The introduction of the MIT tax framework was part of the ATO’s review of the tax treatment of CIVs 
and to consider whether  including a broader range of tax flow-through vehicles should be permitted, 
consistent with the Government’s objective of developing Australia as a leading financial centre.1400 
                                                 
1391Moffat, G, Bean, G, Probert, R. (2009), ‘Trusts Law: Text & Materials, 5th Edition Cambridge University 
Press at 1-115. 
1392Moffat, G, Bean, G, Probert, R. (2009), ‘Trusts Law: Text & Materials, 5th Edition Cambridge University 
Press at 1-115. 
1393Moffat, G, Bean, G, Probert, R. (2009), ‘Trusts Law: Text & Materials, 5th Edition Cambridge University 
Press at 1-115. 
1394Moffat, G, Bean, G, Probert, R. (2009), ‘Trusts Law: Text & Materials, 5th Edition Cambridge University 
Press at 1-115. 
1395Maarbani, S. (2011), ‘Establishing a new Venture Capital or Private Equity Fund’, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
1st September 2011, at page 1. 
1396Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.5. 
1397Paragraph 2.1.(c) in chapter four. 
1398Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au, accessed in May 2015. 
1399The MIT rules were introduced in June 2010, defined under s9 of the Corporations Act, 2001. See Chapter 
5C of the Corporations Act of 2001. See also Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited 
(2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
Limited Report, April 2014. 
1400Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
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A CIV may qualify as a MIT if the trust meets all of the required criteria. The criteria are that the CIV 
has a manager which is an Australian resident with an Australian financial services licence; the trust 
must not control a trading business; is listed or widely held; and invests in passive investments, such 
as rent, debt or equity.1401 If the trust qualifies as a MIT, it can elect to treat qualifying assets on 





Venture Capital and Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships 
 
The VCLP regime was introduced to increase foreign investment in the Australian venture capital 
sector by offering a more familiar legal structure, namely the limited partnership, coupled with 
favourable tax benefits. A VCLP is a separate legal entity and can contract on this basis.1404 As 
evident from the introductory paragraph 1 of this chapter, the use of VCLPs has been limited to 
venture capital and midmarket private equity funds because of the restrictions on the types of 
investments that VCLPs can make. For example, the investment must be in shares or options in a 
company or units in a trust; the target must generally be an operating entity, the head company of a 
consolidated group or a holding company formed specifically for the purpose of making the 
investment; and the target must not have total assets, including goodwill of more than A$250 
million.1405 It should be noted that it is desirable that a VCLP use an incorporated limited 
partnership.1406 Innovation Australia1407 (the ‘Board’) regulates venture capital funds registered as a 
VCLP.1408 Registration as a VCLP entitles a venture capital fund to certain benefits but is conditional 
upon meeting certain obligations. Registration will be granted if the Board is satisfied that the fund, 
among other things has (1) been structured as a limited partnership and established in either 
                                                 
1401Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act of 2001. Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review 
of Taxation Arrangements under the Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant 
Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au, accessed in May 2015. 
1402Maarbani, S. (2011), ‘Establishing a new Venture Capital or Private Equity Fund’, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
1st September 2011, at page 1. 
1403For a more complete discussion on the taxation of CIV/MIT’s, see discussion in chapter four, paragraph 
2.1.(c). 
1404Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1405Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science, (2015), ‘Overview of 
Venture Capital Limited Partnerships’, at pages 1-2. Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-
assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-Overview.aspx, accessed in June 2015. 
1406In terms of section 9-1(1)(a) of the Venture Capital Act of 2002. As partnership laws are the responsibility 
of State and Territory Government's changes to legislation recognising incorporated limited partnerships are 
required. A number of States and Territories are progressing or have passed relevant legislative changes, 
such New South Wales. 
1407Innovation Australia is an independent statutory body established to assist with the administration of the 
Australian Government's innovation and venture capital programs designed to support industry innovation. 
1408Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015.  
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Australia or a foreign country which has a double tax agreement with Australia;1409 (2) a general 
partner that is a resident of either Australia, or a foreign country which has a double tax agreement 
with Australia;1410 (3) not been structured as part of a bigger fund (or attached to a unit trust) and is 
stand-alone; (4) a qualifying partnership agreement that: (4)(a) remains in existence for not less than 
five years and not more than fifteen years; (b) requires partners to contribute capital when required; 
(c) prohibits the addition of new partners except as provided for in the agreement; (d) prohibits 
increases in committed capital except as provided for in the agreement; (e) confers on a general 
partner the right to require partners to contribute their committed capital to the partnership; and (f) 
includes a plan which outlines its intended investment activities;1411 (5) access to the skills and 
resources necessary to implement its investment plan; (7) committed capital of at least $10 
million.1412 
 
The failure to meet these obligations can result in the loss of registration and a loss of the associated 
benefits.1413 VCLPs can only make and hold investments as permitted by the Venture Capital Act 
2002 and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.1414 The Board will monitor compliance through 
examining relevant documents including both the VCLP's quarterly and annual returns.1415 The 
Board may also ask for additional information it considers necessary for the purposes of 
administering the programme. Compliance assessment is also undertaken by the ATO, which 
receives copies of all VCLP reports submitted to the Board.1416 The ATO may undertake risk 
assessment activities to ensure compliance with the legislation under its administration. In the 
quarterly and annual returns a VCLP is required to declare whether it has complied with the relevant 
legislation. The Board monitors compliance rigorously and failure to comply could result in sanctions 
up to and including revocation. The Board expects that the general partner of a VCLP will (a) operate 
the VCLP in accordance with the relevant legislation; (b) operate the VCLP in accordance with its 
approved investment plan; (c) maintain an appropriate audit trail and be able to demonstrate 
legislative compliance; (d) hold all investments in the name of the VCLP; and (e) provide accurate 
and timely reports to the Board as required by the relevant legislation.1417 
                                                 
1409In terms of section 9-1(1)(a)(i)-(ii) of the Venture Capital Act of 2002. 
1410In terms of section 9-1(1)(b) of the Venture Capital Act of 2002.  
1411In terms of section 9-1(1)(c) and section 11-1(2)(f) of the Venture Capital Act of 2002.  
1412In terms of section 9-1(1)(d) of the Venture Capital Act of 2002. 
1413Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015.  
1414In terms of subdivision 118F of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. Australian Government, Department 
of Industry and Science, (2015), ‘Overview of Venture Capital Limited Partnerships’, at pages 1-2. Available at 
www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015. 
1415Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015.  
1416Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015.  
1417Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-
IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015.  




The ESVCLP is essentially an extension of the VCLP regime and was introduced to encourage early 
stage venture capital investment by offering further taxation advantages, provided the fund only 
invests in early stage investments and meets certain criteria, which are similar to the restrictions 
applying to VCLPs.1418 The most notable difference from the VCLP being that the ESVCLP must 
have capital commitments of at least $10 million and no more than $100 million from its partners 
(investors) before it can be registered. A second difference being that the target investment must not 
have total assets, including goodwill of more than A$50 million.1419 Since both VCLPs and ESVCLPs 
are incorporated entities, the limited liability of third-party investors will be respected in the same 
manner as shareholders in a corporation.1420 In addition, in both the VCLP and ESVCLP, the general 
partner has duties arising under the terms of the partnership deed governing the VCLP and 
ESVCLP.1421 Furthermore, the Australian Financial Services Licence (‘AFSL’) imposes duties on the 
licensed entity, typically a private equity firm to act efficiently, honestly and fairly.1422 These legal 
fiduciary duties cannot be contracted out of however the terms of the relevant partnership deed may 
amend or modify such duties to provide for terms agreed between the investors and the private 
equity firm.1423 In terms of the AFSL, the licensed entity needs to remain solvent and have positive 
net assets to keep its licence.1424 Nevertheless, Australian private equity funds are generally set up 
as either MITs or VCLPs. Both are generally flow-through vehicles with respect to the income and 
profits of the MIT or VCLP being taxed in the hands of the investor.  The requirements for a unit trust 
to be an MIT and for a limited partnership to be a VCLP are prescriptive and extensive.1425 The failure 
to meet these requirements can give rise to adverse Australian income tax consequences for 
investors.1426  
                                                 
1418Both the VCLP and ESVCLP are more fully discussed in paragraph  2.1.(c) in chapter four. 
1419Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science, (2015), ‘Overview of 
Venture Capital Limited Partnerships’, at pages 1-2. Available at http://www.business.gov.au/grants-and-
assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-Overview.aspx, accessed in June 2015. 
1420Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science, (2015), ‘Overview of 
Venture Capital Limited Partnerships’, at pages 1-2. Available at www.business.gov.au/grants-and-
assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/VCLP-IncorporatedLimitedPartnerships.aspx, accessed in June 2015. 
1421Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1422An Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) is a licence for any Australian businesses involved in the 
provision of financial services. It is issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
as required by the Corporations Act 2001. 
1423Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. This 
paragraph will not discuss case law in Australia on the subject. However, it is generally accepted that there is 
no legal distinction to be made between the concepts of negligence and gross negligence. See also Brown, L. 
(2005), ‘Gross negligence in exclusion clauses: is there an intelligible difference from ordinary negligence’, 
Insurance Law Journal, 16, at pages 1-11. 
1424Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1425Available at  www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-capital/vclp/Pages/default.aspx, 
accessed in June 2015 and www.business.gov.au/grants-and-assistance/venture-
capital/esvclp/Pages/default.aspx, accessed in June 2015. 
1426See discussion in paragraph 2.1(c) of chapter four for more detailed discussion with regard to the taxation 
of the CIV, MIT, VCLP and ESVCLP structures. 




3.5 Organisational Form in Canada 
 
The predominant legal vehicle used to structure private equity funds in Canada is a limited 
partnership.1427 According to Dolden, a partnership comes into being as a result of an agreement 
among the partners to carry on business together in a manner that is consistent with the 
characteristics of partnership.1428 This agreement may be evidenced by a written partnership 
agreement, or it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties in their business relationship.1429 
This principle was recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada in Porter and Sons v Foster and 
Armstrong:1430 
 
‘Partnership, it is needless to say, does not arise from ownership “in common, or from joint 
ownership. Partnership arises from contract, evidenced either by express declaration or by 
conduct signifying the same thing. It is not sufficient there should be community of interest; there 
must be contract.’1431 
 
Canada has a federal system of government whereby the authority to enact legislation is divided 
between the federal and the provincial and territorial governments. Each of Canada's ten provinces 
and three territories has its own legislative scheme for regulating limited partnerships and can 
therefore vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which are complex and extensive, and beyond the 
scope of this discussion. Therefore, for example reference will only be made to the British Columbia 
Limited Partnership Act of 1996, and not any other Canadian provincial limited partnership 
legislation.1432   
 
Nevertheless, limited partnerships are formed under Canadian provincial laws.1433 The specific 
characteristics of a limited partnership, such as creation formalities and disclosure of limited partners’ 
                                                 
1427Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published: Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1428Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 5. 
1429Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 5. 
1430Porter and Sons v Foster and Armstrong 1926, 2 D.L.R. 340 (S.C.C.). 
1431Porter and Sons v Foster and Armstrong 1926, 2 D.L.R. 340 (S.C.C.), at 341. 
1432British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 [R.S.B.C.] Ch. 348. The other provinces/territories of Canada 
have their own partnership legislation, however similar to the Delaware example which was discussed in 
paragraph 3.2 of this chapter, the British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 will be analysed for ease of 
reference. British Columbia have a well developed common-law regime governing limited partnerships, which 
is generally considered the more sophisticated of the Canadian provinces and territories. Furthermore, the 
provisions contained in the British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 are much the same as the equivalent 
legislation in most of the other provivces. In addition, it is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse all 
the relevant legislation pertaining to limited partnerships in of all the other provinces and territories of Canada. 
1433Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
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names, are dependent on the applicable laws of the province of formation.1434 A limited partnership is 
not a legal entity separate from its partners under Canadian law. In addition, Canadian limited 
partnerships are fiscally transparent in terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act,1435 meaning that the 
gains and losses of the fund flow through to its limited partners.1436 The formation, rights and 
obligations of limited partnerships in Canada are governed by a combination of stautes,1437 the 
common law and the relevant partnership agreement.1438 A limited partnership is required to have at 
least one general partner and at least one limited partner.1439 According to Dolden, a Canadian 
limited partnership is a special kind of partnership that combines some of the advantages of 
partnership with those of incorporation.1440 For example, in British Columbia, the formation of limited 
partnerships is governed by the Part 3 of the British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 (‘Partnership 
Act of 1996’). Section 50(1)-(2) of the Partnership Act of 1996 reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) … a limited partnership may be formed to carry on any business that a partnership without 
limited partners may carry on. 
(2) A limited partnerships shall consist of (a) one or more persons who are general partners; and 
(b) one or more persons who are limited partners.’ 
 
A limited partnership will only be found to exist where the registration requirements of the Partnership 
Act of 1996 have been complied with. These requirements are set out in section 51 of the Partnership 
Act of 1996, which reads as follows: 
 
‘ (1) A limited partnership is formed when there is filed with the registrar a certificate, signed by 
each person who is, on the formation of the partnership, to be a general partner.  
(2) A certificate shall state  
(a)  the business name under which the limited partnership is to be conducted,  
(b)  the general nature of the business carried on or intended to be carried on,  
                                                 
1434The offering of limited partnership interests to investors is subject to applicable Canadian provincial 
securities laws, prospectus and registration requirements. Typically, private equity limited partnership interests 
are intended for ‘accredited investors’, and such interests are not intended to be publicly traded. However, it 
is not the intention of this paragraph to discuss all matters relating to Canadian securities law, as well as all 
the related State statutes that regulate partnerships, as it is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
1435R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl). 
1436Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1437This paragraph will refer to the British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 [R.S.B.C.] Ch. 348, for ease of 
reference. Other Canadian States have an equivalent statute which are very similar. 
1438Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues and Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships Paper 
7.1, Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, June 2009, at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. 
1439Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1440Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 13. 
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(c)  the full name and resident address of each general partner or, in the case of a general 
partner other than an individual, the name and address in the Province,  
(d)  the term for which the limited partnership is to exist,  
(e)  the aggregate amount of cash and the nature and fair value of any other property to be 
contributed by all of the limited partners,  
(f)  the aggregate amount of any additional contributions agreed to be made by limited 
partners and the times at which or events on the happening of which the additional 
contributions are to be made, and  
(g)  the basis on which the limited partners are to be entitled to share profits or receive other 
compensation by way of income on their contributions.’ 
 
In addition to the above mentioned registration requirements, section 51(4) of the Partnership Act of 
1996 provides that where the partnership agreement contains provisions relating to the times when 
the contributions of the limited partners are to be returned, the right to admit additional limited 
partners, or any other matter specified in this provision, these must also be included in the certificate 
of registration. 1441 Furthermore, section 70 of the Partnership Act of 1996 requires that the certificate 
of registration must be amended when there are certain specified changes affecting the nature of 
the partnership business or relating to the composition of the partnership. Section 54 of the 
Partnership Act of 1996 sets out specific requirements for the maintenance of records relating to the 
limited partnership. In addition, the limited partnership is required to have a registered office in the 
Province at which a register stating the name and resident address of each limited partner and the 
percentage interest of each limited partner in the limited partnership is kept. 1442 Also, a copy of the 
certificate of limited partnership and the limited partnership agreement, with all amendments, must 
be kept at the registered office.1443 These records must be available for inspection by the public. 
Section 53 of the Partnership Act of 1996 requires that the business name of a limited partnership 
must end with the words ‘Limited Partnership’ in full or the French equivalent.1444 The Partnership 
Act of 1996 also prohibits the use of the name of a limited partner, either a corporation or individual, 




                                                 
1441See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1442See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1443See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1444See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1445See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
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A general partner’s liability in a limited partnership is unlimited, therefore in practice a limited liability 
corporation is typically formed to act as the general partner.1446 The liability of a limited partner 
generally is limited to the amount contributed or agreed to be contributed by such limited partner. 
However, the protection of limited liability will only be accorded to limited partners where there has 
been strict compliance with the registration and reporting requirements set out in the Partnership Act 
of 1996 and the requirements of provisions relating to the partnership name.1447 The failure to comply 
with these requirements may result in the limited partnership being deemed to be an ordinary 
partnership, with the result that the limited partners will be liable, as ordinary partners, for the debts 
and obligations of the firm.1448 In Laplante v Canada,1449 the Canadian Tax Court dealt with the 
requirement of proper registration for the formation of a limited partnership. In this case, the 
participants in the business had concluded a limited partnership agreement.1450 The court was 
satisfied that at the time that the agreement was concluded Laplante had intended to be a limited 
partner of the business and to have the limited liability status of a limited partner. However, the 
intended limited partnership was never registered under the relevant legislation.1451 The court held 
that despite the intent of the participants in the business, no limited partnership had been formed.1452 
Furthermore, the court further held that where the parties in a business are apparently carrying on a 
partnership, and the partnership is not registered as a limited partnership, the business will be 
deemed to be an ordinary partnership.1453 In Laplante v Canada,1454 the evidence established that 
Laplante had participated in the management of the business, but the failure to register was held to 
be sufficient to negate the existence of a limited partnership. 
 
Furthermore, a limited partner may have unlimited liability (similar to that of a general partner) if such 
limited partner takes part in the control of the business of a limited partnership.1455 In terms of section 
64 of the Partnership Act of 1996,1456 the limited partner is shielded from liability beyond its 
contributions unless the limited partner ‘takes part in the management of the business’. Section 64 
of the Partnership Act of 1996 reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
1446Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. 
1447See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1448See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 13-15. 
1449Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1450Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1451Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1452Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1453Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1454Laplante v Canada 1995, 1 C.T.C. 2647 (T.C.C.). 
1455Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Private Equity: Fund Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation’, Kolb Series in 
Finance, Essential Perspectives, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010. 
1456Partnership Act of 1996 [R.S.B.C.] Ch. 348. 
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‘A limited partner is not liable as a general partner unless he takes part in the management of the 
business.’ 
 
In this regard Dolden argues that: 
 
‘… the limited liability of a limited partner arises out of his or her status as a passive investor. To 
preserve this status the limited partner must refrain from participating in the management of the 
business of the limited partnership. This prohibition has been an element of limited partnership 
since this business vehicle was first recognised in the 19th century. The theory behind the 
prohibition is that imposing liability upon persons for the acts they undertake deters them from 
taking undue risks. Following this reasoning, persons who enjoy limited liability should not have 
the authority to take actions which may affect the risks to which others may be exposed.’1457 
 
In Backman v Canada,1458 the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal held that: 
 
‘A limited partner does not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to exercising his 
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business ... In the ordinary 
case, a limited partnership will consist of a general partner that will control the business and 
limited partners who will have made financial or other contributions but who will not be actively 
involved in the business. However, that obviously does not mean that the limited partnership is 
not carrying on a business. The business is being carried on in common by all the partners, but 
is controlled by the general partner.’1459 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that the prohibition on participation in the management of the 
limited partnership is the primary risk for loss of limited liability status for limited partners.1460 The 
critical issue is what activities would constitute participation in the ‘management’ of the limited 
partnership so as to contravene the provisions of section 64 of the Partnership Act of 1996.1461 
However, it should be noted that the equivalent provisions of statutes in several other jurisdictions 
in Canada state that a limited partner will become liable if he/she participates in the ‘control’ of the 
limited partnership.1462 The distinction between the terms ‘management’ and ‘control’ was expressly 
recognised by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Nordile Holdings Ltd v Breckenridge,1463 where 
                                                 
1457See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 19. 
1458Backman v Canada 2000, 1 FCR 555, 1999 CanLII 9371 (FCA). 
1459Backman v Canada 2000, 1 FCR 555, 1999 CanLII 9371 (FCA). The appeal was dismissed at Backman v 
Canada 2001, 1 SCR 367, 2001 SCC 10 (CanLII). 
1460Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New 
Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. 
1461See Nordile Holdings Ltd v Breckenridge 1991, 25 A.C.W.S. 
1462Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New 
Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. 
1463Nordile Holdings Ltd v Breckenridge 1991, 25 A.C.W.S. 
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the issue to be decided was whether the limited partners had participated in the management of the 
business within the meaning of section 64 of the Partnership Act of 1996.1464 In this case, Esson CJ 
stated:   
 
‘... Management covers a broader range of activity than control and includes any activity covered 
by control.’1465 
 
However, the Partnership Act of 1996 does contemplate a certain degree of participation by the 
limited in matters relating to the limited partnership. For example, Section 56 of the Partnership Act 
of 1996 requires the unanimous consent of the limited partners before a general partner may take 
the following actions with respect to the partnership, namely: (1) do an act which makes it impossible 
to carry on the business of the limited partnership; (2) consent to judgment against the limited 
partnership; (3) possess limited partnership property, for other than a partnership purpose; (4) admit 
a person as a general partner or admit a person as a limited partner unless the right to do so is given 
in the certificate; and (5) continue the business of the limited partnership on the bankruptcy, death, 
retirement, mental incompetence or dissolution of a general partner, unless the right to do so is given 
in the certificate.1466 Furthermore, section 58 of the Partnership Act of 1996 also grants certain rights 
to limited partners in relation to the limited partnership which will not constitute participation in the 
management of the limited partnership. Section 58 of the Partnership Act of 1996, reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) Subject to subsection (2), a limited partner has the same right as a general partner (a) to 
inspect and make copies of or take extracts from the limited partnership books at all times; (b) to 
be given, on demand, true and full information of all things affecting the limited partnership and 
to be given a formal account of partnership affairs whenever the circumstances render it just and 
reasonable; and (c) to obtain dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership by court order.’ 
 
Also, section 60 of the Partnership Act of 1996 provides that a limited partner may conduct 
independent business with the limited partnership without contravening the ‘management’ provision 
in terms section 64 of the Partnership Act of 1996. Section 60(1) of the Partnership Act of 1996 reads 
as follows: 
 
‘A limited partner may lend money to, borrow money from and transact business with the limited 
partnership.’  
 
                                                 
1464Nordile Holdings Ltd v Breckenridge 1991, 25 A.C.W.S. See also Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-
Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law 
Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. See also Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint 
Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 20-23. 
1465Nordile Holdings Ltd v Breckenridge 1991, 25 A.C.W.S. 
1466Section 56 of the Partnership Act of 1996. 
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A limited partner who enters into the permitted transactions with the limited partnership will have the 
rights and duties of any other independent person who conducts business with the limited 
partnership; may take security in the property of the limited partnership; and has the same priority of 
any other creditor in obtaining repayment of the debt.1467 However, Dolden argues that this kind of 
activity should be avoided because it may be regarded as participation in the management of the 
business.1468 Furthermore, section 52 of the Partnership Act of 1996 makes provision for a limited 
partner to also be a general partner in the limited partnership. Section 52 of the Partnership Act of 
1996 reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) A person may be a general partner and limited partner at the same time in the same limited 
partnership.  
(2) A person who is at the same time a general partner and a limited partner has the same rights 
and powers and is subject to the same restrictions as a general partner but in respect of his 
contribution as a limited partner he has the rights against the other partners that he would 
have had if he were not also a general partner.’  
 
The practical application of section 52 of the Partnership Act of 1996 typically occurs where a general 
partner agrees to contribute funds as a limited partner because of a lack of capital for the limited 
partnership.1469 According to Philipps, limited partnership agreements contain a provision stating that 
where a limited partner defaults an instalment payment of his or her agreed contribution, a general 
partner may make the required contribution and thereby assume the defaulting limited partner’s 
interest in the limited partnership.1470 However, a general partner who has also invested as a limited 
partner would only be afforded the protection of limited liability with respect to the contribution as a 
limited partner; as well as entitle such partner to receive his/her allocation of income from the capital 
contribution before the profits of the limited partnership are distributed to the general partners.1471 As 
mentioned above, this kind of activity should be avoided because they create confusion between the 
roles of general partner and limited partner and may be regarded as participation in the management 
of the business.1472 
 
                                                 
1467Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New 
Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. 
1468Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 20-23. 
1469Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 20-23. 
1470Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New 
Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. 
1471Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New 
Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. 
1472Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 20-23. 
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It is submitted, that the failure to observe the above mentioned restrictions may result in the loss of 
a limited partner of his/her limited liability status. Furthermore, section 63 of the Partnership Act of 
1996 states that this liability is owed to the partnership itself, and not to creditors, meaning that a 
limited partner who has not taken part in the management of the partnership is not properly named 
in an action for obligations undertaken by the partnership, even though the limited partner’s initial 
contribution may be implicated in any award granted in an enforcement of the obligation.1473 A further 
distinguishing feature of the limited partnership relates to the manner in which capital is distributed 
between partners upon dissolution of the partnership.1474 For example, in terms of a general 
partnership all partners are entitled to an equal division of their capital contribution, however, in terms 
of a limited partnership structure, section 73 of the Partnership Act of 1996 provides, unless 
otherwise agreed, that limited partners have priority over any partnership assets upon dissolution 
that remain after the satisfaction of the firm’s creditors in respect of the limited partner’s capital 
contributions.1475 For example, in Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd, the practical concern of the 
court was that creditors of the limited partnership could attempt to enforce their claims as against 
limited partners who are not named in the stay order, despite the fact that limited partners are only 
responsible for partnership debts in the amount of their contribution to the partnership.1476 
 
Furthermore, a limited partner may be liable for amounts received on account of profits paid out 
when a partnership is not in a solvent position.1477 Also, in circumstances where a limited partner 
has received the return of all or a part of the limited partner’s contribution, the limited partner is 
nevertheless liable to the limited partnership or where the limited partnership is dissolved to its 
creditors, for any amount not in excess of the amount returned with interest necessary to discharge 
the liabilities of the limited partnership to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims otherwise 
arose before the return of contribution.1478 In addition to the above circumstances, a limited partner 
could also be liable in circumstances where such limited partner is aware of false statements in the 
record of limited partners, or if its name is used as part of the limited partnership’s name.1479 
According to Dzulynsky et al, these circumstances rarely occur in practice.1480   
                                                 
1473Partnership Act of 1996 [R.S.B.C.] Ch. 348. See also Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues 
and Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships Paper 7.1, Continuing Legal Education Society of British 
Columbia, June 2009, at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. 
1474Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues and Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships Paper 
7.1, Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, June 2009, at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. 
1475Partnership Act of 1996 [R.S.B.C.] Ch. 348. See Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues and 
Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships Paper 7.1, Legal Education Society of British Columbia, June 2009, 
at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. 
1476Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd 1993 O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.) (QL). 
1477Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1478Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1479Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1480Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 




Nevertheless, a key attraction of the limited partnership structure, subject to the provisions of 
partnership statutes in specific Canadian jurisdictions, and in terms of any partnership agreement; 
is that the limited partner risks, in the event of the economic failure of the business for which the 
partnership exists, only losing his/her commitment of capital. In terms of a typical limited 
partnership, the limited partner remains silent.1481 However, in terms of most partnership legislation, 
and to protect the public and keep the partnership transparent, if a limited partner interferes with the 
running of the business, they risk losing their limited partner status with possible personal exposure 
to the debts of the partnership.1482 The general partner remains personally liable for the debts of the 
partnership but also generally retains exclusive authority to operate and manage the business; 
whereas the limited partner may be able to access some of the profits of the partnership depending 
on the terms of the partnership contract and, possibly, a share of the assets of the partnership in the 
event of dissolution.1483 Limited partnership agreements vary in their terms as partners try to 
contractually formalise their arrangement, however most jurisdictions have partnership legislation 
that sets out the limits of such agreements.1484 In Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd, Farley J of the 
Ontario Court wrote: 
 
‘A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one 
or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment 
by limited partners … It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary 
course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise 
lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited 
partnership vehicle as opposed to an ‘ordinary’ partnership vehicle) … The limited partners leave 
the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the 
maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited 
partners and the general partner hold an interest.’1485 
 
 
                                                 
1481See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at pages 20-23. See also Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-
Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and New Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law 
Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428.  
1482See Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 
33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 34-39. 
1483See Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues and Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships 
Paper 7.1, Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, June 2009, at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. See also 
Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1484See Rubin, P. and Langlois, J. (2009), ‘Insolvency Issues and Partnerships’, Working with Partnerships 
Paper 7.1, Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, June 2009, at pages 7.1.7-7.1.8. See also 
Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1485Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd 1993 O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.) (QL). 








It must be noted that the discussion to follow will not be a comprehensive analysis of fiduciary duties 
owed by the general partner, nor a discussion on the legal concepts of negligence.1486 Such a 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paragraph. The intention of this paragraph is to highlight the 
salient feature of limited liability afforded by the limited partnership and the basic roles of the general 
partner and limited partner therein. According to Dzulynsky, partners owe a fiduciary responsibility 
to other partners, which includes, among other things, loyalty, good faith and avoidance of conflicts 
of interest.1487 In the context of limited partnerships, this is often viewed as a duty of the general 
partner to the limited partners.1488 As mentioned above, section 56 of the Partnership Act of 1996 
states that a general partner in a limited partnership has all the rights and powers and is subject to 
all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in an ordinary partnership, with certain specified 
exceptions. According to Dolden, Canadian courts have tended to look to the terms of the limited 
partnership agreement to determine the extent of the fiduciary duty owed by general partners.1489 In 
practice, the partnership agreements typically attempt to address any contemplated activities that 
may be viewed as inconsistent with such responsibility.1490 For example in practice, transactions 
where the general partner has a conflict of interest may be subject to a veto by an investor 
committee.1491 However, any exceptions should be addressed with a high degree of specificity, as a 
blanket exemption from all fiduciary or like duties or like standards is unlikely to be accepted by a 
Canadian court.1492  
 
In 337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd the court dealt with the fiduciary obligations of 
general partners in entering into financing agreements for the limited partnership.1493 The fiduciary 
                                                 
1486In this regard see chapter three. Also Canadian courts would recognise a gross negligence standard, 
however the distinction between ‘ordinary’ negligence and ‘gross’ negligence is less clear than in some other 
jurisdictions. 
1487Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1488Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1489Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 27. 
1490Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 27. 
1491Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1492Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, Dolden 
Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 27. 
1493337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
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duty of the general partner to the limited partners was expressly stated in the limited partnership 
agreement, namely:  
 
‘The General Partner and the Managing General Partner will act in a fiduciary capacity towards 
the Limited Partners and will exercise their powers and discharge their duties under this 
agreement honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of the Limited Partners.’1494 
 
In this case, the limited partnership agreement provided the general partner with the express 
authority to negotiate with financial institutions on behalf of the limited partnership. The general 
partner negotiated a financing agreement, which was consistent with this authority; and as a result 
of the new financing agreement, the general partner derived a benefit, to the detriment to the limited 
partners.1495 The limited partners brought an action against the general partner for breach of fiduciary 
duty and claimed that as the general partner had derived profit through its position as a general 
partner and a fiduciary of the limited partners, without the consent of the limited partners, it was 
required to disgorge these profits.1496 In 337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd, the court 
held that a fiduciary duty arose under both the Partnership Act of 1996 and the terms of the limited 
partnership agreement, however it held that the nature and extent of the fiduciary duty ‘must be 
found within the four corners of the limited partnership agreement, properly construed’.1497 The court 
held that no breach occurred because the acts of the general partner were expressly authorised by 
the limited partnership agreement and therefore no consent was required.1498 Nevertheless, the 
general partners and limited partners to a limited partnership generally have significant flexibility in 
structuring and documenting their commercial arrangements, despite statutes in a number of 
Canadian provinces having provisions that prohibits the general partner from taking certain actions 
without the consent of all limited partners.1499 For example, in Ontario these prohibitions include 
prohibitions against any act that makes it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the limited 
partnership and against consenting to a judgment against the limited partnership.1500 In practice, 
these prohibitions are often ignored, or the limited partnership agreement will address such 
prohibitions by providing for powers of attorneys in favour of the general partner or requiring approval 
of only a majority limited partner in such circumstances.1501  
 
 
                                                 
1494337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
1495337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
1496337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
1497337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
1498337965 B.C. Ltd v Tackama Forest Products Ltd 1992, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (B.C.C.A.). 
1499Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1500Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 
1501Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 28-33. 








In terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act,1502 a limited partnership is not itself taxable. A limited 
partnership is generally treated as fiscally transparent for most Canadian income tax purposes such 
that its income, gains and losses flow through to the partners, retaining their original 
characterisation.1503 As limited partnerships are not themselves taxable, there are no exemptions 
applicable to them.1504 However, each partner, for example, a pension fund is generally entitled to 
claim any available tax-exempt or tax-deferred status under the Canadian Income Tax Act.1505 
Nevertheless, the Canadian tax laws that regulate limited partnerships are complex and it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to comprehensively detail all material aspects of such laws. However, 
paragraph 2.1.(b) of chapter four will highlight the key legislated tax concessions that are available 
to investors and fund managers in terms of the numerous Canadian private equity tax incentive 
schemes that have been introduced by Canadian policymakers. For example, in Canada numerous 
tax incentive schemes have been introduced, but they are aimed primarily at small businesses or 
individual investors who are Canadian taxpayers.1506  
 
Chapter four will highlight, for instance, that Canadian-controlled private corporations are entitled to 
a lower rate of tax deduction on operating income up to a specific threshold; they are also entitled to 
enhanced investment tax credits for qualified expenditures on scientific research and experimental 
development; as well as the deferral of an employee's taxable benefit arising from the exercise of 
share options.1507 In addition, shareholders of Canadian-controlled private corporations are entitled 
to a capital gains exemption on a disposition of qualified small business corporation shares.1508 A 
Canadian-controlled private corporation is a Canadian corporation that is not listed on a stock 
exchange and that is not controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more non-residents of Canada.1509 
                                                 
1502R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl). 
1503See Carroll, C. and Kay, S. (2011), ‘Investment Funds: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, First Edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 49-60. See also Cornelius, P. (2011), ‘International Investments in Private 
Equity: Asset Allocation, Markets, and Industry Structure’, 1st edition, Elsevier Publishing, at pages 44-48. 
1504See Carroll, C. and Kay, S. (2011), ‘Investment Funds: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, First Edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 49-60. See also Cornelius, P. (2011), ‘International Investments in Private 
Equity: Asset Allocation, Markets, and Industry Structure’, 1st edition, Elsevier Publishing, at pages 44-48. 
1505R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl). 
1506Cumming, D.J. (2007), ‘Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment funds’, 
Journal of Business Venturing, 22(2), 193-235.  
1507Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: 
An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13:1, at pages 75-94. 
1508Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: 
An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13:1, at pages 75-94. 
1509Brander, J.A., Du, Q. and Hellmann, T.F. (2010b), ‘The Effects of Government-Sponsored Venture Capital: 
International Evidence’, NBER Working Paper No. 16521, November 2010. Available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w16521.pdf, accessed in August 2012. 
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Furthermore, the Canadian federal government, as well as specific Canadian provincial 
governments, provides tax credits to individuals who are Canadian residents in specific provinces 
and who have invested in what is called a labour-sponsored venture capital corporation 
(‘LSVCC’).1510 
 
Nevertheless, the limited partnership in Canada, similar to the limited partnerships in the jurisdictions 
discussed previously in this chapter, remain the predominant legal vehicle for private equity funds 
because of the combination of limited liability protection; fiscal transparency; and the contractual 
flexibility in negotiating the partnership agreement. It is evident from the above discussion that the 
limited partnership structure is not without risks. In order to establish and maintain the protection of 
limited liability the general and limited partners must fully understand and comply with the provisions 
of the various Canadian provincial partnership legislation, such as the British Columbia Partnership 
Act of 1996.1511 More importantly, the limited partnership agreement should be well drafted and 
clearly set out the rights and obligations of the general partners and limited partners, because it must 
at all times ensure that the conduct of the partners is consistent with the provisions of the relevant 




In concluding this section of the chapter, it is submitted that when considering the commencement 
of a private equity fund, one needs to consider which vehicle will be best suited to the circumstances. 
The success of any business may depend upon choosing the correct form of an organisation or 
business structure. Factors to be taken into account invariably include the number of participants in 
the business, how the business is to be operated from a management and control point of view, 
statutory formalities to be complied with, achieving limited liability for participants, the requirement 
of perpetual succession and, importantly, income tax considerations. Both the partnership and trust 
lack legal personality. However, both vehicles provide flexibility in respect of income and capital 
allocation and retention, but still provide a degree of limitation in respect of individual liability. 
 
                                                 
1510Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), pages 145-161. These are 
some of the incentives schemes that will be discussed in chapter four. 
1511As mentioned earlier, Canadian provinces and territories have their own partnership legislation, however 
similar to the Delaware example, which was discussed in paragraph 3.2 of this chapter, the British Columbia 
Partnership Act of 1996 was analysed in this paragraph for ease of reference. The reason for this is because 
British Columbia have a well developed common-law regime governing limited partnerships, which is generally 
considered the more sophisticated of the Canadian provinces and territories. Furthermore, the provisions 
contained in the British Columbia Partnership Act of 1996 are much the same as the equivalent legislation in 
most of the other provinces. In addition, it is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse all the relevant 
legislation pertaining to limited partnerships in of all the other provinces and territories of Canada. 
1512See Dolden, E.A. (1996), ‘Partnerships, Limited Partnerships and Joint Ventures: Managing the Risks’, 
Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, June 1996, at page 29. 
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Furthermore, when analysing the various legal forms used to structure private equity funds in the 
UK, Canada, Australia and the US, it is evident that predominantly the same considerations apply 
as mentioned above. The purpose of the discussion of the various organisational forms used in these 
foreign jurisdictions is to highlight that despite these jurisdictions having developed sophisticated 
levels of development this does not imply that, for example, the regulatory system of the US is more 
efficient than that of South Africa. On the contrary, it is evident from the discussion that the US 
system is much more complex and cumbersome than that of South Africa and so, at times, unduly 
complicates the structuring of private equity funds in the US. However, what is clearly evident is that 
these foreign jurisdictions had significantly contributed towards the development of their respective 
private equity markets via consistent regulatory reforms. In addition, specific regulatory regimes exist 
in the US, Canada, Australia and UK which define private equity investment vehicles on a more 
specific basis, both of which are lacking in South Africa. 
 
In addition, it is evident that the limited partnership is the predominant legal form in the foreign 
jurisdictions discussed above. There are three primary reasons for this, which have been highlighted 
throughout the preceding paragraphs of this chapter. Firstly, the limited partnership is fiscally 
transparent, which means that profits and losses in a limited partnership flow through the fund to the 
partners, all of whom are taxed on their personal income tax returns. The difference is that the limited 
partners get to share in the profits and losses, without having to participate in the private equity fund. 
Secondly, a limited partner’s liability for the partnership’s debt is limited to the amount of money that 
such a partner has contributed to the partnership. Thirdly, the limited partnership affords contractual 
flexibility amongst the general partners and limited partners. The flexibility of the limited partnership 
allows the participants to enter into express contractual terms that align the incentives of the private 
equity firm with those of outside investors. A limited partnership is constituted by express contract or 
by implication from the conduct of the partners; however an express agreement between the partners 
would obviously be practically more desirable. There are also disadvantages to using the limited 
partnership, such as the general partners carrying the burden of all the fund’s debts and obligations. 
Also, the general partner has the ability to make decisions on behalf of the private equity fund, and 
those decisions become the responsibility of all the general partners.  
 
4. Regulatory and Licensing Requirements of a Private Equity Firm 
 
The discussion to follow will highlight the principal regulations and regulatory bodies that would have 
authority over a private equity fund and its manager in South Africa, US, UK, Australia and Canada. 
Paragraph four will analyse the key regulatory and licensing requirements, but also the key trends 
and developments in the relevant areas, highlighting the most significant issues which are current 
and emerging, both in South Africa and the foreign jurisdictions mentioned above. It is important to 
note at the outset that this paragraph is not aimed at providing a comparison with South African 
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licensing requirements with those in foreign jurisdictions such the US, UK, Australia, and Canada. It 
is aimed at encouraging best practices that will hopefully lead to more efficient fund structuring in 
South Africa.1513 
 
4.1 South African Regulatory and Licensing Requirements 
 
In South Africa, the Financial Services Board monitors, regulates and supervises the financial 
services industry through the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002.1514 In 
terms of the provisions of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, the 
General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers and Representatives was 
established, making it mandatory for a range of disclosures to be made to clients, when an advisory 
service is provided.1515 The General Code of Conduct regulates the provision of advisory and 
intermediary services by Financial Service Providers, setting out the process for engaging clients. In 
the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers and Representatives the 
purpose of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 is stated as follows:1516 
 
‘The object of this Code is to ensure that clients to whom financial services are rendered subject 
to this Code will be able to make well informed decisions, that their financial needs regarding 
financial products are appropriately and suitably satisfied and that for those purposes, 
discretionary FSPs and their representatives are obliged to comply with the provisions of the Act.’ 
 
 The regulation and licensing of fund managers in South Africa depends inter alia on the type of 
investors they intend securing, the nature of the services they provide, as well as the type of 
investment fund structure they intend managing. Nevertheless, the provision of fund management 
services in South Africa, is largely subject to the provisions of the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. Furthermore, private equity firms that intend to secure pension 
funds as investors must meet the additional requirements set out in the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956 if their private equity fund(s) are to qualify as ‘private equity funds’.  The investment regulations 
in the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 permit pension funds to invest in private equity funds and 
                                                 
1513Chapter four is a comparative analysis of the extent to which the law impacts the private equity market. The 
applicable regulatory developments and legislation of the US, UK, Canada and Australia are analysed and 
compared to the South African position in order to determine whether the South African law can learn anything 
from these jurisdictions. Chapter four will consider and analyse two key impediments; namely tax legislation 
and exit alternatives; and show how legislation could effectively address the former and how the lack of exit 
routes is an impediment to the growth of the South African private equity industry. 
1514See also paragraph 3 of chapter 5 which provides a broad overview of the current financial services 
regulatory framework aimed at contextualizing the considerations being proposed in chapter 5. 
1515Under section 15 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, the Registrar of 
Financial Services Providers, published a general code of conduct for authorised financial services providers, 
and their representatives. 
1516Part I, Introductory Provisions, of the General code of conduct for authorised financial services providers 
and representatives, 2003. 
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stipulate requirements in order for a private equity fund to qualify for investment by a pension 
fund.1517   
 
It is also important to note as part of this introduction that if a fund manager manages a collective 
investment scheme, the provision of that service is exempted from regulation in terms of the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, as it is subject to regulation in terms of the 
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002. However, a private equity fund structured 
as either a partnership or trust could in theory satisfy all of the requirements of a collective investment 
scheme and be included to be regulated as such in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act 45 of 2002 if ‘members of the public’ are invited and then permitted to invest.1518 It would 
be prudent not to trigger the application of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 
2002, by inviting or permitting members of the public to invest in the private equity fund because 
there is no licensing scheme in place in South Africa to regulate private equity funds in terms of the 
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002.1519 In all likelihood the private equity fund 
would be regarded as unlawful, should the application of the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act 45 of 2002 be triggered. 
 
4.1.1 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
 
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (‘FAIS’), regulates the provision of 
advice by financial services providers (‘FSPs’) in South Africa. A person may not act or offer to act 
as a financial services provider unless that person is authorised by the Registrar of Financial 
Services Providers to do so. Any person,1520 may submit an application for authorisation as a 
financial services provider in South Africa.1521 In terms of section 1(1) of FAIS a ‘financial services 
provider’ (‘FSP’) is defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
1517‘March 2012 Regulations’ means the regulations dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Regulations made under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in 
Private Equity Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (GN 1 of 15 March 2012). 
1518A ‘collective investment scheme’ is defined in part I of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 
of 2002:  ‘a scheme, in whatever form, including an open-ended investment company, in pursuance of which 
members of the public are invited or permitted to invest money or other assets in a portfolio, ...’. 
1519The Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 (‘CISCA’), came into operation on 3rd March 
2003. In summary Collective Investment Schemes (‘CIS’) are broadly regulated as follows:(1) managers of 
CISs must be registered in terms of CISCA;(2) managers of CISs must comply with the fit and proper 
requirements in terms of Board Notice 911 of 2010, issued in terms of CISCA; (3) managers of CISs must 
comply with capital requirements and provide seed capital for each portfolio they administers (except in respect 
of exchange traded portfolios listed on an exchange); (4) portfolios must comply with prudential investment 
guidelines; (5)  the prior approval of the Registrar is required for each new portfolio; (6) managers must comply 
with quarterly reporting requirements; and (7) investors must receive annual reports containing prescribed 
information.  
1520Whether domiciled in or outside South Africa. 
1521See Van Wyk, K. (2011), Regulations and Ethics of South African Financial Markets’, The South African 
Institute of Financial Markets, September 20111, Chapter 4, at pages 66-102. 
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‘means any person, other than a representative, who as a regular feature of the business of such 
person  - 
(a) furnishes advice; or 
(b) furnishes advice and renders any intermediary service; or 
(c) renders an intermediary service.’ 
 
The term ‘financial services’ has a specific meaning in terms of section 1 of FAIS and is defined as: 
 
‘… any service contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of ‘financial services 
provider’, including any category of such services.’ 
 
In terms of section 1(1) of FAIS ‘advice’ is defined as follows: 
 
‘means, subject to subsection (3)(a), any recommendation, guidance or proposal of a financial 
nature furnished, by any means or medium, to any client or group of clients – 
(a) in respect of the purchase of any financial product; or 
(b) in respect of the investment in any financial product; or 
(c) on the conclusion of any other transaction, including a loan or cession, aimed at the incurring 
of any liability or the acquisition of any right or benefit in respect of any financial product; or 
(d) on the variation of any term or condition applying to a financial product , on the replacement 
of any such product, or on the termination of any purchase of or investment in any such 
product, and irrespective of whether or not such advice – 
(i) is furnished in the course of or incidental to financial planning in connection with the affairs 
of the client; or 
(ii) results in any such purchase, investment, transaction, variation, replacement or 
termination, as the case may be, being effected; 
 
In terms of the above definition, the ‘advice’ must relate to a financial product.1522 A ‘financial product’, 
as defined in terms of FAIS, means, among others: securities and instruments (such as shares in a 
company, debentures and securitised debt; any money market instrument, any warrant, certificates 
and other instruments acknowledging, conferring or creating rights to subscribe to, acquire, dispose 
of, or convert the securities and instruments); participatory interest in one or more collective 
investment scheme; a long-term and short-term insurance contract; benefits by a pension fund; 
foreign currency denominated investment instrument (including a foreign currency deposit) and any 
                                                 
1522See also section 8(1) of the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and 
Representatives of 2003, which states that one of the duties of an FSP or their representatives, is to identify 
financial products that will be appropriate to the client’s risk profile and financial needs, subject to the limitations 
imposed on the FSP or any contractual arrangements. The limitations are in relation to the licence categories 
held by the FSP and contractual arrangements refer to those arrangements with product suppliers. 
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other products similar in nature to the financial products described in this paragraph.1523 However, 
the term ‘advice’ under FAIS expressly excludes factual advice given during the procedure for 
entering into a transaction in respect of any financial product, in relation to the description of a 
financial product, in answer to routine administrative queries, in the form of objective information 
about a particular financial product or by the display or distribution of promotional material.1524 It also 
excludes an analysis or report on a financial product that does not contain any express or implied 
recommendation, guidance or proposal that any particular transaction in respect of the relevant 
product is appropriate to the particular investment objectives, financial situation or needs of a 
client.1525  
 
In terms of section 1(1) of FAIS an ‘intermediary service’ is defined as follows: 
 
‘means, subject to subsection (3)(b), any act other than the furnishing of advice, performed by a 
person for or on behalf of a client or product supplier – 
(a) the result of which is that a client may enter into, offers to enter into or enters into any 
transaction in respect of a financial product with a product supplier; or 
(b) with a view to – 
(i) buying, selling or otherwise dealing in (whether on a discretionary or non-discretionary 
basis), managing, administering, keeping in safe custody, maintaining or servicing a 
financial product purchased by a client from a product supplier or in which the client has 
invested;  
(ii) collecting or accounting for premiums or other moneys payable by the client to a product 
supplier in respect of a financial product; or 
(iii) receiving, submitting or processing the claims of a client against a product supplier.’ 
 
The interpretation of the definition of ‘intermediary service’ under FAIS was dealt with by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident 
Fund.1526 The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund (the Respondent) entered into an 
agreement with TriStar Investments (Pty) Ltd (the Appellant), in terms of which Tristar agreed to 
provide certain services to the Chemical Industries National Provident Fund (the ‘Agreement’). 
Tristar was an authorised FSP, licensed under FAIS to provide advice, but not intermediary services. 
The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund contended that it was not bound by the Agreement 
                                                 
1523In terms of Part 1 Introductory Provisions as per section 1 of FAIS. 
1524Modise, L., Horak, W. and Van Zuylen, C. (2014), ‘Transactions: South Africa’, in Private Equity in 29 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editors Cogut, C. and Curbow, W., published by Getting the Deal 
Through, at pages, at pages 276. 
1525Modise, L., Horak, W. and Van Zuylen, C. (2014), ‘Transactions: South Africa’, in Private Equity in 29 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editors Cogut, C. and Curbow, W., published by Getting the Deal 
Through, at pages, at pages 276. 
1526Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA, (59) (Case No. 
455/12). 
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due to inter alia its contention that the Agreement was void because it was unlawful. The 
unlawfulness, in the present situation, was that Tristar was rendering an intermediary service for 
which it was not licensed, which was in contravention of section 7 of FAIS. Section 7 of FAIS prohibits 
a person from acting or offering to act as an FSP unless that person has been issued with a licence 
to do so. As mentioned above, an FSP is defined in FAIS as a person who, as a regular feature of 
his or her business, furnishes advice or renders any intermediary service or both. Tristar undertook, 
inter alia, to monitor and evaluate the performance of investments and asset managers, correct any 
underperformance, and to take appropriate corrective action. In this regard, Nugent JA in Tristar 
Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund,1527 stated: 
 
‘The agreement contemplated that one or more independent asset managers would be appointed 
to effect the various investments approved by the Fund. Amongst the services TriStar was to 
provide, under the heading ‘Investment policy implementation’, were to ‘draft detailed asset 
manager mandates for [the Fund’s] domestic and international asset managers’, and to 
‘implement the asset allocation model, investment strategy and asset manager mandates’, and 
to ‘negotiate any contractual issues with the current and any new asset managers on behalf of 
[the Fund], and to ‘manage the transition from [the Fund’s] current domestic and international 
portfolios to be created as a result of this process’. I need not set out in detail the various services 
to be provided under the heading ‘Ongoing monitoring and management’. It is sufficient to say 
that it undertook, amongst other things, to monitor and evaluate the performance of the 
investments, and the performance of the asset managers, and, in some cases to ‘correct any 
underperformance’, and in other cases to ‘take appropriate corrective action’. Clearly the 
‘corrective action’ it was to undertake was no more than to ensure that the asset managers 
adhered to their mandates.’1528  
 
The court held that none of the services in terms of the Agreement constituted intermediary services 
in the ordinary meaning of the definition, and neither did the court see any reason as to why the 
legislature would have thought it necessary for services of that kind to be regulated. Therefore, 
Tristar was not required to be licensed to provide the services in terms of the Agreement, and the 
objection raised by the Chemical Industries National Provident Fund was dismissed. Nugent JA held 
as follows: 
 
‘[13] Sub-clause (a) of the definition of an intermediary service, properly construed, contemplates 
acts that directly result in the consequences referred to. To construe it as including any act that 
indirectly has that result would lead to absurdities. It contemplates a person who stands with a 
                                                 
1527Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA, (59) Case No:455/12. 
1528Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA, (59) Case No:455/12 
at paragraph 12. 
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client (or clients) on the one side, and a supplier of financial products on the other side, acting as 
the ‘go-between’ to effect the relevant transactions. Quintessentially, that person is the asset 
manager, who is mandated to act on behalf of the Fund. As for sub-clause (b), it contemplates a 
person who manages or administers the relevant financial products.[14] None of the services 
TriStar undertook to provide falls foul of those provisions. Initially they were to compile and convey 
the appropriate mandates and instructions to the asset managers, and thereafter to take steps to 
ensure compliance with their mandates. It was not to bring about the relevant transactions – those 
would be brought about by the asset managers – nor was it to manage or administer the financial 
products. So far as it was to manage or administer anything at all, it was to manage and administer 
no more than the mandates of the asset managers.[15] In my view none of those constitutes 
‘intermediary services’ on the ordinary meaning of the language of the definition. I can also see 
no reason – and none could be suggested – why the legislature would have thought it necessary 
for services of that kind to be regulated. In those circumstances TriStar was not required to be 
licensed to provide them, and the objection raised by the Fund ought to have been dismissed.’1529 
 
The importance of this judgment is that one does not require a licence to provide intermediary 
services, if the services in question do not constitute intermediary services as under FAIS. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgement in Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National 
Provident Fund represents an important precedent especially because it held that it cannot be 
assumed that all services in respect of financial products which do not constitute ‘advice’ would 
constitute ‘intermediary services’, but rather it must be specifically considered whether the services 
in fact constitute ‘intermediary services’.1530 The restrictive interpretation adopted by the court in 
interpreting the language used in the definition of ‘intermediary service’ under FAIS has to be viewed 
in a positive light. Particularly, as the definition is capable of a broad interpretation. Furthermore, the 
judgment highlights the principle that intermediary services must be related to a financial product 
and that the mere monitoring or management of a fund manager will not constitute an intermediary 
service in terms of FAIS. The same principles would apply to an individual client where an FSP or 
representative performs a similar function with regard to an asset manager, even though the client 
in this case was a provident fund.  
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the term ‘financial services’ in terms of section 1(1) of FAIS refers to 
the provision of ‘advice’ and ‘intermediary services’. The definitions mentioned above are some of 
the definitions contained in FAIS and highlight which specific services are regulated under FAIS and 
it also makes it very clear which financial products are subject to the provisions of FAIS. 
Nevertheless, FAIS provides for specific services that may be provided by a licensed FSP, namely 
                                                 
1529Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA, (59) Case No:455/12 
at paragraphs 13-15. 
1530Tristar Investments v The Chemical Industries National Provident Fund 2013 ZASCA, (59) Case No:455/12. 
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advice only; advice and intermediary services; or intermediary services only. FAIS sets the minimum 
standards for FSPs and their representatives if they wish to render advisory and intermediary 
services to the public and therefore it is of the utmost importance that providers understand the basic 
fundamentals of FAIS compliance.1531 In addition, the Registrar of Financial Services Providers 
authorises and supervises various categories of FSPs:1532  
 
 Category I: Financial advisers and intermediaries who may not use discretion in the rendering 
of financial services.  
 Category II: Intermediary services in terms of a mandate granting to the FSP discretion 
regarding the choice of financial products.  
 Category IIA: Hedge fund managers.  
 Category III: Investment administrators specialising mainly in bulking collective investments on 
behalf of clients (linked investment services providers).  
 Category IV: Assistance business administrators (funeral brokers).  
 
A fund manager may provide advice to its clients.1533 However, typically a fund manager will provide 
intermediary services.1534 Nevertheless, in practical terms, before the fund manager can provide 
such intermediary services, the fund manager must first be licensed in terms of one of the above 
mentioned categories.1535 As from December 2012,1536 all FSPs providing financial services to 
private equity funds are required to hold a Category II FSP licence.1537 FAIS prohibits any person 
from acting as an FSP unless such a person has been properly licensed.1538 An authorised FSP may 
                                                 
1531Van Zyl, F.H. (2004), ‘The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Manual’, Juta and Company, at 1-
11. 
1532The term ‘financial services provider’ is wide and the regulated activities diverse, ranging from relatively 
simple activities, such as selling funeral policies to very complex activities, such as buying a derivative 
instrument to hedge a portfolio’s exposure. Therefore, policymakers introduced requirements appropriate to 
each category. 
1533In this general sense. 
1534As set out in terms of a Category II FSP licence. 
1535Section 3(1) of the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and 
Representatives of 2003, describes the financial advisory and intermediary service process with several of the 
steps requiring the presentation of or completion of appropriate documentation. For example, the remuneration 
to be paid for the financial service have to be established at the initial stage of the professional relationship 
between the client and the FSP or representative. 
1536Board Notice 208 of 2012, 13th December 2012, Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 
2002, Exemption of Certain Persons Conducting Financial Services Related Business with Private Equity 
Funds, No. 35997. 
1537Category II FSPs must at all times comply with the following requirements, namely the assets (excluding 
goodwill and other intangible assets and investments in related parties) must exceed liabilities (excluding loans 
validly subordinated in favour of all other creditors); the FSP must maintain sufficient current assets to cover 
current liabilities must be maintained; and the FSP must maintain liquid assets equal to 8/52 weeks of annual 
expenditure must at all times be maintained.  
1538Prior to the effect of amended Regulation 28 as read with the March 2012 Regulations, SAVCA met with 
the FSB to seek clarification as to the application of FAIS to private equity funds. The outcomes from this 
meeting were that SAVCA members should apply for a Category 1 licence for the investment advisor to the 
private equity fund, provided that the investment advisor does not provide discretionary financial services. If 
the private equity fund is managed by a discretionary fund manager, then the fund manager will require a 
Category II licence. In addition, FAIS requires that the Registrar draft and publish codes of conduct for 
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also not conduct financial services related business with a person rendering financial services if such 
person has not also been properly licensed.1539  
 
FAIS covers a comprehensive regulatory framework applying to FSPs and it is beyond the scope of 
this discussion to cover all the related aspects contained in FAIS.  For example, some of the 
important aspects covered in FAIS are:1540  
 
 Only fit and proper persons, namely persons who have not been found guilty of dishonesty in 
the past and who are properly qualified with the requisite experience, will be licensed to 
conduct business as an FSP.  
 FSP or its representative must avoid and where this is not possible, mitigate any conflict of 
interest between an FSP or representative and the client.1541 
 FSP, other than a representative, must adopt, maintain and implement a conflict of interest 
management policy that complies with the provisions of the Act.1542  
 FSP must be solvent and, in the case of FSPs holding assets or receiving money, must in 
addition have sufficient current assets to meet current liabilities and maintain a prescribed 
number of liquid assets, depending on the category of FSP.  
 FSP must hold guarantees and fidelity guarantee insurance and professional indemnity 
insurance depending on the category of FSP and whether it receives or holds clients’ cash or 
financial products.  
 FSP must comply with the operational requirements such as having a fixed address and 
telephone, a bank account, storage and filing facilities and appropriate anti money-laundering 
control systems.  
 FSP must have proper accounting records and be audited annually.  
 FSP must, in addition, submit a report by the auditor certifying the amount of cash and market 
value of assets held on behalf of clients and whether such cash and assets are held separately 
from its own cash and assets.  
 FSP must comply with the General Code of Conduct in addition to the special Code of Conduct 
applicable to the industry concerned.  
 
However, the determination of fit and proper requirements under FAIS (mentioned above) is an 
                                                 
authorised FSPs, which upon publication become binding on all FSPs and their representatives to which such 
codes apply. 
1539In terms of section 7(1) and (3) of FAIS. In order to protect consumers against inappropriate financial advice, 
FAIS requires an FSP to register with the Financial Services Board (‘FSB’), which issues a licence only when 
predetermined minimum qualifications are met. 
1540Van Wyk, K. (2011), Regulations and Ethics of South African Financial Markets’, The South African Institute 
of Financial Markets, September 20111, Chapter 1, at pages 16-17. 
1541Sec 3(1)(b) and (c), General Code of Conduct as amended by BN 58 of 2010 published on 19 April 2010. 
1542Sec 3A(2)(a) of General Code of Conduct as amended by BN 58 of 2010 published on 19 April 2010 . 
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important aspect to the discussion at hand, and will next be considered in greater detail. 
 
Fit and Proper Requirements 
 
The regulatory requirements in South Africa affecting the private equity fund management industry 
has had an increase in focus by the regulator (FSB), particularly with regard to the competence of 
individuals providing financial services.1543 In order to accommodate the private equity industry within 
the fit and proper requirements, the FSB acknowledged that what was needed from the private equity 
industry was information on the appropriate experience and qualifications that should be set for 
private industry professionals in order to fulfill the fit and proper requirements.1544 For example, what 
is the benchmark for the private equity industry? What would investors require from a private equity 
fund manager in order to raise a fund? Nonetheless, there is currently no specific category of FSP 
licence tailored for private equity managers in South Africa.1545 In terms of section 8 of FAIS, the 
Registrar must determine the requirements with which FSPs, key individuals and representatives of 
the provider must comply. These requirements are termed the Determination of Fit and Proper 
Requirements for FSPs and their representatives. In 2006, the Advisory Committee of Financial 
Services Providers identified the need to review the fit and proper requirements set out in FAIS.1546 
The fit and proper requirements were updated in 2008 in terms of Board Notice 106 of 2008 which 
came into effect on the 31st December 2008. Subsequently, several amendments have been 
effected. The fit and proper requirements contain the following sections:1547 
 
                                                 
1543At the outset of this discussion under paragraph 4.1.1 of this chapter relating to ‘fit and proper requirements’, 
it is noted that it was decided not to include a discussion on the South African Fidentia case study, but simply 
to make reference thereto. The reasons, inter alia, are as follows: (i) the Fidentia case was a matter of simple 
fraud that in a nutshell fell squarely outside the scope of this thesis; (ii) the media references to a Fidentia 
‘private equity portfolio’ were misleading because such a supposed portfolio was a collection of shares held in 
companies which were not registered in investors' names or in the name of a nominee company. The shares 
held in companies in the supposed ‘private equity portfolio’ were either held in the name of Fidentia Asset 
Management or the names of key individuals associated with Fidentia Asset Management; (iii) private equity 
consists of investments in unlisted investee companies, with an investment horizon of between five and seven 
years after which the private equity manager will ‘exit’ the underlying investee company. This strategy was 
missing from the Fidentia case study; (iv) at the time of the Fidentia scandal, the prevailing South African 
regulations restricted the maximum amount to 5% of the total fund size that pension funds could allocate to 
private equity. The Financial Services Board (FSB) in its inspection report stated that R695 million of the R1,6 
billion consolidated client assets under management of Fidentia Asset Management was in private equity 
which was  in excess of the 5% limit; (v) Fidentia Asset Management did not use acceptable accounting 
procedures; (vi) Fidentia Asset Management operated outside the South African Regulatory and Licensing 
Requirements; and (vii) the actual pension funds’ mandates were not to invest in private equity. However, it 
could be argued that should there have been adequate regulatory and licensing requirements in place at the 
time, the negative impact of the Fidentia case would in all likelihood have been minimised in the least. 
1544‘SAVCA’s approaches to the FSB on FAIS Exemptions’, 17th August 2009.  
1545The FSB is seeking to introduce a category of FSP licence specifically for the private equity industry and 
the prelimary draft of the Code of Conduct for Private Equity Managers is largely based on several of the 
European Union’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. 
1546Board Notice 91 of 2006, Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, Determination of 
Fit and Proper Requirements for Financial Services Providers, 2006, No. 29131. 
1547Available at www.fsb.co.za/Departments/fais/requirements/Pages/requirements.aspx, accessed at August 
2016. 
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 Honesty and Integrity requirements that are applicable to all FSPs, key individuals, 
representatives and compliance officers. 
 Competency requirements that consist of experience and qualification requirements that are 
applicable to all FSPs, key individuals and representatives. 
 Operational ability requirements that are applicable to all FSPs, key individuals and 
representatives. 
 Solvency requirements that are applicable to the FSP. 
 
Section 6A(1) to (4) of FAIS, relating to fit and proper requirements, reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) The registrar, for purposes of this Act, by notice in the Gazette 
(a) must – 
(i) classify financial services providers into different categories; 
(ii) determine fit and proper requirements for each category of providers; and 
(iii) in each category of providers determine fit and proper requirements for – 
(aa) key individuals of providers; 
(bb) representatives of providers; 
(cc) key individuals of representatives of providers; and 
(dd) compliance officers; and 
(b) may determine fit and proper requirements for providers, key individuals, representatives, 
key individuals of representatives and compliance officers in general. 
(2) Fit and proper requirements may include, but are not limited to, appropriate standards relating 
to – 
(a) personal character qualities of honesty and integrity; 
(b) competence, including – 
(i) experience; 
(ii) qualifications; and 
(iii) knowledge tested through examinations determined by the registrar; 
(c) operational ability; 
(d) financial soundness; and 
(e) continuous professional development. 
(3) Different fit and proper requirements may be determined for providers, representatives and 
compliance officers that are natural persons and for those that are partnerships, trusts or 
corporate or unincorporated bodies. 
(4) The registrar may, by notice in the Gazette, amend the fit and proper requirements from time 
to time, and a provider, key individual, representative, key individual of a representative and 
compliance officer must comply therewith such period as determined by the registrar.’ 
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Section 8 of FAIS is applicable to FSPs and key individuals with regard to the authorisation of FSPs, 
who are responsible for managing or overseeing the activities of an entity rendering any financial 
service. Section 8(1) of FAIS reads as follows: 
 
‘An application for an authorisation referred to in section 7(1), including an application by an 
applicant not domiciled in the Republic, must be submitted to the registrar in the form and manner 
determined by the registrar by notice on the official web site, and be accompanied by information 
to satisfy the registrar that the applicant complies with the fit and proper requirements determined 
for financial services providers or categories of providers, determined by the registrar by notice in 
the Gazette, in respect of – 
(a) personal character qualities of honesty and integrity; 
(b) competence; 
(bA) operational ability; and 
(c) financial soundness.’ 
 
According to section 8 of FAIS, authorisation of financial service providers or categories of providers, 
is subject to the satisfaction of the Registrar of FSPs that the applicant complies with the fit and 
proper requirements.1548 In addition, such fit and proper standards apply to individuals of the FSP 
and the FSPs themselves. Section 8(1A) of FAIS reads as follows: 
 
‘If the applicant is a partnership, trust or corporate or unincorporated body, the requirements in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) do not apply to the applicant, but in such a case the 
application must be accompanied by additional information to satisfy the registrar that every 
person who acts as a key individual of the applicant complies with the fit and proper requirements 
for key individuals in the category of financial services providers applied for, in respect of – 
(a) personal character qualities of honesty and integrity; 
(b) competence; and 
(c) operational ability, 
(d) to the extent required in order for such key individual to fulfil the responsibilities imposed by 
this Act.’ 
 
                                                 
1548In December 2015, the Registrar, in a Memorandum for Proposed Amendments to Fit and Proper 
Requirements for Financial Service Providers and Representatives, 2015 (‘the Memorandum’), announced the 
intention to make amendments to the Fit and Proper requirements. The proposed amendments will be effected 
by repealing the Notice on Determination of Qualifying Criteria and Qualifications for Financial Service 
Providers Number 1 of 2008; and determining new Fit and Proper requirements for FSP, Key Individuals and 
Representatives. These changes have been proposed to align the Fit and Proper Requirements with the 
competency framework applicable to FSPs, their Key Individuals and Representatives. Available a 
twww.fsb.co.za/departments/fais/communication/documents/explanatory% 
20memorandum%20for%20proposed%20amendments%20to%20fit%20and%20proper%20requirements%2
0for%20fsps%20and%20representatives,%202015.pdf, accessed in December 2016. 
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Representatives, who are employed by authorised FSPs and render a financial service for and on 
behalf of such FSP, must comply with section 13 of FAIS which sets out the qualifications of 
representatives and the duties of FSPs.1549 Section 13(1) to (2) of FAIS reads as follows: 
  
‘(1) A person may not – 
(a) carry on business by rendering financial services to clients for or on behalf of any person 
who – 
(i) is not authorised as a financial services provider; and 
(ii) is not exempted from the application of this Act relating to the rendering of a financial 
service; 
(b) act as a representative of an authorised financial services provider, unless such person – 
(i) prior to rendering a financial service, provides confirmation, certified by the provider, 
to clients 
(aa) that a service contract or other mandate, to represent the provider, exists; and 
(bb) that the provider accepts responsibility for those activities of the representative 
performed within the scope of, or in the course of implementing, any such contract 
or mandate; and 
(iA) meets the fit and proper requirements; and 
(ii) if debarred as contemplated in section 14, complies with the requirements determined 
by the registrar by notice in the Gazette, for the reappointment of a debarred person 
as a representative; or 
(c) render financial services or contract in respect of financial services other than in the name 
of the financial services provider of which such person is a representative. 
(2) An authorised financial services provider must – 
(a) at all times be satisfied that the provider's representatives, and the key individuals of such 
representatives, are, when rendering a financial service on behalf of the provider, 
competent to act, and comply with – 
(i) the fit and proper requirements; and 
(ii) any other requirements contemplated in subsection (1)(b)(ii); 
(b) take such steps as may be reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that representatives 
comply with any applicable code of conduct as well as with other applicable laws on 
conduct of business .’ 
  
In addition, FAIS imposes accounting and audit requirement duties on FSPs, such as FSPs having 
to submit financial statements and compliance reports annually to the FSB. This is to enable the FSB 
                                                 
1549Section 13 of FAIS. Under Chapter III: Representatives of Authorised Financial Services Providers, 
Qualifications of representatives and duties of authorised financial services providers. 
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to determine whether the FSP complies with the solvency requirements of the determination of fit 
and proper requirements set out above. For example, section 19(2) of FAIS reads as follows: 
 
‘(a) An authorised financial services provider must cause the statements referred to in 
subsection (1)(b) to be audited and reported on in accordance with auditing 
pronouncements as defined in section 1 of the Auditing Professions Act, 2005 (Act No. 26 
of 2005) by an external auditor approved by the registrar. 
(b) the financial statements must - 
(i) fairly represent the state of affairs of the provider's business; 
(ii) refer to any material matter which has affected or is likely to affect the financial affairs of 
the provider; and 
(iii) be submitted by the authorised financial services provider to the registrar not later than 
four months after the end of the provider's financial year or such longer period as may 
be allowed by the registrar.’ 
 
A further consideration relates to continuous professional development. Board Notice 106 of 2008 
under FAIS increased the minimum level of competence required by FSPs, key individuals and 
representatives. Prior thereto, FSPs, key individuals and representatives required a minimum level 
of competence and was examined on a once off basis and not on a continuous basis.1550 However, 
in terms of Board Notice 106 of 2008, an FSP, a key individual and/or representative must meet the 
continuous professional development requirements. They must obtain a number of prescribed 
credits over a three year period, via for example formal studies, workshops, conferences and 
seminars, which have to be approved by the FSB. The regulatory examinations have been 
introduced in terms of Board Notice 106 of 2008.1551 In addition, the qualification requirements vary 
according to the category in which the FSP falls.1552 
 
                                                 
1550All sole proprietors and key individuals must meet the qualification requirements when they apply to the 
Registrar for authorisation as an authorised FSP or approval as a key individual. 
1551These examinations consist of two levels. The purpose of the examination requirement is to ensure that 
any person who acts as a key individual or representative is able to provide the relevant and necessary 
information to consumers. Level 1 is a legislative examination addressing the legal obligations that are imposed 
on a sole proprietor, key individual and representative. This includes FAIS, Code of Conduct and Anti-Money 
laundering requirements. Level 2 addresses product specific knowledge. 
1552Category I refers to all other persons other than persons referred to in Categories II, IIA, III and IV. Category 
II refers to persons who are authorised as discretionary FSPs whereas persons who are authorised as hedge 
fund FSPs fall under Category IIA. Category III refers to persons who are authorised as administrative FSPs 
and persons who require licences as Assistance Business FSP falls under Category IV. The entry level 
qualification for an FSP (who is a sole proprietor) and key individuals in respect of Category I and IV is Matric 
and a fully recognised qualification as determined by the Registrar by notice in the Gazette. However, a 
representative of the same category can be appointed even if they meet entry level requirements, provided 
that they work under supervision of an authorised FSP being a natural person or a representative or key 
individual of the provider who meets the relevant requirements set out in Board Notice 104 of 2008, until 
meeting the qualification requirements. An FSP (who is a sole proprietor) and key individual must meet the 
entry level requirement of a Bachelors degree or equivalent qualification from the recognised qualification list 
for Categories II, IIA and III. 
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Nevertheless, it is evident from the discussion thus far that South African policymakers have 
attempted to set a minimum standard that would be imposed on FSPs. It is submitted that these 
minimum entry requirements, such as the determination of fit and proper requirements are necessary 
in developing the local financial services market because it encourages the adherence to acceptable 
ethical standards.  
 
In Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another,1553 the Supreme Court of Appeal delivered a 
judgment highlighting that representatives of FSPs must be honest and people of integrity or face 
being disbarred from ever working in the financial services industry. The case related to Mr PGE 
Barthram who was employed by Discovery Life Limited to market and sell its products and policies, 
and to provide advice and intermediary services in relation to the products and policies provided by 
Discovery. Discovery conducts its business as an FSP under FAIS, and therefore is required to 
uphold the qualities of honesty and integrity. Barthram purported to resign from Discovery and 
commenced employment a day later with Old Mutual Life Insurance Limited. As a result, Discovery’s 
chief compliance officer notified Barthram that Discovery had taken a decision to notify the Registrar 
of Financial Services Providers that Barthram had failed to comply with the fit and proper 
requirements under FAIS for the continued appointment as a Representative for Discovery. Section 
14(3) of FAIS provides that an authorised FSP must within a period of fifteen days after the removal 
of the name of a Representative from the register as contemplated in section 14(1) of FAIS, inform 
the Registrar in writing thereof and provide the Registrar with the reasons for the debarment in such 
format as the Registrar may require. The Registrar may then make known any such debarment and 
the reasons therefore by notice in the Gazette or by means of any other appropriate public media.1554  
 
Following the notice to Barthram, Discovery withdrew Barthram’s authority to act on its behalf and 
removed his name from the register of Representatives. In Discovery’s notice, it highlighted the 
reasons for the removal as ‘honesty and integrity’. On receipt of the notice from Discovery, the 
Registrar of Financial Services Providers listed Barthram on its website as a debarred 
Representative, stating that Barthram ‘does not comply with personal character qualities of honesty 
and integrity’. The action by the Registrar of Financial Services Providers disbarred Barthram from 
working in the industry as a whole.  Section 14(1) of FAIS makes provision for the debarment of 
financial services representatives and requires that an authorised FSP must ensure that any 
Representative who no longer complies with the ‘fit and proper’ requirements referred to in section 
13(2)(a) read with section 8(1), or has contravened or failed to comply with any provision of FAIS in 
a material manner, is prohibited by such provider by the withdrawal of any authority to act on behalf 
                                                 
1553Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another 2015, 96, SCA (Case No. 20207/2014). 
1554Section 14(2) of FAIS states that ‘for the purposes of the imposition of a prohibition contemplated in 
subsection (1), the authorised financial services provider must have regard to information regarding the 
conduct of the representative as provided by the registrar, the Ombud or any other interested person.’ 
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of the FSP, and that the Representative’s name is removed from its register referred to in section 
13(3) of FAIS. 
 
Barthram filed an application in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria to review and set aside his 
debarment, and although Discovery opposed the review application, the Registrar did not. The High 
Court decided in favour of Barthram and held Discovery and the Registrar had failed to recognise 
the distinction between debarment by FSPs and debarment by the Registrar. The High Court held 
that the debarment by a FSP effectively means that the Representative can no longer represent that 
particular FSP, whereas debarment by the Registrar precludes the Representative from rendering 
financial services on behalf of any FSP. The High Court judgment meant that Barthram should have 
only been debarred from representing Discovery, and not the entire financial services industry. One 
of the consequences of the High Court judgment was that Representatives who had been previously 
disbarred from the entire industry because they had been disbarred by one FSP could approach the 
Registrar and demand reinstatement to the Registrar of Representatives so that they can work for 
other FSPs. This led the Registrar to appeal the decision of the High Court. The Registrar argued 
that the High Court had erred in its finding that the effect of a debarment of Barthram by Discovery 
was that he was only precluded from rendering financial services to the public on behalf of Discovery. 
In Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another,1555 Ponnan JA stated: 
 
‘The court below appears to have misinterpreted the legal effect of a debarment in terms of s 
14(1) in holding that it precludes the representative from acting as such only in respect of the 
debarring FSP. The absurdity of such an approach is patent. The debarment of the representative 
by an FSP is evidence that it no longer regard the representative as having either the fitness and 
propriety or competency requirements. A representative who does not meet those requirements 
lacks the character qualities of honesty and integrity or lacks competence and thereby poses a 
risk to the investing public generally. Such a person ought not to be unleashed on an unsuspecting 
public and it must therefore follow that any representative debarred in terms of s 14(1), must 
perforce be debarred on an industry-wide basis from rendering financial services to the investing 
public.’1556 
 
The Registrar succeeded in its appeal and the case highlights the fact that failure by a 
Representative to uphold the standards of integrity and honesty will result in a Representative not 
only being debarred by his employer but by the Registrar on an industry wide basis.  
 
                                                 
1555Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another 2015, 96, SCA, Case No. 20207/2014. 
1556Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another 2015, 96, SCA, Case No. 20207/2014 at paragraph 16. 
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In Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1557 the court judgment led to the 
reinstatement of a representative who had been debarred. In this case a distinction had been made 
between the two types of debarments, one where the FSP initiates the debarment in terms of Section 
14(1) of FAIS as stated above; and another in terms of section 14A of FAIS, which applies when the 
FSB effects the debarment. Section 14A(1) to (3) of FAIS reads as follows: 
 
‘(1) The registrar may, subject to subsection (2), at any time debar a person, including a 
representative, for a specified period from rendering financial services if satisfied on the basis 
of available facts and information that the person – 
(a) does not meet, or no longer meets, the requirements contemplated in section 8(1)(a); or 
(b) has contravened or failed to comply with any provision of this Act. 
(2) The provisions of section 9(2) regarding a decision to suspend a licence, apply with the 
necessary changes to the debarment of a person contemplated in subsection (1). 
(3) An authorised financial services provider must within a period of five days after being 
informed by the registrar of the debarment of a representative or key individual, remove the 
names of that representative and key individuals from the register as contemplated in section 
13 (3). 
(4) The registrar may make known any such debarment and the reasons therefor, or the lifting 
thereof, by notice on the official web site or by means of any other appropriate public media.’ 
 
In Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1558 the FSP initiated the debarment in terms 
of Section 14(1) of FAIS. In the case, the FSB indicated that its duty was to regulate the FSP who, 
in turn, was obliged to ensure that its Representatives complied with the requirements of FAIS. In 
Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1559 the FSB stated that it: 
 
‘ ... is not required to evaluate or adjudicate on the reasonableness, validity or otherwise of the 
reasons for the debarment.’1560 
 
However, that it had an obligation to:  
 
‘…ensure that a financial services provider acts in accordance with the provisions of the Act. As 
such, the Registrar may engage a financial services provider to determine whether a debarment 
was effected in accordance with the requirements of section 14(1) of the FAIS Act.’ 1561 
 
                                                 
1557Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1558Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1559Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1560Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1561Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
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Therefore, the request for debarment must relate to the fit and proper status of the Representative, 
and not another reason. These reasons mentioned above also guide the Registrar’s decision 
whether or not to grant the request and place the representative on the register of debarred 
representatives. In Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1562 the court found that 
the supporting documentation, submitted with the debarment request, was insufficient evidence for 
the reason given for the debarment. In this case the debarment process was used to attain a different 
outcome to what was intended in terms of FAIS. In addition, Mageza AJ in Pienaar v Registrar of 
Financial Services and Another1563 referred to a requirement in the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 that an individual is entitled to just and reasonable procedure. Mageza AJ 
stated as follows: 
 
‘Section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the Act) requires administrative 
action which materially adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person to be 
procedurally fair. A compliance officer in the position of second respondent must provide any such 
person in terms of section 3(2)(b) of the Act adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the 
administrative action; reasonable opportunity to make representations; notice of any right of 
review and right to request reasons for the administrative action. In terms of section 6 of the Act 
a court may review action taken by an administrator who was biased and/or where such action 
was procedurally unfair. In receiving the information and carrying out the public function of 
recording the details of the debarment and publishing a notice in the Government Gazzette for 
public information the first respondent concurrently carries out a public function and must act 
consonant with procedural fairness.’1564 
 
Furthermore, Mageza AJ stated that: 
 
‘Section 14(1) does not authorise unlawful acts either in respect of the conduct of the financial 
services provider or the first respondent (the FSB).’1565 
 
Therefore, once a debarment is completed, the FSB is not empowered to undo it and this can only 
be nullified by the court such as in Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another.1566 This 
would of course have serious financial implications for someone who had been debarred unfairly, 
and is not allowed to operate in the industry for the period prescribed under the debarment 
conditions. Mageza AJ was critical of the FSB as the court held that the FSB did not follow its own 
                                                 
1562Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1563Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
1564Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). at 
paragraph 25. 
1565Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013), at 
paragraph 24. 
1566Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013). 
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due process. If it had, it would in all likelihood have not debarred the Representative. Mageza AJ 
stated as follows: 
 
‘First respondent failed to act lawfully by debarring applicant without determinable reason and 
exacerbated the situation by undertaking what I view as an inexplicable excursion to search for 
reasons post effecting the debarment. Its own letter dated 5 November 2012 acknowledged the 
letter requesting the debarment and with an alarming innocence and lack of consciousness of its 
duties, assured her that it had recorded the debarment of applicant and had entered this in its 
central representative register ‘as per your notification in the letter referred to above’. In this Court 
first respondent advanced differing alternative premises in justifying its conduct. First it denies 
that it has a role to play in the process of a debarment by a requester and states that ‘any 
aggrieved individual must address such grievance with the financial services provider.’ That, ‘the 
Registrar is not required to evaluate or adjudicate on the reasonableness, validity or otherwise of 
the reasons for debarment’ but nonetheless it acknowledges that it has a duty to ensure the 
financial service provider acts within the terms of the FAIS Act and the law. The first respondent 
then makes the startling averment that Ms van Rooyen furnished it with reasons and, ‘The 
reasons for the debarment were set out in a form used by the Registrar’s office for this purpose’ 
and, ‘Attached to the form was a notice of motion (without any founding affidavit) in Case No 
19761/2012 of the Western Cape High Court, in which van Rooyen figured as applicant and 
sought interdictory relief against Applicant (First Respondent in that matter) not to interfere in the 
affairs of Second Respondent.[17] I do not agree with this assertion made in first respondent’s 
papers. In the first place, the prescribed form referred to by first respondent and annexed is no 
more than a sterile and bland document requiring only the personal details of the compliance 
officer and representative sought to be debarred. All that Ms van Rooyen had done in addition 
was to simply tick the ‘Honesty and Integrity’ box or column but failed to attach any report of a 
duly convened hearing or forensic investigative report from which the first respondent could have 
seen detail resembling reasons. There were none. The fact such a material assertion, is made by 
an officer charged with the responsibility to independently navigate the obligations set out in the 
FAIS Act and enforce compliance therewith, is disturbing.’1567 
 
The irony of this case was that had the Regulator applied its mind properly and followed due process, 
it would have arrived at the same conclusion as the High Court, because the person requesting the 
debarment may well have found herself in trouble, based on the principles of honesty and integrity. 
In essence, once an employer determines that the Representative is not fit and proper the 
Representative may be barred from ever providing financial services to the investing public in South 
Africa. However any disbarment must be preceded by due process. Overall, the case enhances 
                                                 
1567Pienaar v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2013, 37 ZAECPEHC, (Case No. 629/2013), at 
paragraphs 16-17. 
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protection for the investing public and clarifies the implications of disbarment of a Representative by 
his employer.  
 
In Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1568 the Appeal Board had to consider, 
in a nutshell, the nature and effect of an invalid debarment by an FSP of a representative. The Appeal 
Board in the Hollenbach1569 case stated that this question was answered by the authoritative 
judgment in Bathram1570 discussed above. The Appeal Board in Hollenbach stated: 
 
 ‘The question was answered in Bathram (supra) at [15]: 
 
“A debarment of a representative is terms of s 14(1) is complete when the FSP has withdrawn 
the representative’s authority to act on its behalf and has removed such person’s name from 
its own register in terms of s 13(3). Moreover, the Registrar only gets to learn of a 
repesenative’s debarment, after the event, on being informed of such by the FSP in terms of 
s 14(3). Upon removal of the representative’s name from the FSPs register, the FSB’s central 
register is correspondingly updated.” 
  
 The court added at [16] that – 
 
 “it must therefore follow that any representative debarred in terms of s 14(1), must perforce 
be debarred on an industry-wide basis from rendering financial sercices to the investing 
public.” 
 
This means that the decision to debar is that of the FSP and not the Registrar. Once that has 
taken place s 14(3) of the Act kicks in, requiring the Registrar to update the central register: 
 
“(a) The authorised financial services provider must within a period of 15 days after the 
removal of the names of a representative and key individuals from the register as 
contemplated in subsection (1), inform the registrar in writing thereof and provide the registrar 
with the reasons for the debarment in such format as the registrar may require. (b) The 
registrar may make known any such debarment and the reasons therefor by notice on the 
official web site or by means of any other appropriate public media.” ’1571 
                                                 
1568Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraphs 11-15. 
1569Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraphs 11-15. 
1570Financial Services Board v Barthram and Another 2015, 96, SCA (Case No. 20207/2014), at paragraphs 
15-16. 
1571Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraphs 15-18. 




Therefore, the Appeal Board in Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another,1572 
dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on the grounds that the two jurisdictional facts required to update 
the register have been satisfied. Firstly, that the FSP must inform the Registrar of the debarment; 
and secondly that the FSP must provide the Registrar with reasons for the debarment.1573 The 
Appeal Board in Hollenbach stated: 
 
 ‘It is not disputed that these jurisdictional requirements were satisfied.’1574 
 
According to Slabbert, the requirement for being considered a ‘fit and proper’ person is neither 
defined nor described in legislation, and given the lack of definition, it has to be interpreted in a 
subjective manner.1575 Slabbert argues that:1576 
 
‘ ... what exactly a ‘fit and proper’ person is not defined or described in legislation or regulations. 
It is commonly accepted that in order to be ‘fit and proper’ a person must show integrity, reliability 
and honesty, as these are the characteristics which could affect the relationship ... Although the 
burden of proof is on the applicant to prove that he or she is a ‘fit and proper’ person to enter the 
... profession, the decision remains essentially a discretionary value-judgement on the part of 
seniors.’1577  
                                                 
1572Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraph 18. 
1573Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraph 18. 
1574Hollenbach v Registrar of Financial Services and Another, 2016, Appeal Board of the Financial Services 
Board, (Case No. A9/2016), at paragraph 18. 
1575Slabbert, M. (2011), ‘The Requirement of Being a ‘Fit and Proper’ Person for the Legal Profession’, PELJ, 
14(4) at 209. Slabbert’s article largely related to the ‘fit and proper’ requirements with regard to the legal 
profession, including reference to case law. Despite the discussion at hand being with regard to the financial 
services industry, the principles relating to the conduct and character of legal and investment professionals in 
terms of ‘fit and property’ are largely similar. 
1576Slabbert, M. (2011), ‘The Requirement of Being a ‘Fit and Proper’ Person for the Legal Profession’, PELJ, 
14(4), at 212.  
1577See Slabbert, M. (2011), ‘The Requirement of Being a ‘Fit and Proper’ Person for the Legal Profession’, 
PELJ, 14(4), at pages 212-213. Slabbert argues that such discretionary value judgments have been politically 
influenced in South Africa in the past. For example, Mahatma Gandhi’s application to be admitted as an 
advocate of the High Court of Natal was opposed by the Law Society of Natal because he was a person of 
Indian origin and as such not a ‘fit and proper’ person to practise law. See In re Gandhi 1894 NLR 263. 
Furthermore, in Incorporated Law Society v Wookey 1912 AD 623, Madeline Wookey’s articles of clerkship 
were refused because she was a woman and women were seen to be improper for legal practice. Innes ACJ, 
Solomon J and J de Villiers JP upheld an appeal by the law society that the respondent should not be admitted 
as an attorney because she was a female. Innes ACJ addressed the question to counsel appearing for the 
respondent: ‘How can a married woman appear for another and not for herself?’ at 626. The full bench of the 
then Appellate Division relied on Roman Dutch law and its exclusion from legal practice of persons who could 
be termed ‘unfit and improper’ including, deaf, the blind, pagans, Jews, persons who denounced the Christian 
Trinity and women. Also during the years before South Africa became a democracy, various Law Societies 
brought applications to have lawyers involved in the struggle against apartheid removed from the roll of 
attorneys or advocates mainly on the basis that they were not ‘fit and proper’ persons because they violated 
the legislation of the country. See also Society of Advocates of SA (Witwatersrand Division) v Fischer 1966 (I) 
SA 133 (T); Ex Parte Krause 1905 TS 221; Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal v Mandela 1954 (3) SA 102 






‘The test to determine whether or not an applicant is indeed ‘fit and proper’ … is not perfect, nor 
is it any guarantee …  would act morally and ethically in future, yet it is a means of screening … 
and it must be enhanced by further training through seminars or workshops on ethical behaviour 
or morality within the … profession. The ‘fit and proper’ test could be seen in the same light as 
the ‘I do’ that marriage partners exchange during a wedding ceremony. By saying ‘I do’ the 
partners accept the responsibility to try to make a success of the marriage. They know that 
circumstances and personalities might change in future, yet a commitment is made. If the ‘fit and 
proper’ person test is to remain the moral scrutiny of prospective lawyers, its consequences and 
meaning should be communicated to each and every candidate so that all of them know exactly 
what moral conduct is expected of them not only shortly after admission but also well into the 
future. This knowledge should be followed up by extra training in ethics. To remind them of their 
respective Codes of Conduct or Ethical Rules is not enough to guarantee acceptable 
behaviour.’1578 
 
Slabbert quotes the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Harms J in Malan and another v The 
Law Society, Northern Provinces ,1579 when he stated:1580 
 
‘The exercise of this discretion is not bound by rules and precedents consequently have a limited 
value. All they do is to indicate how other courts have exercised their discretion in the 
circumstances of a particular case. Facts are never identical, and the exercise of a discretion 
need not be the same in similar cases. If a court were bound to follow a precedent in the exercise 
of its discretion it would mean that the court has no real discretion.’1581 
 
It is submitted that the financial services industry in South Africa has put in place measures to ensure 
that FSPs employ individuals who are sufficiently qualified to perform their duties. The fit and proper 
requirements discussed above not only encourage the employment of fit and proper individuals but 
also improve public confidence in the employees and the quality of services that are being offered, 
particular with regard to private equity firms. Prior to the effect of amended Regulation 28 as read 
with the March 2012 Regulations discussed earlier,1582 the South African Venture Capital Association 
                                                 
(T); Matthews v Cape Law Society 1956 (1) SA 807 (C); Incorporated Law Society, Natal v Hassim 1976 (4) 
SA 332; Ex Parte Moseneke 1979 (4) SA 884 (T); Natal Law Society v Maqubela 1986 (3) SA 849 (N). 
1578Slabbert, M (2011), ‘Requirement of Being a ‘Fit and Proper’ Person for the Legal Profession’, PELJ, 14(4) 
at 225-226. 
1579Malan and another v The Law Society, Northern Provinces 2009, 1 All SA 133 (SCA). 
1580Slabbert, M. (2011), ‘The Requirement of Being a ‘Fit and Proper’ Person for the Legal Profession’, PELJ, 
14(4) at 212. 
1581See also Naylor and another v Jansen 2007 (1) SA 16 (SCA), at paragraph 21. 
1582‘March 2012 Regulations’, the regulation dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: Amended 
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(‘SAVCA’) met with the FSB on 13th August 2009 to seek clarification as to the application of FAIS 
to private equity funds, as well as to apply for an exemption for private equity advisors from 
compliance with the provisions of FAIS and its subordinate legislation.1583 The outcomes from this 
meeting were that SAVCA members should apply for a Category 11584 licence for the investment 
advisor to the fund, provided that the investment advisor does not provide discretionary financial 
services. If the fund is managed by a discretionary fund manager, then the fund manager will require 
a Category II licence.1585 The FSB at the meeting also acknowledged that the fit and proper 
requirements were inappropriate for the private equity industry.1586  In order to accommodate the 
private equity industry within the fit and proper requirements, the FSB stated that what was needed 
from the private equity industry was information on the appropriate experience and qualifications that 
should be set for private equity industry professionals in order to fulfill the fit and proper requirements. 
For example, what is the benchmark for the private equity industry? What would investors require 
from a private equity fund manager in order to raise a fund?  In the meeting the FSB confirmed that 
key individuals rendering financial services and representatives are required to write a regulatory 
exam and a product–knowledge exam.1587 The FSB acknowledged that the product-knowledge 
exam for ‘securities and financial instruments’ was not appropriate for private equity professionals 
and indicated a willingness to set a specific product-knowledge exam for private equity professionals 
(which would be done in conjunction with SAVCA).1588 The FSB stated that the regulatory exam 
should be less burdensome if the private equity professionals are only required to have knowledge 
on a limited code of conduct and not the general code of conduct.1589 The outcomes from this meeting 
laid the foundation for the March 2012 Regulations. 
 
Currently, FAIS requires that the Registrar draft and publish codes of conduct for authorised FSPs, 
which upon publication become binding on all FSPs and their representatives to which such codes 
apply.1590 Section 16(1) of FAIS further provides that a code of conduct must be drafted so that an 
authorised FSP and its representatives are obliged by the provisions of the code to inter alia (a) act 
honestly and fairly, and with due skill, care and diligence, in the interests of the clients and the 
integrity of the financial services industry; (b) act with circumspection and treat clients fairly in a 
situation of conflicting interests; and (c) comply with all applicable statutory and common law 
requirements applicable to the conduct of the business. If there is any contravention of FAIS by a 
                                                 
Regulation 28 of the Regulations under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in Private Equity 
Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (Government Notice 1 of 15 March 2012). 
1583‘SAVCA’s approaches to the FSB on FAIS Exemptions’, 17th August 2009. Available at 
http://www.savca.co.za/news/item.aspx?id=170, accessed in June 2013. 
1584See requirements for a category I FSP in terms of the FAIS Act.    
1585See requirements for a category II FSP in terms of the FAIS Act. 
1586‘SAVCA’s approaches to the FSB on FAIS Exemptions’, 17th August 2009.  
1587‘SAVCA’s approaches to the FSB on FAIS Exemptions’, 17th August 2009.  
1588‘SAVCA’s approaches to the FSB on FAIS Exemptions’, 17th August 2009.  
1589General Code of Conduct for Authorised FSPs and Representatives in terms of Board Notice 80 of August 
2003. 
1590Section 15 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002.  
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private equity fund manager the Registrar has the power to suspend or withdraw the fund manager’s 
licence which would result in pension funds being precluded from investing in the private equity 
fund(s) managed by such a fund manager.1591 
 
Section 2 of the General Code of Conduct for Authorised FSPs and Representatives of 2003, 
provides that:1592 
 
‘...a provider must at all times render financial services honestly, fairly, with due skill, care and 
diligence and in the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry.’  
 
In terms of section 3(b) a provider and a representative of the provider must avoid and where this is 
not possible mitigate any conflict of interest between the provider and a client or the representative 
and a client. In terms of section 1 of the General Code a conflict of interest is defined as:1593 
 
‘any situation in which a provider or representative has an actual or potential interest that may, in 
rendering a financial service to a client (a) influence the objective performance of his, her or its 
obligation to that client; or (b) prevent a provider or representative from rendering an unbiased 
and fair financial service to that client, or from acting in the interests of that client, including but 
not limited to (i) a financial interest; (ii) an ownership interest; (iii) any relationship with a third 
party.’1594  
 
Section 3(b) places a positive obligation on every FSP to avoid a conflict of interest and where such 
conflict cannot be avoided, to mitigate against such conflicts. For example, a conflict of interest could 
occur by way of an economic benefit received by the fund manager from a transaction entered into 
by the private equity fund. The private equity fund’s constitutional documents should contain well 
drafted provisions aimed at mitigating such conflict of interest risks. For example, the constitutional 
documents should spell out a well communicated conflict of interest policy that sets out what 
constitutes a conflict of interest; a disclosure procedure; a conflict of interest assessment and 
mitigation process to be followed before approving a transaction; and a procedure for the 
communication of the outcome of such process to all stakeholders of the private equity fund. The 
General Code places a very important obligation on an FSP in that it has to ensure that the 
constitutional documents (namely a trust deed or partnership agreement in the case of a bewind 
trust or en commandite partnership respectively) of the private equity fund, guards against conflicts 
                                                 
1591Section 9 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002. 
1592Board Notice 80 of August 2003.  
1593General Code of Conduct for Authorised FSPs and Representatives of 2003. 
1594Board Notice 80 of August 2003.  
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as opposed to being a vehicle through which such conflict may arise. This is specifically emphasized 
under regulation 4 of the March 2012 Regulations:1595 
 
‘The responsible person, manager, administrator, or advisor of a private equity fund must disclose 
to the fund any possible conflict of interest that may arise or any direct or indirect benefit it may 
obtain or may have obtained as a consequence of any transaction concluded by the private equity 
fund or in the acquisition or disposal of assets in the execution of the business of the private equity 
fund.’ 
 
Thus, should a private equity fund firm be in contravention of any of the provisions of FAIS, its licence 
could be suspended or withdrawn by the Registrar, which would render the private equity fund 
ineligible to receive contributions from investors. Section 9(1)(c) of FAIS confers on the Registrar the 
power to suspend or withdraw the licence of an FSP in instances where the FSP has failed to comply 
with any other provisions of the Act. As the definition of  ‘this Act’ includes in its meaning any code 
of conduct, it appears that the Registrar has the power to suspend the licence of an FSP where there 
is non-compliance with any provision of the General Code. In addition, section 9(2)(d) of FAIS 
provides that where the licence of an FSP is suspended or withdrawn, the Registrar must make 
known the reasons for such suspension or withdrawal and any terms attached thereto by way of 
notice in the Government Gazette and may make known such information by means of any other 
appropriate public media.  
 
4.1.2 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956  
 
The limitations imposed in the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and the regulations issued pursuant 
thereto are the only regulatory prohibitions that prevents a pension fund organisation1596 from 
participating as an investor in a private equity fund structured as either a bewind trust, en 
commandite partnership or company. In terms of regulation 3(1) of the March 2012 Regulations,1597 
pension funds may invest in private equity funds on condition that any person rendering a financial 
service, whether discretionary or otherwise, to that private equity fund, is a discretionary FSP1598 or 
a representative of such an FSP.1599 A FSP has been defined under section 1(1) of FAIS.1600 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956 defines a private equity fund as follows:  
                                                 
1595‘March 2012 Regulations’ means the regulations dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Regulations made under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in 
Private Equity Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (Government Notice 1 of 15 March 2012). 
1596As defined under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
1597‘March 2012 Regulations’ means the regulations dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Regulations made under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in 
Private Equity Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (Government Notice 1 of 15 March 2012). 
1598Category II Licence holder as discussed above. 
1599Regulation 28 means the Pensions Fund Act, 1956: Amendment of Regulation 28 of the Regulations made 
under Section 36 of the Act (Government Notice 183 of 4 March 2011: took effect on 1 July 2011). 
1600See paragraph 4.1.1 of chapter two. 




‘Private Equity Fund’ means a managed pool of capital that … (c) is managed by a person 
licensed as a discretionary Financial Services Provider as defined in the Code of Conduct for 
Administrative and Discretionary Financial Service Providers, 2003, or if a foreign private equity 
fund managed by a person licensed as a Category I Financial Services Provider that is authorised 
to render financial services on securities and instruments as defined in the Determination of Fit 
and Proper Requirements for Financial Services Providers, 2008…’  
 
In addition, Regulation 28 to the Regulations sets out certain limitations relating to the types of assets 
in which a pension fund may invest and the percentage which a particular type of investment may 
bear to the total market value of the total assets of the pension fund.1601 The applicability of any 
limitation and the scope of any limitation are determined by having regard to the particular 
constitution, circumstances and investment policy of the relevant pension fund. Accordingly, each 
pension fund, which is to become an investor in the trust, must satisfy itself as to the extent to which 
the pension fund is entitled to effect an investment in the trust. In terms of section 13B(1) of the 
Pension Funds Act,1602 no person shall administer on behalf of a pension fund the investments of 
such a pension fund, or the disposition of benefits provided for in the rules of the fund, unless the 
registrar has in a particular case or in general granted approval and the person complies with such 
conditions as the registrar may from time to time determine in the particular case or in general. During 
2011 the amendment of Regulation 28 of the regulations made under section 36 of the Pension 
Funds Act was introduced. The preamble to the latter amendment states: 
 
‘A fund has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of its members whose benefits depend on 
the responsible management of fund assets. This duty supports the adoption of a responsible 
investment approach to deploying capital into markets that will earn adequate risk adjusted 
returns suitable for the fund’s specific member profile, liquidity needs and liabilities. Prudent 
investing should give appropriate consideration to any factor which may materially affect the 
sustainable long-term performance of a fund’s assets, including factors of an environmental, 
social and governance character. This concept applies across all assets and categories of assets 
and should promote the interests of a fund in a stable and transparent environment.’ 
 
However, prior to the amendment there was no reference to private equity in Regulation 28. Pension 
funds in South Africa that included private equity in their portfolios had to include it under the ‘old’ 
Regulation 28 guidelines for either ‘other assets’, which allowed a 2.5 percent allocation, or ‘unlisted 
equity’, which allowed a 5 percent allocation. However, many pension fund trustees were not 
                                                 
1601The prudential investment limits for pension funds registered under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
permits pension funds to invest up to 10 percent of their assets in private equity funds, with a limit of 2.5 percent 
per private equity fund and 5 percent per fund-of-funds. 
1602Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956. 
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prepared to allocate any funds to private equity because the legislation was not clear on its 
categorisation and made no specific reference to private equity at all. However, the amendments to 
Regulation 28 now allow pension fund allocations to private equity. An allocation of up to 10 percent 
may go to private equity.1603 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the private equity industry in South Africa does not have 
a specifically designated regulator or its own industry-specific legislation. There is no requirement 
that a private equity fund be registered with a government agency, other than the amended 
Regulation 28 requiring that the private equity fund manager of a private equity fund be licensed as 
a discretionary FSP under FAIS. The March 2012 Regulations merely state in regulation 2(2) that a 
‘fund may only invest in a private equity fund which is a member of a private equity fund industry 
body recognised by the Registrar’, referring to industry bodies such as ASISA1604 and SAVCA. The 
March 2012 Regulations, largely contain the conditions for a private equity fund to qualify for 
investment by a pension fund. A further condition is regulation 5 of the March 2012 Regulations that 
requires that the private equity fund must submit to the pension fund, at least quarterly, the 
investment reports recording the private equity fund’s performance, activities, the value of 
investments and any other information to enable the pension fund to fulfill its reporting requirements.  
 
Regulation 9 requires the financial statements of the private equity fund to be audited annually and 
made available to the pension fund within 120 days after the end of the private equity fund’s financial 
year end. It further requires that a pension fund may only invest in a private equity fund that has clear 
policies and procedures for determining the fair value of the assets of the private equity fund, which 
valuation must be independently verified at least annually be a third party and must be in line with 
the International Private Equity Valuation Guidelines.1605 Regulation 6 requires that the pension fund 
must ensure that the assets of the private equity fund are verified by the auditors through a scrip 
count at intervals not exceeding 6 months. Regulation 2 of the March 2012 Regulations has 
established the permissibility of private equity funds structured as en commandite partnerships, 
bewind trusts and companies. Since the above mentioned regulations came into effect, it would be 
logical to expect an increase in related contractual terms for new private equity funds in which 
pension funds are looking to invest (or are currently invested in). These pension funds would be 
seeking assurances via express contractual terms from the private equity fund and the fund 
                                                 
1603The amendment of Regulation 28 of the regulations made under section 36 of the Pension Fund Act 24 of 
1956 goes as far as defining a private equity fund. 
1604Association for Savings and Investment South Africa. 
1605A revised version of the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines (‘IPEV 
Guidelines’) was issued on 17 December 2012. The revised Guidelines are intended to be applicable across 
all private equity funds and to all financial instruments commonly held by private equity funds. The new 
Guidelines are effective for reporting periods post 1 January 2013. Available at 
www.privateequityvaluation.com/, accessed in June 2015. 
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managers that they will be in compliance with the regulatory requirements prescribed by the 
Registrar.  
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the March 2012 Regulations has had two important implications. 
Firstly, the size of the permitted allocation into private equity would logically increase the possible 
pool of pension fund investors into private equity. However, the boards of trustees of pension funds 
must first consider the advantages and disadvantages of private equity. As mentioned in the 
introductory paragraph 1 of chapter one, private equity as an asset class has clear and demonstrable 
benefits, but also poses several dangers. Secondly, the fact that private equity has been specifically 
defined in terms of the March 2012 Regulations, implies that the boards of trustees of pension funds 
have to consider private equity as an asset class.  
 
Pension fund trustees should assess the impact of the March 2012 Regulations and revise their 
pension fund asset allocations carefully. As mentioned above, the preamble to Regulation 28 
declares that it recognises and promotes the responsibility of pension funds and boards of trustees 
to make sound retirement fund investments. It also better enables investments into private equity to 
support economic development. The March 2012 Regulations has at the least afforded private equity 
managers the opportunity to engage pension fund trustees with the possible investment into private 
equity. 
 
4.1.3 Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 
 
An important regulatory consideration when forming a private equity fund in South Africa is the 
provisions of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 (‘CISCA’). CISCA regulates 
the establishment and administration of collective investment schemes in South Africa. As mentioned 
in paragraph 4.1 of this chapter, a private equity fund may have the characteristics of a collective 
investment scheme and may be subject to the laws governing such schemes. In terms of the CISCA 
a collective investment scheme is defined as follows:  
 
‘...‘collective investment scheme’ means a scheme, in whatever form, including an open-ended 
investment company, in pursuance of which members of the public are invited or permitted to 
invest money or other assets in a portfolio, and in terms of which (a) two or more investors 
contribute money or other assets to and hold a participatory interest in a portfolio of the scheme 
through shares, units or any other form of participatory interest; and (b) the investors share the 
risk and the benefit of investment in proportion to their participatory interest in a portfolio of a 
scheme or on any other basis determined in the deed, but not a collective investment scheme 
authorised by any other Act ...’1606   
                                                 
1606Part 1 under definitions of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002.  




CISCA regulates all collective investment schemes previously known as unit trusts in South Africa, 
where such investments are offered to members of the public. In theory private equity funds 
structured as an en commandite partnerships and bewind trusts could fulfill all of the requirements 
of a collective investment scheme and be subject to CISCA if ‘members of the public’ are invited and 
then are allowed to invest in such funds. The term ‘members of the public’ is defined to include:  
 
‘members of any section of the public, whether selected as clients, members, shareholders, 
employees or ex-employees of the person issuing an invitation to acquire a participatory interest 
in a portfolio;  and a financial institution regulated by any law, but excludes persons confined to a 
restricted circle of individuals with a common interest who receive the invitation in circumstances 
which can properly be regarded as a domestic or private business venture between those persons 
and the person issuing the invitation.’1607 
 
Currently there are no licensing schemes in place to regulate private equity funds under CISCA. 
Should the provisions of CISCA be invoked by inviting or permitting members of the public to invest 
in such a private equity fund, it could result in the fund being unlawful1608 and persons involved in the 
administration of the fund being criminally liable.1609 For this not to happen, the private equity fund 
should not be regarded as a collective investment scheme under CISCA based upon the exclusion 
wording appearing at the end of the definition of collective investment scheme in CISCA which 
states, ‘… but not a collective investment scheme authorised by any other Act …’.1610  
 
There are two important exclusionary provisions in CISCA. The proviso to the above mentioned 
definition of members of the public contains the first important exclusion being:  
 
‘… but excludes persons confined to a restricted circle of individuals with a common interest who 
receive the invitation in circumstances which can properly be regarded as a domestic or private 
business venture between those persons and the person issuing the invitation …’.1611   
 
                                                 
1607Part 1 under definitions of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002. 
1608Section 5 of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 states that ‘No person may perform 
any act or enter into any agreement or transaction for the purpose of administering a collective investment 
scheme, unless such person (a) is registered as a manager by the registrar or is an authorised agent; or (b) is 
exempted from the provisions of this Act by the registrar by notice in the Gazette.’ 
1609Section 115(b) of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 states that ‘Any person who 
not being a manager or an authorised agent of a manager, performs an act amounting to administration...is 
guilty of an offence’. 
1610 ‘Members of the public’ is widely defined, which means that many private equity fund entities may qualify 
as a CIS. The Financial Services Board (FSB) have exempted private equity funds that are members of the 
South African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association from regulation under CISCA, provided that 
SAVCA members do not market their funds to members of the public. See March 2012 Regulations as 
discussed earlier. 
1611Part 1 under definitions of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002. 
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Given that private equity funds normally invite investor participants by means of a private placement 
memorandum it is arguable that private equity funds fall outside the jurisdiction of CISCA. Private 
equity funds are typically open to only a small number of investors who are invited on an individual 
‘bespoke’ basis by means of a private placement memorandum to invest in the fund. The approach 
to the concept of ‘member of the public’ is consistent with the concept of ‘the public’, a term which 
has been extensively considered in many South African and foreign cases in the context of offers to 
the public.  
 
It must be noted that the question as to what constitutes an offer to the public is ‘one of the most 
vexing questions in this particular area of company law and is the source of most of the reported 
cases’.1612 It is beyond the scope of this paragraph to discuss the extensive body of case law and 
authorities that have developed in terms of this phrase. Nevertheless, both Cassim et al1613 and 
Delport1614 provide a concise analysis of the phrase.1615 At this point it is also important to note the 
distinction that the current discussion does not relate to the private equity fund that invests in the 
underlying investee company and the ‘public’ that invests in the underlying investee company. 
Rather, the issue at hand pertains more to the question of whether the offer to the public in the area 
of company law is the same as the law that regulates CISCA in the instance where the private equity 
fund is seeking investors. 
 
According to Cassim et al, there was an anomaly in our law prior to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
with regard to what was meant by the term ‘offer to the public’.1616 This anomaly created 
complications as the test applied in deciding what was an offer of securities to the public by a 
shareholder in terms of section 142 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was different from the one that 
had to be applied when the company made an offer to the public of its own securities in terms of 
Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.1617 The Supreme Court of Appeal when faced with this 
in Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd1618 tried to manage the anomaly away. Thus 
                                                 
1612Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, 2nd Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at page 652. ‘The issue is simply that, if an offer 
constitutes an offer to the public, it falls within the purview of the legislative provisions and thus becomes 
subject to a substantial body of restrictions and requirements, most notably the requirement to issue a 
prospectus.’ 
1613Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at pages 652-657. 
1614Delport, P.A. (2011), ‘Offers and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch 
Law, 74(2) at pages 280-286. 
1615Both Cassim et al and Delport make reference to Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA). 
1616Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at page 653. 
1617Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at pages 652-657. See also Delport, P.A. 
(2011), ‘Offers and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law, Volume 74, 
No. 2, at pages 280-286. 
1618Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 246 
 
the court ignored the special meaning of an offer to the public defined in chapter 6 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973, relying instead on cases dealing with the general meaning of the term. In Gold Fields 
Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd,1619 Nugent JA stated as follows:  
 
‘I can add nothing useful to what has been said in earlier cases as to the meaning of ‘public’ (there 
is no suggestion that the word is used in section 145 in any special sense). In S v V 1977 (2) SA 
134 (T) at 137 Franklin J (citing S v Rossouw and Tatem Co v Inland Revenue Commissioners to 
similar effect) said that: ‘the ordinary meaning of the word 'public' is the community as a whole 
rather than the community as an organised body’. I think it is unhelpful, and potentially misleading, 
to attempt to determine by inference what is included in an ‘offer to the public’ by referring to the 
inclusions and exclusions in section 142 (the definition of an "offer to the public’) and section 144 
respectively, for those inclusions and exclusions might just as well have been inserted to avoid 
uncertainty. The better approach, in my view, is to ask whether the present offer can properly be 
said to have been made to the public as that term is ordinarily understood.’1620 
 
The important question inter alia in Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd,1621 was 
whether the offer should be held to be an offer to the public and therefore the intended offerees were 
afforded the protection of a prospectus. The court answered this question in Gold Fields Ltd v 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd1622 by stating the following: 
 
 ‘... an offer that aims to acquire specific private property would not achieve its purpose if it was 
made to the public for no reason but that the property is in private hands. The offer in the present 
case is in that category. It is not made to the public but to shareholders in Gold Fields who are 
not, in that capacity, a mere section of the public at large.’1623 
 
According to Delport, if an offer constitutes an offer to the public then it falls within the ambit of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, subject to its numerous requirements and 
restrictions.1624 Section 95(1)(h) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, reads as follows: 
 
‘(h) ‘ ‘offer to the public’ – 
(i) includes an offer of securities to be issued by a company to any section of the public, 
whether selected –  
                                                 
1619Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA). 
1620Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA), 
at page 117. 
1621Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA). 
1622Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA). 
1623Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA), 
at page 510, paragraph 16. 
1624Delport, P.A. (2011), ‘Offers and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch 
Law, 74(2) at pages 280-286. 
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(aa) as holders of that company’s securities; 
(bb) as clients of the person issuing the prospectus; 
(cc) as the holders of any particular class of property; or 
(dd) in any other manner; but 
(ii) does not include – 
(aa) an offer made in any of the circumstances contemplated in section 96; or 
(bb) a secondary offer effected through an exchange;’ 
 
According to Cassim et al, the definition of an offer to the public must be applied literally as defined; 
and the term no longer has an ordinary meaning separate and distinct from the definition quoted 
above.1625 The definition includes the ordinary meaning of the term, and this cannot be separated 
from the defined meaning as the court did in Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Ltd.1626 The adverse effect resulting from this literal interpretation of section 95(1)(h) is amplified by 
the amendment to the definition of the word ‘offer’ in terms of section 95(1)(g) of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008. The extent of what is generally referred to as an offer to the public no longer includes an 
invitation to make an offer for securities in a company.1627 Section 95(1)(g) of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, reads as follows: 
 
‘ ‘offer’, in relation to securities, means an offer made in any way by any person with respect to 
the acquisition, for consideration, of any securities in a company.’ 
 
Coming back to the discussion at hand, private equity funds normally invite investor participants by 
means of a private placement memorandum and therefore it is arguable that private equity funds fall 
outside the jurisdiction of CISCA. A case that dealt with this issue was Financial Services Board v 
Dynamic Wealth Ltd.1628 Dynamic Wealth argued that its investment scheme was not a collective 
investment scheme as defined in CISCA because its members were a restricted circle of individuals 
engaged in a domestic or private business venture and thus fell outside the definition of members of 
the public.1629 In Financial Services Board v Dynamic Wealth Ltd and others,1630 Wallis J summarily 
dismissed Dynamic Wealth’s argument as follows: 
 
‘This claim was shown to be false when lists of the participants were provided to the inspectors. 
By way of example, a tennis association; a primary school and a school for the blind; a church; 
                                                 
1625Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at pages 652-657. 
1626Gold Fields Ltd and another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and others 2005 (3) All SA 114 (SCA), 
at page 117. 
1627Delport, P.A. (2011), ‘Offers and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch 
Law, 74(2), at pages 280-286. 
1628Financial Services Board v Dynamic Wealth Ltd and others 2012 (1) All SA 135 (SCA). 
1629Financial Services Board v Dynamic Wealth Ltd and others 2012 (1) All SA 135 (SCA). 
1630Financial Services Board v Dynamic Wealth Ltd and others 2012 (1) All SA 135 (SCA). 
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an optometrist and other businesses; several trusts, both family and charitable; some deceased 
estates and a number of individuals from various parts of the country and having little other than 
their investment in that portfolio in common. The answering affidavit said that membership was 
restricted to persons invited to join through Dynamic Wealth's network of independent financial 
advisers. However, this network was 470 strong and it recruited literally thousands of investors 
who invested hundreds of millions of Rand through these associations. There can be no doubt 
that investments were being solicited from members of the public.’1631 
 
There is also the question as to whether or not private equity funds may contravene the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. It is submitted that private equity funds are typically open to only a small number of 
investors who are invited on an individual ‘bespoke’ basis by means of a private placement 
memorandum to invest in the fund. The approach to the concept of ‘member of the public’ in terms 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, is consistent with the concept of ‘the public’, a term which has 
been extensively considered by South African case law in the context of offers to the public. 
However, private equity funds in South Africa are legally structured as either a bewind trust or en 
commandite partnership,1632 therefore it is submitted that if the private equity fund is not a company, 
it cannot contravene the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The more direct question is whether the private 
equity fund would contravene CISCA. 
 
Nevertheless, private equity funds formed in South Africa have to ensure that they are not 
unintentionally regulated by CISCA’s broad provisions. The bottom line is that private equity firms, 
whether or not they are registered as Collective Investment Scheme (‘CIS’) managers under CISCA, 
are not allowed to solicit investments in private equity funds which are not registered under CISCA 
from members of the public in South Africa. Therefore, for CISCA not to be applicable, private equity 
firms/funds have to adhere to the exclusion in the definition of ‘members of the public’. As mentioned 
above, ‘members of the public’ is widely defined, which means that many private equity fund entities 
may qualify as a CIS manager. Nevertheless, what may be necessary is a factual enquiry, having 
regard to all relevant facts. For instance, in S v Rossouw1633 the court in considering the question, 
what constitutes an offer to the public, held that such a question can only be answered with reference 
to the circumstances of the particular case. For instance, these would include the true nature of the 
offer of the investment opportunity (that is, whether, as a matter of fact, the offer was capable of 
being accepted by any member of the public); the manner in which the offer of the investment 
opportunity was communicated, for example, whether it was advertised in the press or only 
addressed to certain specific recipients; and the number of offerees.1634  
 
                                                 
1631Financial Services Board v Dynamic Wealth Ltd and others 2012 (1) All SA 135 (SCA), at paragraph 23. 
1632See paragraph four of chapter one at page 78. 
1633S v Rossouw 1971 (3) All SA 135 (T). 
1634S v Rossouw 1971 (3) All SA 135 (T). 
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The proviso to the above mentioned definition of a ‘collective investment scheme’ in the CISCA 
contains the second important exclusion, namely that ‘a collective investment scheme authorised by 
any other Act’ will not be regarded as a collective investment scheme for the purposes of the 
CISCA.1635 For example, one question that needs to be decided could be whether a private equity 
fund which complies with the Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956 regulations is a scheme ‘authorised by 
any other Act’. It is submitted that the word ‘authorised’ as used in the latter definition can be 
contrasted with the use of the word ‘regulated’ as used in the definition of ‘members of the public’. 
In the definition of ‘members of the public’, the reference is to ‘a financial institution regulated by any 
law’ which prima facie falls within the definition of ‘members of the public’. However in the case of 
the definition of a ‘collective investment scheme’, it is not a requirement that the collective investment 
scheme concerned be regulated by any law and it is submitted that it is therefore sufficient if it is 
merely ‘authorised by any other Act’. Furthermore, in terms of section 5(2)(e) of the Pension Funds 
Act 24 of 1956, the Registrar is specifically empowered to approve a person or a category of persons 
who can hold the money and assets of a pension fund.1636 However, it could not be argued 
convincely, based on the wording of the March 2012 Regulations, that the Registrar automatically 
granted the relevant approval to private equity funds in terms of an Act, namely section 5(2)(e) of 
the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.  
 
A private equity fund will have to comply with the conditions set out in the March 2012 Regulation, 
otherwise the private equity fund will not be able to enjoy the benefit of the collective investment 
scheme exclusion provision, in which case it will become subject to regulation in terms of CISCA 
(based on the assumption that ‘members of the public’ are invited or permitted to participate in the 
private equity fund).1637 Nevertheless, the weakness of such an argument would be that it is restricted 
to investor participants that are pension funds regulated and authorised by the Pensions Fund Act 
24 of 1956. For example, where investors are wealthy individuals, it could not be argued convincingly 




In concluding this paragraph 4.1 it is evident that South Africa's financial services sector is backed 
by a sound regulatory and legal framework. The non-banking sector is overseen by the Financial 
Services Board (FSB), which is an independent body responsible for the regulation of financial 
markets and institutions, including the licensing of private equity firms. The FSB monitors, regulates 
and supervises the financial services industry through the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act 37 of 2002 and the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers 
                                                 
1635Part 1 under definitions of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002. 
1636Regulation 28 means the Pensions Fund Act, 24 of 1956: Amendment of Regulation 28 of the Regulations 
made under Section 36 of the Act (Government Notice 183 of 4 March 2011 which took effect on 1 July 2011). 
1637With effect from 1 October 2012. 
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and Representatives. In addition, specific reference was made above to the Determination of the Fit 
and Property Requirements in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 
2002.1638 Additional considerations, when forming a private equity fund in South Africa, would be 
with regard to the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 1956; and Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 
45 of 2002; as discussed above. The next paragraph 4.2 will discuss the regulatory and licensing 
requirements with regard to the private equity industry in the US, because for private equity firms, 
the impact of US regulation and licensing requirements is often complex and significant. The 
objective of the discussion to follow is to provide a critical comparison of South Africa’s regulatory 
environment with the regulatory and licensing issues arising from structuring and investing in, US 
based private equity funds. 
 
4.2 US Regulatory and Licensing Requirements  
 
In the US private equity funds are regulated by or require exemptions from the regulation of a large 
set of US federal legislation.1639 For example, the Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates mutual 
funds and other companies that engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, 
and whose own securities are offered to the investing public by requiring them to either register with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) as an investment company or qualify for an 
exemption from registration.1640 Private equity firms that form private equity funds in the US typically 
seek to qualify under certain exemptions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.1641 Registration 
would subject them to numerous regulations that would make it impracticable for a private equity 
firm to administer a fund.1642 For example, Section 13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 limits 
the ability of a registered investment company to borrow money or issue securities.1643  
                                                 
1638In terms of section 8 of FAIS, the Registrar must after consultation with the Advisory Committee determine 
the requirements that financial services providers, key individuals and representatives of the provider must 
comply to. These requirements are termed the Determination of Fit and Proper Requirements for financial 
services providers and their representatives. The fit and proper requirements were updated in 2008 in terms 
of Board Notice 106 of 2008 which came into effect on the 31st December 2008. Subsequently, several 
amendments have been effected. The requirements set the honesty and integrity, competency and operational 
ability requirements for all FSPs, key individuals and representatives. It also set out the solvency requirements 
applicable to FSPs.  
1639Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. 
1640It was passed as a US Public Law on 22nd August 1940. Along with the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and extensive rules issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, it forms the backbone of US financial regulation. It have been updated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010. Discussed in greater detail in chapter four. 
1641See Appelbaum, E. and Batt, R. (2014), ‘Private Equity at Work: When Wall Street Manages Main Street’, 
Russell Sage Foundation. See also Lemke, T.P., Lins, G.T. and Sommer, A.A. (2014), ‘The Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940’, Securities Law Techniques, 6. 
1642See Appelbaum, E. and Batt, R. (2014), ‘Private Equity at Work: When Wall Street Manages Main Street’, 
Russell Sage Foundation. See also Lemke, T.P., Lins, G.T. and Sommer, A.A. (2014), ‘The Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940’, Securities Law Techniques, 6. 
1643For an overview of the exemptions under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and why it is important for 
private equity funds to avoid becoming registered investment companies, See Smith, J.A. (2014), ‘Special 
Issues of Investment Advisers and Investment Companies’, Securities Enforcement: Counseling and 




Private equity funds seeking to raise capital from US investors commonly rely on one of two primary 
exemptions under the Investment Company Act of 1940 for private investment companies. Section 
3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 exempts from the definition of an investment 
company any private equity fund that is not making a public offering of its interests and is beneficially 
owned by not more than one hundred persons.1644 Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 exempts from the definition of investment company any private equity fund that: does not 
make a public offering of its interests; and is beneficially owned exclusively by qualified purchasers, 
generally, a person owning at least $5 million or more of investments, or an entity with at least $25 
million or more of investments.1645 The exemptions in terms of sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 are complex, including a number of rules requiring the fund to look 
through certain investors to determine their ultimate beneficial owners.1646 For example, each 
exemption requires a fund to disregard, and look through to the beneficial owners of, any entity 
formed for the purpose of investing in the fund.1647 Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 requires a fund to look through any investor that is itself an investment company or would 
be an investment company, but for the section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exclusions and which has more 
than ten percent of the voting securities of the fund.1648 Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 allows non-US issuers to count only US investors for purposes of counting the total 
number of beneficial owners. Similarly, section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 allows 
non-US issuers to require only that their US investors be qualified purchasers.1649 
 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is a US federal law that was created to regulate the actions 
of investment advisers.1650 Section 80b–1 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, provides: 
 
‘Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and report of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission made pursuant to section 79z–4 of this title, and facts otherwise disclosed and 
                                                 
Defense, 2. See also Practice Note, Investment Company Act of 1940 Exceptions: Guide for Transactional 
Lawyers. Available at http://us.practicallaw.com/1-504-8727, accessed in June 2015. 
1644Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9. See also Anderson, J.E., Bagnall, R.G. and 
Smythe, M.K. (2014), ‘Who is an Investment Adviser?’, Investment Advisers: Law & Compliance, Volume 1. 
1645Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9. See also Anderson, J.E., Bagnall, R.G. and 
Smythe, M.K. (2014), ‘Who is an Investment Adviser?’, Investment Advisers: Law & Compliance, Volume 1. 
1646Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9.  
1647Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9.  
1648Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9.  
1649Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9.  
1650Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. 
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ascertained, it is found that investment advisers are of national concern, in that, among other 
things – 
 
(1) their advice, counsel, publications, writings, analyses, and reports are furnished and 
distributed, and their contracts, subscription agreements, and other arrangements with clients 
are negotiated and performed, by the use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce; 
(2) their advice, counsel, publications, writings, analyses, and reports customarily relate to the 
purchase and sale of securities traded on national securities exchanges and in interstate over-
the-counter markets, securities issued by companies engaged in business in interstate 
commerce, and securities issued by national banks and member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System; and 
(3) the foregoing transactions occur in such volume as substantially to affect interstate 
commerce, national securities exchanges, and other securities markets, the national banking 
system and the national economy.’1651 
 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires that investment advisers register as such with the 
SEC unless an exemption from registration is available.1652 Unlike the Investment Company Act of 
1940, which regulates the fund itself, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 regulates the sponsors 
and advisers (private equity firms) to the fund.1653 According to Naidech, private equity firms prior to 
the promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,1654 
avoided registration with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 by relying on an 
exemption for investment advisers with fewer than fifteen clients with each fund advised counting as 
only one client.1655 However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to eliminate the private investment adviser 
exemption, requiring advisers/private equity firms to private equity funds to register with the SEC 
                                                 
1651Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is codified at section 80b-1 through to section 80b-21 at Title 15, Chapter 
D, of the US Code.  Title 15 of the United States Code outlines the role of the commerce and trade in the United 
States Code. 
1652Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. See also Weiner, P.M., 
Hunnius, P. and Crain, S.R. (2015), ‘SEC Asset Management Unit’s Priorities for 2015–Conflicts of Interest’, 
Journal of Investment Compliance, 16(2). See also Smith, J.A. (2014), ‘Special Issues of Investment Advisers 
and Investment Companies’, Securities Enforcement: Counseling and Defense, 2. 
1653Baird, J. and Stuart, E. (2013), ‘The US Investment Company Act: A legal minefield for non-US issuers’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, March 2013, at pages 1-9. See also US Investment Adviser Registration: 
Overview available at http://us.practicallaw.com/7-386-4497, accessed in June 2015. 
1654The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is also discussed in chapter 
four as part of the discussion on the regulatory developments impacting private equity in the US. 
1655Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 13.  
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unless they can rely on an alternative registration exemption.1656 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 broadly expand the group of private equity firms that must 
register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.1657 In terms thereof, US private 
equity firms with assets under management of $150 million or more must register with the SEC as 
investment advisers.1658 In addition, foreign private equity firms with US investors or US staff are 
required to register to take advantage of exemptions from registration in light of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010’s narrowing of the foreign private adviser 
exception.1659 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 imposes 
additional recordkeeping and reporting requirements as well as the examination and audit obligations 
on private equity firm’s that are required to register.1660 In addition to federal regulation in terms of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 also requires private equity firms to be subject to US state registration and conduct 
regulation requirements.1661 In terms of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prior to the promulgation 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, private equity firms 
with less than $25 million in aggregate assets under management were not required to register with 
the SEC, but were subject to applicable US state regulation.1662 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to require 
a private equity firm with assets under management between $25 million and $100 million or a higher 
amount determined by the SEC, to register with the US state of its principal office and place of 
business, and not with the SEC, but only if the private equity firm is subject to registration and 
examination as an investment adviser with this US state.1663  
                                                 
1656Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 13. See also Practice Note, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Private Equity and Hedge Funds, available at http://us.practicallaw. com/1-502-8932, accessed in June 2015. 
1657Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 13. See also Practice Note, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Private Equity and Hedge Funds, available at http://us.practicallaw. com/1-502-8932, accessed in June 2015. 
1658Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. 
1659See Smith, J.A. (2014), ‘Special Issues of Investment Advisers and Investment Companies’, Securities 
Enforcement: Counseling and Defense, 2. See also Practice Note, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act: Private 
Equity and Hedge Funds: Foreign Private Advisers, available at http://us.practicallaw. com/1-502-8932, 
accessed in June 2015. 
1660Dimitrov, V., Palia, D. and Tang, L. (2015), ‘Impact of the Dodd-Frank act on credit ratings’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 115(3), at pages 505-520. See also Schultz, P.H. (2014), ‘Perspectives on Dodd-Frank 
and Finance’, MIT Press. 
1661Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. See also Kaal, W.A., Luppi, 
B. and Paterlini, S. (2014), ‘Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance?’, University of St. 
Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper, at 14-09. 
1662Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at pages 99-126. See Akhigbe, A., Martin, A.D. 
and Whyte, A.M. (2015), ‘Dodd–Frank and risk in the financial services industry’, Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, at pages 1-21. 
1663Carroll, B. (2015), ‘Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’, Austrian Law Journal, 1, at 99-126. See Kaal, W.A., Luppi, B. and 
Paterlini, S. (2014), ‘Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Fund Performance?’, University of St. Thomas 
Legal Studies Research Paper, at 14-09. 




This registration requirement expands the jurisdiction of US state regulators over private equity firms 
with assets under management of $100 million or less. However, many US states have their own 
exemptions from state registration, so private equity fund firms with assets under management of 
$100 million or less may be exempt under both US federal and state laws.1664 Naidech states that 
whether or not a private equity firm must register as an investment adviser with the SEC, is subject 
to a number of provisions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, including a fiduciary duty to 
the fund, in addition to those fiduciary duties that may exist under US state common law.1665 For 
example, section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits an investment adviser from 
engaging in any act or practice that is fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative with respect to the 
fund.1666 
 
A further regulatory consideration when forming a private equity fund in the US, is the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which requires an issuer with total assets exceeding $10 million to register 
with the SEC any class of equity securities held of record by five hundred more persons, in the case 
of a US issuer and two hundred and ninety nine or more US investors, in the case of a non-US 
issuer.1667 In this regard, US private equity funds will attempt to restrict the number of record owners 
to up to four hundred and ninety nine investors so that its securities are not subject to registration 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1668 However, if the private equity fund has to register its 
securities, it becomes subject to onerous reporting and recordkeeping requirements, as well as 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 compliance requirements.1669 In addition, Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to make any material misrepresentation or omission in the 
private equity fund’s offering materials.1670  
 
                                                 
1664Akhigbe, A., Martin, A.D. and Whyte, A.M. (2015), ‘Dodd–Frank and risk in the financial services industry’, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, at pages 1-21. 
1665Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 14. 
1666Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 14. 
1667Kaufmann, D.J. (2013), ‘Attracting Private Equity’, International Franchise Association 46th Annual 
Symposium, 5-7 May 2013, at pages 1-34. 
1668Kaufmann, D.J. (2013), ‘Attracting Private Equity’, International Franchise Association 46th Annual 
Symposium, 5-7 May 2013 at 1-34. See Practice Note, Exchange Act Registration: Overview, available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/7-506-3135, accessed in June 2015. 
1669See discussion at paragrapgh 3.1 in chapter 1 with regard to the impact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
had on the LBO and private equity markets. See also Kaufmann, D.J (2013), ‘Attracting Private Equity’, 
International Franchise Association 46th Annual Symposium 5-7 May 2013 at 1-34. Practice Notes, Periodic 
Reporting and Disclosure Obligations: Overview, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/7-381-0961, accessed 
in June 2015 and Corporate Governance Standards: Overview available at http://us.practicallaw.com/7-381-
0956, accessed in June 2015.  
1670Kaufmann, D.J. (2013), ‘Attracting Private Equity’, International Franchise Association 46th Annual 
Symposium, 5-7 May 2013, at pages 1-34. See also Practice Note, Liability Provisions: Securities Offerings: 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/6-381-1466, 
accessed in June 2015.  
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In terms of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors and the SEC itself have a 
private right of action against the private equity fund and private equity firm managing the fund, as 
well as any individual who orally may make a misrepresentation or omission to investors.1671 The 
party seeking civil liability under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must be able to 
show a misrepresentation of a material fact, or a failure to disclose a material fact that there was a 
duty to disclose.1672 Secondly, that the misrepresentation or omission was committed with intent to 
deceive or was reckless.1673 Thirdly, it must be shown that there was a reasonable reliance on the 
misrepresentation or omission and that in the case of investor claims, resulting damages are 
proximately linked to the misrepresentation or omission.1674 However, a fund investor may be unable 
to prove either that a misrepresentation or omission occurred or that it reasonably relied on a 
misrepresentation or omission, or both, where the potential risks that supposedly led to its loss was 
fully and adequately disclosed in the private placement memorandum.1675  
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also requires that anyone engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for an issuer must be registered as a broker with the SEC.1676 According to 
Eisert et al, the SEC has noted that anyone who gets paid on a commission basis for raising capital 
for an issuer, including for example a private equity fund, must be a registered broker.1677 Thus, if 
someone is engaged in raising capital for a private equity fund who should be a registered broker 
but is not registered, there is a risk that the investor potentially could have a rescission right, to 
unwind the investment and receive a return of its capital contributions possibly plus interest.1678 For 
example, if an employee of the private equity firm is compensated on a commission basis for finding 
                                                 
1671For example, in statements by the private equity firm’s staff at a fund raising road show presentation.  
1672See Chaffee, E.C. (2015), ‘Oak Is an Oak Is an Oak Is an Oak: The Disappointing Entrenchment in 
Halliburton Co. v Erica P. John Fund of the Implied Private Right of Action under Section 10 (B) and Rule 10B-
5’, New York University Journal of Law and Liberty, 9, at 92.  
1673Chalmers, K., Naiker, V. and Navissi, F. (2012), ‘Earnings quality and Rule 10b-5 securities class action 
lawsuits’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(1), at pages 22-43. 
1674Chalmers, K., Naiker, V. and Navissi, F. (2012), ‘Earnings quality and Rule 10b-5 securities class action 
lawsuits’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(1), at pages 22-43. 
1675Chalmers, K., Naiker, V. and Navissi, F. (2012), ‘Earnings quality and Rule 10b-5 securities class action 
lawsuits’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(1), at pages 22-43. See also Chaffee, E.C. (2015), ‘Oak 
Is an Oak Is an Oak Is an Oak: The Disappointing Entrenchment in Halliburton Co. v Erica P. John Fund of 
the Implied Private Right of Action under Section 10 (B) and Rule 10B-5’, New York University Journal of Law 
and Liberty, 9, at 92. 
1676Kahn, H., Welp, R. and Parrino, R. (2014), ‘SEC staff expands relief from broker-dealer registration under 
US Securities Exchange Act for intermediaries in private M&A transactions’, Journal of Investment 
Compliance, 15(2), at pages 22-25. 
1677Eisert, E., Katz, T., Carotenuto, G. and Ball, M.F. (2013), ‘The extra-territorial reach of the broker-dealer 
registration requirements under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission addresses asked questions regarding Rule 15a-6 and foreign broker-dealers’, Journal 
of Investment Compliance, 14(2), at pages 50-56. 
1678Eisert, E., Katz, T., Carotenuto, G. and Ball, M.F. (2013), ‘The extra-territorial reach of the broker-dealer 
registration requirements under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission addresses asked questions regarding Rule 15a-6 and foreign broker-dealers’, Journal 
of Investment Compliance, 14(2), at pages 50-56. 
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investors for the private equity fund, that employee could be deemed to be acting as an unregistered 
broker, which could subject the employee and the sponsor to sanctions.1679 
 
A further regulatory consideration when forming a private equity fund in the US, is the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which may place restrictions on private equity funds if the 
fund is deemed to hold ‘plan assets’ in terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974.1680 The result hereof is that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 treats the 
private equity firm as directly managing the plan assets of any benefit plan investors, unless the 
private equity fund meets one of the exceptions from the look-through rules under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.1681 In this regard, US private equity funds try to meet one 
of the following three exceptions to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 look-
through rules, namely (a) less than twenty five percent of the value of any class of the private equity 
fund’s equity is held by benefit plan investors; (b) the private equity fund qualifies as a venture capital 
operating company; and (c) the fund qualifies as a real estate operating company.1682 Therefore, if 
one of these exceptions applies, the underlying assets of a private equity fund in which a benefit 
plan investor makes an investment are not considered plan assets under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974.1683 However, should a private equity fund not be exempt from the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 it will be deemed to hold plan assets subject to 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The fund’s investment adviser (private equity 
firm) may be deemed to be a fiduciary with respect to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 plan assets invested1684 by benefit plan investors.1685 Naidech argues that if the private equity 
firm breaches its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, it can 
lead to substantial liabilities and other penalties for the private equity firm, including a requirement 
                                                 
1679Eisert, E., Katz, T., Carotenuto, G. and Ball, M.F. (2013), ‘The extra-territorial reach of the broker-dealer 
registration requirements under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934: the staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission addresses asked questions regarding Rule 15a-6 and foreign broker-dealers’, Journal 
of Investment Compliance, 14(2), at pages 50-56. 
1680Allen, C.T. (2014), ‘Where Do We Go Now: The Uncertain Future for 29 USC Sec. 1301 (b)(1), Private 
Equity Funds, and Multiemployer Pension Plans after Sun Capital’, Georgia Law Review, 49, at 209. 
1681Allen, C.T. (2014), ‘Where Do We Go Now: The Uncertain Future for 29 USC Sec. 1301 (b)(1), Private 
Equity Funds, and Multiemployer Pension Plans after Sun Capital’, Georgia Law Review, 49, at 209. See also 
Hartley, A.S. (2006), ‘Making the Case for Mandatory Removal of Imprudent Investment Vehicles: Inside 
Information Can Make Employer Securities a Bad 401 (k) Option’, Appalachian Journal of Law, 5, at 99. 
1682Levine, D. and Mangiero, S. (2014), ‘Private Equity Funds and Pension Plans: A Changing Dynamic’, CFA 
Institute Magazine, 25(2), at pages 16-17. 
1683Levine, D. and Mangiero, S. (2014), ‘Private Equity Funds and Pension Plans: A Changing Dynamic’, CFA 
Institute Magazine, 25(2), at pages 16-17. See also Practice Note, ERISA Plan Asset Rules: Effect of Look-
through Rule on Plan Investments, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/0-506-0461, accessed in June 2015. 
1684The capital commitments to the private equity fund. 
1685Levine, D. and Mangiero, S. (2014), ‘Private Equity Funds and Pension Plans: A Changing Dynamic’, CFA 
Institute Magazine, 25(2), at pages 16-17. See also Practice Note, ERISA Plan Asset Rules: Effect of Look-
through Rule on Plan Investments, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/0-506-0461, accessed in June 2015. 
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to restore losses to the investors or to disgorge most of the profits earned by the private equity firm 
as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty.1686 
 
Furthermore, if the private equity fund is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, then the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 restricts transactions between the private equity fund and certain parties in interest, or 
disqualified persons related to the plan, such as the private equity fund and its affiliates.1687 Both the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 also 
prohibit the ability of the private equity firm and its affiliates to engage in affiliated transactions with 
the private equity fund.1688 In order to prohibit such conflict of interest transactions, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code provisions provide that 
prohibited transaction limits may be imposed on management and performance fees and 
investments in illiquid securities; assets held outside the US, depending on the fund structure and 
prime brokerage or custody arrangements; and the administrative and operational expenses that 
may be borne by the fund.1689 According to Naidech, the consequences of a prohibited transaction 
are quite burdensome, for example, the transaction may be required to be unwound and any profits 
returned, regardless of whether the benefit plan investors benefited economically from the 
transaction.1690 Nevertheless, regardless of whether the private equity fund is subject to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, if benefit plan investors invest in the fund, the 
private equity fund is still required to disclose service provider compensation and fee disclosure 
information to benefit plan investors.1691  
 
                                                 
1686Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 15. See also Practice Note, ERISA Fiduciary Duties: Overview: 
Penalties for Breaching Fiduciary Duties. Available at http://us.practicallaw.com/5-504-0060, accessed in June 
2015. 
1687IsenBerg, A.H. and DiSabatino, M.B. (2013), ‘Private-Equity Funds Beware’, American Bankruptcy Institute 
Journal, 32(9), at 20. See Flint, G.L. (2013), ‘Moench Presumption: Butchering ERISA’, Wayne Law 
Review, 59, at 461. 
1688IsenBerg, A.H. and DiSabatino, M.B. (2013), ‘Private-Equity Funds Beware’, American Bankruptcy Institute 
Journal, 32(9), 20. See also Flint, G.L. (2013), ‘Moench Presumption: Butchering ERISA’, Wayne Law 
Review, 59, at 461. See also Hughes, V.M. (2013), ‘Flip This Company, but Don't Leave Its Pensioners Out in 
the Cold: Sun Capital as a Call to Action to Change Taxation of Private Equity Funds’, North Carolina Law 
Review, 92, at 1322. 
1689See also Practice Note, ERISA Plan Asset Rules: Effect of Look-through Rule on Plan Investments, 
available at http://us.practicallaw.com/0-506-0461, accessed in June 2015. 
1690Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 16. See also Practice Note, ERISA Plan Asset Rules: Effect of 
Look-through Rule on Plan Investments, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/0-506-0461, accessed in June 
2015. 
1691Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 16. See Practice Note, ERISA Plan Asset Rules: Effect of Look-
through Rule on Plan Investments, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/0-506-0461, accessed in June 2015 
and Legal Update, New fee disclosure rules in effect for certain US benefit plans, available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/1-501-8594, accessed in June 2015. 
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In order to avoid the burdensome provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, benefit plan investors in a private equity fund may require that the private equity fund provide 
assurances that it will be exempt from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, for 
example by way of legal opinions that the fund is exempt from the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974.1692 A further practical consideration is that the benefit plan investors in a private 
equity fund may also negotiate special withdrawal rights and other remedies in the event that the 
private equity fund becomes subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.1693 
On the other hand, private equity firms that intend to ensure that the private equity fund is exempt 
from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 could in practice include provisions in 
the fund operating agreement that restrict, or reduce investment by, benefit plan investors to the 
extent necessary to prevent the application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974.1694  
 
4.3 UK Regulatory and Licensing Requirements  
 
As mentioned in paragraph 3.3 of this chapter, in the UK the private equity firm will typically need to 
apply to the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’). The FCA is a financial regulatory body in the UK, 
but operates independently of the UK government, and is financed by charging fees to members of 
the financial services industry.1695 The FCA regulates financial firms providing services to consumers 
and maintains the integrity of the UK’s financial markets.1696 It focuses on the regulation of conduct 
by both retail and wholesale financial services firms.1697 Similar to its predecessor the Financial 
Services Authority (‘FSA’), the FCA is structured as a company limited by guarantee.1698 The 
Financial Services Act of 2012 created a new regulatory framework for financial services and 
abolished the FSA.1699 Specifically, the Financial Services Act of 2012 gave the Bank of England 
                                                 
1692See IsenBerg, A.H. and DiSabatino, M.B. (2013), ‘Private-Equity Funds Beware’, American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal, 32(9), 20. 
1693See IsenBerg, A.H. and DiSabatino, M.B. (2013), ‘Private-Equity Funds Beware’, American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal, 32(9), 20. 
1694Naidech, S.W. (2011), ‘Private Equity Fund Formation’, Practice Note: Chadbourne and Parke LLP, 
published by Practical Law Company, at page 16. For example, by including in the operating agreement 
mandatory distribution rights and prohibitions on transfers to benefit plan investors. 
1695UK: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A 
Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission Consultation, The Stationery 
Office, at chapter 8. 
1696UK: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A 
Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission Consultation, The Stationery 
Office, at chapter 8. 
1697UK: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A 
Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission Consultation, The Stationery 
Office, at chapter 8. 
1698UK: Law Commission, (2013), ‘Law Commission: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A 
Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215: Great Britain Law Commission Consultation, The Stationery 
Office, at chapter 8. 
1699On 19th December 2012, the Financial Services Act of 2012 received royal assent and came into force on 
1st April 2013. 
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responsibility for financial stability, bringing together macro and micro prudential regulation, created 
a new regulatory structure consisting of the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee, 
the Prudential Regulation Authority and the FCA.1700  The FCA has significant powers, including the 
power to regulate conduct related to the marketing of financial products; specify minimum standards 
and to place requirements on products; investigate organisations and individuals; ban financial 
products for up to a year while considering an indefinite ban; instruct firms to immediately retract or 
modify promotions which it finds to be misleading, and to publish such decisions.1701 In addition 
hereto, the FCA has power to take enforcement action, such as disciplining authorised persons and 
approved persons; imposing civil penalties for market abuse; apply to court for injunctions against 
persons contravening relevant requirements; or order restitution of profits arising from contravening 
relevant requirements.1702 Furthermore, the UK tax authorities also have rights of audit and 
inspection over the books and financial records of the private equity firm and the limited 
partnership.1703 Nevertheless, the private equity firm that manages the private equity limited 
partnership must be authorised by the FCA in order to operate and manage in the UK a private equity 
fund. In addition to such authorisation, authorised persons must themselves take reasonable care 
not to allow individuals to perform ‘controlled functions’ without the approval of the FCA.1704 In terms 
of the FCA, controlled functions include the following: director, chief executive, partner, 
apportionment and oversight, compliance oversight, money laundering reporting and customer 
functions, such as advising and managing investments.1705 The FCA no longer requires that 
examinations must be passed in the non-retail context, however an FCA-authorised fund manager 
must ensure that its partners and employees have the skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for 
the discharge of the responsibilities allocated to them.1706  
 
                                                 
1700See Kovas, A. (2015), ‘Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers’, 
Troubador Publishing Limited. 
1701See https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA, accessed at June 2015. See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund 
Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., 
published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at pages 67-73. See also Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and 
Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 321-326. See also Kovas, A. 
(2015), ‘Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers’, Troubador Publishing. 
1702See https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA, accessed at June 2015. See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund 
Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., 
published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at pages 67-73. See also Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and 
Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 321-326. See also Kovas, A. 
(2015), ‘Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers’, Troubador Publishing. 
1703Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance 
Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. 
1704Hill-Smith, A. (2015), ‘Consumer Credit: Law and Practice’, Practical Finance and Banking Guides, CRC 
Press at 35-95. 
1705Hill-Smith, A. (2015), ‘Consumer Credit: Law and Practice’, Practical Finance and Banking Guides, CRC 
Press at 35-95. See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at page 69. 
1706Hill-Smith, A. (2015), ‘Consumer Credit: Law and Practice’, Practical Finance and Banking Guides, CRC 
Press, at pages 35-95. See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 
33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at page 69. 
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An additional regulatory consideration to be had with regard to forming a private equity fund in the 
UK, pertains to collective investment schemes. According to Barry, in relation to the limited 
partnership itself, limited partnerships are usually specifically designated as ‘unregulated collective 
investment schemes’ for the purposes of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.1707 In 
relation to the general partner or, where appointed, the manager of a limited partnership, where it 
acts in the UK as the manager of a limited partnership, it will require to be authorised and regulated 
by the FCA in terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.1708 As mentioned above, private 
equity firms that are authorised by the FCA must comply with applicable regulatory requirements. 
These include the FCA Principles for Businesses as mentioned earlier in paragraph 3.3 of this 
chapter, which are intended as concise statements of the fundamental standards expected of all 
firms; rules requiring effective systems and controls and adequate risk management arrangements; 
division of roles between its senior management to ensure that their individual responsibilities for the 
various aspects of the business are always clear; designation of an individual as having responsibility 
for oversight of the firm’s compliance function; business standards in the areas of conduct of 
business, client assets and market conduct; and prudential standards setting the financial resources 
requirements applicable to authorised firms by type.1709  
 
Section 235(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 defines a collective investment 
scheme as follows: 
 
‘any arrangements with respect to property of any description, including money, the purpose or 
effect of which is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners 
of the property or any part of it or otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or income arising 
from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such 
profits or income.’ 
 
                                                 
1707Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 68. Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 is concerned with the regulation of financial services and markets in the UK. In terms of 
section 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, any person who carries on a regulated activity in 
the UK must be authorised by the FCA or exempt (an appointed representative or some other exemption). 
Breach of section 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 may be a criminal offence and punishable 
on indictment by a maximum term of two years imprisonment and/or a fine. 
1708Hudson, A. (2014), ‘Equity and Trusts’, Eighth Edition, Routledge Publishers, at page 455. 
1709See https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA, accessed at June 2015. See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund 
Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., 
published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at pages 67-73. See also Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and 
Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 321-326. See also Kovas, A. 
(2015), ‘Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers’, Troubador Publishing. 
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On the other hand, an unregulated collective investment schemes is described as unregulated 
because they are not subject to the same restrictions as a regulated collective investment scheme 
in terms of their investment powers and how they are run.1710 According to the FCA, if: 
 
‘a CIS is not authorised or recognised it is considered an unregulated collective investment 
scheme (UCIS). UCIS are not subject to the same restrictions in terms of their investment powers 
and how they are run.’1711 
 
An unregulated collective investment scheme is an investment vehicle set up for asset classes that 
are unable to follow the FCA specific rules on matters such as liquidity, leverage or cash reserves.1712 
As mentioned above, although unregulated collective investment schemes themselves are not 
directly authorised by the FCA, persons carrying on activities related to unregulated collective 
investment schemes are themselves subject to FCA regulation.1713 According to the FCA: 
 
‘UCIS and close substitutes such as qualified investor schemes, traded life policy investments 
and certain funds structured as corporate vehicles – which are collectively described as non-
mainstream pooled investments (NMPIs) – are not subject to the rules that apply to retail-oriented 
investment funds. In our view, these products are unlikely to be suitable for the vast majority of 
retail investors. The marketing of UCIS and other NMPIs is regulated and subject to complex 
rules, including a restriction on UCIS imposed by s. 238 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 and our rules about NMPIs in COBS 4.12, in addition to provisions in secondary 
legislation. These products may not be promoted to the general public and can only be marketed 
where an exemption is available.’1714 
 
However, as of the 1st January 2014 the FCA banned the promotion of unregulated collective 
investment schemes, however venture capital trusts, enterprise investment schemes (‘EIS’)1715 and 
real estate investment trusts are exempt from the ban. In this regard, the FCA stated the following:  
 
                                                 
1710Ghanty, J., Cornelius, J., Baker, M. and Ormond, C. (2014), ‘Marketing funds in Europe: a practical look at 
the marketing regime under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 2011/61/EU and other 
regulatory requirements’, Journal of Investment Compliance, 15(3), at pages 20-27. See also Innes, D., Lewin-
Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 321-326. 
1711Sourced and available at www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-of-
investment/ucis, accessed in June 2015. 
1712Fisher, J. (2003), ‘The Law of Investor Protection’, Second Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Limited Publishers, 
at page 156. 
1713Fisher, J. (2003), ‘The Law of Investor Protection’, Second Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Limited Publishers, 
at page 156. 
1714Available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-services-products/investments/ucis, accessed in June 2015. 
1715Discussed in paragraph 2.1(d) at chapter four. 
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‘The FSA published a consultation paper in August 2012 proposing rule changes aimed at 
improving retail consumer outcomes by banning the promotion of UCIS and close substitutes to 
retail investors other than where specific exemptions apply. For example, promotions are still 
allowed for individuals certified as sophisticated or high net worth investors. The new marketing 
restriction rules came into force on 1 January 2014 and aim to ensure that NMPIs are recognised 
as specialist products unsuitable for general promotion in the UK retail market. As providing 
financial advice generally includes making a financial promotion, by limiting the promotion of UCIS 
we aim to limit the number of retail clients being wrongly advised to invest in UCIS.’1716 
  
In terms of an unregulated collective investment scheme, the investor takes no responsibility for the 
day-to-day running of the scheme.1717 Despite the name, unregulated collective investment schemes 
might not be authorised in themselves but the ‘establishing, operating and winding up’ of the scheme 
is a regulated activity and the rules on promoting such schemes are very clear.1718 However, the 
primary consideration is that they must not be promoted to the general public.1719  
 
4.4 Australian Regulatory and Licensing Requirements  
 
A private equity fund vehicle formed in Australia could have a domestic or international private equity 
fund manager, although to access the tax treatment afforded by the VCLP, ESVCLP and MIT 
regimes,1720 the specific requirements associated with those regimes must be complied with.1721 For 
example, the MIT regime requires that the trustee of the trust be an Australian resident for tax 
purposes.1722 A domestic private equity firm will generally be required to hold an Australian Financial 
Services Licence (‘AFSL’), which will set out the authorised activities that the manager may 
undertake.1723 Depending on the circumstances, the licensed entity may be the manager of the fund, 
the trustee of the trust or general partner of the VCLP or ESVCLP.1724  
 
                                                 
1716Available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-services-products/investments/ucis, accessed in June 2015. 
1717See Athanassiou, P. (2012), ‘Research Handbook on Hedge Funds, Private Equity and Alternative 
Investments’, Research handbooks in financial law, Edward Elgar Publishing, at pages 139-290. 
1718Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, 
contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at pages 67-73. 
1719Available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-services-products/investments/ucis, accessed in June 2015. 
See also Barry, B. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at pages 67-73. 
See also Innes, D., Lewin-Smith, G., and Raven, D. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: United Kingdom’, in Private 
Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 
pages 321-326. 
1720Discussed in paragraph 3 of this chapter. 
1721Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1722Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
1723As discussed earlier in paragraph 3 of this chapter 
1724Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 263 
 
A domestic private equity firm will generally have a head office in Australia, be structured as a 
proprietary limited company, which requires at least one resident director and have a company 
secretary.1725 Apart from the compliance requirements associated with AFSLs, limited financial 
records and statutory registers are required to be kept.1726 VCLPs and ESVCLPs are able to hold 
assets directly, but in the case of trusts,1727 trustees hold the title and, where they have more than 
twenty clients, may need an AFSL with a custody authorisation to enable them to do so.1728 
Alternatively, a licensed custodian can be hired to provide this service to the fund.1729 Where the 
trustee has fewer than twenty clients, there are some exemptions from the requirement for a fund 
manager to either hold an AFSL with an authorisation to provide custody services or use an external 
custodian.1730 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) is an Australian government body 
that acts as Australia's corporate regulator.1731 ASIC's role is to enforce and regulate company and 
financial services laws to protect Australian consumers, investors and creditors.1732 ASIC is the 
principle regulatory authority that has oversight of the operation of private equity funds in 
Australia.1733 In terms of the AFSL licensing regime, licensed entities are required to prepare and 
publicly lodge audited accounts and comply with stringent ASIC requirements relating to compliance 
and compliance auditing.1734 For example, the ASIC has the right at any time to inspect books and 
records of a licensed entity in relation to their compliance with these provisions of the Corporations 
Act of 2001.1735  
 
In addition, the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited have released a 
code of private equity governance that sets out principles and guidance to inform decisions about 
how Australian private equity funds and their portfolio companies might be better governed.1736 
Compliance with these codes are not compulsory for private equity firms, general partners and 
trustees, however, industry practice dedicates that most investors expect that private equity firms, 
general partners and trustees follow the principles set out in the code and report to investors where 
                                                 
1725Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/, accessed in June 2015. 
1726Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/, accessed in June 2015. 
1727Including MITs. 
1728Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/, accessed in June 2015. 
1729Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/, accessed in June 2015. 
1730Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/, accessed in June 2015. 
1731Available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/, accessed in June 2015. 
1732Available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/, accessed in June 2015. ASIC was 
established on 1st July 1998 and its authority and scope is determined pursuant to the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act of 2001. 
1733Available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/, accessed in June 2015. 
1734Available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/, accessed in June 2015. 
1735Available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/, accessed in June 2015. 
1736Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL), (2011), ‘Code of Private Equity 
Governance’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, September 2011, at 
pages 1-11. 
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they have not followed the principles.1737 Nevertheless, most private equity funds in Australia target 
predominantly institutional or wholesale investors, meaning there are no registration requirements 
for the fund in terms of corporate law legislation.1738 If a private equity fund were to target retail 
investors, however, the Australian regulations would require the fund to be registered and the 
constituent documents to comply with strict requirements.1739 Therefore, VCLPs and ESVCLPs 
established in Australia must be registered as an incorporated limited partnership in a particular state 
and as a VCLP or ESVCLP with the federal government body that oversees the VCLP and ESVCLP 
regimes.1740 The trustee of an MIT must elect for the trust to be treated as an MIT, otherwise the 
AFSL requirements described above are the main licensing requirements applicable to private equity 
firms.1741 In addition, the AFSL registration requirements as described above  need to be satisfied 
and the entity managing the fund must have organisational capacity and relevant experience with 
dealing in and advising on securities to wholesale clients at a minimum.1742 These requirements set 
out detailed tests that need to be satisfied by the persons responsible for the day-to-day 
management and operation of the private equity fund.1743 
 
4.5 Canadian Regulatory and Licensing Requirements 
 
As mentioned earlier in paragraph 3.5 of this chapter, Canada has a federal system of government 
whereby the authority to enact legislation is divided between the federal and the provincial and 
territorial governments.1744 The Canadian securities markets are regulated solely by the provincial 
and territorial governments, therefore each of Canada's ten provinces and three territories has its 
own legislative scheme for regulating the securities market within its own provincial or territorial 
jurisdiction and its own securities commission or regulatory authority for administering and enforcing 
such legislation.1745 Securities regulatory requirements in Canada can therefore vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, which are complex and extensive, and beyond the scope of this discussion. Canadian 
                                                 
1737Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
1738Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1739Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1740Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1741Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
1742Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/applying-for-and-managing-an-afs-
licence/, accessed in June 2015. 
1743Available at http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/applying-for-and-managing-an-afs-
licence/, accessed in June 2015. 
1744Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012),  ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 1. 
1745Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012),  ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 1. 
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securities legislation generally regulates the trading of, and advising in respect of, securities within 
a province or territory by requiring those who engage in, or hold themselves out as being engaged 
in, the business of trading in, or advising in respect of, securities to become registered or licensed 
as a dealer or adviser, respectively, with the applicable Canadian Securities Regulators unless: (a) 
the securities legislation provides for an express statutory exemption from the relevant requirement; 
or (b) an order or ruling can be obtained from the applicable Securities Regulator which exempts a 
trade, a security or a person or company from the relevant requirement.1746 
 
In terms of the adviser registration requirement set out above, what constitutes carrying on the 
business of an adviser has, for example, been the subject of two decisions of the Ontario Securities 
Commission.1747 In The Matter of Jack Maguire and J.K. Maguire and Associates,1748 the Ontario 
Securities Commission confirmed the statement of the British Columbia Securities Commission 
made In The Matter of Robert Anthony Donas, which reads as follows: 
 
‘A person who does nothing more than provide factual information about an issuer and its 
business activities is not advising in securities. A person who recommends an investment to an 
issuer or a purchase or sale of an issuer’s securities, or who distributes or offers an opinion on 
the investment merits of an issuer or an issuer’s securities, is advising in securities. If a person 
advising in securities is distributing or offering the advice in a manner that reflects a business 
purpose, the person is required to be registered under the Act.’1749 
 
Furthermore, In The Matter of Brian K. Costello,1750 the Ontario Securities Commission held: 
 
‘the trigger for registration as an adviser is not doing one or more acts that constitute the giving 
of advice but engaging in the business of advising … Providing mere financial information in 
relation to specific securities does not constitute the giving of advice, but providing an opinion on 
the wisdom or value or desirability of investing in specific securities does: Re Canadian 
Shareholders Association (1992), 15 OSCB 617. In Lowe v Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), a ‘one-on-one’ relationship involving the giving of advice on 
specific securities to specific individuals was found to be required to qualify as the giving of advice 
under US law. Such a direct one-on-one relationship with an investor is not required to qualify as 
the giving of advice under Ontario law.’1751 
                                                 
1746See also Johnston, D.L. (2014), ‘Canadian Securities Regulation’, Fifth Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths. 
1747Available at www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_rad_20110121_goldbridge2.htm, accessed at June 2015. 
Available at  http://do.bcsc.bc.ca/Enforcement/Decisions/Robert_Anthony_Donas__Decision_/, accessed at 
June 2015. 
1748In the Matter of Jack Maguire and J.K. Maguire and Associates 1995, 18 OSCB 4623. 
1749In The Matter of Robert Anthony Donas 1995 BC Weekly Summary, 7th April, at page 39. 
1750In The Matter of Brian K. Costello 2003, 26 OSCB 1617. 
1751In The Matter of Brian K. Costello 2003, 26 OSCB 1617. 




Nevertheless, the general rule is that any person who is in the business of advising another about 
the sale or purchase of securities must be registered as an adviser. Accordingly, managers must be 
registered as advisers, unless there is an applicable exemption.1752 In terms of the laws of certain 
jurisdictions only Canadian corporations or partnerships can be registered as advisers.1753 A partner, 
director or officer of an adviser who advises on securities must also be personally registered as an 
adviser.1754 The applicable exemption being that general partners and offshore managers of a private 
equity fund that are actively involved in managing its portfolio investments need not be registered in 
this way.1755  
 
However, any person who acts as a manager of an investment fund must be registered as an 
investment fund manager.1756 An investment fund is defined as a mutual fund, or a fund whose 
primary purpose is to invest money, but that is not formed for the purposes of exercising control over 
or managing an issuer (in this context, an underlying portfolio investee company).1757 Therefore a 
private equity fund is not an investment fund as defined, because it is formed for the purposes of 
exercising control over or managing the issuer. Nicholas et al defines an investment fund as follows: 
 
‘… a mutual fund or a non-redeemable investment fund, and, for greater certainty in British 
Columbia, includes an employee venture capital corporation that does not have a restricted 
constitution, and is registered under Part 2 of the Employee Investment Act (British Columbia) 
and whose business objective is making multiple investments, and a venture capital corporation 
                                                 
1752See Kirsch, C.E. (2011), ‘Investment Adviser Regulation: A Step-by-step Guide to Compliance and the 
Law, First Edition, Volume 1, Practising Law Institute's corporate and securities law library, Practising Law 
Institute. 
1753Hernandez, M. (2012), ‘The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers: Comparative Analysis of 
Certain Aspects of Regulatory Regimes in Europe, Canada and the USA’, University of Toronto, Doctoral 
Dissertation. 
1754Hernandez, M. (2012), ‘The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers: Comparative Analysis of 
Certain Aspects of Regulatory Regimes in Europe, Canada and the USA’, University of Toronto, Doctoral 
Dissertation. 
1755Hernandez, M. (2012), ‘The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers: Comparative Analysis of 
Certain Aspects of Regulatory Regimes in Europe, Canada and the USA’, University of Toronto, Doctoral 
Dissertation. 
1756Canadian securities legislation also requires any person or company who acts as an investment fund 
manager in a province or territory of Canada to become registered as such with the relevant Securities 
Regulator subject to certain relief that have been granted pursuant to National Instrument 31-103 Registration 
Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Obligations (‘NI 31-103’). In an effort to harmonize Canadian 
securities laws, each of the 13 Securities Regulators in Canada have, under rule making authority granted by 
the provincial and territorial governments, established numerous rules, referred to as national instruments that 
operate in a substantially identical manner in each province and territory. NI 31-103 is a product of this 
harmonization effort. 
1757Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 21. 
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registered under Part 1 of the Small Business Venture Capital Act (British Columbia) whose 
business objective is making multiple investments.’1758 
 
Since a private equity fund typically seeks to exercise some degree of control over their portfolio 
companies, the private equity firm is exempt from the above mentioned registration requirement. 
Active management in an underlying portfolio investee company would include a private equity fund 
having representation on the board of directors of such underlying company; having direct 
involvement in the appointment of managers of such underlying company; and/or having a say in 
material management decisions of such underlying company.1759 As mentioned throughout chapter 
one and two thus far, the private equity fund aims to realize on the underlying portfolio investment, 
for instance, via a sale of its ownership interest in the underlying portfolio investee company. It is at 
such point that the investors’ money can be returned to them together with any profit. Furthermore, 
the investors depend on the private equity firm’s skill and expertise in selecting and managing 
underlying portfolio investee companies into which the private equity will invest.1760 In return, the 
private equity firm receives a management fee and carried interest in the profits generated from such 
investments.1761 A key feature of private equity investing is that the private equity firm does not 
receive compensation for raising capital or trading in securities.1762  Therefore, as Nicholas et al 
states:  
 
‘investors rely on the private equity firm to manage a private equity fund but not to manage in any 
way the underlying businesses that are included in the investment portfolio of the fund.’1763 
 
By taking the above considerations into account, Canadian Securities Regulators have advised that 
if a private equity firm is not compensated for either the raising or investment of money received from 
investors, and the investment of such money is occasional, the dealer registration requirement 
mentioned earlier should not apply to the private equity firm in respect of its capital raising activities 
                                                 
1758Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 21. 
1759See paragraphs 2 and 3 of chapter one for a discussing of the salient features of private equity investing. 
1760See paragraphs 2 and 3 of chapter one for a discussing of the salient features of private equity investing. 
1761See Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’, Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 13. See also Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and 
Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing 
editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 28-33. 
1762See Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’, Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 13. See also Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and 
Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing 
editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 28-33. 
1763Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 13. 
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on behalf of the private equity fund.1764 Similarly, the private equity firm would not be subject to the 
investment fund manager registration requirement because it would be managing a private equity 
fund rather than an investment fund.1765 Nicholas et al states that:  
 
‘For Canadian securities regulatory purposes, an investment fund is either an open end or closed 
end investment fund that offers liquidity, takes passive positions in securities and does not try to 
exercise control or otherwise influence the day-to-day business of the investee issuer. Unlike 
investment funds, a private equity fund raises capital for the purpose of investing in issuers that 
are not publicly traded and becoming actively involved in the management of such issuers, often 
over a period of several years. As a result, persons or companies that invest in a private equity 
fund must generally agree to remain invested in the private equity fund for a period of time and 
thereby agree to forego the liquidity that is generally characteristic of an investment in an 
investment fund.’1766 
 
As described above, a typical private equity fund generally would not qualify as an ‘investment fund’ 
and, as a result, its manager would not need to be registered in Canada. The general rule is that 
private equity firms/general partners and offshore managers of a private equity fund that are actively 
involved in managing its portfolio investments need not normally be registered in terms of the dealer 
registration and investment fund manager registration requirements under Canadian securities 
regulations.1767 In practice, Canadian securities regulators would typically have authority over the 
offering and sale of securities of a private equity fund to investors in the jurisdiction where such 
investors reside.1768 Such securities regulators may, in certain circumstances when there is a 
perceived breach of securities laws, also exercise broader regulatory powers. However, they would 
not have jurisdiction over the operation of a ‘typical’ private equity fund itself.1769 There generally are 
                                                 
1764By way of interpretive guidance. See also National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements, 
Exemptions and Ongoing Obligations (‘NI 31-103’). 
1765This dealer registration and investment fund manager registration analysis may be different if the private 
equity fund engages in activities other than those described above. 
1766Nicholas, M.C., Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements 
applicable to Non Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’,  Securities Regulation 
and Investment Products Group, 4th September 2012, at page 13. 
1767Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 33 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 34-39. See 
also Carroll, C. and Kay, S. (2011), ‘Investment Funds: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, First Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell Publishers, at pages 49-60. 
1768See Hernandez, M. (2012), ‘The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers: Comparative Analysis 
of Certain Aspects of Regulatory Regimes in Europe, Canada and the USA’, University of Toronto, Doctoral 
Dissertation. 
1769See Philipps, L. (1993), ‘The Amazing Three-Headed Limited Partner: Reflections on Old Loopholes and 
New Jurisprudence’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 21(3), at pages 410-428. See also Kirsch, C.E. (2011), 
‘Investment Adviser Regulation: A Step-by-step Guide to Compliance and the Law, First Edition, Volume 1, 
Practising Law Institute's corporate and securities law library, Practising Law Institute. See also Nicholas, M.C., 
Sadler, S.D. and Struthers, S.J. (2012), ‘Canadian Securities Regulatory Requirements applicable to Non 
Resident Broker-Dealers, Advisers and Investment Fund Managers’, Securities Regulation and Investment 
Products Group, 4th September 2012, at pages 1-26. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 269 
 
no ongoing regulatory audit requirements and inspection rights in respect of a private equity fund; 
as well as no regulatory reporting requirements to investors or regulators by the private equity firm, 








It is evident from the discussion in this paragraph 4, that there has been an increase in scrutiny and 
regulation of private equity firms and their activities in all the jurisdiction discussed above. In terms 
of the South African regulatory framework, the Registrar of Pension Funds published conditions for 
investment in private equity funds in March 2012 that stipulate requirements for a private equity fund 
to qualify for investment by a pension fund. Despite these requirements not binding private equity 
funds, pension funds are significant investors and therefore private equity funds have an incentive 
to comply. In addition, managers of South African private equity funds must be regulated as FSPs 
in terms of FAIS. Therefore, a fund manager managing private equity funds, whether local or foreign, 
with South African pension fund investors must have a Category II FSP license. The FSB have 
engaged with the private equity industry representatives with the view of developing industry specific 
regulations. However, there is no certainty as to when such draft private equity specific regulations 
will be published. 
 
Also evident from this discussion, is that private equity firms in all these foreign jurisdictions have 
faced increased legislative pressure to deliver greater transparency, better reporting, more onerous 
licensing and registration conditions, and tighter accounting controls. One notable trend when 
analysing the licensing and regulatory developments in South Africa compared with those of the 
foreign jurisdictions is that all the foreign jurisdictions can be characterised as having consistent 
regulatory developments and transformation, whereas the South African regulatory development is 
uncertain and lacks industry specific regulation. Continuous regulatory transformation in these 
foreign jurisdictions have and will lead to structural changes in the way in which private equity firms 
operate. Private equity always has been fairly private, characterised as having less regulatory 
oversight than other more tightly regulated sectors of the financial services industry. Nevertheless, 
financial regulation and pending reforms in South Africa, UK, US, Australia and Canada have to a 




                                                 
1770Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2011), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 33 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 34-
39. See also Carroll, C. and Kay, S. (2011), ‘Investment Funds: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, 1st Edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 49-60. 
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As mentioned throughout this chapter, the two main legal vehicles used in South Africa to structure 
a private equity fund is the bewind trust and en commandite partnership. The first part of this chapter 
dealt with the pertinent legal characteristics of the en commandite partnership and bewind trust, and 
examined the rationale behind these two legal structures and their tax implications. It is submitted, 
that the reasons for the use of these two legal structures, are that they both (a) are fiscally 
transparent which allows for the income and capital gains of the private equity fund to be taxed in 
the hands of investors according to the tax status of each investor; (b) allow for the appointment of 
a private equity firm, which will be responsible for the daily administration of the private equity fund; 
(c) provide investors into the private equity fund with limited liability; and (d) afford contractual 
flexibility in structuring and documenting the commercial arrangements between the investors and 
the private equity firm.  
 
The second part of this chapter addressed the regulatory and licensing considerations as it pertains 
to South Africa, however reference was made to the commonly used private equity fund vehicles in 
foreign jurisdictions such the US, UK, Australia, and Canada. Furthermore, it must be noted that 
there are a number of regulatory provisions and licensing requirements that govern private equity 
firms, fund formation and operation, and investment activities in South Africa. In addition, private 
equity investors and fund managers must take into account the specific provisions of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002,1771 Pensions Fund 
Act 24 of 1956, and the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002.  
 
Nevertheless, to restate what was stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to undertake a critical analysis of the taxation of private equity funds. Therefore, whether 
private equity funds should pay higher taxes or lower taxes, is not a matter of substantial critical 
analysis in this thesis, however chapter four does examine the key impediments to the development 
of a private equity market and argues that tax legislation is one such impediment. For instance, it 
argued in chapter four that if a private equity fund is treated as an operating business rather than a 
long term passive investor, then the returns to the private equity firm could be taxed as ordinary 
income, rather than at lower capital gains rates. This would mean that the compensation of private 
equity firms, namely carried interest, would be taxed at higher rates, which implies that private equity 
firms would be paying higher taxes under current South African tax legislation, without the need for 
new legislation. However, chapter four argues for the current status quo to remain, which means that 
private equity funds are taxed at the lower capital gains tax rates. 
 
                                                 
1771Including the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers and Representatives 
and the determination of fit and property requirements in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act 37 of 2002. 
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It has been noted above that a principal advantage of using either a bewind trust or an en 
commandite partnership as a fund vehicle is because both these vehicles are ‘pass-through’ entities 
for income tax purposes and, therefore, are not subject to income tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962. Instead, the bewind trust or en commandite partnership’s income, gains, losses and 
deductions are passed through to the investor’s and taxed only once at the investor level.1772 
However, this thesis does not argue for the altering the tax treatment of a single industry (private 
equity industry) because it raises tax policy concerns which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, changing the way private equity firms, bewind trusts and en commandite partnerships 
in general are taxed is a subject that should only be undertaken after very careful consideration of 
the real and potential consequences. 
 
The next chapter will examine the application of effective corporate governance systems as an 
important risk management tool available to investors in safeguarding their investment in a private 
equity fund. As part of a private equity manager marketing its skills to investors as a fund manager, 
it needs to demonstrate how it will address sound corporate governance practices in a business from 
the day when it first meets with management to consider an investment in the underlying investee 
company, right up to the time when it exits from the investment. Private equity managers could 
become involved, for example via their participation on the board and engagement with 
management, in a wide variety of governance practices, such as making the board more effective or 
improving financial reporting and disclosure, to unusual undertakings, such as assisting 
management in corporate restructuring or acquisitions. In addition, private equity managers take a 
long term view with regard to the investments they make and are ideally placed to play an active role 
in promoting sound corporate governance practices. Chapter three will discuss the two levels of 
corporate governance involved in private equity investing. The first level of governance relates to the 
relation between the private equity fund and the underlying investee company, and will include a 
discussion on the duties of the fund manager, particularly in their capacity as serving as directors on 
the boards of such companies. The second level of governance relates the relationship between the 
private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private equity fund. 
 
  
                                                 
1772See discussion on tax considerations impacting private equity in chapter four. 
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Chapter three will analyse corporate governance in relation to the private equity business model. 
Chapter three seeks to explain the link between the private equity business model and corporate 
governance that is based on the assertion that there are two levels of corporate governance involved 
in private equity investing. The first level of governance relates to the private equity fund’s underlying 
portfolio investee companies and this will include inter alia, a discussion on the duties of the fund 
manager, particularly in their capacity as serving as directors on the boards of such companies. A 
discussion on fiduciary duties includes various principles and arguments and for this reason this 
chapter will only analyse the relevant authority necessary for establishing the fiduciary duty owed by 
a director to a company, because the private equity firm typically appoints a staff member(s) or 
independent experts to serve on the board of the investee companies in which the firm invests on 
behalf of the private equity fund which it is contracted to manage. Nevertheless, the modest goal of 
this chapter, inter alia, is to analyse the law of fiduciary duties with respect to corporate directors and 
officers of limited liability companies and to illustrate the extent to which corporate law concepts and 
precedents should be applied (or not applied) in the context of advancing higher standards of 
corporate governance to the private equity business model.   
 
The second level of governance relates to the private equity fund itself which focuses on the 
relationship between the private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private equity fund. 
For instance, it is evident from the discussion on fiduciary duties to follow and in terms of the 
discussion in chapter two, that an agency relationship exists between the investors and the fund 
manager, namely that the private equity firm act as agents for external investors, who choose to 
invest in underlying portfolio investee companies via an intermediary rather than directly.1773 The 
discussion and analysis will be restricted to the risks inherent to the private equity fund investors 
from potential conflicts of interest which may exist within the private equity firm or within the private 
equity fund and will outline possible mitigating measures alongside the potential conflict of interest 
risks.1774 In addition, this chapter will not attempt the homogenisation of fiduciary duty law as applied 
to different forms of legal vehicles with respect to partnerships and trust, and the numerous side line 
issues that emanate from a discussion of the concept of fiduciary duties. Chapter two discussed the 
                                                 
1773Metrick, A., (2007), ‘Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation’, John Wiley and Sons, 2007. This 
agency problem stems from inevitably high degree of information asymmetry between the private equity firm, 
who play an active role in the portfolio companies and the passive investors, who have no involvement in 
managing the underlying investee companies. 
1774See discussion with regard to Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, 
Delaware Supreme Court, at paragraph 3.2 in chapter two earlier. See also Strine, L.E. and Travis, L.J. (2014), 
‘The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom’, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion 
Paper No. 789, 1st August 2014. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 273 
 
most appropriate legal vehicles used to structure a private equity fund. In this regard chapter two 
discussed the legal principles relating to the trust and limited partnership. The latter two legal 
vehicles were emphasized as the two most suitable legal vehicles.  
 
Private equity funds differ from other investment funds, such as hedge funds and collective 
investment schemes, mainly in the larger size of their stakes in underlying investee companies, their 
longer investment horizons and the fewer number of companies in individual fund portfolios.1775 The 
private equity firms have a greater involvement in their investee companies compared to other 
investment managers and fulfil a greater role in influencing the corporate governance practices of 
their investee companies. For instance, there is no certainty that an effectively governed company 
will produce more effective exits and higher returns for private equity firms, but there is an 
understanding that poorly governed companies are more at risk of failure.1776 Therefore it is important 
for private equity firms to ensure that their funds are invested in properly governed companies which 
demonstrate an inclination to improve their governance. According to a report by the European 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’):  
 
‘Successful investment requires well informed decision making at all levels and by all parties. At 
its core, good governance creates the environment for the attitudes, mechanisms and behaviours 
that allow this well informed decision making to take place. Failures of governance lead to bad 
decisions and business failures. Where individuals can be relied upon to act with integrity a 
proliferation of guidance and the imposition of regulation is unnecessary ... Private equity 
investing as represented by the EVCA membership is characterised by a number of features. The 
private equity and venture capital investor brings deep industry focus and understanding to the 
particular business and its investments are characterised by a great deal of shareholders 
involvement in the particular business and its investments are characterised by a great deal of 
shareholders involvement in strategy and direction of the investee company. The private equity 
and venture capital investor takes a long term view of value creation and is seeking, as much as 
possible, the alignment of stakeholder interests in order to maximise value ... and the industry 
has been hugely successful in promoting the concept that good corporate governance is a key 
element in value creation.’1777 
 
                                                 
1775Stowell, D. (2012), ‘Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity’, Academic Press Publishers, at 
pages 217-219. 
1776See Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, 
and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons.  
1777European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA Corporate 
Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held companies in the 
private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, at page 
6. 
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The above mentioned report also made reference to a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (‘OECD’)1778 which stated that: 
 
‘Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well 
as enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between 
a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.’1779 
 
It is clear from the above introduction, that there is a strong investment case for driving corporate 
governance in the private equity fund management industry. This investment case raises an 
important question; namely whether the inclusion of corporate governance principles into the 
investment policy of a private equity firm is a legal requirement or rather nothing more than a 
voluntary consideration. In raising this question, the issue that needs to be understood is whether 
the commonly held view that fiduciary duties require a private equity firm solely to pursue the 
maximum profit is a correct interpretation of the law or whether acting in the interests of investors 
can also incorporate other objectives? As stated earlier, this chapter will therefore comprise of two 
parts because there are two levels of governance involved in private equity investing. The first level 
of governance relates to the private equity fund’s underlying portfolio investee companies. The 
second level relates to the private equity fund itself which focuses on the relationship between the 
private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private equity fund. The first part will discuss 
the broader corporate governance compliance framework, more notable the common law and 
legislated grounds for corporate governance adherence. In addition, the first part will discuss the 
relationship between corporate governance principles and law. For example, equity investors invest 
their capital in enterprises with the intention of obtaining a return on that capital and a goal of 
company law should be to ensure that shareholders, as the investors of equity, are granted explicit 
rights and that they have effective recourse when those rights are violated. While the clear statement 
of such rights and recourse does provide protection to shareholders, it is equally important that 
investors be educated about those rights and that their statement is easily accessible in the law. The 
legal protection of investors is one way of thinking about corporate governance and the first part of 
this chapter will discuss inter alia investor protection and fiduciary duties as part of the broader 
                                                 
1778Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) Report (2004), ‘OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance’, OECD publications, Paris, France. 
1779European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA Corporate 
Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held companies in the 
private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, at page 
6. 
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corporate governance compliance framework. Such a discussion emanates as a result of the 
principal (investor) and agent (private equity firm) relationship.1780  
 
The second part of this chapter will discuss the role of corporate governance in terms of the 
relationship between the private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private equity fund. 
This will include a discussion of the practical corporate governance contracting techniques employed 
between the private equity firm and investors. In addition, the second part of this chapter will also 
include several key practical recommendations that could be applied within the private equity firm 
itself to improve its own internal corporate governance framework. As mentioned earlier, this 
discussion will be restricted to the risks inherent to the private equity fund investors from potential 
conflicts of interest which may exist within the private equity firm or within the private equity fund and 
will not address potential conflicts of interest which are not specific to the private equity business 
model or those potential conflicts of interest which are not usually within the ambit of securities 
market regulators. Furthermore, it will be recommended that corporate governance mechanisms 
should be put in place by the private equity firm in order to mitigate the conflicts of interest that may 
arise within the firm itself. 
 
2(a) Corporate Governance in Relation to Investor Protection 
 
The first part of the discussion to follow is not an exclusive discussion on fiduciary duties per se, 
despite the fact it is extensively discussed below (at paragraph 2(b) of this chapter), but rather the 
intention is to argue the point that the legal protection of investors is one way of approaching 
corporate governance as part of a broader private equity industry governance framework. According 
to Claessens and Yurtoglu:  
 
‘Many other factors dictate the success of firms and the economies in which they operate. Well 
functioning legal and judicial systems are also necessary for improving financial markets, securing 
external financing, and ensuring that economic development is shared by many ... Property rights 
must be clearly defined and enforced, and key regulations covering disclosures and accounting, 
among other things, must be in place, with effective and competent supervision to ensure proper 
compliance ... legal and other reforms - from mandatory internal and external controls to 
competent, adequately staffed regulators to securities laws ... strongly protect shareholders from 
dilutive offers, freeze-outs, and fraud - can provide benefits, since they are the necessary 
foundations for an effective corporate governance system. The level of competition in a market is 
also a factor, given that good corporate governance behavior can distinguish one company within 
                                                 
1780The relationship between a private equity fund manager and the investors is that of principal and agent in 
terms of which the investor (principal) engages the fund manager (as agent) to invest in investee companies 
for the benefit of the investors. 
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a crowded field. Vigorous competition imposes a discipline that supports adherence to corporate 
governance best practice.’1781 
 
According to La Porta et al, corporate failures in relation to governance are, at least in part, due to 
an absence of active institutional investors. Institutional investors should be encouraged to engage 
with companies, or require their agents through mandates to vote and engage.1782 This will ensure 
that governance best practice principles are more consistently applied. La Porta et al argue that 
corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by the insiders.1783 The expropriation is related to the agency problem 
described by Jensen and Meckling, who argue that the insiders use the profits of the company to 
benefit themselves rather than return the money to the outside investors.1784  
 
According to Blackman, one of the key functions of company law is to provide protection for 
investors.1785 Blackman broadly describes investors in companies as equity investors, employees 
and creditors and argues that employee rights are generally protected in labour law, while large 
creditors increasingly rely on contract to protect their investment, leaving equity investors at the 
greatest risk.1786 According to Haidar, the level of investor protection in an economy matters and that 
countries with stronger investor protection tend to grow faster than those with poor investor 
protection.1787 In addition, countries with poorer investor protections have smaller and narrower 
capital markets. These findings were obtained by measuring both the character of the legal rules 
and the quality of law enforcement in the countries used in their study.1788 The findings apply to both 
equity and debt markets and particularly highlight that French civil-law countries have both the 
weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to 
                                                 
1781Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development: An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), IFC, Washington, DC., at vi. Forward by Millstein, I.R. 
1782La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1999), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance’, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. See Claessens, S., and 
Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development-An Update’, Global Corporate Governance 
Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC. 
1783La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1999), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance’, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge. Bruno, V., and Claessens, S. (2010), 
‘Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?’, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 19, at 461–82. 
1784Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. See article by Bebchuk, L.A., and Weisbach, 
M.S. (2010), ‘The state of corporate governance research’, Review of Financial Studies, 23, 939–961. 
1785Blackman, M.S. (2002), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act’, Cape Town, Juta and Co., Volume 1 at 5-
408. See also Brink, A. (2009), ‘Corporate governance and the Companies Act’, 25 Management Today at 
page 6. See also Esser, I.M. (2009), ‘The protection of stakeholder interests in terms of the South African King 
III Report on Corporate Governance: an improvement on King II?’, 21 SA Mercantile Law Journal 188.   
1786Blackman, M.S. (2002), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act’, Cape Town, Juta and Co., Vol 1 at 5-408. 
See Brink, A. (2009), ‘Corporate governance and the Companies Act’, 25 Management Today at page 6. See 
also Esser, I.M. (2009), ‘The protection of stakeholder interests in terms of the South African King III Report 
on Corporate Governance: an improvement on King II?’, 21 SA Mercantile Law Journal 188.   
1787Haidar, J.I. (2009), ‘Protections and Economic Growth’, Economics Letters, 103(1), April 2009, at 1-4.  
1788170 countries were studied in the sample. 
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common-law countries.1789 South Africa is a common-law country. According to David and Brierly, 
the commercial legal systems of most countries originate from three groups, namely the English 
(common law), the French, and the German, the latter two derived from Roman Law.1790 England 
and its former colonies, including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and many 
countries in Africa and South East Asia, ended up with the common-law system. France and many 
countries Napoleon conquered ended up with French civil law tradition.1791 This extends to the former 
French, Dutch, Belgian, and Spanish colonies, including Latin America. Germany, Germanic 
countries in Europe, and several countries in East Asia are part of the German civil law tradition.1792 
 
Prior to the global corporate sector scandals, the widely accepted view was that  the common-law 
systems protect investors better than civil law and that the legal rules in the common-law system are 
usually made by judges, based on precedents and general principles such as fiduciary duties or 
fairness.1793 These judges are expected to rule on unprecedented matters by applying these general 
principles even when specific conduct has not yet been described or prohibited in the statutes.1794 In 
addition, the expansion of legal precedents with regard to fiduciary duty, and the fear of such 
expansion, limit the expropriation by the insiders in common-law countries.1795 On the other hand, 
laws in civil-law systems are made by legislatures, and judges are not supposed to go beyond the 
statutes which result in the corporate insider finding ways not explicitly forbidden by the statutes to 
expropriate outside investors and can proceed without fear of an adverse judicial ruling.1796 However, 
because of the corporate governance scandals in the US and Europe (common-law systems), the 
argument that common-law systems protect investors better than civil law seemed to be not that 
                                                 
1789Haidar, J.I. (2009), ‘Protections and Economic Growth’, Economics Letters, 103(1), April 2009, at 1-4.  
1790David, R., and Brierley, J., (1985), ‘Major Legal Systems in the World Today’, Stevens and Sons: London, 
1985. See also an article by Ararat, M., and Dallas, G. (2011), ‘Corporate governance in emerging markets: 
Why it matters to investors—and what they can do about it’, Forum Private Sector Opinion 22. Available at 
www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/Content/PSO_22_Melsa, accessed in June 2015. 
1791David, R., and Brierley, J., (1985), ‘Major Legal Systems in the World Today’, Stevens and Sons, 1985. 
1792David, R., and Brierley, J., (1985), ‘Major Legal Systems in the World Today’, Stevens and Sons, 1985. 
1793See Cuomo, F., Zattoni, A., and Valentini, G. (2013), ‘The Effects of Legal Reforms on the Ownership 
Structure of Listed Companies’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 22, Issue 2, at pages 427-458. Their 
findings show an increase in the protection of investors' rights is associated with a lower use of control 
enhancing mechanisms and a lower separation of control and cash flow rights, while it is less evident if it is 
associated with a more dispersed ownership.  
1794Cuomo, F., Zattoni, A., and Valentini, G. (2013), ‘The Effects of Legal Reforms on the Ownership Structure 
of Listed Companies’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 22, Issue 2, at pages 427-458. 
1795Foley, F., and Greenwood, R. (2010), ‘The Evolution of Corporate Ownership after IPO: The Impact of 
Investor Protection’, Review of Financial Studies 23(3), at 1231-1260. Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., and Stulz, 
R.M. (2007), ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate Governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics 
86(1), at 1-39. This paper develops and tests a model of how country characteristics, such as legal protections 
for minority investors and the level of economic and financial development, influence firms’ costs and benefits 
in implementing measures to improve their own governance and transparency. Further, the study show that 
firm characteristics explain almost none of the variation in governance ratings in less-developed countries and 
that access to global capital markets sharpens firms’ incentives for better governance. 
1796Mallin, C. (2013), ‘Corporate Governance’, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, at pages 15-68. 
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plausible.1797 Claessens argues that many of the assumptions and prejudgments that were made at 
the start of the transition (‘pre-scandals’) regarding the reform process have proved to be 
incorrect.1798 Instead, Fox and Heller argue that corporate governance should be defined by looking 
at the firm’s economic functions, rather than any particular set of corporate laws.1799 According to 
Fox and Heller:  
 
‘firms exhibit good corporate governance when they both maximize the firm’s residuals – the 
wealth generated by the real operations of the firm –and, in the case of investor-owned firms, 
distribute the wealth so generated to shareholders in a pro rata fashion ...’1800   
 
These authors argue that ineffective corporate governance is rooted in a firm’s inability to meet one 
or both of these conditions.1801 Mahoney also challenged the assertion that suggests that countries 
with common-law systems have better developed financial systems than do civil law countries.1802 
Mahoney argues that the reason for the better developed financial systems is because of their 
economic growth performance. He agrees that legal origin affects economic growth, but argues that 
the rules of investor protection are not the sole or principal challenge through which legal origin 
affects growth. Instead, the difference between common-law and civil-law countries originate from 
each system’s different philosophies of government. 1803 According to Mahoney: 
 
‘Legal origin does not affect economic growth solely, or even principally, through its effect on 
financial markets. The major families of legal systems were created as a consequence of debates 
about government structure, not merely about the rules that should govern particular transactions. 
                                                 
1797Mallin, C. (2013), ‘Corporate Governance’, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, at pages 15-68. See 
also Du Plessis, J.J., Hargovan, A. and Bagaric, M. (2010), ‘Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance’, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, at paragraph 2.3.2.7.  
1798Claessens, S., (2006), ‘Corporate Governance and Development’, The World Bank Research Observer, at 
pages 91-122. 
1799Fox, M.B, and Heller, M.A. 2006), ‘Corporate Governance Lessons From Transition Economy Reforms’, 
Princeton University Press. 
1800Fox, M.B, and Heller, M.A. (2006), ‘Corporate Governance Lessons From Transition Economy Reforms’, 
Princeton University Press, at page 4. 
1801Fox, M.B, and Heller, M.A. (2006), ‘Corporate Governance Lessons From Transition Economy Reforms’, 
Princeton University Press, at page 4. 
1802Mahoney, P.G. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’, Journal of Legal 
Studies 30, at 503–525. McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., and Starks, L.T. (2010), ‘Behind the scenes: The 
corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 
010/2010; and Kose, A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., and Wei, S. (2010), ‘Financial globalization and economic 
policies’, Discussion Paper 7117, Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
1803Mahoney, P.G. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’, Journal of Legal 
Studies 30, at pages 503–525. See McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., and Starks, L.T. (2010), ‘Behind the scenes: 
The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 
010/2010; and see Kose, A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., and Wei, S. (2010), ‘Financial globalization and economic 
policies’, Discussion Paper 7117, Centre for Economic Policy Research. See Bloomfield, S. (2013), ‘Theory 
and Practice of Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach’, First Edition, Cambridge University Press. 
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A country’s legal system accordingly reflects, albeit remotely and indirectly, a set of prior choices 
about the role of the state and the private sector in responding to change.’1804 
 
Nevertheless, common-law countries experienced higher growth during the 1980s and 1990s 
because common law is associated with fewer governmental restrictions on liberty, more judicial 
power, and more secure property and contract rights.1805 According to Doidge et al, changes in law 
and the enforcement thereof is the core to understanding the reasons companies raise more funds 
in some countries than in others.1806 Doidge et al argue that investors finance companies because 
their rights are protected by the law and that these outside investors are more dependent on the 
law.1807 For instance, company and insolvency laws specifically describe certain rights to investors 
on the one hand, as well as to directors and managers on the other. The quality of these laws and 
the quality of their enforcement by the regulators and courts are essential elements of corporate 
governance and finance.1808 If investor rights, for example the voting rights and liquidation rights of 
the creditors are well enforced by courts, then investors are more willing to invest. On the other hand, 
when the legal system does not protect outside investors, corporate governance and external finance 
do not work well.1809 This emphasis on legal rules and regulations protecting outside investors stands 
in sharp contrast to the view of financial contracting, which postulates that most regulations of 
financial markets are unnecessary because financial contracts take place between sophisticated 
issuers and sophisticated investors.1810 However, whether contracts or court enforced legal rules and 
regulations are the most efficient form of protecting financial arrangements is largely an empirical 
question.1811 Franks et al, reject the hypothesis that private contracting is sufficient and their findings 
                                                 
1804Mahoney, P.G. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’, Journal of Legal 
Studies 30, at pages 503–525. See also Mallin, C. (2013), ‘Corporate Governance’, Fourth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, at 15-68. 
1805Mahoney, P.G. (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’, Journal of Legal 
Studies 30, at pages 503–525. See also Mallin, C. (2013), ‘Corporate Governance’, Fourth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, at 15-68. 
1806Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., and Stulz, R.M. (2007), ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate 
Governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics 86(1), at pages 1-39.  See also Bloomfield, S. (2013), ‘Theory 
and Practice of Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach’, First Edition, Cambridge University Press. 
1807Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., and Stulz, R.M. (2007), ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate 
Governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics 86(1), at pages 1-39.  
1808Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., and Stulz, R.M. (2007), ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate 
Governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics 86(1), at pages 1-39.  
1809Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., and Stulz, R.M. (2007), ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate 
Governance?’, Journal of Financial Economics 86(1), at 1-39. The authors argue that the incentives to adopt 
better governance mechanisms at the company level increase with a country's financial and economic 
development. When economic and financial development is poor, the incentives to improve company level 
governance are low because outside finance is expensive and the adoption of better governance mechanisms 
is expensive. The authors state that almost all of the variation in governance ratings across companies in less 
developed countries is attributable to country characteristics rather than company characteristics typically used 
to explain governance choices. Secondly, company characteristics explain more of the variation in governance 
ratings in more developed countries; and thirdly access to global capital markets sharpens company incentives 
for better governance, but decreases the importance of home-country legal protections of minority investors. 
1810Fligstein, N and Choo, J (2005),‘Law and Corporate Governance’ Review of Law and Social Science at 61-
83. 
1811Fligstein, N and Choo, J (2005),‘Law and Corporate Governance’ Review of Law and Social Science at 61-
83. 
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prove that even among countries with well functioning judiciaries, those with laws and regulations 
more protective of investors have better developed capital markets.1812 
 
Aguilera et al, supported the above mentioned view postulated by La Porta et al and highlighted 
three broad areas in which investor protection has been shown to matter, namely ownership and 
control patterns of companies, the development of financial markets and the allocation of real 
resources.1813 Aguilera et al argue that the focus on expropriation of investors and its prevention has 
a number of implications for the ownership structures of companies.1814 The evidence put forward in 
their paper on corporate ownership patterns around the world supports the importance of investor 
protection, and that countries with poor investor protection display more concentrated control of 
companies than do countries with good investor protection. This evidence is consistent with their 
proposition that the legal environment shapes the value of the private benefits of control and thereby 
determines the equilibrium ownership structures.1815 
 
The most basic predictor of the legal approach is that investor protection encourages the 
development of financial markets.1816 Creditor rights encourage the development of lending and the 
exact structure of these rights may alternatively favour bank lending or market lending; while on the 
other hand shareholder rights encourage the development of equity markets as measured by the 
valuation of companies, the number of listed companies and the rate at which firms go public.1817 
Therefore both shareholders and creditors’ protection includes not only the rights written into the 
laws and regulations, but also the effectiveness of their enforcement. In terms of the above 
discussion, it is submitted that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock markets, 
larger numbers of listed companies and a higher rate of stock market listing activity than countries 
that do not protect shareholders. In addition, investor protection influences what is described as the 
                                                 
1812Franks, J., Volpin, P. and Wagner, H.F. (2012), ‘The Life Cycle of Family Ownership’, Review of Financial 
Studies, 25(6), at pages 1675-1712.   
1813Aguilera, R.V., de Castro, L.R.K., Lee, J.H. and You, J. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets’, forthcoming in Morgan, G., and R. Whitley, R. (2011), ‘Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st 
Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
1814Aguilera, R.V., de Castro, L.R.K., Lee, J.H. and You, J. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets’, forthcoming in Morgan, G., and R. Whitley, R. (2011), ‘Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st 
Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
1815Aguilera, R.V., de Castro, L.R.K., Lee, J.H. and You, J. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets’, forthcoming in Morgan, G., and R. Whitley, R. (2011), ‘Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st 
Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
1816Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Mueller, H.M. and Panunzi, F. (2014), ‘Legal investor protection and takeovers. The 
Journal of Finance, 69(3), at pages 1129-1165. See also Claessens, S., (2006), ‘Corporate Governance and 
Development’, The World Bank Research Observer, at pages 91-122. See also Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, 
B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development - An Update’, Global Corporate Governance Forum 
Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC. 
1817Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Mueller, H.M. and Panunzi, F. (2014), ‘Legal investor protection and takeovers. The 
Journal of Finance, 69(3), at pages 1129-1165. See also Claessens, S., (2006), ‘Corporate Governance and 
Development’, The World Bank Research Observer, at pages 91-122. 
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real economy.1818 To this end, financial development can accelerate economic growth in three ways. 
The first is that it can enhance savings; secondly it can channel these savings into real investment 
and thereby foster capital accumulation. Thirdly, financial development allows capital to flow toward 
the more productive uses, which improves the efficiency of resource allocation, provided that the 
financiers exercise some control over the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs.1819 
 
According to Claessens and Yurtoglu, the more traditional comparisons of corporate governance 
systems focus on the institutions financing companies rather than on the legal protection of 
investors.1820 The former are commonly referred to as bank centred corporate governance systems, 
in contrast to the latter, which are referred to as market centred systems. The characteristics of the 
two have been central to the evaluation of alternative corporate governance policy proposals for 
improvement.1821 For example, in the 1980s the Japanese economy could do no wrong and its bank 
centred governance system was viewed as superior. The tide turned in the 1990s, as the Japanese 
economy collapsed. This led to dramatic corporate governance reform in Japan in 2002.1822 
According to Aoki and Patrick, Japanese corporate governance in the post-war period was both 
insular and conservative.1823 It was insular in that Japanese corporate governance had a unique 
structure that reflected the special characteristics of Japan, whether cultural or industrial. It was 
conservative in that in the familiar account, Japanese corporate governance largely walled off 
company management from external pressure, whether from the market or from shareholders.1824 
While a main bank may intervene in circumstances of distress, intervention comes from within rather 
than from without and later in the process than would be the case with US and UK.1825 Instead of 
adopting a blanket reform of its corporate law that applied to all corporations, as has been the 
                                                 
1818See Aguilera, R.V., de Castro, L.R.K., Lee, J.H. and You, J. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets’, forthcoming in Morgan, G., and R. Whitley, R. (2011), ‘Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st 
Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
1819See Aguilera, R.V., de Castro, L.R.K., Lee, J.H. and You, J. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets’, forthcoming in Morgan, G., and R. Whitley, R. (2011), ‘Capitalisms and Capitalism in the 21st 
Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
1820Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development - An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, US, at pages 8-13. 
1821Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development: An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, US, at pages 8-13. 
1822Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development: An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, US, at pages 8-13. 
1823Aoki, M., and Patrick, H. (1993), ‘The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and 
Transforming Economies’, Oxford University Press: New York. See also Amaeshi, K., Osuji, O.K., and Doh, 
J.P. (2011), ‘Corporate social responsibility as a market governance mechanism: Any implications for 
corporate governance in emerging economies?’, Paper presented at the Third International Conference on 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, Korea University Business School, Seoul. 
1824Aoki, M., and Patrick, H. (1993), ‘The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and 
Transforming Economies’, Oxford University Press: New York. See also Amaeshi, K., Osuji, O.K., and Doh, 
J.P. (2011), ‘Corporate social responsibility as a market governance mechanism: Any implications for 
corporate governance in emerging economies?’, Paper presented at the Third International Conference on 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, Korea University Business School, Seoul. 
1825Amaeshi, K., Osuji, O.K., and Doh, J.P. (2011), ‘Corporate social responsibility as a market governance 
mechanism: Any implications for corporate governance in emerging economies?’, Paper presented at 3rd 
International Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, Korea University Business School. 
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strategy, for example, in the transition economies arising out of the break-up of the Soviet Union or 
Korea following the Asian financial crisis, Japan followed an enabling strategy of reform.1826 Since 
2003, Japanese companies have had the option of choosing features of a US/UK style governance 
structure. According to Gilson and Milhaupt, this reform permits companies to change from a 
‘Japanese’ to a ‘US’ board structure, featuring independent committees of the board for audit, 
compensation, and nomination. 1827  These authors examined why Japanese companies might make 
the change and found that the belief that US corporate governance structures are superior to 
Japanese structures (one would assume at least before the US corporate governance scandals), so 
that the adoption serves a signalling and bonding function. According to Gilson and Milhaupt:  
 
‘The most straightforward explanation for a Japanese company adopting a board centered 
governance structure is the belief ... that the Anglo-Saxon governance structure was better suited 
to the current economic environment and therefore reform would lead to better corporate 
performance. From this perspective, companies would adopt the board committee structure to 
improve their performance. The difficulty with this analysis is the data. Studies of governance 
differences within developed countries in general, and of board composition in particular, do not 
show that “better” governance results in better performance. Only with respect to takeover 
defenses does there seem to be clear evidence that governance matters.’1828  
 
Milhaupt argues that the 2002 amendment to the Japanese Commercial Code, which permits choice 
in board structure, caps several years of corporate governance reform in Japan. 1829 Milhaupt 
                                                 
1826Gilson, R.J., and Milhaupt, C.J. (2004), ‘Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate 
Governance’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 251; Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 282. See also Bebchuk, L.A., and Weisbach, M.S. (2010), ‘The state of corporate 
governance research’, Review of Financial Studies, 23, at pages 939–961. 
1827Gilson, R.J., and Milhaupt, C.J. (2004), ‘Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate 
Governance’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 251; Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 282. 
1828Gilson, R.J., and Milhaupt, C.J. (2004), ‘Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate 
Governance’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 251; Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 282, at pages 25-27. See also Carney, R.W., and Child, T.B. (2011), ‘Changes to the 
ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 1996 and 2008’, Working Paper, S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Singapore, and the Australian National University. 
1829Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 234. See also Kose, A., Prasad, 
E., Rogoff, K., and Wei, S. (2010), ‘Financial globalization and economic policies’, Discussion Paper 7117, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research. See also Kato, K., Li, M. and Skinner, D.J. (2014), ‘Is Japan Really a 
'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies’, 
Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st Octber 2014, (13-06). 
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highlights the sheer volume of reform, evidenced by the most extensive amendments to Japanese 
corporate law found principally in the Commercial Code.1830  According to Gilson and Milhaupt:  
 
‘The 2002 amendment to the Commercial Code that enabled choice in the selection of board 
structure occurred in the midst of worldwide fallout from the Enron and WorldCom scandals. 
Ironically, at the precise moment Japanese firms were given the option of adopting “US-style” 
corporate governance (and that is how the new system is commonly, if controversially, referred 
to in Japan), the United States was undergoing its most serious corporate governance crisis in at 
least a generation. This, together with uncertainty about the stability of the political balance 
reflected in the 2002 amendment, may have slowed the migration to the new governance 
structure.’1831 
 
Milhaupt noted that the signs of change in response to the corporate law reform in Japan can be 
found in the areas of shareholder activism, corporate mergers and acquisitions and other 
organisational changes, board structure, and corporate finance.1832 At the same time, however, 
domestic institutional investors remained passive, management remained largely insulated from the 
market for corporate control, and ‘lifetime’ employment practices, while covering a declining subset 
of the Japanese workforce, remained firmly in place.1833 Milhaupt examined the pattern of change 
and non-change by analysing the relationship between corporate law and corporate governance and 
argued that corporate law has a limited relationship to corporate governance and the changes in 
corporate practices are brought about by dynamics external to the formal corporate governance 
institutions.1834 Furthermore, he argues that the extensive change in Japanese corporate governance 
                                                 
1830Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 234. See also Kato, K., Li, M. and 
Skinner, D.J. (2014), ‘Is Japan Really a 'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic 
Performance of Japanese Companies’, Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st October 2014, (13-06). 
1831Gilson, R.J., and Milhaupt, C.J. (2004), ‘Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate 
Governance’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 251; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working 
Paper 282, at 20. Qian, J., and Zhao, S. (2011), ‘Do shareholder rights matter? Evidence from a quasi-natural 
experiment’, Paper presented at the Third International Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets, Korea University Business School, Seoul. 
1832Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 234. McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., 
and Starks, L.T. (2010), ‘Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, 
Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 010/2010. Kato, K., Li, M. and Skinner, D.J. (2014), ‘Is Japan Really 
a 'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies’, 
Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st Octber 2014, (13-06). 
1833Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 234. McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., 
and Starks, L.T. (2010), ‘Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, 
Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 010/2010. Kato, K., Li, M. and Skinner, D.J. (2014), ‘Is Japan Really 
a 'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies’, 
Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st Octber 2014, (13-06). 
1834Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 234. McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., 
and Starks, L.T. (2010), ‘Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, 
Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 010/2010. Kato, K., Li, M. and Skinner, D.J. (2014), ‘Is Japan Really 
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must await further changes in the distribution of shareholders, in the capital markets, and in the 
incentive structures for management, and the further erosion of corporate norms that promote 
employee and managerial interests over shareholder interests.1835 
 
The classification of financial systems into bank and market centered is not an easy exercise. As 
discussed above, one way to classify financial systems is based on the existence of regulations 
restricting bank ownership of corporate equity. This approach is useful for distinguishing the US from 
Germany, which does not have such regulations. However, regulations restricting bank ownership 
of corporate equity do not assure the development of a market centred system.1836 Styre supports 
the view of Fligstein and Choo1837 that corporate governance literature in law has always considered 
political and social factors as fundamental to companies and economic growth and dismiss the 
classification of financial systems as bank or market centred because it misses the importance of 
investor rights.1838 Fligstein and Choo supported the view postulated by La Porta et al, namely that 
all financiers depend on legal protection to function and that a method of financing develops when it 
is protected by the law that gives financiers the power to get their money back.1839 For example 
Germany and certain German civil law countries have developed banking systems that afford strong 
legal protection of creditors, because without such rights German banks would have much less 
power. The same applies to the UK that also has a large banking and public debt sector, because 
creditors have extensive rights.1840 However, countries such as Italy and Belgium, for example, do 
not have well developed debt nor equity markets because of the limited legal protection afforded to 
minority shareholders.1841 Franks et al stated that in countries with poor shareholder protection they 
found that even the largest firms tend to have controlling shareholders and in most instances the 
controlling shareholders was a family and sometimes even the State.1842 The controlling 
                                                 
a 'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies’, 
Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st Octber 2014, (13-06). 
1835Milhaupt, C.J. (2003), ‘A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What's Changed, 
What Hasn't, and Why’, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 234. Kato, K., Li, M. and Skinner, D.J. 
(2014), ‘Is Japan Really a 'Buy'? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings, and Economic Performance of 
Japanese Companies’, Chicago Booth Research Paper, 1st Octber 2014 (13-06). 
1836Dam, L. and Koetter, M. (2012), ‘Bank bailouts and moral hazard: Evidence from Germany’, Review of 
Financial Studies, 25(8), at 2343-2380. 
1837Fligstein, N. and Choo, J. (2005), ‘Law and Corporate Governance’, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, at pages 61-83. Kose, A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., and Wei, S. (2010), ‘Financial globalization and 
economic policies’, Discussion Paper 7117, Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
1838Styhre, A. (2015), ‘A managerial revolution in reverse: finance market control of the corporation and the 
triumph of the agency theory model’, Management & Organizational History, 10(1), at 71-86. 
1839Fligstein, N. and Choo, J. (2005), ‘Law and Corporate Governance’, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, at pages 61-83. See also Giroud, X., and Mueller, H. (2010), ‘Does corporate governance matter in 
competitive industries?’, Journal of Financial Economics 95: at 312–31. 
1840Styhre, A. (2015), ‘A managerial revolution in reverse: finance market control of the corporation and the 
triumph of the agency theory model’, Management & Organizational History, 10(1), at pages 71-86. 
1841Fligstein, N. and Choo, J. (2005), ‘Law and Corporate Governance’, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, at pages 61-83. For a paper on the link between law and corporate governance see Claessens, S., 
and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development - An Update’, Global Corporate 
Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC., at 8-13. 
1842Franks, J., Volpin, P. and Wagner, H.F. (2012), ‘The Life Cycle of Family Ownership’, Review of Financial 
Studies, 25(6), at 1675-1712.   
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shareholders often control large firms through pyramid structures, and in part because they manage 
the firms they control.1843 This has resulted in these firms having a problem of separation of 
ownership and control. 1844 
 
Despite the difficulty of classifying financial systems into bank and market centred, Burkart et al 
highlight that bank centered financial systems distract attention from the important role that stock 
markets play in external finance.1845 They argue that equity financing is essential for the expansion 
of new companies whose main assets are growth opportunities, and are therefore in principle 
companies which could utilize private equity financing.1846 However, it has many of the same 
problems of excessive investor power suppressing entrepreneurial initiative as does a bank centred 
financial system. On the other hand public equity financing, for which a well developed stock market 
is needed, has other advantages over private equity financing. These advantages include allowing 
the buyers of equity to diversify.1847 It also offers the initial equity holders, such as the private equity 
fund, an attractive exit option through the public equity markets. In addition, it allows companies to 
time their equity issues to take advantage of favourable investor sentiment toward the market.  La 
Porta et al in a subsequent article state that a legal approach is a better way to understand corporate 
governance and its reform, rather than the common distinction between bank centered and market 
centred financial systems.1848 The aforementioned authors stated: 
 
‘... Our analysis suggests that the objective of corporate governance reform in most countries is 
to protect the rights of outside investors, including both shareholders and creditors. To organize 
this discussion, we draw a distinction between legal and functional convergence. Legal 
convergence refers to the changes in the rules and in enforcement mechanisms toward some 
desirable standard. To achieve legal convergence to effective investor protection, most countries 
                                                 
1843Borisova, G., Brockman, P., Salas, J.M. and Zagorchev, A. (2012), ‘Government ownership and corporate 
governance: Evidence from the EU’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(11), at 2917-2934. 
1844Borisova, G., Brockman, P., Salas, J.M. and Zagorchev, A. (2012), ‘Government ownership and corporate 
governance: Evidence from the EU’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(11), at pages 2917-2934. See also 
Horn, L. (2012), ‘Corporate governance in crisis? The politics of EU corporate governance regulation’, 
European Law Journal, 18(1), at pages 83-107. 
1845Burkart, M., Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. (1997), ‘Large shareholders, monitoring and fiduciary duty’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, at pages 693-728. See also Claessens, S., Ueda, K., and Yafeh, Y. 
(2010), ‘Financial frictions, investment, and institutions’, Discussion Paper DP 8170, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
1846Burkart, M., Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. (1997), ‘Large shareholders, monitoring and fiduciary duty’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, at pages 693-728. See also Claessens, S., Ueda, K., and Yafeh, Y. 
(2010), ‘Financial frictions, investment, and institutions’, Discussion Paper DP 8170, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
1847Burkart, M., Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. (1997), ‘Large shareholders, monitoring and fiduciary duty’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, at pages 693-728. See also Bruno, V., and Claessens, S. (2010), 
‘Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?’, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 19, at pages 461–82. 
1848La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1999), ‘Investor Protection: Origins, 
Consequences, Reform’, NBER Working Paper No. 7428. Available at www.nber.org/papers/w7428, accessed 
in August 2012, page 25. See also Bebchuk, L.A., and Weisbach, M.S. (2010), ‘The state of corporate 
governance research’, Review of Financial Studies, 23, at pages 939–961. 
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require extensive legal, regulatory, and judicial reform. Alternatively, functional convergence 
refers to more decentralized, market-based changes, which do not require legal reform per se, 
but still bring more firms and assets under the umbrella of effective legal protection of investors 
...’1849  
 
Fox and Heller state that the structural changes that took place in the world’s political economy 
during the 1980s and 1990s, made it even more imperative to examine carefully how social and legal 
arrangements affect firms, markets and economic growth across nations.1850 In addition, Claessens 
states that technological progress and opening up of financial markets have complicated the 
allocation and monitoring of capital within and between countries.1851  
 
It is submitted that the private equity industry should strive at bettering the corporate governance 
practices of investee companies based on the assumption that ultimately the investors in their private 
equity funds will benefit. However, this should be done within a legal framework that includes 
effective legal contracting and improved regulation. Since good governance requires adequate 
transparency and an effective board, there is a better chance for the private equity firm to detect 
problems and engage with management to take remedial action sooner rather than later. Private 
equity investments usually involve large interest in often illiquid companies and the private equity 
firms seldom have the option of disposing of their interests relatively quickly where an investee 
company encounters a major crisis. Thus, disclosure and transparency enables early detection of 
underperformance while the promotion of best practices, maintain management’s focus on the 
ultimate goals for the company.1852 In addition, sound governance should improve a company’s 
credibility. Investors would prefer dealing with a company that is transparent and properly governed. 
The primary objective of most private equity investments is to exit at a profit. Sullivan and Lim argue 
that there is a positive correlation between good governance and a company’s share price, in that 
the market is willing to pay a premium for a well governed company.1853  
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page 95. See also Bruno, V., and Claessens, S. (2010), ‘Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be 
too much of a good thing?’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19, at pages 461–82. 
1852Sullivan, P.H. and Lim, G. (2004), ‘Corporate Governance and Private Equity: Global Corporate 
Governance Guide 2004’, Globe White Page Ltd. 
1853Sullivan, P.H. and Lim, G. (2004), ‘Corporate Governance and Private Equity: Global Corporate 
Governance Guide 2004’, Globe White Page Ltd. Their study shows the relationship of corporate governance 
and the value of equity in public companies and that there is indeed such a premium. For a related discussion 
see also Yafeh, Y., and Hamdani, A. (2011), ‘Institutional investors as minority shareholders’, Working Paper 
172/2010, Fifth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, European Corporate Governance Institute, 
sourced from Social Science Research Network. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641138, accessed in 
May 2013. 
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that the consistent development of well defined corporate governance 
practices and laws in South Africa are essential.  It would be too restrictive to only focus such 
development in relation to the private equity business model, because corporate 
governance essentially involves balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders, which 
may include a private equity fund as a shareholder. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
define an appropriate corporate governance framework, other than to submit that a company should 
have an adequately defined and enforced corporate governance framework, which should be based 
on both statutory rules and a code of principles. It is evident from the above discussion that a 
corporate governance framework broadly consists of a system of rules, practices and processes, or 
laws by which a company is directed, operated, regulated, and controlled, but which is based on the 
principle of investor protection. 
 
Following on from this discussion is a legal analysis of the principles relating to the fiduciary duties 
of directors in corporate law. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss each of the 
fundamental fiduciary duties a director of a company must be mindful of in terms of common law and 
related statutory provisions.1854 Also it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the statutory 
standards of directors, in terms of section 75 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The provisions in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 that regulate a director’s duties are further supported by provisions, for 
example, sections 77 and 78 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which deal with the liability of directors 
and a director’s indemnity respectively; however both sections 77 and 78 are also beyond the scope 
of this discussion. However, the analysis in paragraph 2(b) of this chapter will include a broad 
discussion of section 76 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 because it makes provision for the 
codification of the fiduciary duties of directors.  
 
As briefly mentioned in chapter one, managers from private equity firms serve as directors of the 
private equity funds’ underlying investee companies in which the private equity firms invest. This 
feature has raised the importance of legal issues related to the fiduciary duties of directors, including 
the specific issues related to the interrelation of private equity firms and the portfolio companies in 
which they invest. Therefore, the next paragraph 2(b) will provide a critical analysis of the concept 
of fiduciary duties and will analyse the common law rules and relevant case law, as well as related 




2(b) Fiduciary Duties 
 
                                                 
1854Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208. 





It is trite that the relationship between a private equity firm and the investors is that of principal and 
agent, in terms of which the investor (as principal) engages the private equity firm (as agent) to invest 
in investee companies for the benefit of the investors.  In terms of the private equity business model, 
the investors invest in a private equity fund managed by the private equity firm who in turn invests 
the investor capital into numerous underlying portfolio companies on their (investors) behalf. As part 
of managing these underlying portfolio companies, the private equity firm typically appoints staff 
member(s) to the board of directors of these companies to manage the interest of the private equity 
fund. For this reason it is important to discuss the statutory and common law duties of a director, 
such as his or her fiduciary duties. According to Stevens and De Beer, directors of companies in 
terms of South African common law have two duties; namely fiduciary duties and the duty of skill 
and care.1855 They state that the duty of skill and care is delictual in nature.1856 Nevertheless, it is 
beyond the scope of this paragraph to discuss the common law duty of skill and care, but rather to 
focus on the fiduciary duties of a director of a company.  
 
Black’s Law Dictionary, defines a fiduciary is either ‘one who owes to another the duties of good 
faith, trust, confidence, and candor,’ or ‘one who must exercise a high standard of care in managing 
another’s money or property’.1857 According to the Wex legal dictionary: 
 
‘A fiduciary duty is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty 
are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. Fiduciaries 
may not profit from their relationship with their principals unless they have the principals' express 
informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between themselves 
and their principals or between their principals and the fiduciaries' other clients. A fiduciary duty 
is the strictest duty of care’1858 
 
A more appropriate definition in the context of this discussion is the one put forward by Idensohn 
that states: 
 
‘According to the ‘voluntary assumption or contractual’ theory, a fiduciary relationship arises only 
where a person willingly undertakes or assumes a position of trust, confidence and loyalty in 
relation to a vulnerable beneficiary who legitimately expects and relies on the maintenance of that 
trust, confidence and loyalty ... The general function of the fiduciary principle is to ensure that the 
                                                 
1855Stevens, R., and De Beer, P. (2016), ‘The Duty of Care and Skill, and Reckless Trading: Remedies in 
Flux?’, South African Mercantile Law Journal, 2, at page 250. 
1856Stevens, R., and De Beer, P. (2016), ‘The Duty of Care and Skill, and Reckless Trading: Remedies in 
Flux?’, South African Mercantile Law Journal, 2, at page 250. 
1857Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition (2009), 702. 
1858Available  at www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty, accessed in June 2015. 
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interests of the beneficiary remain paramount, and to do so prophylactically by imposing strict 
liability and deterring opportunistic breaches by the fiduciary.’1859 
 
Frankel describes a fiduciary relationship as follows:  
 
‘As in a status relation, one party to a fiduciary relation (the entrustor) is dependent on the other 
(the fiduciary) … By definition, the entrustor becomes dependent because he must rely on the 
fiduciary for a particular service … Moreover, unless the entrustor agrees, the fiduciary cannot 
manipulate the terms of his performance once the relation has been established. In contrast to 
contract and status relations, in which both parties seek to satisfy their own needs and desires 
through the relation, fiduciary relations are designed not to satisfy both parties' needs, but only 
those of the entrustor. Thus, a fiduciary may enter into a fiduciary relation without regard to his 
own needs. Moreover, an entrustor does not owe the fiduciary anything by virtue of the relation 
except in accordance with the agreed-upon terms or legally fixed status duties. Therefore, in a 
fiduciary relation, the entrustor is free from domination by the fiduciary, although he may still be 
coerced in parallel status relation. Thus, fiduciary relations combine the bargaining freedom 
inherent in contract relations with a limited form of the power and dependence of status relations. 
Accordingly, the law of fiduciary relations should, if possible, preserve the best aspects of status 
and contract relations. It is desirable for the entrustor to depend on the fiduciary to satisfy certain 
needs. But it would not be desirable for fiduciary law to impose the relation on either law should 
permit the parties to enter into the relation freely and to ensure that the fiduciary will not coerce 
the entrustor.’1860 
 
Ribstein remarks that the most famous judicial expression of fiduciary duties is Justice Cardozo’s 
lines in the case of Meinhard v Salmon,1861 where he stated: 
 
‘Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty 
of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter 
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is 
                                                 
1859Idensohn, K. (2010), ‘The regulation of shadow directors’, 22 SA Mercantile Law Journal at 334. 
Furthermore, Idensohn mention that the voluntary assumption and legitimate expectation criteria have found 
particular favour with the English courts and quoted Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding (2005) EWHC 1638 (Ch), 
note 11 in paragraph 1285, as quoted in McGhee, J. (2005), ‘Snell’s Equity’, 31 ed, in paragraph 7-07. Namely, 
‘... there is growing judicial support for the view that a fiduciary is someone who have undertaken to act for or 
on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relation of trust and confidence. 
The concept encaptures a situation where one person is in a relationship with another which gives rise to a 
legitimate expectation, which equity will recognise, that the fiduciary will not utilise his or her position in such 
a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal ...’. 
1860Frankel, T. (1983), ‘Fiduciary Law’, California Law Review, May 1983, 71, at pages 797-802. 
1861Meinhard v Salmon 1928 (164) N.E. 545, (N.Y), at 546. 
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unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular 
exceptions (citation omitted). Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level 
higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this 
court.’1862 
 
Fiduciary duties are duties that are based on the concept of good faith and are owed to the company 
as a result of the control that directors exercise over the assets of the company, and the power that 
is held by such directors to act on behalf of another.1863 Fiduciary duties are non-negotiable and 
cannot be waived in any manner or form.1864 Furthermore, a fiduciary relationship, in the context of 
a company and its director, emanates from the concept of trust and the director putting the interest 
of the company before his or her own interests.1865 In Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Brothers1866 
the court accepted that a director of a company must not place himself in a position in which his duty 
and self-interest may conflict with each other. This duty protects the company from potential abuses 
by a director, for instance, where a director is faced with a situation where he or she could negatively 
impact the business of a company by not placing the interest of the company first.1867 According to 
Blackman et al, a fiduciary duty in broad terms is a person who has the responsibility or is required 
by law to act in the best interest of another and therefore by handling a company’s affairs the 
directors of a company owes fiduciary duties to the company.1868 According to Cassim, all directors 
of companies by virtue of their positions in relation to the company have fiduciary duties that have to 
be adhered to at all times.1869 Blackman et al, acknowledge nine fundamental fiduciary duties which 
directors must be mindful not to breach at any given time.1870 According to Blackman et al, directors 
may not: 
 
‘(i) exceed their power; or (ii) exercise their power for an improper or collateral purpose; or (iii) 
fetter their discretion; or (iv) place themselves in a position in which their personal interest conflict, 
                                                 
1862Ribstein, L.E. (2005), ‘Are Partners Fiduciaries?’, University of Illinois Law Review, Symposium Issue, 
Volume 2005, No. 1, February 2005; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 04-20 at page 210. 
1863Delport, P. and Esser, I.M. (2011), ‘The duty of care, skill and diligence: The King report and the 2008 
Companies Act’, Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 74, at 449. 
1864Delport, P. and Esser, I.M. (2011), ‘The duty of care, skill and diligence: The King report and the 2008 
Companies Act’, Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 74, at 449. 
1865Havenga, M. (1996), ‘Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Liability on What Basis?’, 8 SA Mercantile Law 
Journal 366.  
1866Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Brothers, 1854 (2) ER Rep 12 461. 
1867Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Brothers, 1854 (2) ER Rep 12 461. 
1868Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208. 
1869Cassim, M.F. (2009), ‘Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd: Fiduciary Duties of Resigning Directors’, 
126, South African Law Journal 61. Cassim discussed Da Silva and others v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd, 2008 (6) 
SA 620 (SCA), where the argument was raised that a director, in certain instances, will also have a fiduciary 
duty to a company even after resignation. 
1870Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208. 
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or may possibly conflict, with their duties to the company; or (v) deal with the company otherwise 
than openly and in good faith; or (vi) make a secret profit; or (vii) take certain economic 
opportunities; or (viii) compete with the company; or (ix) misuse confidential information.’1871 
 
As mentioned above, one of the typical features of private equity investing is the private equity firm 
appointing individual(s) to serve on the board of directors of the underlying portfolio investee 
companies to manage the interest of the private equity fund and ultimately to act in the best interest 
the fund’s investors. However, in the context of a private equity fund, this expectation can often be 
problematic because directors must exercise their duties as directors with unfettered discretion. 
Directors cannot, without the consent of the company, fetter their discretion in relation to the exercise 
of their powers, and cannot bind themselves to vote in a particular way at future board meetings.1872 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen1873 the court held that if a director is 
appointed to represent certain shareholders he/she is still obliged to exercise his/her discretion and 
must act positively to protect the interests of the company even if they conflict with those of the 
people who elected him. In this case, it was stated as follows: 
 
‘ … in carrying out his duties and functions as director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests 
of the company to the exclusion of any such nominator, employer or principal.’1874 
 
According to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’): 
 
‘This dual role creates an ongoing obligation for the appointed individual to consider the needs of 
both parties independently, and to ensure that any information received from either party is not 
shared inappropriately. While it is generally considered that the interests of the firm, its fund 
investors and the portfolio companies are well aligned, that alignment may break down in 
instances where, for example, the investee company may be seeking additional funding as a 
result of extreme financial distress. However, in such circumstances it is common for the private 
equity firm to instruct another member of its staff (or independent party) to monitor the investee 
company on behalf of the fund, leaving its board representative free to fulfil those duties owed to 
the investee company. This issue is already addressed under company law which often clarifies 
                                                 
1871Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208. 
1872Ferran, E. (1994), ‘The Decision of the House of Lords in Russel v Northern Bank Development Corporation 
Ltd’, Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 53(2), at pages 343-366. 
1873Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWF Investments (Ply) Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 156 (W). 
1874Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWF Investments (Ply) Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at 156. 
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the requirement that as a director of the investee company such individuals have a primary 
responsibility to the company.’1875 
 
In the case Kregor v Hollins1876 the principle was established that company directors must exercise 
an independent and unfettered discretion. A company director cannot fetter his discretion by way of 
a contract with an outsider. The facts of the case were that Hollins invested £5,000 and agreed to 
pay remuneration to Kregor to act as his nominee director. Hollins defaulted in paying and Kregor 
succeeded in a suit when there was a finding of fact that the agreement did not obligate Kregor to 
put Hollin's interest above that of the company.1877 Judge Avory (Court of Appeal) stated that if Kregor 
was to prefer the interest of Hollins to that of the shareholders and that if there is conflict that Kregor 
was to promote Hollin's interests rather than the interests of the whole body of shareholders (which 
were in conflict), then the agreement will be unlawful.1878 Cassim et al makes reference to Keay1879 
when stating: 
 
‘Accordingly, a voting agreement under which a director binds him- or herself to vote or to 
exercise his or her powers in accordance with the instructions of some other person, thereby 
fettering the director’s discretion, will not be enforced by the court. The effect of such a voting 
agreement, if it were to be binding, is that the directors thereby disable themselves from 
acting honestly in what they believe to be the best interest of the company.’1880 
 
Company directors are required to act independently of control by any other person and must 
exercise their own judgment as to the discharge of their duties.1881 Therefore company directors may 
not simply act as the proxies or nominees of other people.1882 In practice, it will not be a good defence 
from liability to an action for breach of a fiduciary duty, for a director (private equity firm’s appointed 
individual) to argue that he/she simply took instructions from another. In the private equity industry, 
the duty to exercise an independent judgment is critical when it comes to nominee directors (private 
equity firm’s appointed director). In this regard the High Court judgment in Fisheries Development 
                                                 
1875International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at page 18. 
1876Kregor v Hollins, (1913) 109 LT 225 (King’s Bench Division and Court of Appeal). 
1877Kregor v Hollins, (1913) 109 LT 225 (King’s Bench Division and Court of Appeal). 
1878Kregor v Hollins, (1913) 109 LT 225 (King’s Bench Division and Court of Appeal). See also Fulham FC Ltd 
v Cobra Estates Plc, (1994) 1 BCLC 363. 
1879Keay, A. (2008), ‘The Duty of Directors to Exercise Independent Judgment’, Company Lawyer, 29.10, at 
pages 290-296. 
1880Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 528-529. 
1881Sealy, L.S. (1971), ‘Cases and Materials in Company Law’, Cambridge Legal Case Books, Cambridge 
University Press, at page 396. 
1882Sealy, L.S. (1971), ‘Cases and Materials in Company Law’, Cambridge Legal Case Books, Cambridge 
University Press, at page 396. 
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Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ 
Investments (Pty) Ltd1883 is particularly important:  
 
‘A director is in that capacity not the servant or agent of a shareholder who votes for or otherwise 
procures his appointment to the board …. The director’s duty is to observe the utmost good faith 
towards the company, and in discharging that duty he is required to exercise independent 
judgment and to take decisions according to the best interests of the company as his principal. 
He may in fact be representing the interests of the person who nominated him, and he may even 
be the servant or agent of that person, but, in carrying out his duties as a director, he is in law 
obliged to serve the best interests of the company to the exclusion of the interests of any such 
nominator, employer or principal. He therefore cannot fetter his vote as a director, save in so far 
as may be a contract for the board to vote in that way in the best interests of the company, and, 
as a director, he cannot be subject to the control of any employer or principal other than the 
company.’1884 
 
It is common practice to appoint nominee directors and it is expected that any decisions made by 
such nominee directors, ‘must be in accordance with what he genuinely and honestly considers to 
be in the best interests of the company’.1885 According to Cassim et al: 
 
‘Financial institutions frequently appoint nominees to safeguard their interest. The courts have 
ruled that there is nothing inherently dishonest or improper about nominee directors. In most 
cases no harm is done to the company mainly because the interests of the nominator often 
coincide with, or conform to, those of the company, to the extent that they both desire the company 
to prosper. This enables nominee directors to comply with their duties both to the company as 
well as to their nominators. When, however, the interests of the company clash with those of the 
nominator there is a manifest conflict of interest that puts the nominee director in an invidious 
position. The problem is exacerbated if the nominee is also an employee of the nominator.’1886 
 
In the case Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd1887 the plaintiff trustee of a 
company loan stock sought to make the employer (the employer being a bank who had made 
nominee appointments to the debtor company board) of the two directors who negligently prepared 
financial certificates for the trustee relating to the stock, liable for their negligent acts. The plaintiff 
                                                 
1883Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and another; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163. 
1884Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and another; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163. 
1885Cassim, F.H.I. (2011), ‘The Practitioners Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Chapter 8: The Fiduciary 
and Statutory Duties of Directors, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 85. 
1886Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 530. 
1887Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd 1990 (3) All ER 404 (PC). 
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trustee had to show that the employees were acting within the scope of the defendant’s employment, 
as distinct from their agency authority from the company of which they were directors.1888 Lord Lowry, 
in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council dismissed the plaintiff trustee’s claim and stated: 
 
‘the two directors owed three separate duties. They owed in the first place to the company the 
duty to perform their duties as directors without gross negligence ... they owed a duty to the 
plaintiff (the trustee) to use reasonable care to see that the certificates complied with the 
requirements of the trust deed. Finally, they owed a duty to their employer, the bank, to exercise 
reasonable diligence and skill in the performance of their duties as directors … but these duties 
were separate and distinct and different in scope and nature.’1889 
 
The common law principle with regard to the duty to exercise an independent judgment is clear. 
Despite a nominee director representing the interests of the nominator, the nominee is required in 
law to serve the interest of the company to the exclusion of the interests of its nominator.1890 
According to Cassim et al: 
 
‘As directors, they cannot be subject to the control of any employer or principal other than the 
company. In short, a director may not serve two masters as this gives rise to conflicting loyalties. 
It is the interests of the company, and not that of the nominator, that are paramount.’1891 
 
The case Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise1892 is a Supreme Court of 
Canada decision on the scope of the fiduciary duty upon directors and officers of a corporation. The 
court held that that there is a distinction between the interests of the corporation and those of the 
stakeholders and creditors. The court also placed significant heavy emphasis on the fact that a 
director owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation.1893 The facts of the case were that Wise Stores 
Inc. was a retail store chain whose shares were primarily held by the three Wise brothers. In 1992 
they acquired Peoples Department Store, a competitor. From 1994 their business interests went 
through a difficult time and in an attempt to reduce costs they developed a scheme where certain 
inventory would be purchased through Peoples and then given to Wise on credit. Soon thereafter, 
Wise owed in excess of $18 million to Peoples and by 1995, both Wise and Peoples declared 
bankruptcy. The creditors for Peoples brought an action against the Wise brothers for breach of their 
fiduciary duties as directors by implementing the credit scheme. The Trustees argued that the Wise 
                                                 
1888Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd 1990 (3) All ER 404 (PC). 
1889Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd 1990 (3) All ER 404 (PC). 
1890Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 530-531. 
1891Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 531. 
1892Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise 2004, 3 S.C.R. 461.  
1893Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise 2004, 3 S.C.R. 461.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 295 
 
brothers favoured the interests of Wise Stores over that of Peoples. At trial the Quebec Superior 
Court found that the Wise brothers breached their fiduciary duty, however the decision of the trial 
judge was overturned by the Quebec Court of Appeal.1894 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise1895 held that 
a director is not an agent of the shareholders or other stakeholders. The director is expected at all 
times to act in the best interests of the corporation as a complete entity, and not in the best interests 
of any of its individual parts.1896 The court went on to state that this principle of corporate altruism 
becomes questionable when a director is a nominee of a specific shareholder. Furthermore, the 
nominee director must balance his/her overarching duty to the corporation and his/her obligation to 
his/her appointing shareholder.1897 In the case 820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd,1898 the 
court stated that whether this balance can be achieved depends, realistically, on the degree of 
involvement of the appointing shareholder. In 820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd,1899 Farley 
J stated as follows: 
 
‘ … the life of a nominee director who votes against the interests of his appointing shareholder is 
neither happy nor long.’1900 
 
In the case Hawkes v Cuddy,1901 Burton LJ stated that: 
 
‘In my judgement, the fact that a director of a company has been nominated to that office by a 
shareholder does not, of itself, impose any duty on the director owed to his nominator. The director 
may owe duties to his nominator if he is an employee or officer of the nominator, or by reason of 
a formal or informal agreement with his nominator, but such duties do not arise out of his 
nomination, but out of a separate agreement or office. Such duties cannot however, detract from 
his duty to the company of which he is a director when he is acting as such … an appointed 
director, without being in breach of his duties to the company, may take the interests of his 
nominator into account, provided that his decisions as a director are in what he genuinely 
considers to be the best interests of the company; but that is a very different thing from his being 
under a duty to his nominator by reason of his appointment by it.’1902 
 
                                                 
1894Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise 2004, 3 S.C.R. 461.  
1895Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise 2004, 3 S.C.R. 461.  
1896See also Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp 1998, 42 O.R. (3d) 177. 
1897Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise 2004, 3 S.C.R. 461.  
1898820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd 1991, 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113 (ON. S.C.). 
1899820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd 1991, 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113 (ON. S.C.). 
1900820099 Ontario Ltd v Harold E. Ballard Ltd 1991, 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113 (ON. S.C.). 
1901Hawkes v Cuddy 2009 EWCA Civ 291. 
1902Hawkes v Cuddy 2009 EWCA Civ 291. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 296 
 
In an ideal scenario, the interests of the underlying portfolio company and its shareholders will be 
aligned with the private equity fund that wants to improve shareholder value to increase the return 
on its investment. However, the commercial reality is that there will be instances in which these 
interests will come into conflict, which will put the private equity fund appointed director in a position 
of conflict between his/her fiduciary duties to the portfolio company and his/her duties to the private 
equity fund. For instance, conflicts of interest could result from situation in which certain transactions 
benefit the private equity fund's short term objectives but not the long term objectives of the 
underlying portfolio investee company and its other shareholders. An example would be where the 
private equity fund wants the portfolio company to raise additional debt finance to grow the company 
‘quicker’ in order for it to exit sooner, rather than grow at a slower rate using organic earnings to 
finance the company’s growth.  
 
Furthermore, it is suffice to state that board members have fiduciary duties to the companies on 
whose boards they serve. These duties requires directors to keep themselves informed about the 
affairs of the company and to use all reasonably available information when making decisions as a 
board member. These duties require directors to place the interests of the company and its 
shareholders ahead of their own personal interests and the interests of private equity fund that 
appointed them. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to expect that a person who serves on a 
portfolio company board as an appointee of his/her private equity fund also has a duty to such private 
equity fund. For instance, the private equity fund appointee director would typically be a member of 
the private equity firm, which in turn is the manager of the private equity fund in which the investors 
made their investments. The private equity firm owes duties to the investors in terms of the private 
equity fund partnership agreements, therefore the private equity fund appointee director owe duties 
to the private equity fund's investors to take reasonable actions to secure the investors' return on 
their investment in the private equity fund. It will be argued throughout this chapter that company 
directors must however, at all times, exercise an independent and unfettered discretion and that a 
company director cannot fetter his/her discretion by way of a contract with an outsider, such as with 
the private equity fund that appointed him/her. Particularly in those situations where there is a conflict 
between the interests of the underlying portfolio investee company, with those of the private equity 
fund, the private equity fund appointee director must always act in the interest of the company on 
whose board he/she serves.1903 However, what would be the position in a practical situation where 
the shareholders of a company consents to a private equity fund nominee director negotiating with 
the company, but on behalf of the private equity fund (his/her nominator) and ultimately putting the 
interest of the private equity fund before that of the company? 
 
In Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport it was recognised that the shareholders could, by 
unanimous consent, agree that a nominee director could negotiate with the company on behalf of 
                                                 
1903See Kregor v Hollins, (1913) 109 LT 225 (King’s Bench Division and Court of Appeal). 
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his nominator without regard to the best interests of the company.1904 In South Africa, the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 does not specifically make reference to the duty to exercise any independent 
judgment, since the duty to exercise an independent judgment is an aspect of the directors’ duty to 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company.1905 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in 
general, a director may not fetter his discretion by contracting with other directors or with third parties 
to act in a certain way in the future. Therefore, a director’s obligation to act in accordance with his 
fiduciary duties would usually take precedence over any course of conduct he may have previously 
agreed with co-directors or third parties.1906 However, there is authority to the effect that a director 
would not be fettering his discretion where he/she has entered into a contract for the company on a 
bona fide basis which requires the director or any number of directors to act in a certain way in order 
to give effect to the contract. Also, provided the decision to enter the contract is made in accordance 
with the fiduciary duties of the director, the consequence of the manner in which he may be required 
to act in accordance with the contract remains as a result of the exercise of fiduciary duties.1907 
However, this would not be so in the case of a contract binding a director to exercise his discretion 
in a certain way, which has not been entered into for or on behalf of the company at all, or for or on 
behalf of the company other than in accordance with the fiduciary duties of the director.1908 The 
Australian case Thorby v Goldberg dealt with the restructuring of the capital of a company in terms 
of an agreement entered into in advance with regard to certain steps which would be taken.1909 In 
this case Kitto J stated as follows: 
 
‘The argument for illegality postulates that since the discretionary powers of directors are 
fiduciary, in the sense that every exercise of them is required to be in good faith for the benefit of 
the company as a whole, an agreement is contrary to the policy of the law and void if thereby the 
directors of a company purport to fetter their discretions in advance: see Gower on Modern 
Company Law 2nd ed (1957) p 478. It is said that the agreement in the present case does purport 
to bind those of the O Group who are directors to take future steps as to which it is their duty to 
exercise an unfettered discretion when the time comes for taking those steps. There may be more 
answers than one to the argument, but I content myself with one. There are many kinds of 
transactions in which the proper time for the exercise of the directors' discretion is the time of the 
negotiation of a contract, and not the time at which the contract is to be performed. A sale of land 
                                                 
1904Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport 2008 EWHC 2810 (Ch). 
1905Cassim, F.H.I. (2011), ‘The Practitioners Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, Chapter 8: The Fiduciary 
and Statutory Duties of Directors, Juta and Company Ltd, at page 85. 
1906See Keay, A. (2007), ‘Tackling the issue of the corporate objective: an analysis of the United Kingdom's 
enlightened shareholder value approach’, Sydney Law Review, 29, at 577. 
1907See Keay, A.R. (2010), ‘The duty to promote the success of the company: is it fit for purpose?’, University 
of Leeds School of Law, Centre for Business Law and Practice Working Paper. See also Ashton, P. (2013), 
‘How Fred the Shred Got Away with It: Loud Calls for Company Law Reform’, Birkbeck Law Review, 1, at 187. 
1908See also Parry, R. (2005), ‘Directors’ duties within the United Kingdom’, Research Handbook on Corporate 
Legal Responsibility, 73. See also Siems, M.M. (2002), ‘Shareholders, Stakeholders and the 'Ordoliberalism'’, 
European Business Law Review, 13, at pages 147-159. 
1909Thorby v Goldberg 1964, 112 CLR 597. 
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is a familiar example. Where all the members of a company desire to enter as a group into a 
transaction such as that in the present case, the transaction being one which requires action by 
the board of directors for its effectuation, it seems to me that the proper time for the directors to 
decide whether their proposed action will be in the interests of the company as a whole is the time 
when the transaction is being entered into, and not the time when their action under it is required. 
If at the former time they are bona fide of opinion that it is in the interests of the company that the 
transaction should be entered into and carried into effect, I see no reason in law why they should 
not bind themselves to do whatever under the transaction is to be done by the board. In my 
opinion the defendants' contention that the agreement is void for illegality should be rejected.’1910 
 
In Thorby v Goldberg, Litton J also stated: 
 
‘If, when a contract is negotiated on behalf of a company, the directors bona fide think it is the 
interests of the company as a whole that the transaction should be entered into and carried into 
effect they may bind themselves by contract to do whatever is necessary to effectuate it.’1911 
 
In Thorby v Goldberg, Owen J also stated as follows: 
 
‘For all that appears from the plea, the directors of the Company may, before the execution of the 
agreement, have given proper consideration to the desirability of entering into it and decided that 
it was in the best interests of the Company that it should be made. If so, it would be impossible to 
argue that they had by executing the document, improperly fettered the future exercise of their 
discretion.’1912 
 
The judgment in the Australian case Thorby v Goldberg1913 was referred to with approval in the 
English decision of Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc.1914 In this case, the Court of Appeal 
dealt with a number of arguments relating to an agreement between shareholders and directors 
relating to planning permission to develop certain land for residential purposes.1915 Furthermore, inter 
alia, the directors argued that the restraints imposed by the covenants contained in the agreements 
were unenforceable as being illegal; and contrary to public policy; and that they could not be bound 
by the undertakings so far as they conflicted with their fiduciary duties to the club as directors.1916 
The judge accepted the first and second arguments, and rejected the third on the basis that the 
                                                 
1910Thorby v Goldberg 1964, 112 CLR 597. 
1911Thorby v Goldberg 1964, 112 CLR 597. 
1912Thorby v Goldberg 1964, 112 CLR 597. 
1913Thorby v Goldberg 1964, 112 CLR 597. 
1914Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
1915Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
1916Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
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directors had assumed the obligations in question as the only members of the company.1917 Neill LJ 
stated as follows: 
 
‘Before the judge it was argued by the plaintiffs that it was an implied term of the undertaking that 
the directors would not thereby be required to do anything that would be inconsistent with the 
fiduciary duties owed by them to the company. It was further argued that, whether or not any such 
term should be implied, as a matter of law a director of a company may not fetter the exercise of 
his fiduciary duties by contractual undertaking. Both these arguments were rejected by the judge 
but were revived before us by a respondent's notice. It is trite law that directors are under a duty 
to act bona fide in the interests of their company. However, it does not follow from that proposition 
that directors can never make a contract by which they bind themselves to the future exercise of 
their powers in a particular manner, even though the contract taken as a whole is manifestly for 
the benefit of the company. Such a rule could well prevent companies from entering into contracts 
which were commercially beneficial to them.’1918 
 
In addition, the English cases Rackham v Peek Foods1919 and John Crowther v Carpets 
International,1920 were referred to in Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc,1921 affirming the view 
that an undertaking given by a director of a company to act in a certain way, will remain subject to 
the director's fiduciary duty to act bona fide and in the best interests of the company at the time. Neill 
LJ further stated:  
 
‘We were referred to two English cases at first instance where in each the court held that an 
undertaking by directors to use their best endeavours to ensure that their shareholders should 
approve a particular deal by the company (in one case a purchase, in the other a sale) was 
unenforceable. The cases are Rackham v Peek Foods Ltd 1990 BCLC 895 and John Crowther 
Group plc v Carpets International plc 1990 BCLC 460. In neither case was Thorby v Goldberg 
cited. It may be that these decisions can be justified on their particular facts, but they should not 
be read as laying down a general proposition that directors can never bind themselves as to the 
future exercise of their fiduciary powers. If they could be so read then they would be wrong.’1922 
 
                                                 
1917Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
1918Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
1919Rackham v Peek Foods 1990 BCLC 895. 
1920John Crowther v Carpets International 1990 BCLC 460. 
1921Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
1922Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates Plc 1992 BCC 863. 
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Nevertheless, the above mentioned cases affirm the position that the wording of the agreements in 
question are critical with regard to the director's fiduciary duty to act bona fide and in the best 
interests of the company.1923 In the case Rackham v Peek Foods,1924 Templeman J stated that: 
 
‘Of course, directors normally recommend a conditional agreement because otherwise they would 
never have allowed the company to enter into the agreement itself. But, if, after the date of the 
conditional agreement, the directors consider that the bargain has become unacceptable from the 
point of view of the shareholders, it is the duty of the directors so to advise the shareholders and 
that advice by the directors does not constitute a breach of the 'best endeavours' covenant by the 
company. Similarly, although Bates had given a 'best endeavours' covenant, they were 
nevertheless entitled and bound to give honest advice to Consolidated and could not be in breach 
of their covenant if they gave honest advice, albeit that the advice resulted in the agreement failing 
to become unconditional.’1925 
 
It is submitted that the common law would support the view that a director may enter into a contract 
on a bona fide basis in the best interests of the company, with the result that the director is obliged 
by the contract to act in a certain way in the future, which may not be construed as an improper 
fettering of discretion.1926 This being so, despite the general principle that a director may not fetter 
his discretion. Nevertheless, apart from fiduciary duties, other issues arise in the case of a director 
attempting to agree to act in a certain manner in the future.1927 Odell states that where the future 
conduct being agreed to is uncertain in relation to the facts, it gives rise to the following contractual 
issues: 
 
‘certainty – whether an agreement requiring a director to vote in a certain manner is sufficiently 
certain as a matter of contract law, in particular if the manner in which he should vote, and subject 
matter with respect to which he will vote, remains unknown at the time he enters into the 
agreement; and legality – whether an agreement may be void for illegality on the basis that it is 
too broad and constitutes an unlawful fettering of discretion. In this regard, we anticipate that a 
                                                 
1923Copp, S.F. (2009), ‘Corporate social responsibility and the Companies Act 2006’, Economic Affairs, 29(4), 
at pages 16-21. Keay, A.R. (2010), ‘The duty to promote the success of the company: is it fit for purpose?’, 
University of Leeds School of Law, Centre for Business Law and Practice Working Paper. See also Keay, A. 
(2007), ‘Tackling the issue of the corporate objective: an analysis of the United Kingdom's enlightened 
shareholder value approach’, Sydney Law Review, 29, at 577. 
1924Rackham v Peek Foods 1990 BCLC 895. 
1925Rackham v Peek Foods 1990 BCLC 895. 
1926Copp, S.F. (2009), ‘Corporate social responsibility and the Companies Act 2006’, Economic Affairs, 29(4), 
at 16-21. 
1927See Stevens, R., and De Beer, P. (2016), ‘The Duty of Care and Skill, and Reckless Trading: Remedies in 
Flux?’, South African Mercantile Law Journal, 2, at 250. 
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distinction may be drawn between a case where the future conduct agreed to is agreed in the 
absence of knowledge of the specific facts to which the agreed conduct will apply.’1928 
 
As submitted at the closing of paragraph 2(a) of this chapter, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss each of the fundamental fiduciary duties a director of a company must be mindful of in terms 
of common law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is important firstly to consider the fiduciary 
relationship that exists between directors and their respective companies. The central idea in a 
fiduciary relationship is service of another's interests and so fiduciaries must avoid putting 
themselves in a position where they will be tempted into their own interests or any interest other than 
their principal's. The common law principles discussed above, as developed by the courts, remains 
relevant to the statutory standards of directors in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which will 
be discussed next. 
 
Statutory Provisions  
 
As mentioned at the closing of paragraph 2(a) of this chapter, the discussion of the common-law 
fiduciaries duties will now be followed by a broad discussion of the related statutory provision, namely 
section 76 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 76 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 makes 
provision for the codification of the fiduciary duties of directors, as well as the standards of conduct 
required to be performed and exercised by a director. As mentioned above in terms of the common 
law discussion, Blackman et al are of the view that in the group of companies scenario a director 
only owes duties to the company he works for and not for any other company in the group.1929 In the 
holding-subsidiary company scenario, particularly where nominee directors are put on the board of 
subsidiary companies by the holding company, such directors should not dismiss their duties to the 
subsidiary for the sole benefit of the holding company.1930 Section 76(2)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 clarifies the common law fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the company and 
imposes a duty on directors not to misuse their positions as directors or not to use information 
obtained as directors to knowingly cause harm to a subsidiary of a company. According to Cassim 
et al: 
 
‘Moreover, section 76(2)(a) does not explicitly require the use of the position of director or any 
information obtained as director to be improper, but it is submitted that the whole tenor and 
                                                 
1928Odell, A. (2013), ‘Jersey: Appointing Nominee Directors And Fettering Of Discretion Of Directors’, Institute 
of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, March 2013. Available at  
www.icsa.org.uk/?utm_source=website&utm_medium=icsa-promotion-ad&utm_campaign=mondaq, 
accessed in  June 2015. 
1929Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208. 
1930See Botha, D.H. (1983), ‘Holding and subsidiary companies: fiduciary duties of directors’, 16 De Jure 234, 
(1984), De Jure 167. 
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intention of the section is that it is improper to use the office of director, or information obtained 
as director to gain an advantage for him-or herself, or to knowingly cause harm to the company 
or its subsidiary...Section 76(2)(a)(i) encapsulates the common-law ‘non-profit’ rule and imposes 
a mandatory and positive duty on directors to avoid a conflict of interest...’1931 
 
Cassim et al state that the statutory duty in terms of sections 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 and the common-law fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of interest, should support each 
other and that the courts should be left to develop these parallel duties so that they are mutually 
reinforcing.1932 This approach should be supported by the view stated by Blackman et al:  
 
‘... while certain duties apply without qualification to all directors, the extent to which other duties 
apply to particular directors depends upon the tasks or functions assigned to or assumed by 
them.’1933 
 
It is submitted that section 76(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 places a positive obligation on a 
director to avoid any conflict of interests with the company. This obligation is two-fold. Firstly, in terms 
of section 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as discussed above, a director must not use 
the position of director to gain an advantage for the director or for another person other than the 
company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company; or knowingly cause harm to the company or 
a subsidiary of the company. Secondly, section 76(2)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 places a 
mandatory duty on a director of a company to communicate to the board, at the earliest moment 
possible, any information that comes to the director’s attention, unless he/she reasonably believes 
that such information is immaterial to the company or is generally available to the public or known to 
other directors; or unless he/she is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical 
obligation of confidentiality. Section 76(2)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, reads as follows: 
 
‘(b) communicate to the board at the earliest practicable opportunity any information that comes 
to the director’s attention, unless the director – 
(i) reasonably believes that the information is – 
(aa) immaterial to the company; or 
(bb) generally available to the public, or known to the other directors; or 
(ii) is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical obligation of confidentiality.’ 
 
                                                 
1931Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 551. 
1932Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at page 551. 
1933Blackman, M.S., Jooste, R.D., and Everingham, G.K.  (2008), ‘Commentary on the Companies Act,’ Juta 
and Company, Cape Town, volume 2, 208 at 8-40. 
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However, directors are exempt from disclosing such information if he/she is bound by a legal or 
ethical obligation of confidentiality that prohibits them from doing.1934 In addition, directors are also 
exempt from disclosing such information if he/she may have signed a non-disclosure or 
confidentiality agreement with a third party.1935 Furthermore, a director may also be protected if they 
fail to disclose relevant information in the reasonable belief that the information is immaterial or 
generally known to the public or to the other directors, despite this not in fact being the case.1936  
 
In addition, section 76(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 states that a director of a company, when 
acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director: in good 
faith and for a proper purpose; in the best interests of the company; and with the degree of care, skill 
and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions in 
relation to the company as carried out by that director, and having the general knowledge, skill and 
experience of that director. Section 76(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 states that in respect of 
any matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of a director, a 
director will have satisfied the obligations in section 76(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, if the 
director: has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter; has made a 
decision, or supported the decision of a committee or the board with regard to that matter; and had 
a rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company.1937 In further compliance with this section, the director is required to communicate to the 
board, at the earliest practicable opportunity, any material information that comes to his or her 
attention, unless he/she: reasonably believes that the information is publicly available or known to 
the other directors; or is bound by a legal or ethical obligation of confidentiality.1938 
 
Nevertheless, the provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 that regulate a director’s duties are 
further supported by provisions such as sections 77 and 78 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which 
deal with the liability of directors and a director’s indemnity respectively; both of which are beyond 
the scope of this discussion. It is submitted that directors need to know what their duties are, and 
                                                 
1934Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at page 553. 
1935Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at page 553. 
1936Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Company, Cape Town, at page 553. See also Delport, P.A., Kunst, 
J.A. and Vorster, Q. (2011), ‘Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, LexisNexis Butterworth’s 
Publishers. 
1937Section 77 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 makes provision for the liability of a director in the event that 
he/she breaches one or more of his statutory duties owed towards the company. Common law liability would 
be attracted by a director for the breach of any duty(ies) contained in sections 75, 76(2) and 76(3)(a) and (b) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1938Section 72 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 entitles companies to appoint board committees and delegate 
to any committee any authority of the board. Such committees may include people who are not directors of the 
company, but they may not be ineligible or disqualified to be a company director and may not vote on any 
matter to be decided by the committee. 
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directors must be aware of what is expected of them. In an effort to create greater clarity, certain 
duties of directors have been partially codified in the Companies Act 71 of 2008.1939 The provisions 
in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 relating to directors duties are a partial codification of the company 
law, and the common law principles remain, subject to the specific conditions imposed by the 
Companies Act 2008.1940 In addition, all directors of a company are subject to statutory and common 
law fiduciary duties. However, the mere appointment as a nominee does not imply a duty to act in 
favour of the nominator, but in certain situations as mentioned above, a director of a company may 
fetter his/her discretion by agreeing to act in a particular manner in respect of decisions he/she may 
make in the future. Nevertheless, much of the latter will depend on the facts of each situation.1941  
 
Stevens raises an ancillary question:1942 
 
‘to what extent directors on the subsidiary board may fetter their discretion, especially in the 
context of the holding company subsidiary company relationship.’ 
 
Stevens, furthermore states that:1943 
 
‘the untenable situation could arise where a director acted in the best interest of the holding 
company ... but to the detriment of the subsidiary of which he is also a director. When the 
holding company gives instructions to the subsidiary company, it effectively gives the 
instructions to the board of the subsidiary to decide and implement the instructions. The 
holding company, in terms of section 3 of the act, will naturally control the board of the 
subsidiary and “nominee” directors in place.’ 
 
Stevens argues that:1944 
 
‘if one accepts that company groups are commercial realities, it could quite easily be 
accepted that the board of directors of the holding com[any will give instructions to the (board 
of the) subsidiary company which may face value be detrimental to the subsidiary company. 
                                                 
1939Companies Act 71 of 2008. See Bouwman, N. (2009), ‘An appraisal of the modification of the director's 
duty of care and skill’, South African Mercantile Law Journal, 21, at 509 and Cassidy, J. (2009), ‘Models for 
reform: the directors' duty of care in a modern commercial world’, Stellenbosch Law Review, 20, at pages 373 
- 406.   
1940Bouwman, N. (2009), ‘An appraisal of the modification of the director's duty of care and skill’, South African 
Mercantile Law Journal, 21, at 509. 
1941Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
pages 709-730. See also section 76(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1942Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
page 717. 
1943Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
page 717. 
1944Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
page 707. 
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This begs the question of who will be exposed to liability to the subsidiary company where 
the subsidiary suffers damages due to the instructions which the holding company issued to 
its representatives on the board of the subsidiary. If one ignores the possibility of joint and 
several liability, two possible wrongdoers could be identified, and therefore, two possibilities 
could exist for the subsidiary to recover damages from. In the first instance, the more obvious 
possibility would be to hold the directors of the subsidiary company liable for breach of their 
fiduciary duty for not acting in the best interest of the company ... less obvious possibility in 
terms of current South African law would be to hold the holding company liable ... due to 
instructions which holding company issued to the board of directors.’ 
 
Nevertheless, our law does not readily recognise this commercial reality and the only possible 
defence that a director may have against the allegation that he/she did not act in the best interest of 
his/her company is that he/she had a rational belief that he/she did.1945 Stevens argument suggests 
in theory that it would be possible for a director to argue a rational basis in defence for the belief “... 
in the materialisation of such benefits”.1946 
 
Despite the latter submission, the general position is still that the directors of a company owe 
fiduciary duties to the company of which they are directors, and not to the specific shareholders of 
such company. Therefore, in the context of a private equity fund, the primary reason for appointing 
the nominee director to an underlying portfolio investee company’s board would generally be to 
protect the private equity fund’s interests in the underlying portfolio investee company. However, this 
often leads to instances where the nominee director is conflicted between protecting the private 
equity fund’s interest and acting in the best interest of the investee company.  
 
The nature of the private equity business model is that conflicts of interest are a commercial reality. 
Board members, especially private equity fund appointed directors, have fiduciary duties to the 
companies on whose boards they serve and to the shareholders of such companies. These duties 
require directors to place the interests of the company and its shareholders ahead of their own 
personal interests and the interests of private equity fund that appointed them. On the other hand, it 
would be reasonable to expect that a person who serves on a portfolio company board as an 
appointee of his/her private equity fund also has a duty to such private equity fund. However, in the 
context of a private equity fund this expectation can often be problematic because directors must 
exercise his/her duties as a director with unfettered discretion and in accordance with the degree of 
care required of a person in his/her position. Directors cannot, without the consent of the company, 
fetter their discretion in relation to the exercise of their powers, and cannot bind themselves to vote 
                                                 
1945Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
page 729. See also section 76(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1946Stevens, R. (2016), ‘Liability Within Company Groups’, Journal of South African Law (TSAR), 2016(4), at 
page 729. See also section 76(4)(a)(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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in a particular way at future board meetings. It is clear from the preceding case law and legislation 
that company directors must however, at all times, exercise an independent and unfettered discretion 
and that a company director cannot fetter his/her discretion by way of a contract with an outsider, 
such as with the private equity fund that appointed him/her. Particularly in those situations where 
there is a conflict between the interests of the underlying portfolio investee company, with those of 
the private equity fund, the private equity fund appointee director must always act in the interest of 




In concluding the first part of the chapter, it is submitted that private equity fund investors have far 
higher expectations with respect to the corporate governance of the funds in which they invest. For 
example institutional investors globally are actively calling for changes in the way company boards 
are constituted, and the role played by directors on those boards. Aspinall and Smith stated that: 
 
‘The obligations that apply to directors in this regard are set out in a combination of statutory 
requirements (including company law), regulatory obligations and common law fiduciary and 
other duties of directors. Statutory obligations generally include, inter alia, an obligation to 
ensure that proper records are maintained, whereas common law duties are more general in 
nature, requiring directors to act with due skill, care and diligence and a duty to act in the 
best interests of the company. Increasingly, regulators are seeking to codify these 
requirements and add to them, generally in the form of corporate governance codes of 
conduct ... while tailoring the requirements to the investment funds industry.’1947 
 
Nevertheless, it is beneficial that the interests of the underlying portfolio investee company and its 
shareholders be aligned with the private equity fund that wants to improve shareholder value to 
increase the return on its investment. In addition, despite the merits of fiduciary duties as established 
in law, legal duties need to be embedded in an industry structure which provides the expertise and 
resources for good governance and duties must be enforced by efficient regulation.1948 This seems 
to be lacking in the South African private equity regulatory environment.1949 This does not imply a 
call for a general reform of the law of fiduciary duties, but rather that regulation needs to be 
strengthened in specific areas, more notably the fundamental duties owed by the fund manager to 
the investors. This brings us to the second part of this chapter that will inter alia discuss the practical 
corporate governance contracting techniques employed between the private equity firm and the 
                                                 
1947Aspinall, R., and Smith, S. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Investment Funds: Duties and Responsibilities 
of Directors Revisited’, Deloitte’s November 2011. 
1948United Kingdom Law Commission Report (2013), ‘Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Summary 
of the Consultation Paper’, Consultation Paper No 215, October 2013. Paper commissioned by the United 
Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for Work and Pensions, at page 3. 
1949See discussion South African regulatory environment in chapter two. 
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investors. This discussion will hopefully highlight the areas of regulation that needs to be 
strengthened in relation to duties owed by the fund manager. 
 
The second part of this chapter will discuss more specifically the role of corporate governance in 
terms of the relationship between the private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private 
equity fund. It is submitted that the private equity industry should strive at bettering the corporate 
governance practices within a legal framework that also includes effective legal contracting. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of chapter two, the relationship between 
partners and the relationship between the trustees and beneficiaries, respectively, must display the 
highest degree of good faith which is utmost good faith. Therefore, fund managers of a private equity 
fund, whether structured as a bewind trust or en commandite partnership; and the investors to such 
private equity fund; must at all times consider the duty of utmost good faith when drafting the terms 
of a partnership agreement and/or any dealing in relation to such private equity fund.1950  
 
The second part of this chapter will consist of two sections. The first will include a discussion with 
regard to the practical corporate governance contracting techniques employed between the private 
equity firm and the investors. The second part will include recommendations for effective risk 
mitigation of conflicts of interest within the private equity firm itself. 
 
4. Corporate Governance: Between Investors and Fund Manager 
 
Several of the characteristics of the private equity business model that have already been discussed 
in chapter one, chapter two, and to a large part in the preceding paragraphs of this chapter, will again 
form part of the discussion below. These characteristics are introduced only to discuss more 
specifically the practical corporate governance techniques employed between the private equity firm 
and the investors that invest in the private equity fund. For instance, it is evident from the preceding 
discussion on fiduciary duties that an agency problem exists in the underlying portfolio investee 
company between the active private equity fund and the investee company’s other shareholders and 
managers. According to Metrick,1951 a second agency relationship also exists in the private equity 
market, in that the private equity firm act as agents for external investors, who choose to invest in 
underlying portfolio investee companies via an intermediary rather than directly.1952 This agency 
problem stems from inevitably high degree of information asymmetry1953 between the private equity 
firm, who play an active role in the portfolio companies, and the passive investors, who have no 
involvement in managing the underlying portfolio investee companies. The legal practice has 
                                                 
1950See paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of chapter two. 
1951Metrick, A., (2007), ‘Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation’, John Wiley and Sons, 2007.  
1952Metrick, A., (2007), ‘Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation’, John Wiley and Sons, 2007.  
1953In contract theory and economics, information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions 
where one party have more or better information than the other.  
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however developed corporate governance and risk mitigating techniques that are effective in limiting 
opportunism and controlling the level of risk created by the above mentioned agency problems.1954  
 
As mentioned earlier, the extent of this discussion is restricted to the risks inherent to the private 
equity fund investors from potential conflicts of interest which may exist within the private equity firm 
or within the private equity fund, which emanates throughout the life cycle of a typical private equity 
fund. More specifically the potential conflicts of interest that may be encountered by the private equity 
firm that manages the private equity fund. Furthermore, the discussion will not address potential 
conflicts of interest which are not specific to the private equity business model or those potential 
conflicts of interest which are usually within the ambit of company law, such as the duties and 
liabilities of nominee directors appointed to an underlying portfolio investee company by the private 
equity firm. The latter has been extensively discussed under paragraph 3 earlier in this chapter.   
 
Private equity funds are created following contractual negotiation between the private equity firm and 
the investors, who are the potential investors in the private equity fund. The private equity funds are 
established under a negotiated contractual agreement which will stipulate the material terms and 
conditions of the private equity fund, which will include inter alia specific terms and conditions relating 
to the appropriate private equity fund legal structure, its investment strategy, the allocation of fees 
and costs, allocation of investment opportunities, any co-investment arrangements, the allocation 
and distribution of profits, the content and frequency of investor reporting key-man provisions and 
mechanisms for conflict and dispute resolution.1955 The chosen legal structure for a private equity 
fund is crucial to the governance structure of a private equity fund, whether a bewind trust or en 
commandite partnership. The above mentioned private equity fund structures permit the private 
equity firm to achieve significant control over the operation and management of their funds subject 
to a limited number of negotiated intrusive legal obligations afforded to the investors.1956 As 
discussed in chapter two, other features, such as tax benefits, the flexibility surrounding its structure 
and terms and its fixed life, contribute to the private equity business model continuing its viability as 
the business form of choice.1957 The nature of these models allows the participants to enter into a 
fund management arrangement that aligns the interests of the private equity firm to those of the 
outside investors. The flexibility of the model allows the investors to vote on important issues such 
as the amendment and dissolution of the fund agreements, the extension of the private equity fund’s 
life and the valuation of the underlying portfolio, despite the restrictions on the investor’s managerial 
rights.1958 
                                                 
1954Metrick, A., (2007), ‘Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation’, John Wiley and Sons, 2007.  
1955Talmor, E., and Vasvari, F. (2011), ‘International Private Equity’, Wiley and Sons. See also Meyer, T. 
(2014), ‘Private Equity Unchained: Strategy Insights for the Institutional Investor’, First Edition, MacMillan 
Publishers Ltd, at pages 149-160 and 259-270. 
1956Talmor, E., and Vasvari, F. (2011), ‘International Private Equity’, Wiley and Sons. 
1957Albeit structured as a bewind trust or en commandite partnership. 
1958European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’) Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA 




Generally there is an alignment of interest between the private equity firm and the fund investors, 
but at times such an alignment is broken. For instance, a private equity firm and/or its staff may co-
invest alongside the private equity fund in an underlying portfolio company. This is generally 
considered as an alignment of interests of the private equity firm, its staff and the private equity 
fund’s investors. However, conflicts of interest can occur if the private equity firm is permitted to 
invest on a deal-by-deal basis and/or on different terms to those offered to fund investors.1959 For 
instance, where the private equity firm and/or its staff and/or its affiliates are offered more favourable 
terms of investment to that which is offered to the private equity fund. In practice, such potential 
conflicts of interest are mitigated by contractual terms that will stipulate the basis upon which the 
fund manager and/or its staff are required to co-invest alongside the fund.1960 For instance, such 
terms will require an upfront agreed pro rata participation by the private equity firm and/or its staff 
which must invest in all deals pari passu with the fund investors.1961 
 
In practice, the mitigation of potential conflict of interest risks typically occurs by way of the 
contractual alignment of interest, such as contracting mutually acceptable disclosure and incentive 
agreements between the private equity firm and the funds' investors.1962 Despite the alignment of 
interests between the private equity firm and the funds' investors, the commercial reality of the private 
equity business model is that the potential for material conflicts of interest always exist.1963 The 
discussion to follow will outline possible mitigating measures alongside the potential conflict of 
interest risks. The extent to which the mitigation of conflicts of interest by private equity firms is 
regulated may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction because the mitigation of conflicts may either be 
required due to general or specific legal or regulatory provisions or as a consequence of general 
industry practice.1964 The modest goal of this chapter is to outline principles against which both the 
private equity industry and regulators can assess the quality of mitigation of conflicts of interest by 
private equity firms. 
                                                 
Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held 
companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. 
1959Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. 
1960International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at page 16. 
1961According to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’), the use of preferential 
co-investment terms by private equity firms have largely been removed in developed private equity markets, 
but still represent an issue in emerging markets. International Organization of Securities Commissions, (2009), 
‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, November 2009, at 16. 
1962Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
1963Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
1964Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. 




4.1 Corporate Governance: Between Investors and Fund Manager at the Fund Raising 
Stage 
 
An important area where legal practice has developed specific contractual considerations relates to 
the fees and services of external advisors. For instance, when raising a private equity fund, the 
private equity firm often retains the services of an external placement agent to market the fund to 
the potential outside investors.1965 If the private equity firm intends to recover the costs incurred by 
the appointment of a placement agent from the private equity fund on an undisclosed basis, it would 
present a material conflict of interest with the fund’s investors. A further material conflict would exist 
where the external advisor failed to disclose to potential investors that it is incentivised by or affiliated 
to the private equity firm that is raising the private equity fund.1966  
 
In practice, an example of a corporate governance and risk mitigating technique would be that the 
above mentioned advisory fees are to be borne by the private equity fund, but the basis of any such 
cost would typically be agreed in advance with the fund investors. The private equity fund 
management agreements between the parties will stipulate the clear expectation that investors will 
receive appropriate disclosure of all actual costs as and when such costs are incurred. The private 
equity fund placement agents’ costs are usually paid by the private equity firm directly, or paid by 
the private equity fund with a corresponding offset against the private equity fund firm’s management 
fees.1967  
 
Another area where contractual techniques intend to create an alignment between the interests of 
the private equity firm and the outside investors, relates to remuneration arrangements. As discussed 
in chapter one, the remuneration arrangement between the private equity firm and the outside 
investors is usually comprised of two main sources. Firstly, the private equity firm will receive a fund 
management fee for managing the private equity fund. Secondly, the private equity firm will usually 
also be entitled to a percentage of the profits (carried interest) generated by the private equity fund. 
Contractually, the private equity firm will typically only be entitled to the carried interest after the fund 
investors have received a full return on their investment (hurdle rate) plus having taken into account 
all fund costs and fees.1968 
 
                                                 
1965Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0.  
1966See Meyer, T. (2014), ‘Private Equity Unchained: Strategy Insights for the Institutional Investor’, First 
Edition, MacMillan Publishers Ltd, at pages 149-160 and 259-270. 
1967Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0.  
1968See paragraph four of chapter one hereof. 
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A further area of potential conflict of interest between the private equity firm and investors relate to 
the final size of the private equity fund. This is usually determined and agreed upon during the fund 
raising process by means of contractual negotiation between the private equity firm and potential 
fund investors.1969 There remains a potential conflict of interest between the private equity firm’s 
ambitions to raise increasingly larger size private equity funds, whereas the potential investors’ goal 
is to ensure that whatever capital is raised can be effectively deployed towards suitably attractive 
investment opportunities within the fund’s proposed investment period. This conflict of interest stems 
from the way that the private equity firm’s management fee is calculated.1970 Typically, the private 
equity firm receives an annual fund management fee determined as a percentage of the total size of 
the private equity fund. Therefore, the larger the size of the private equity fund, the more fees the 
private equity firm would earn. This serves the interests of the private equity firm without any real 
increased investment benefit to the prospective investors.1971  
 
In addition, the amount of capital raised by the private equity firm for the private equity fund could 
result in a fund size that is greater than what can be reasonable invested by the private equity firm. 
In practice, a method used by investors and private equity firms to show an alignment of interest, is 
for the private equity fund that is to be raised, to be subject to the condition that the private equity 
firm commit to co-invest a set percentage of their own capital on a co-investment basis alongside 
the private equity fund.1972 The set percentage would be determined in relation to the total amount 
of investor committed capital. It is submitted that a private equity firm is strongly motivated to protect 
their reputation and to maintain a healthy relationship with its investors because of future fund 
raising.1973 Despite the latter, the main mitigating factor against the potential conflicts of interests is 
that the fund-raising process is subject to contractually binding negotiations between the private 
equity firm and the investors, where investors are able to negotiate definitive terms and conditions 
relating to the management fees and performance based fees to be earned by the private equity 
firm.1974 In addition, during the fund-raising process the investors are able to negotiate definitive 
                                                 
1969Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0.  
1970See International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of 
Interest’, Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
November 2009, at pages 13-14. 
1971Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0. See also Bartlett, J.W. (1995), ‘Organising the Pooled Investment Vehicle (PIC), Equity 
Finance: Venture Capital, Buy-outs, Restructuring and Reorganisations’, Second Edition, Aspen, Volume 3.  
1972Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. 
1973European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’) Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA 
Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held 
companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. 
1974Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. 
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terms and conditions relating to a maximum fund size that will not be exceeded at the final closing 
of the private equity fund. During the fund-raising process, the investors would also be able to 
negotiate the terms and manner of information disclosure to be made by the private equity firm 
relating to the private equity fund. In the developed private equity markets the provisions and content 
of investor reporting and disclosure requirements are well established.1975 Despite the above 
common risk mitigation strategies being in place to address potential conflicts of interest, they do not 
represent all possible risk mitigation methods at the fund raising stage of a private equity fund.1976  
 
The above mentioned contractually binding negotiations during the fund-raising stage would typically 
result in the establishment of an investor advisory committee of the private equity fund. This 
committee is usually established subject to a contractual requirement that the private equity fund has 
to maintain an investor advisory committee, comprising of the private equity funds’ investors.1977 The 
investor advisory committee offers the fund investors a forum in which to examine and comment on 
the operation and management of the private equity fund.1978 The exact role of an investor advisory 
committee would invariably differ from one private equity fund to another. An investor advisory 
committee could simplistically be described as having a board-like character.1979 The investor 
advisory committee’s primary responsibility is to address and resolve all material conflicts of interest 
relating to the private equity fund; and review the private equity firm’s approach towards resolving all 
material fund-related conflicts of interest.1980 In practice, this should be done before the private equity 
firm decides upon a particular proposed course of action.1981 The committee is not an investment 
decision making body, but rather a body for sound corporate governance adherence.1982 
 
4.2 Corporate Governance: Between Investors and Fund Manager at the Investment and 
Management Stage 
 
Another area where the legal practice has developed practical contracting techniques is in terms of 
the private equity fund’s investment allocations. In terms of the private equity business model, a 
                                                 
1975European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’) Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA 
Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held 
companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. 
1976See Bassi, I. And Grant, J. (2006), ‘Structuring European Private Equity’, Euromoney Books Publishers, at 
pages 35-84. 
1977Stowell, D. (2012), ‘Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity’, Academic Press Publishers, at 
pages 389-408. 
1978Bassi, I. And Grant, J. (2006), ‘Structuring European Private Equity’, Euromoney Publishers, at page 40. 
1979See Povaly, S. (2007), ‘Private Equity Exits: Divestment Process Management for Leveraged Buyouts’, 
Springer Science and Business Media Publishers, at pages 36-41. 
1980International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at page 12. 
1981Bassi, I. And Grant, J. (2006), ‘Structuring European Private Equity’, Euromoney Publishers, at 35-84.  
1982Also mentioned under paragraph 4.4 of this chapter. 
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private equity firm would typically be subject to a contractual stipulation which prevents it from raising 
a successive fund with a similar investment strategy until such time that the preceding private equity 
fund has, for instance, invested a predetermined amount of its committed capital.1983 For instance, 
the preceding private equity fund should be eighty percent invested before a successive private 
equity fund with a similar investment strategy could be raised by the same private equity firm.1984 
The objective of the latter principle is to protect the interests of investors in the preceding private 
equity fund, while at the same time providing the private equity firm with access to sufficient capital 
to complete investment opportunities during the successive private equity fund’s fund raising 
process.1985 The downside of this risk mitigation technique is that it could result in a situation where 
for a period of time the private equity firm may have a discretion over how to allocate its investment 
opportunities between the two funds (preceding and successive) until such time as the preceding 
fund is fully invested.1986  
 
In practice, another common occurrence is when the private equity firm would typically charge the 
underlying portfolio investee company fees for its time and expertise as part of completing a 
transaction. For instance, these fees would include inter alia, advisory fees, underwriting fees and 
arrangement fees.1987 The argument against the latter practice is that the fees paid by the underlying 
portfolio investee company has a negative financial effect on the investee company and dilutes the 
investment value of the private equity fund’s investment. The contractual terms that regulate the 
conditions under which such fees are payable to the private equity firm are usually agreed in advance 
with the investors during the fund raising process.1988 Despite the latter, it is difficult to determine in 
advance what the amount of such fees would be because the resulting transactions have not yet 
been completed.  In practice, an example of a corporate governance and risk mitigating technique 
would be for the investors to negotiate the contractual terms with the private equity firm to either set 
                                                 
1983Barret, R., Butler, M., and Bartlett, J.W., (2011), ‘Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A 
Document: Business Structure and Operations’, Release 19, Law Journal Press, New York, 2011, ISBN No. 
978-1-58852-120-0. See also Bartlett, J.W. (1995), ‘Organising the Pooled Investment Vehicle (PIC), Equity 
Finance: Venture Capital, Buy-outs, Restructuring and Reorganisations’, Second Edition, Vol. 3. Aspen.  
1984Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. See also 
Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons.  
1985International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at pages 15-16. 
1986Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. See also Asset Alternatives 
Inc. Report (1999), ‘Private Equity Partnership Terms and Conditions’, Asset Alternatives Inc. 
1987International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at pages 11-18. 
1988Cooke, D. (2011), ‘Private Equity: Law and Practice’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers at 17-40; 185-260. 
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off all or part of any transaction fees received against its management fee.1989 Another practical 
example would be for the investors to negotiate the contractual terms by which the private equity 
firm is allowed to charge and retain such fees. In addition, investors can require the private equity 
firm to provide disclosure of every transaction fee received by the fund management company.1990  
 
In the same manner, a material conflict of interest may also occur where a private fund operates two 
or more funds with a very similar investment strategy. In practice this area of potential material 
conflict of interest is mitigated by stipulating that the private equity firm give priority towards allocating 
all appropriate investment opportunities to the preceding private equity fund.1991 Alternatively, 
through negotiation between the private equity firm and the investors, the private equity fund terms 
could stipulate that investment opportunities are to be allocated between the relevant funds on a pro 
rata basis, or provide the flexibility to allocate larger investments directly to the successor fund to 
circumvent practical problems associated with joint ownership.1992 To this end, it is important for the 
contractual negotiation between the private equity firm and the investors to take into account the full 
extent, inter alia, of the size and investment strategy of the current private equity funds under 
management of the private equity firm, as well as the future private equity funds the firm intends to 
raise, particular private equity funds with overlapping investment strategies.1993 However, where 
such funds have been raised, it is standard practice for the private equity firm to provide disclosure 
upfront to all the investors.1994  
 
As stated above, the co-investment by the private equity firm alongside the private equity fund which 
it is managing can be viewed as an alignment of interests of the private equity firm with those of the 
private equity fund’s investors.1995 However, a material conflict of interest will arise if the private 
equity firm selectively participates in certain of the private equity fund’s investments or is permitted 
to invest on preferential terms and conditions to those applicable to the private equity fund in which 
the investors have committed capital.1996 In practice, the private equity fund’s contractual terms and 
                                                 
1989International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at pages 11- 18. 
1990See Gompers, P.A and Lerner, J. (1996), ‘The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture 
Partnership Agreements’, Journal of Law and Economics, 39, at pages 463-98. 
1991Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 145-174. 
1992Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 145-174. 
1993Moloney, N. (2014), ‘EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation’, Oxford University Press at 194-319; 
366-378. 
1994Both investors in the preceding and successive/‘new’ funds. 
1995Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402.  
1996See Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, 
and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons.  
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conditions should stipulate the basis upon which the private equity firm will be required to co-invest 
alongside the private equity fund to eliminate preferential co-investment terms and conditions.1997  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the private equity firm will typically appoint a 
member of its staff to the board of directors of an underlying portfolio investee company. The 
rationale behind the appointment is twofold. Firstly, the staff member is appointed to the board of the 
investee company to monitor performance; and secondly to foster the growth and development of 
the underlying portfolio company.1998 The role of the above mentioned appointed director creates an 
ongoing duty to consider the requirements of both the private equity fund and the underlying portfolio 
company separately. In addition, the duly appointed director needs to ensure that any information 
received from either party is not shared inappropriately.1999 In theory, it would commonly be accepted 
that the interests of the private equity fund investors, the underlying portfolio investee companies 
and the private equity firm are all well aligned. However, such an alignment of interest can easily be 
undone in practice. For instance, an underlying portfolio investee company may be in desperate 
need of additional funding and this can create a material conflict of interest between the above 
mentioned parties, particularly in relation to the private equity firm’s appointed director. However, in 
practice it is common for the private equity firm to rely on an independent third party/director to 
monitor the underlying portfolio investee company, instead of one of its own staff members to avert 
any material conflicts of interest.2000 To this end, the private equity firm would have to rely on the 
principle that the independent director would be able to fulfil his/her duties owed to the underlying 
portfolio investee company as fully described in paragraph 2(b) of this chapter.2001  
 
It is submitted that the enforcement of corporate governance at the investment and management 
stage, specifically with regard to the private equity firm in relation to the investee company, falls 
broadly into two categories, namely formal and informal enforcement measures.2002 The formal 
measures, for instance, could be that the private equity firm contractually binds the investee 
company’s executive management to specific behaviour. Such specific provisions would typically be 
contained in the shareholder agreements and would be conditional upon the private equity fund’s 
                                                 
1997Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers, at pages 138-170. 
1998See Aspinall, R., and Smith, S. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Investment Funds: Duties and 
Responsibilities of Directors Revisited’, Deloitte’s November 2011. 
1999Cassim, F.H.I., Cassim, M.F., Cassim, R., Jooste, R.D., Shev, J., and Yeats, J. (2012), ‘Contemporary 
Company Law’, Second Edition, Juta and Co, Cape Town, at pages 528-531. 
2000International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at page 18. 
2001This principle was discussed earlier in the chapter under paragraph 2.2 which discussed statutory and 
common law duties of a director, clarifying the requirement that as a director of the investee company, such 
individuals have a primary responsibility to the company and not its nominator. 
2002Du Plessis, J.J., Hargovan, A., and Bargic, M. (2011), ‘Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance’, 
Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, at 51. 
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investment in the underlying portfolio investee company.2003 Further examples of such specific 
provisions would be the relative quantum of voting rights which the private equity fund would acquire, 
whether or not the private equity fund has taken a controlling stake in the investee company and 
provisions that relate to the private equity firms representation on the board of investee 
companies.2004 In contrast, informal measures could include the extent and level of active 
involvement by the fund manager in the investee companies, the appointment of expert independent 
directors on the board of investee companies and the development of professional relationships with 
the executive management of the investee companies.2005 The appointing of non-executive directors 
to the boards of investee companies who are industry experts within the industry of the investee 
company holds several benefits. For instance, it is aimed at stimulating investment for the investee 
company, brings prominent individuals onto the board of the investee company that will not only 
contribute to the running of the business as a result of the individual’s expert skills and knowledge, 
but could also increase the performance amongst the fellow board members.2006 
 
In practice, both the formal and informal enforcement measures are determined, agreed upon and 
legislated in the shareholders agreement of the investee company. This is typically concluded during 
the investment process by means of contractual negotiation between the private equity firm and 
portfolio investee company.2007 To this end, detailed shareholders’ agreements which would inter 
alia contain provisions dealing with approvals frameworks, board representation, number of 
executive and non-executive directors, and the establishment of subcommittees, are crucial to the 
enforcement of corporate governance at the investment and management stage of the private equity 
life cycle. The above mentioned formal and informal corporate governance enforcement measures 
are aimed at aligning the interests of private equity firms with those of investee companies and are 
often the most effective method of promoting good corporate governance and performance in their 
investee companies. In practice it is difficult to legislate corporate governance practices but it is 
essential that a culture of corporate governance be developed within portfolio investee companies.  
 
A related corporate governance issue, pertains to the situation where the private equity firm itself 
and/or staff and/or its nominee director(s) have an interest in an underlying portfolio investee 
company, into which the private equity fund (which they are managing), makes an investment. It is 
assumed for the purposes of this discussion that the private equity firm (nominator) is aware of the 
                                                 
2003See Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, 
and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons.  
2004Bassi, I. And Grant, J. (2006), ‘Structuring European Private Equity’, Euromoney Publishers, at 35-84. 
2005See Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, John Wiley and Sons. See 
Moloney, N. (2014), ‘EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation’, Oxford University Press, at pages 194-
319; 366-378. 
2006See Aspinall, R., and Smith, S. (2011), ‘Corporate Governance in Investment Funds: Duties and 
Responsibilities of Directors Revisited’, Deloitte’s November 2011. 
2007Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 145-174. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 317 
 
nominee director’s interest in an investee company; and that such nominee director’s interest has 
been dealt with in adherence with his/her fiduciary duties under the common-law and the statutory 
requirements of such investee company, as discussed in paragraph 3 of this chapter. This related 
issue pertains to the fiduciary duties owed by the private equity firm to the investors of the private 
equity fund.2008 Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the private equity fund is structured as a bewind 
trust or en commandite partnership, the private equity firm and its staff owe the investors and the 
fund itself, the duties of avoiding conflict of interest and proper disclosure.2009 Furthermore, statutory 
law, judicial precedent, and the terms of the private equity fund and fund management agreements 
will further determine what fiduciary duties, if any, the private equity firm and its staff will owe to the 
investors.2010 For example, in chapter two it was argued that one of the advantages of the bewind 
trust and en commandite partnership structures is that both these legal vehicles are generally very 
flexible business entities. For example, they both allow many of the statutory provisions that would 
otherwise apply to a company to be overridden, modified or supplemented by the specific terms of 
the trust or partnership agreements. This flexibility allows the private equity firm and investors in a 
private equity fund to structure a wide variety of economic and governing arrangements. It was also 
argued in chapter two that the nature and structure of each individual private equity fund is largely 
dependent on the operating agreement.2011  
 
In operating a private equity fund, the general rule must be that the investors in a private equity fund 
must be able to trust and rely upon the private equity firm managing the fund to promote the best 
interests and success of the fund.2012 As mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of chapter two, the private 
equity firm participate in the daily operation and management of the private equity fund and because 
of their role in managing the fund; they are usually viewed as having fiduciary duties towards the 
investors in the fund. In contrast, the investors provide the capital and are not involved in managing 
                                                 
2008See Cumming, D. and Walz, U. (2010), ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(4), at pages 727-754. 
2009See Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2010Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, Second Edition, Volume 792, John Wiley and Sons. This is even more relevant in the case of an 
en commandite partnership because it is established by way of a contract between the parties expressly 
reflecting the intention of establishing an en commandite partnership. There are no specific registration 
requirements and legislation for establishing and regulating en commandite partnerships.  
2011See paragraph 3.2 of chapter two and particular Gatz Properties LLC v Auriga Capital Corporation 2012, 
59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court which deals with the application of the operating agreement and 
fiduciary duties. In this case, the court stated that members of limited liability companies should clearly state 
in the limited liability company agreement whether and to what extent the company managers or controlling 
persons is should have any fiduciary duties to the members. The court upheld the Chancery Court’s decision 
regarding Gatz’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty; however, it based its decision solely on contractual 
grounds and not on the existence of any default fiduciary duties under Delaware’s limited liability company 
statute.  
2012See Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW 
Corporate Finance Faculty, Second Edition, March 2010. 
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the private equity fund, leaving operational duties to the private equity firm instead.2013 It was also 
discussed paragraph 3 of chapter two that the investors typically do not owe fiduciary duties to the 
private equity firm. Nevertheless, the private equity firm is expected to comply with a duty of 
disclosure and as such must make informed decisions and should make full disclosures about 
reasonably known risks and potential benefits of a particular action.2014 These disclosures relate to 
all the private equity fund’s activities, including the fund’s assets, investments in underlying portfolio 
investee companies, operations, finances, debt, potential and real conflicts of interest and 
contracts.2015 Disclosure is particularly important in instances involving potential conflicts of interests 
in business dealings related to the private equity fund, such as where the private equity firm itself 
and/or its nominee director(s) having an interest in an underlying portfolio investee company, in 
which the private equity fund has or intends making an investment. Therefore, as part of their duty 
of disclosure, the private equity firm should disclose any conflict of interest they may have relative to 
any fund investments and decisions.2016 
 
In practice, an example of a corporate governance and risk mitigating technique would be for the 
investors to negotiate the contractual terms with the private equity firm relating to investor reporting 
and disclosure requirements. The private equity fund management agreements between the parties 
will stipulate the clear expectation that investors will receive appropriate disclosure of all such related 
material conflicts of interest. In addition, investors should be able to negotiate definitive terms and 
conditions relating to the proper disclosure by the private equity firm to the investors relating to 
interest held in underlying investee companies by the private equity firm and/or its staff and/or 
nominee directors appointed to the board of investee companies by the private equity firm. 
Furthermore, the investors should also be able to negotiate the terms and manner of information 
disclosure to be made by the private equity firm relating to interest held in underlying investee 
companies by the private equity firm and/or its staff and/or nominee directors appointed to the board 
of investee companies by the private equity firm. In the developed private equity markets the 
provisions and content of investor reporting and disclosure requirements are well established.  
 
This duty of disclosure, is a continuing duty that arises starting with the formation of the fund and 
continues through the fund's ongoing daily operations and ultimately through the fund’s ultimate 
                                                 
2013Vestal, A.W. (1994), ‘Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se under the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act of 1994: Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing’, William and Mary Law School Law Review, 36, at 1559. 
2014Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1017-1051. See also 
discussion had in paragraph 3 of chapter two and the discussion had in paragraph 2 of chapter three. See also 
Gatz Properties, LLC v Auriga Capital Corp. 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
2015Healy, P.M. and Palepu, K.G. (2001), ‘Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital 
markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature’, Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), at pages 
405-440. 
2016See Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW 
Corporate Finance Faculty, Second Edition, March 2010. 
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dissolution.2017 One notable development in this regard was the amendment of Regulation 28 of the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, which was discussed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of chapter two. In terms 
of the aforementioned amendment, the Registrar of Pension Funds published conditions for 
investment by pension funds in private equity funds. One of the conditions imposed by the Registrar 
pertained to the management of conflicts of interest. According to this condition stated that any 
responsible person, manager, administrator, or advisor of a private equity fund must disclose to the 
fund any possible conflicts of interests that may arise or any direct or indirect benefit which such 
person may obtain as a consequence of any transaction concluded by the private equity fund or in 
the acquisition or disposal of assets in the execution of the business of the private equity fund.2018 
 
Nevertheless, it is submitted, that similar to a nominee director having to place the company’s interest 
above those of its nominator; so to should a private equity firm and their staff’s place the success 
and interests of the private equity fund above their own personal or other business interests. 
Therefore, where the private equity firm itself and/or its nominee director(s) have an interest in an 
underlying portfolio investee company, such impacted parties should avoid any conflicts of interest 
between their duties to the fund and its investors, and their other personal and business activities.2019 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the private equity firm must properly hold the private equity fund’s 
investments for the benefit of the investors and not use it for its own personal advantage. For 
example, a private equity firm and/or its staff personally may own shares in a particular company, 
but the private equity firm, on behalf of the private equity fund, should not subsequently acquire 
shares in the same company for their own economic gain to the detriment of the private equity fund 
and its investors. In practice, the private equity firm and/or its staff may be allowed to obtain an 
individual benefit from the private equity fund’s investments, such as in the aforementioned scenario, 
but only after full disclosure to and prior approval from the investors.2020 Nevertheless, as mentioned 
in chapter two, the private equity fund agreements, largely contracted between the private equity 
firm and the investors may limit, expand, or eliminate fiduciary duties by agreement, which would 
include the duty of disclosure, provided that these changes are reasonable under the circumstances, 
subject to those fiduciary duties that cannot be eliminated by agreement because they are required 
by statutory law.2021 As mentioned in chapters two and the first part of chapter three, fiduciary duties 
                                                 
2017Vestal, A.W. (1994), ‘Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se under the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act of 1994: Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing’, William and Mary Law School Law Review, 36, at 1559. 
2018‘March 2012 Regulations’ means the regulations dated 15 March 2012 entitled ‘Pensions Fund Act, 1956: 
Amended Regulation 28 of the Regulations made under Section 36 of the Act: Conditions for Investment in 
Private Equity Funds Approval in terms of Section 5(2)(e) of the Act’ (GN 1 of 15 March 2012). 
2019See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2020Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1017-1051. See also 
discussion had in paragraph 3 of chapter two and the discussion had in paragraph 2 of chapter three. See also 
Gatz Properties, LLC v Auriga Capital Corp. 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
2021For example, section 9(2) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 states: ‘Any provision contained in 
a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of exempting a trustee from or indemnifying 
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are spelled out in statutory law or through judicial precedents. However, it is submitted that it should 
also be spelled out in the private equity fund operating agreements in order to better mitigate conflicts 
of interest. 
 
It is important that private equity firms address the above mentioned corporate governance issues 
from the time that a decision was made to raise a private equity fund and when they engage with 
potential investors, right up to the point when the private equity fund is ultimately dissolved. The next 
part of this chapter will discuss several key practical recommendations that could be applied within 
the private equity firm itself to improve its own internal corporate governance framework. It will be 
submitted that corporate governance mechanisms should be put in place by the private equity firm 
in order to mitigate the conflicts of interest that may arise within the firm itself.   
 
4.3 Corporate Governance: Within the Fund Management Firm 
 
It is submitted that the ability of a private equity firm to demonstrate to its prospective investors and 
portfolio companies that it adheres to the principles of sound corporate governance; in terms of 
common law, statutorily and voluntary; will only enhance its reputation as a well structured and 
managed company.2022 This will ultimately increase investor confidence and facilitate greater interest 
from prospective portfolio investee companies. To this end, corporate governance mechanisms must 
be put in place in order to mitigate the conflicts of interest that may arise in private equity firms.2023 
One such recommended mechanism would be for the private equity firm to implement a sound 
corporate governance framework that aims to manage conflicts of interest in a manner that serves 
the interests of all the private equity funds’ under its management, but that ultimately is in the best 
interests of the private equity funds’ investors.2024  
 
The clients of a private equity firm are the investors into the private equity fund(s) under its 
management. The mere nature of the private equity business model creates the need for the private 
equity firm to enter into binding contractual relationships with a wide range of stakeholders, inter alia, 
fund investors, underlying portfolio investee companies, banks, affiliated companies, finance 
                                                 
him against liability for breach of trust where he fails to show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required 
in subsection (1)’. 
2022Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 163-234. 
2023Walker, D. (2007), ‘Walker Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity’, in association 
with British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘BVCA’), November 2007, at pages 16-32. In 
February 2007 the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘BVCA’) asked Sir David Walker to 
undertake an independent review of the adequacy of disclosure and transparency in private equity with a view 
to recommending a set of guidelines for conformity by the industry on a voluntary basis. This review culminated 
in November 2007 with the publication of the Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity. 
2024Walker, D. (2007), ‘Walker Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity’, in association 
with British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘BVCA’), November 2007, at pages 16-32. 
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providers and third-party advisors.2025  Many of these contractual relationships could and will give 
rise to material conflicts of interest. For instance, the contractual relationships could be in conflict 
with the duties and responsibilities owed by the private equity firm to the private equity funds’ under 
its management and the private equity funds’ investors. Despite the latter, the private equity firm’s 
ultimate duty and responsibility is to the private equity funds’ investors.2026 It is therefore important 
for a private equity firm to structure its business in a manner that allows it to manage all relevant 
conflicts of interest, underpinned by the firm placing emphasis on those duties and responsibilities 
owed to the private equity funds under its management.2027 As stated above, the private equity firm 
should seek to manage conflicts in a way that serves the interests of all the private equity funds’ 
under its management, but that ultimately is in the best interests of the private equity funds’ 
investors.2028 
 
Secondly, private equity firms should draft and implement written policies and procedures that are 
readily accessible and that are aimed at identifying, monitoring and effectively mitigating conflicts of 
interest that may arise (or that are unavoidable) in the normal cause of it conducting business as a 
private equity fund management company.2029 These policies and procedures should clearly set out 
the private equity firm’s governance framework in relation to the roles and responsibilities of parties 
involved in implementing the policies and procedures.2030 In addition, the policies and procedures 
should also be consistent with any legislation and regulation applicable in any of the jurisdictions in 
which the private equity firm operates and should be applied uniformly to all the private equity funds’ 
under its management, as well as all the geographical locations that the firm operates in.2031 Such 
policies and procedures should allow for the adequate consideration of issues such as, inter alia, the 
specific processes through which conflicts of interest will be identified, the mechanisms the private 
                                                 
2025Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 163-234. 
2026See Cumming, D. and Walz, U. (2010), ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(4), at pages 727-754. 
2027Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and 
Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 163-234. 
2028See Guidelines Monitoring Group (2014), ‘Private Equity Monitoring Group on Transparency and 
Disclosure’, 7th Report, December 2014, at pages 30-42. Available at http://walker-
gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/141204_gmg_guidelines_final.pdf, accessed in December 2015. This is the 
seventh report of the Guidelines Monitoring Group established to review the private equity industry’s conformity 
with the Walker Guidelines as well as keeping the Guidelines under review and making recommendations for 
changes when necessary. The Group’s aim is to guide and assist the industry in evolving to a position of best 
practice over a period of time through annual reviews of conformity. This report summarises the actions of the 
Guidelines Monitoring Group to achieve such and the performance of the industry under the Guidelines. The 
Guidelines Monitoring Group makes periodic recommendations for changes to the Guidelines to be 
implemented by the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (the ‘BVCA’) after due consultation. 
2029See Gilligan, J. and Wright, M. (2010), ‘Private Equity Demystified: An Explanatory Guide’, ICAEW 
Corporate Finance Faculty, Second Edition, March 2010. 
2030International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at pages 23-26. 
2031International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), (2009), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest’, 
Report by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, November 
2009, at pages 23-26. 
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equity firm will apply to mitigate conflicts of interest, for instance, the process through which identified 
conflicts will be disclosed to the investors.2032 For example, in paragraph 4.2 of this chapter, it was 
submitted that a private equity firm should place the interests of the private equity fund and its 
investors above its own business interests. Therefore, where the private equity firm itself and/or its 
nominee director(s) have an interest in an underlying portfolio investee company, such impacted 
parties should avoid any conflicts of interest between their duties to the fund and its investors, and 
their other personal interest; however (as submitted in paragraph 4.2 of this chapter) in practice, the 
private equity firm and/or its staff may be allowed to obtain an individual benefit from the private 
equity fund’s investments, but only after full disclosure to and prior approval from the investors.2033 
 
To this end, private equity firms should establish a well documented and defined process which 
facilitates investor consultation regarding matters relating to conflicts of interest. Potential conflicts 
of interest can effectively be eliminated via constructive discussion and collaboration between the 
private equity firm and with the investors who may be negatively affected if the conflict of interest 
had materialised. To facilitate this process, a firm should establish a clearly defined process for 
engaging in investor consultation.2034 This process should be appropriate for the size and scale of 
the private equity firm’s activities and the range of investors in its funds.2035 In practice, an effective 
forum used for facilitating investor consultation has been through the use of investor advisory 
committees (as mentioned earlier). However, for such a committee to be effective there has to be 
clearly documented terms of reference. For instance, terms of reference should include inter alia, 
the selection and appointment of committee members, the spectrum of issues on which the 
committee should be consulted, the method and timeframes within which consultation will occur and 
the nature of decisions taken by the committee.2036 The private equity firm should disclose the 
decisions taken through the investor consultation process to all the fund investors within reasonable 
time periods. It is important to recognise that the investors in all probability will have an interest in 
the outcome of the investor consultation process, albeit via the of investor advisory committee.  It is 
therefore important that the process is transparent to all the investors.2037 The outcome of 
                                                 
2032European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2009), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital in the European Economy: An Industry Response to the European Parliament and European 
Commission’, February 2009. See also European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘EVCA’) 
Report (2005) updated in 2010, ‘EVCA Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in 
the management of privately held companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association. 
2033Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1017-1051. See also 
discussion had in paragraph 3 of chapter two and the discussion had in paragraph 2 of chapter three. See also 
Gatz Properties, LLC v Auriga Capital Corp. 2012, 59 A. 3d 1206, Delaware Supreme Court. 
2034Such as in the scenario discussed in paragraph 4.2 of this chapter. 
2035Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2036Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2037Scharfman, J.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Operational Due Diligence: Tools to Evaluate Liquidity, Valuation, 
and Documentation’, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 301-314. 
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discussions taken forward through this process should therefore be consistently disclosed to all 
relevant investors as soon as is appropriate.2038 In practice, this will be done via regular investor 
reporting compliance procedures that the private equity firm has established, which would have been 
contractually agreed upon with its investors during the fund raising process.2039  
 
A private equity firm should make the policies and procedures available to all investors in the private 
equity fund(s) under its management. This should be done as soon as the private equity firm and 
the investors established their relationship and should continue to be periodically made available. 
The periodic review and updated versions of such policies and procedures should also be made 
available to all investors on an equal basis.2040 The periodic review and the application thereof should 
be done on a regular basis to ensure the continued relevance of such policies and procedures.2041 
In addition, the private equity firm should establish and document the policies and procedures before 
the formation of a private equity fund.2042 The policies and procedures should be made available at 
the outset of the negotiations with prospective investors, to afford all the potential investors adequate 
opportunity to incorporate such policies and procedures into the investor’s decision making process. 
2043 Private equity firms operate in an environment that is constantly changing. To this end, a private 
equity firm’s policies and procedures could easily become ineffective in managing conflicts of 
conflicts of interest that may arise.2044 It is therefore important that private equity firms establish a 
well defined approach to reviewing its policies and procedures to ensure they remain relevant and 
appropriate.2045 The review should be conducted as and when change to the business environment 
occurs. The periodic review of the policies and procedures should also include analysis as to the 
appropriateness of their application.2046    
                                                 
2038See Cumming, D. and Walz, U. (2010), ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(4), at pages 727-754. 
2039Scharfman, J.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity Operational Due Diligence: Tools to Evaluate Liquidity, Valuation, 
and Documentation’, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 301-314. 
2040Tricker, B. And Tricker, R.I. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’, Oxford 
University Press, at pages 110-172. 
2041Tricker, B. And Tricker, R.I. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices’, Oxford 
University Press, at pages 110-172. 
2042Frase, D., Helm, R., and Day, M. (2012), ‘Practitioner's Guide to Conflicts of Interest in the Financial 
Services Industry’, First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers,  at pages 1-130. 
2043European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2009), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital in the European Economy: Industry Response to the European Parliament and European Commission’, 
February 2009. See European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2005) updated in 2010, 
‘EVCA Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately held 
companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. 
2044Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2045See Cumming, D. and Walz, U. (2010), ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 41(4), at pages 727-754. 
2046European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2009), ‘Private Equity and Venture 
Capital in the European Economy: Industry Response to the European Parliament and European Commission’, 
February 2009. See also European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Report (2005) updated in 
2010, ‘EVCA Corporate Governance Guidelines: Guidelines and good practice in the management of privately 




It is submitted, that the corporate governance compliance framework of a private equity firm should 
at all times ensure that the disclosure provided to investors is clear, complete, fair and not 
misleading.2047 The application of effective disclosure procedures is a vital method of mitigating 
conflicts of interest in any business. Despite the method of individual disclosure situations varying 
depending on the precise requirements of the issue at hand, it still remains imperative that the private 
equity firm does everything reasonable possible to ensure that disclosures are clear, complete, fair 
and not misleading.2048 In addition, the private equity firm should implement a sound corporate 
governance framework that aims to manage conflicts of interest in a manner that serves the interests 
of all the private equity funds’ under its management, but that ultimately is in the best interests of the 






It is evident from the above discussion that the application of effective corporate governance systems 
is an important risk management tool available to investors in safeguarding their investment in a 
private equity fund. In addition, it was also highlighted that investor protection via legal rules and 
regulations is more effective in developing countries financial markets than the traditional law and 
economics perspective of financial contracting. However, as a result of the often-widening gap 
between ownership and control of companies it is important for policy makers to pay attention to 
legal rules and regulations protecting investors and corporate governance. This is because despite 
the statutory inefficiencies at times, it generally seems to have had a positive impact in several 
(English) common-law countries.  
 
Corporate governance is a topic of considerable interest following events, such as the Enron scandal 
and other corporate governance failures. In particular, it has highlighted the important role that 
corporate governance plays in a modern economy. It has strengthened the incentives for directors 
and policymakers alike to reassess the structures needed to produce high quality corporate 
governance. In this chapter, a number of corporate governance issues were discussed. In particular, 
                                                 
held companies in the private equity and venture capital industry’, European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association. 
2047Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2048Acharya, V.V., Gottschalg, O.F., Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. (2013), ‘Corporate governance and value 
creation: Evidence from private equity’, Review of Financial Studies, 26(2), at pages 368-402. 
2049Walker, D. (2007), ‘Walker Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity’, in association 
with British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (‘BVCA’), November 2007, at pages 16-32. See 
Guidelines Monitoring Group (2014), ‘Private Equity Monitoring Group on Transparency and Disclosure’, 7 th 
Report, December 2014, at pages 30-42. Available at http://walker-
gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/141204_gmg_guidelines_final.pdf, accessed in December 2015.  
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the chapter commented on the role that corporate governance plays in the financial system and 
wider economy, and why it is important for economic growth and financial stability as evidenced in 
various jurisdictions. Although corporate governance involves many systems and structures, the 
heart of it lies in affording efficient investor protection, together with the common law principles of 
fiduciary duties owed to investors. Sound corporate governance is essential to the well being of an 
individual company and its stakeholders, particularly its shareholders and creditors. It is also a critical 
ingredient in maintaining a sound financial system and a robust economy. That is why governments 
have taken such an interest in corporate governance failures. In the financial system, corporate 
governance is one of the key factors that determine the health of the system and its ability to survive 
economic shocks, as evidenced by the Japanese experience. Furthermore, understanding the 
statutory and common law rules of fiduciary duties and the interpretation thereof by the courts, helps 
in understanding its function in modern corporate governance.  
 
In addition, the importance of the relationships between corporate governance and economic 
development is self explanatory. Following on from the discussions set out in chapter one, two and 
three, it is evident that well governed corporate frameworks benefit companies through greater 
access to financing, lower cost of capital, better company performance and more favourable 
treatment of all stakeholders.2050 Throughout the first three chapters, there is sufficient evidence to 
show that if a country’s overall corporate governance and property rights systems are weak, 
voluntary and market corporate governance mechanisms have more limited effectiveness. 
Claessens and Yurtoglu, appropriately state that:  
 
‘It is evident that, although corporate governance may not be the sole driver for sound economic 
performance, it is a significant contributor, and we have only to see the devastating consequences 
of poor corporate governance practices to appreciate the importance of corporate governance to 
economic development and its benefits for jobs and wealth creation.’2051   
 
It was discussed above that the structure and operation of private equity funds in practice raises two 
agency problems. Firstly, an agency problem exists in the underlying portfolio investee company 
between the active private equity fund and investee company’s other shareholders2052 and 
managers. The second is where a private equity firm acts as an agent for external investors, who 
choose to invest in underlying portfolio investee companies via an intermediary rather than directly. 
However, legal practice has developed corporate governance and risk mitigating techniques via 
effective legal contracting aimed at controlling the level of risk created by the above mentioned 
                                                 
2050Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development - An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC. 
2051Claessens, S., and Yurtoglu, B. (2012), ‘Corporate Governance and Development: An Update’, Global 
Corporate Governance Forum Publication (Focus 10), International Finance Corporation, US, at page vii. 
2052A company typically have several shareholders and a private equity fund will typically not be the sole 
shareholder of a company’s shares. 
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agency problems. In addition, a corporate governance structure with private equity involvement 
provides incentives to reduce agency problems.  
 
Despite legal practice having developed effective risk mitigating techniques, the legal duties of the 
private equity firm still needs to be embedded in an industry structure for private equity which 
provides the expertise and resources for good governance; and these duties must be enforced by 
efficient regulation. In South Africa there are no specific case law precedents nor legislation with 
regard to fiduciary duties, that are directly applicable to private equity firms. Private equity will in 
terms of the vehicles for investment used be subject to general fiduciary duties. On the other hand, 
there is a widely accepted view that the starting point for understanding the obligations on investment 
market participants is the contract agreed by the parties; and where market participants are 
sophisticated commercial parties, the courts will be reluctant to interfere with their commercial 
arrangements. So while the private equity firm owes the investors certain fiduciary duties, it is clear 
that if the duties are not spelled out in the private equity fund agreement by way of covenants, the 
fund managers will be bound by the fiduciary duties under common law and statutory law. Therefore 
the private equity industry should strive at bettering the corporate governance practices within a legal 
framework that also includes effective legal contracting. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the introductory paragraph 1 of this chapter, that there is a strong 
investment case for driving corporate governance in the private equity fund management industry. 
This chapter highlighted that there are two levels of corporate governance involved in private equity 
investing. The first level of corporate governance relates to the private equity fund’s underlying 
portfolio investee companies. The second level relates to the private equity fund itself which focuses 
on the relationship between the private equity firm and the investors that invest in the private equity 
fund. The first part of this chapter discussed the broader corporate governance compliance 
framework, more notable the common law and legislated grounds for corporate governance 
adherence. In addition, this chapter discussed the relationship between corporate governance 
principles and law, more notable investor protection and fiduciary duties owed by the private equity 
firm and its staff to the investors as part of the broader corporate governance compliance framework.  
 
The second part of this chapter also discussed the practical considerations with regard to the role of 
corporate governance in terms of the relationship between the private equity firm and the investors 
that invest in the private equity fund. This included a discussion with regard to the practical corporate 
governance contracting techniques employed between the private equity firm and investors. In 
addition, the second part of this chapter submitted several key practical recommendations that could 
be applied within the private equity firm itself to improve its own internal corporate governance 
framework. It is submitted that private equity investment in South Africa is a positive feature of the 
corporate landscape. Policymakers and regulators need to be aware of all the systematic evidence 
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discussed throughout the first three chapters of this thesis when they set out in designing policy and 
mechanisms aimed at regulating the private equity industry.  
 
The next chapter will examine inter alia the regulatory, policy and tax reforms in the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia aimed at promoting private equity investing. The modest objective of chapter four is to 
establish a set of key lessons that could assist South African policymakers in creating the framework 
which will enhance the human and financial resources needed for a dynamic private equity sector. 
Chapter four intends to achieve the latter by reviewing the reforms in the above mentioned countries. 
The framework mentioned above, must improve the potential for capital formation via private equity 
funding from both local and international investors; encourage the development of entrepreneurship; 
and remove practical impediments to private equity investing.  
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Chapter Four: Legal Considerations in the Private Equity Market 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter will critically analyse the tax and regulatory environment within which the private equity 
industry operates and to which extent this environment stimulates or hinders private equity. A 
comparative analysis will be done with the US, UK, Canada, Australia and South Africa. Furthermore, 
this chapter will consider and analyse two key impediments; namely tax legislation and exit 
alternatives; and show how legislation could effectively address the former and how the lack of exit 
routes is an impediment to the growth of the local private equity industry. Two further key 
impediments have already been extensively discussed in the preceding three chapters, namely 
appropriate pension fund legislation that encourages private equity investments by pension funds 
and the importance of advancing higher standards of corporate governance to the private equity 
business model.2053 Therefore, chapter four will not discuss again the important role corporate 
governance and pension fund legislation plays in shaping the private equity industry. This chapter is 
a comparative analysis of the extent to which the law impacts the private equity market. The 
applicable regulatory developments and legislation of the US, UK, Canada and Australia are 
analysed and compared to the South African position in order to determine whether the South African 
law can learn anything from these jurisdictions. The real issue for South African policy makers should 
be how to enhance the South African private equity markets development and role as a catalyst for 
economic growth. One way is to strengthen private equity regulation in South Africa, and, if so, in 
what ways.  
 
Firstly, chapter four will discuss that an appropriate tax regime is critical to the private equity industry. 
Tax incentives have been widely used worldwide to stimulate private equity investments, and most 
established private equity markets provide some form of tax incentives.2054 For instance in the US 
investment vehicles that are not subject to double taxation, such as the limited partnership and 
limited liability company, are the norm for structuring private equity funds.2055 Cumming and Johan, 
                                                 
2053For example, it was highlighted in chapter one that the US have encouraged private equity investments by 
pension funds which had a significant impact on the US private equity industry. The change in regulatory 
interpretation by federal pension authorities in the 1970s led pension funds to become the single most 
important source of US private equity funds. See also Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), 
‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons. According to SAVCA, one of 
the main drivers for the increase in private equity investments by South African pension funds have been the 
greater clarity on pension fund regulation in South Africa. Available at 
www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2013/07/09/sa-private-equity-industry-on-growth-path, accessed in 
August 2014. 
2054See Bedu, N. and Montalban, M. (2014), ‘Analysing the uneven development of private equity in Europe: 
legal origins and diversity of capitalism’, Socio-Economic Review, 12(1), at pages 33-70. 
2055As discussed in paragraph 3.2 of chapter two. 
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discuss related empirical evidence on the effect of regulation on the development of private equity 
markets.2056 They state: 
 
‘Most notably, the most recent empirical evidence indicates low capital gains taxation stimulates 
the supply of entrepreneurial capital.’2057 
 
They argue that for instance in the US, the reduction of capital gains taxes as an incentive is viewed 
as having made a significant contribution to the growth of private equity investments.2058 Low capital 
gains taxation in a private equity market gives investors a greater incentive to invest in long-term 
private equity funds which increases the flow of capital into the industry.2059 
 
Secondly, chapter four will discuss that for a private equity market to develop, one of the key 
characteristics of the market is that private equity firms must have solid exit alternatives that enable 
them to realise the gains on their investments. As mentioned in chapter one, when the private equity 
firm invests in a transaction, the goal is to exit its investment at a profit when the portfolio company's 
value has been maximized.  
 
2. Tax Considerations Impacting Private Equity 
 
Foreign investors have earmarked several jurisdictions as emerging markets stable enough to attract 
offshore private equity investment.2060 For South Africa to compete as such a jurisdiction, the rate of 
return on funds invested must be competitive with those offered in other markets.2061 Thus it would 
be fair to assume that investment proceeds should be returned to investors free of tax or taxed at a 
beneficial rate. Therefore it is imperative for South Africa to provide for a beneficial tax regime 
applicable to private equity investment and returns.2062 The fact that the South African private equity 
industry is not separately regulated to ensure the capital treatment of returns from investments, 
negatively impacts on South Africa as a suitable jurisdiction to attract both local and foreign investors. 
This chapter will next discuss, amongst others: 
 
                                                 
2056Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2057Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2058Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2059See paragraph 2.1(a) of this chapter below. 
2060Modise, L., Makola, M., and Drake, H. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: South Africa’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 278-288.  
2061Modise, L., Makola, M., and Drake, H. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: South Africa’, in Private Equity in 32 
Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 278-288.  
2062The taxation of investment proceeds in the private equity context in South Africa is regulated in terms of 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.   
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 Private equity tax incentives in the US, Canada, Australia, UK and South Africa; 
 Taxation of carried interest in the US, Canada, Australia, UK and South Africa; and 
 Taxation of share options in the US, Canada, Australia, UK and South Africa when used as an 
incentive mechanism in underlying portfolio investee companies. 
 
The above mentioned tax considerations are important to the private equity industry and the 
discussion to follow is aimed at analysing how these jurisdictions have addressed taxation with 
regard to their respective private equity industries in a manner which could be beneficial to South 
African law. As mentioned earlier, this chapter is a comparative analysis of the extent to which the 
law impacts the private equity market. The applicable regulatory developments and legislation of the 
US, UK, Canada and Australia will first be analysed and then compared to the South African position 
in order to determine whether the South African law can learn anything from these jurisdictions.  
 
2.1 Tax Incentives 
(a) United States (‘US’)  
 
An important event that contributed to the success of the private equity industry in the US was the 
substantial reduction of capital gains tax.2063 The Revenue Act of 1978 in the US reduced the 
prevailing capital gains tax rate from 49.5 percent to 28 percent in the US, giving investors a greater 
incentive to long-term equity investments.2064 Another important event that contributed to the success 
of the private equity industry in the US was the Stock Options Law of 1981.2065 It provided that taxes 
on share options are to be paid when shares are sold, instead of when the options were exercised. 
Ironically, there is no direct tax incentive scheme available under current US law aimed at 
encouraging investment in unlisted companies, unlike in the UK, Canada and Australia.2066 For 
instance in Canada, numerous tax incentive schemes have been introduced, such as the labour-
sponsored venture capital corporation (‘LSVCC’) which provide tax credits to individuals who are 
Canadian residents in specific Canadian provinces.2067 However, it is submitted that the most 
important tax incentive that has been widely used to stimulate private equity investments in the US 
is that US private equity vehicles are not subject to double taxation. Therefore the limited partnership 
                                                 
2063See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 
Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, 
LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2064See Barry, F., O’Mahony, C. and Sax, B. (2012), ‘Venture capital in Ireland in comparative perspective’, 
The Irish Journal of Management, 32(1), at pages 1-26. 
2065In terms of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provides 
special tax treatment for certain employee options with the introduction of ‘incentive stock options’ into the US 
Internal Revenue Code. 
2066Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, 2nd Edition, Elsevier Inc. at paragraph 9.6.3. Osborne, D., and Sandler, D. (1998), ‘Tax 
Expenditure Analysis of Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations’, Canadian Tax Journal 46(3) at 
pages 499-574. 
2067The various tax incentive schemes introduced in the UK, Canada and Australia, aimed at encouraging 
investment in unlisted companies, will be discussed in detail hereinafter. 
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and limited liability company are the norm for structuring private equity funds in the US.2068 Almost 
all studies on US private equity activity conclude that the lack of double taxation was (and still is) 
instrumental in increasing the flow of capital into the industry.2069 Therefore, double taxation can be 
viewed as a barrier to an increase in flow of capital into a private equity market. Taken together, 
these changes had the simultaneous effect of increasing both the supply of and demand for private 
equity. However, in the US there is a strong drive by opponents to the private equity model to 
introduce a new entity level tax on private equity partnerships and other flow-through entities.2070  
 
As discussed in paragraph 3.2 of chapter two, the most commonly used vehicle for private equity 
funds in the US is the Delaware limited partnership, which gives limited liability to the investors who 
are limited partners in the limited partnership and these investors are often a mix of domestic and 
foreign, and taxable and tax-exempt investors (for example pension funds).2071 Private equity funds 
are structured as limited partnerships in the US due to the lack of an entity-level tax 
on partnerships and other flow-through entities under the US tax system.2072  Private equity funds in 
the US are treated as partnerships for US tax purposes. The fund itself is then not taxed in the US, 
but instead the fund's income flows through to each investor and is taxable at the investor level.2073 
The character of the income also flows through to the investors so that capital gains realised by the 
fund maintain that character in the investors' hands. The flow-through tax treatment applies to both 
US and non-US investors.2074  
 
According to the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (‘PEGCC’), businesses that are structured 
as corporations, on the other hand, are taxed separately from their owners.2075 These businesses 
are referred to as ‘C’ corporations in the US and they pay an entity level corporate tax.2076 In the US 
during 2013, Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives had solicited industry 
                                                 
2068As discussed in paragraph 3.2 of chapter two. 
2069See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2070According to the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Available at 
www.pegcc.org/issues/private-equity-and-tax-policy/., accessed in April 2015. 
2071See Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1017-1051. 
2072See subchapter K of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the US Code. 
2073Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2074Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2075The Private Equity Growth Capital Council is an advocacy, communications and research organization and 
resource center established to develop, analyze and distribute information about the private equity and growth 
capital investment industry and its contributions to the national and global economy.  Established in 2007 and 
formerly known as the Private Equity Council, the PEGCC is based in Washington, D.C. The members of the 
PEGCC are 34 of the world’s leading private equity and growth capital firms united by their commitment to 
growing and strengthening the businesses in which they invest. More information about the PEGCC can be 
found at www.pegcc.org. Available at www.pegcc.org/issues/private-equity-and-tax-policy/private-equity-
partnership-taxation/#sthash.Oui9L34j.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2076Income that is distributed to the owners of the corporation (commonly referred to as shareholders), is then 
taxed at the individual level. 
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comments on various aspects of tax policy that the Committee and its Working Groups were 
considering as part of the comprehensive tax reform that took place in the US.2077 One such 
consideration that would have a negative impact on the private equity industry is for the introduction 
of a new entity level tax that should be imposed on partnerships and other flow-through entities in 
order to reduce tax rates on ‘C’ corporations.2078 In a letter by the PEGCC to Dave Camp, the 
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives, the PEGCC 
set forth sound reasons opposing a proposal for the introduction of a new entity level tax that it was 
considering to be imposed on partnerships and other flow-through entities in order to reduce tax 
rates on ‘C’ corporations.2079 In the letter, the PEGCC argued that: 
 
‘Changes to the current flow-through (pass-through) tax structure for private equity firms 
organized as partnerships would diminish competition and capital formation in the industry by 
effectively subjecting these entities to triple taxation. Since most of the companies owned by 
private equity partnerships (i.e. portfolio companies) are typically organized as C Corporations, 
they are already subject to double taxation. A policy adopting C Corporation treatment for private 
equity partnerships would create a third level of taxation, increasing the overall tax rate for private 
equity investments by at least 10%. This new entity-level tax on flow-through (pass-through) 
entities would make these businesses less competitive in the global economy and create new 
barriers to entry for emerging funds.’2080 
 
The principle policy consideration according to the PEGCC, when it comes to the taxation of private 
equity at the fund level, is that: 
 
‘If there is a flaw with the current corporate tax model, it is not that partnerships pay one level of 
tax but that C Corporations pay two levels of tax.  The solution is not to extend a defect in the 
current system to more taxpayers by requiring flow-through entities to pay two levels of tax, it is 
to revise the law so all forms of business are subject to one level of taxation.’2081 
 
A Delaware limited liability company may also be used instead of a Delaware limited partnership to 
structure a private equity fund in the US. The Delaware limited liability company is less popular and 
there are disadvantages to using a Delaware limited liability company. For instance, private equity 
funds that invest outside of the US or which have non-US investors, the main disadvantages are that 
                                                 
2077See Graetz, M.J. (2014), ‘The Tax Reform Road Not Taken – Yet’, National Tax Journal, 67(2). 
2078Available  at www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2079Dated 15th April 2013. 
2080Available  at www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2081Available at www.pegcc.org/issues/private-equity-and-tax-policy/private-equity-partnership-
taxation/#sthash.Oui9L34j.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
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Delaware limited liability companies are not recognised as tax transparent in certain jurisdictions; 
and in some jurisdictions investors and Delaware limited liability companies may have difficulty 
accessing the benefits of tax treaties.2082 Nonetheless, both limited partnerships and Delaware 
limited liability companies are commonly treated as tax transparent for US tax purposes. However, 
the Delaware limited partnership is generally considered the most suitable legal vehicle because of 
its better developed statutory regime and body of case law.2083 It is the uniqueness of the ‘flow-
through’ nature of these vehicles and tax treatment thereof that has contributed to the success of 
the US private equity model.2084 It is submitted that introducing an entity level tax on the private equity 
partnerships model would have catastrophic consequences on the private equity business model. It 
would be imperative for South African policy makers to take note and not introduce a similar policy 
consideration of introducing an entity level tax (at private equity fund level), albeit structured as a 




The limited partnership is the predominant legal structure used in Canada as a vehicle for private 
equity funds.2085 Limited partnerships are subject to Canadian provincial law and are formed under 
the laws of the relevant Canadian province. Similar to limited partnerships discussed throughout the 
previous chapters, investors in a Canadian limited partnership are also afforded limited liability 
provided such investors do not actively participate in the conduct of the business.2086 In addition, 
Canadian limited partnerships are fiscally transparent in terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act.2087 
A limited partnership with any non-resident limited partners is deemed to be non-Canadian and all 
limited partners are subject to a 25 percent withholding tax on dividend or interest income (subject 
to reduction under any applicable treaties).2088 It is for this reason that parallel vehicles are commonly 
created for non-Canadian investors otherwise there is no difference in treatment for domestic 
investors and foreign investors under Canadian law.2089 Furthermore, limited liability corporations 
                                                 
2082See Hopson, J.F. and Hopson, P.D. (2014), ‘Making the Right Choice of Business Entity’, The CPA 
Journal, 84(10), 42. 
2083Lewis, W.A. (2013), ‘Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability 
Companies’, Fordham Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 2, Article 20, 1017, at pages 1017-1051. 
2084See Sensoy, B.A., Wang, Y. and Weisbach, M.S. (2014), ‘Limited partner performance and the maturing of 
the private equity industry’, Journal of Financial Economics, 112(3), at pages 320-343. 
2085See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. See also Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Private Equity: Fund 
Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation’, Kolb Series in Finance, Essential Perspectives, published by John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010. 
2086See paragraph 3.5 of chapter two. 
2087R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl). 
2088See Steenkamp, L.A. (2014), ‘The Permanent Establishment Concept In Double Tax Agreements Between 
Developed And Developing Countries: Canada/South Africa As A Case In Point’, International Business and 
Economics Research Journal (IBER), 13(3), at pages 539-552. See also Brander, J.A., Du, Q. and Hellmann, 
T.F. (2010b), ‘The Effects of Government-Sponsored Venture Capital: International Evidence’, NBER Working 
Paper No. 16521, November 2010. 
2089Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: 
An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13:1, at pages 75-94. 
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formed in the US2090 are not fiscally transparent in terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act and are 
taxed as corporations in terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act.2091 According to Cumming, limited 
liability corporations are not typically used for investment purposes in Canada instead a limited 
partnership will be used as the investment vehicle.2092 
 
In Canada numerous tax incentive schemes have been introduced, but they are aimed primarily at 
small businesses or individual investors who are Canadian taxpayers.2093 For instance, Canadian-
controlled private corporations are entitled to a lower rate of tax deduction on operating income up 
to a specific threshold; they are also entitled to enhanced investment tax credits for qualified 
expenditures on scientific research and experimental development; as well as the deferral of an 
employee's taxable benefit arising from the exercise of share options.2094 In addition, shareholders 
of Canadian-controlled private corporations are entitled to a capital gains exemption on a disposition 
of qualified small business corporation shares.2095 A Canadian-controlled private corporation is a 
Canadian corporation that is not listed on a stock exchange and that is not controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by one or more non-residents of Canada.2096 
 
Furthermore, the Canadian federal government as well as specific Canadian provincial governments 
provides tax credits to individuals who are Canadian residents in specific provinces and who have 
invested in what is called a labour-sponsored venture capital corporation (‘LSVCC’).2097 As 
mentioned in chapters one and two, the most important provision that grants a significant tax benefit 
in Canada for underlying private equity portfolio companies are the LSVCC credit.2098 In terms of a 
Canadian Venture Capital Association (‘CVCA’) report, investors can claim a federal credit of 15 
percent for up to $5000 invested in LSVCC shares, while federal credits on qualifying research and 
                                                 
2090As mentioned in paragraph 2.1(a) of this chapter above, the Delaware limited liability company (‘LLC’) may 
also be used to structure a private equity fund in the US. The LLC is less popular because private equity funds 
that invest outside of the US are often not recognised as tax transparent.  
2091R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl). 
2092Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: 
An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13(1), at pages 75-94. 
2093Cumming, D. (2014), ‘Public economics gone wild: Lessons from venture capital’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 36, at pages 251-260. See also Cumming, D.J. (2007), ‘Government policy towards 
entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment funds’, Journal of Business Venturing, 22(2), at 193-235.  
2094Cumming, D. (2014), ‘Public economics gone wild: Lessons from venture capital’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 36, at pages 251-260. See also Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of 
active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13(1), at 
pages 75-94. 
2095Cumming, D. (2014), ‘Public economics gone wild: Lessons from venture capital’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 36, at pages 251-260. 
2096Cumming, D. (2014), ‘Public economics gone wild: Lessons from venture capital’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 36, at pages 251-260. See also Cumming, D.J. (2011), ‘Public policy and the creation of 
active venture capital markets’, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 13(1), at 
pages 75-94. 
2097Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Volume 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
2098Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Volume 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
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development is generally 20 percent with an enhanced credit of 35 percent for small Canadian 
controlled private corporations.2099 On the other hand provincial credits in the region of 40 percent to 
50 percent of the cost of research and development are covered by tax support. In the case of the 
enhanced credit, up to 40 percent of the credit is paid to the corporation if the company has no taxes 
at which to claim the credit.2100 To this end, both the LSVCC credit and enhanced research and 
development credit can provide significant resources to the company at the time when it starts.2101  
 
According to Cumming and MacIntosh,2102 LSVCCs are tax-subsidized investment funds that attract 
contributions from individual investors via tax incentives and invest the funds in entrepreneurial 
businesses. The reason why they are referred to as ‘labour sponsored’ is because a trade union 
must initially create the corporation and such sponsoring union receives a special class of shares in 
the LSVCC which, while not entitled to dividends or assets, can appoint a majority of directors.2103 In 
essence, a LSVCC is a form of private equity fund that depends on small amounts of capital from a 
large pool of individual investors.2104 A LSVCC is different to a typically private equity fund which 
would typically depend on institutional investors such as pension funds and large corporations. 
According to Cumming and MacIntosh, a typical private equity fund also attracts investor capital from 
individuals, however such individuals tend to be few in number and contribute much larger amounts 
of money.2105 There are several shortcomings of the Canadian LSVCC structure and most of the 
reasons relate to the way the Canadian Federal Government and specific provinces regulate the 
structure of LSVCCs and their investment activity.2106 For instance, LSVCCs are subject to 
restrictions on the companies in which they can invest and are more regulated than other forms of 
                                                 
2099Canadian Venture Capital Association Submission, (2001), ‘Tax Submission to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce on Equity Financing’, Canadian Venture Capital Association. See also 
Wonglimpiyarat, J. (2014), ‘Technology Financing and Commercialization: Exploring the Challenges and How 
Nations Can Build Innovative Capacity’, First Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, at pages 132-152. 
2100Canadian Venture Capital Association Submission, (2001), ‘Tax Submission to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce on Equity Financing’, Canadian Venture Capital Association. See Cumming, 
D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International Perspective’, 
2nd Edition, Elsevier Inc., at 292-293. 
2101Osborne, D., and Sandler, D. (1998), ‘Tax Expenditure Analysis of Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations’, Canadian Tax Journal, 46(3), at pages 499-574. Wonglimpiyarat, J. (2014), ‘Technology 
Financing and Commercialization: Exploring the Challenges and How Nations Can Build Innovative Capacity’, 
1st Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, at 132-152. 
2102Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2103Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2104See Dzulynsky, M.B., Imerti, V.F. and Kraeker, B.A. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Canada’, in Private Equity in 
32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 
28-33. See also Sandler, D. (2004), ‘Venture Capital and Tax Incentives: A Comparative Study of Canada and 
the United States’, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation.  
2105Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2106Berube, C. and Mohnen, P. (2009), ‘Are Firms that Receive R&D Subsidies More Innovative?’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 42(1), at pages 206-225. 
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private equity funds.2107 In addition, LSVCCs are only active in the Canadian domestic venture capital 
market segment.2108 For example, LSVCCs can only invest in businesses in the province in which 
they were incorporated, regardless of market conditions and despite the fact that businesses in other 
regions that may offer investors superior rates of return.2109  
 
LSVCCs are also constrained as to the size and nature of their investments in any given 
entrepreneurial business.2110 Furthermore, they must invest a set percentage of the funds they raise 
typically within one to three years regardless of the prevailing economic conditions. 2111 According to 
Cumming and MacIntosh, the latter is further exacerbated by the fact that the governments 
predetermine the number of LSVCCs in each region in Canada.2112 These authors state: 
 
‘effectively stifling competition among such funds, and in turn, reducing the incentives to provide 
high rates of return. These geographical and financial restrictions, as well as investment time 
limits, can lead to pressure on LSVCC managers to invest in businesses regardless of market 
conditions, and can result in investments in inferior firms.’2113  
 
Since only individuals are permitted to invest in LSVCCs, they differ from typical private equity funds 
that receive capital from institutional investors such as pension funds and corporations. In addition, 
LSVCC managers would typically contract out investment management services to professional 
managers as opposed to operating the fund themselves.2114 Johan et al, argues that this combination 
of a large number of small investors making small investments, coupled with the distant relationship 
between investors and fund managers implies that investors will not have the proper means to 
discipline fund managers for poor performance.2115 Cumming and MacIntosh further state:  
 
                                                 
2107Berube, C. and Mohnen, P. (2009), ‘Are Firms that Receive R&D Subsidies More Innovative?’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 42(1), at pages 206-225. 
2108Berube, C. and Mohnen, P. (2009), ‘Are Firms that Receive R&D Subsidies More Innovative?’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 42(1), at pages 206-225. 
2109Berube, C. and Mohnen, P. (2009), ‘Are Firms that Receive R&D Subsidies More Innovative?’, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 42(1), at pages 206-225. 
2110Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161. 
2111Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2112Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2113Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at 569-609. Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: 
Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
22(2), at 145-161. 
2114Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
2115Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
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‘the atomization of share ownership sacrifices most if not all of these benefits, since collective 
action and free rider problems ensure that few if any shareholders have the appropriate incentives 
to monitor or discipline fund managers.’2116 
 
What this implies is that individual investors that invest a small amount in an LSVCC will be less 
likely to effectively express dissatisfaction with fund managers than an investor in a private limited 
partnership who invests a relatively larger amount of money and has a more direct relationship with 
fund managers.2117 Cumming and MacIntosh state that as a result, ‘LSVCC fund managers have 
less incentive to perform well than do managers of private funds’.2118 According to Cumming and 
Johan,  the Canadian tax system inadvertently imposes barriers to equity investments in private 
equity.2119 They argue that Canadian policy should favour polices that reduce high, inefficient taxes 
on winners and obstacles to the growth of businesses. For instance, US policymakers reduced by 
half capital gains taxes on stock market listings by small businesses as long as the investor 
shareholder(s) hold the shares for at least five years.2120 This encourages the growth of businesses 
to become a publicly listed company. On the other hand, Canada’s favourable incentive regime for 
small private companies encourages businesses to stay small rather than pay high taxes, if they 
grow or become public.2121 Policies legislated in Canada aimed at encouraging greater growth and 
increasing the incentive to undertake risks include the reductions in personal tax rates on capital 
income, including dividends, capital gains and interest. Also put forward has been the reductions in 
corporate tax rates on income earned by large companies.2122  These policy changes can be 
expected to positively affect the private equity industry. For instance, the reduction in tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains will increase the after-tax return on an investment. The prospect of higher 




                                                 
2116Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at page 582. 
2117Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), at pages 145-161.  
2118Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at page 582. 
2119Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.3.  
2120Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.3.  
2121Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.3.  
2122Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.3.  
2123See also Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional 
Research Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
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As mentioned in paragraph 3 of chapter two, the most common legal structure used in Australia to 
structure private equity funds is the closed-ended Collective Investment Vehicles (‘CIVs’) or more 
commonly referred to as a unit trust.2124 This is used by funds targeting buyouts of companies or 
businesses with assets exceeding A$250 million. Alternatively, either a Venture Capital Limited 
Partnership (‘VCLP’) structure or Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnership (‘ESVCLP’) 
structure may be used.  A VCLP is used by private equity funds targeting smaller investments with 
assets of up to A$250 million whereas a ESVCLP is used by private equity funds targeting smaller 
investments with assets of up to A$50 million.2125 The VCLP regime was introduced in 2002 under 
the Venture Capital Act 2002 and Taxation Laws Amendment (Venture Capital) Act 2002. The 
ESVCLP regime was introduced in 2007 under the Tax Laws Amendment (2007 Measures No. 2) 
Act 2007.2126 Therefore, in Australia either of the above structures may be used for private equity 
funds, which are aimed at both larger and smaller private equity transactions. 
 
The Australian laws that regulate fund structures in Australia are complex and it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to comprehensively detail all material aspects of the relevant laws. This discussion will 
provide a broad analysis of the available fund structures, but more importantly highlight the key 
legislated tax concessions that are available to investors and fund managers of each of these fund 
structure types. For instance, certain of the key legislated tax concessions that are available to 
investors and the fund manager of an ESVCLP or a VCLP are not available in respect of a CIV. 2127 
Furthermore, on 11th May 2010 the Australian Tax Authority (‘ATO’) released rulings indicating it will 
treat income from the disposal of assets by private equity funds on revenue account, namely taxing 
it as ordinary income. However, the ATO ruled that if the CIV qualifies as a Managed Investment 
Trust (‘MIT’) then it can elect to treat qualifying assets on capital account, namely taxing it as capital 
gains.2128 The introduction of the MIT tax framework was part of the ATO’s review of the tax treatment 
of CIVs and to consider whether including a broader range of tax flow-through vehicles should be 
permitted, consistent with the Government’s objective of developing Australia as a leading financial 
centre.2129 A CIV may qualify as a MIT if the trust meets all of the required criteria. The criteria being 
                                                 
2124Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 6-12. 
2125As discussed in paragraph 3.4 of chapter two. See also Australian Government: The Board of Taxation 
(2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report 
to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, June 2011. 
2126As discussed in paragraph 3.4 of chapter two. 
2127Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited, (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. See 
also Maarbani, S. (2011), ‘Establishing a new Venture Capital or Private Equity Fund’, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1st September 2011. 
2128The MIT rules were introduced in June 2010 and defined under section 9 of the Corporations Act, 2001. 
See Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act of 2001. See also Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
2129Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
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that the CIV has a manager which is an Australian resident with an Australian financial services 
license; the trust must not control a trading business; is listed or widely held; and invests in passive 
investments, such as rent, debt or equity.2130 
 
Collective Investment Vehicles (‘CIVs’) are fiscally transparent if they do not constitute public CIVs 
that control or are able to control a trading business.2131 One method used in practice to overcome 
this, is by structuring the private equity fund as multiple CIVs, co-investing in parallel so that the 
trustee of any one CIV/unit trust does not effectively control the trading business.2132 A CIV is not 
fiscally transparent in relation to tax losses that cannot be used by its investors and these losses 
remain in the trust and can be offset against the trust's future income if certain criteria are met.2133 
Furthermore, in certain circumstances trustees may be required to withhold from certain returns paid 
to, or at the direction of non-resident beneficiaries.2134 In addition, a lower rate applies to distributions 
from a CIV that qualifies as a MIT.2135 In this regard they allow the trustee of a qualifying MIT to make 
an irrevocable election to apply only the Australian capital gains tax provisions to gains and losses 
on disposal of qualifying assets.2136 However, the capital gains treatment does not apply to carried 
interests acquired by the manager of the MIT.2137 If a trust is eligible to be a MIT and does not make 
the capital election, then the gains and losses are applied to income.2138 
 
During 2014 the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (‘AVCAL’) met 
with the Secretariat to the Financial System Inquiry (‘FSI’) to discuss a range of specific issues 
relevant to the private equity market in Australia.2139 The AVCAL highlighted several policy and 
regulatory factors that act as impediments on the capacity of the Australian private equity industry to 
                                                 
2130Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act of 2001. Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review 
of Taxation Arrangements under the Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant 
Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed in May 2015. 
2131Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act of 2001. As defined in the public trading trust rules. 
2132Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
2133Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-12. 
2134At 30 percent for a corporate beneficiary. See also Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund 
Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published 
by Getting the Deal Through, at pages 6-154. 
2135At 15 percent for a corporate beneficiary. 
2136Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. This 
election should both result in greater certainty for foreign investors concerning the Australian tax consequences 
of their investment; and in certain circumstances, ensure that the foreign resident CGT exemption applies. 
2137Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
2138Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
2139Stated in a letter addressed to the Chairman, David Murray, of the Financial System Inquiry (‘FSI’) by the 
Chief Executive Officer, Yasser El-Ansary, of the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
Limited (‘AVCAL’) dated 28 April 2014. Sourced in Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
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increase its contribution to the future growth and expansion of Australian businesses within its 
economy. The AVCAL made specific reference to the findings of the Johnson Report of 2010.2140 
The Johnson Report recommended that the Treasurer request the Board of Taxation to review the 
scope for providing a broader range of tax flow-through collective investment vehicles.2141 The 
subsequent Board of Taxation review of the tax arrangements applying to CIVs was completed in 
December 2011 but the report, and the Government's response, has to date not yet been 
released.2142 As part of the AVCAL supplementary submission to the FSI on 28th April 2014, they 
argue that: 
 
‘AVCAL believes that the outcomes of this review are important because the CIV of choice 
domestically, apart from VCLPs, remains a managed investment scheme taking the legal form of 
a trust. Some features of Managed Investment Trust (MIT) tax framework put Australia’s funds 
management sector at a competitive disadvantage in terms of managing funds for offshore clients 
who have greater certainty of flow-through tax treatment through other international CIVs of 
choice such as limited partnerships and limited liability companies. These shortcomings and 
uncertainties should be addressed, in consultation with industry, as part of the Government's 
ongoing review of the MIT tax framework. These reforms are also important to Australia’s future 
capacity to attract foreign investment into our economy. In view of this, AVCAL recommends that 
the FSI encourage the Government to: release the Board of Taxation's review of CIVs, together 
with its response to the report; provide legislative certainty for the retention of character and 
source for investors in MITs, and address other areas of the MIT tax framework to allow these 
vehicles to operate in as similar a fashion as possible to how international CIVs are taxed in other 
jurisdictions; and prioritise, as part of the proposed Tax White Paper which will be prepared in the 
course of the next two years, the implementation of policies that will support Australia’s capacity 
to attract capital from domestic and international investors through a globally competitive 
environment for collective investment management activities.’2143 
                                                 
2140Johnson Report (2010), ‘Australia as a Financial Centre: Building on our Strengths’, Report by the 
Australian Financial Centre Forum. On 26 September 2008, Minister Bowen established the Australian 
Financial Centre Forum (AFCF) to progress the Government's initiative to position Australia as a leading 
financial services centre in the region. The AFCF is a Government and industry partnership comprising: a 
Chairman, Mr Mark Johnson; a Panel of Experts, consisting of six senior financial sector representatives; the 
Treasury Taskforce; and a Reference Group, which will be the main consultative body and includes 
representatives from the peak financial sector industry associations, the State Governments and Austrade. 
2141Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed in June 2015. 
2142Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. The 
delay between reporting and public release is a concern pointed to in Parliament by the current Government 
(when in Opposition), in March 2013. Senate Notice Paper No.143 – 14/5/2013; Orders of the Senate, Senator 
Mathias Cormann. 
2143Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014, at 
page 5. 




Subsequent to the AVCAL supplementary submission, the Financial Services Council (‘FSC’) 2144 
also commented on the Board of Taxation’s review of the tax arrangements applying to CIVs.2145 
The FSC, like the AVCAL argued that Australian policy makers should be more cognisant of the 
preferences of international private equity investors. The FSC submission argued that most foreign 
investors2146 do not come from a common-law jurisdiction and thus are not familiar with trusts and 
often prefer to invest in a CIV which possess either a contractual basis2147 or is a corporate entity.2148 
Therefore, to allow Australian based fund managers to service these clients from Australia, as 
opposed to them establishing an offshore CIV in a competing jurisdiction, the FSC proposes the 
establishment of alternative flow through vehicles, particularly for non-resident investors.2149 In 
addition, the FSC suggested that the elective provisions that apply to MITs should not be limited to 
unit trusts, but to any legal entity that meets the prescribed prerequisite conditions.2150 The FSC 
submission states that:  
 
‘Once such an entity has elected into the regime the features normally associated with MITs such 
as transparency, flow through, deemed capital status would apply, regardless of how that type of 
entity might normally be treated for tax purposes. By allowing such flexibility, Australian managers 
would be able to develop products that suited particular overseas jurisdictions … the preferred 
style of CIV may differ from country to country and, indeed, may even vary within a country 
depending upon the type of investment. Such flexibility provides a degree of protection against 
future developments that may result in unit trusts falling out of favour with investors.’2151   
 
According to the FSC, the proposed new CIV flow through vehicle will be an Australia domiciled 
onshore vehicle, primarily intended for investment by non-resident investors.2152 The definition of a 
CIV in terms of the FSC proposal should encompass corporate vehicles, limited partnership vehicles 
and any future vehicle which meets the criteria. The existing definition of ‘managed investment 
                                                 
2144The Financial Services Council (‘FSC’) is the peak body representing Australia’s retail and wholesale funds 
management businesses, superannuation funds, life insurers and financial advisory networks. Collectively the 
FSC have 128 members who are responsible for investing over $1.7 trillion on behalf of more than ten million 
Australians.  
2145Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011.  
2146Despite foreign investors residing in a double tax treaty country. 
2147For instance an Irish common contractual fund. 
2148For instance a Luxembourg SICAV. 
2149Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011.  
2150Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011.  
2151Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011, 
at page 1. 
2152Financial Services Council Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review of the 
Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1 March 2011, at page 
5. 
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scheme’ as contained in section 9 of the Corporations Act of 2001 applies to cover all forms of CIV 
legal structures except that for a corporate CIV vehicle and the definition will need to be amended 
so that the corporate CIV vehicle is not exempted from being a managed investment scheme simply 
because it is a body corporate, otherwise an alternative regulatory regime would need to be 
enacted.2153 As mentioned above, the Board of Taxation review of the tax arrangements applying to 
CIVs was completed in December 2011 but the report (despite compelling supplementary 
submissions from the likes of the AVCAL and FSC), and the Government's response, has to date 
not yet been released.2154  
 
The other available legal vehicles used in Australia to structure a private equity fund are the 
previously mentioned VCLP2155 and ESVCLP2156 regimes.2157 VCLPs and ESVCLPs are both fiscally 
transparent for tax purposes for both domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investors may be 
exempt from Australian income tax and capital gains tax on capital gains made on the disposal of 
qualifying investments held for at least twelve months.2158 The origins to VCLPs and ESVCLPs date 
back to 1999 in Australia. In Australia the support for private equity through tax concessions was 
highlighted as the correct policy response in the Ralph Report of 1999.2159 The Ralph Report broadly 
supported the introduction of tax measures that would increase Australia’s international 
competitiveness. The Ralph Report recommended that targeted tax relief be provided by way of a 
capital gains tax exemption for private equity investment:  
 
‘A major motivation for reform of the capital gains tax arrangements was the desire to increase 
the international competitiveness of Australian business and to encourage greater investment by 
Australians. The Review believes lower capital gains tax will improve the workings of Australian 
capital markets and encourage a greater level of investment and innovation. The constraint on 
lowering capital gains tax to maximise investment is that imposed by the need to maintain revenue 
neutrality. The measures recommended in this report are also designed to encourage greater 
                                                 
2153Financial Services Council Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review of the 
Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1 March 2011, at page 
5. 
2154Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. The 
delay between reporting 
 
and public release is a concern pointed to in Parliament by the current Government 
(when in Opposition), in March 2013. Senate Notice Paper No.143 – 14/5/2013; Orders of the Senate, Senator 
Mathias Cormann. 
2155Introduced in 2002: Venture Capital Act 2002 and Taxation Laws Amendment (Venture Capital) Act 2002. 
2156Introduced in 2007 under Tax Laws Amendment (2007 Measures No. 2) Act 2007. 
2157As discussed in paragraph 3.4 of chapter two. 
2158As discussed in paragraph 3.4 of chapter two. 
2159Ralph Report (1999), ‘A Tax System Redesigned, More Certain, Equitable and Durable’, Review of 
Business Taxation, July 1999. Available at www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/., accessed in June 2015. In 1999, the 
Australian government received and basically adopted the Ralph Report which recommended sweeping 
changes to the basis of business taxation, including the international taxation regime. 
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investment in venture capital and so support new high growth businesses in Australia based on 
innovation and development of new markets.’2160 
 
The VCLP regime was introduced to encourage foreign investment in Australian private equity and 
provided an exemption from income tax on profits, both capital and revenue, from the disposal of 
qualifying investments by certain foreign partners of a VCLP.2161 As a result of the introduction of 
Division 855 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, which exempts non-residents from Australian 
income tax in relation to capital gains from the sale of investee companies in defined circumstances, 
this benefit is now largely obsolete for non-resident limited partners of VCLPs.2162 The VCLP 
structure provides no such tax advantages for Australian resident investors. Funds structured as 
VCLPs are either managed by the general partner of the limited partnership, or have the investment 
management functions outsourced to a special purpose investment management entity.2163 Investors 
in a VCLP obtain limited partnership interests and have rights and obligations governed by the limited 
partnership deed and must have a minimum fund size of AUD$10 million.2164 However, there is no 
limitation on the maximum fund size of a VCLP. The VCLP is a tax flow-through vehicle allowing 
distributions to be taxed in the hands of the investors and the right to claim losses will depend on an 
individual investor's circumstances.2165 In terms of the VCLP regime, one restriction is that the VCLP 
may only invest in qualifying private equity investments, which broadly excludes investing in entities 
which activities primarily  include property development, land ownership, banking, providing capital 
to others, leasing, factoring, securitisation, insurance, construction or the acquisition of infrastructure 
facilities and/or making passive investments.2166 
 
As part of the same above mentioned review by the Australian Board of Taxation of CIVs, the Board 
of Taxation also undertook a review into the current taxation arrangements under the VCLP 
regime.2167 The starting point of the aforementioned review was to determine whether the current 
rules of the VCLP regime were delivering on the original policy objectives. The policy objectives of 
the VCLP regime are explicitly stated in the explanatory memorandum: 
                                                 
2160Ralph Report (1999), ‘A Tax System Redesigned, More Certain, Equitable and Durable’, Review of 
Business Taxation, July 1999. Available at www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/, accessed in June 2015. 
2161Introduced in 2002: Venture Capital Act 2002 and Taxation Laws Amendment (Venture Capital) Act 2002. 
2162Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed in June 2015. 
2163Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2164Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2165See Maarbani, S. (2011), ‘Establishing a new Venture Capital or Private Equity Fund’, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1st September 2011. 
2166Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc., at pages 267-301. 
2167Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed in June 2015. 




‘To facilitate non-resident investment in the Australian venture capital industry by providing 
incentives for increased investment which will support patient equity capital investments in 
relatively high-risk start-up and expanding businesses that would otherwise have difficulty in 
attracting investment through normal commercial means.’2168 
 
The Board of Taxation recommended that that deemed capital account treatment should apply to 
qualifying domestic partners on gains or profits made by a VCLP on the disposal of eligible 
investments.2169 According to the AVCAL, this recommendation by the Board of Taxation was made 
on the basis of the Board of Taxation’s assessment of how the current VCLP regime could be 
amended in order to facilitate more direct investment into Australian businesses by private equity.2170 
The AVCAL stated that the previous government had made a decision to proceed with amendments 
that would introduce consistency as between the tax treatment of different classes of domestic and 
offshore investors into VCLPs,2171 but the current Government reversed this decision in December 
2013, and decided not to proceed with this reform, which was stated as follows:  
 
‘AVCAL’s view at that time, and still at this point, is that the Government had missed an 
opportunity to implement reforms that would assist in facilitating greater investment into mid-
market Australian businesses through PE and VC funds. AVCAL believes that the Government 
should continue the implementation of the BoT’s recommended reforms, which will improve the 
capacity of the current VCLP regime to deliver on the original policy objectives that were set by 
the Coalition Government when this structure was first introduced back in 2002. To the best of 
our understanding, AVCAL does not believe that the implementation of these reforms would carry 
a significant revenue cost to the federal budget position.2172
  
In AVCAL’s assessment, further 
investment into mid-market businesses is being held back as a direct result of the current 
inconsistency in the tax rules that apply to different classes of domestic investors in VCLPs. As 
the legislation currently stands, foreign investors have certainty in respect of capital account tax 
treatment, but a similar level of certainty does not exist for all domestic investors. Feedback from 
AVCAL members over many years has consistently highlighted that the present capital/revenue 
account tax uncertainty is the issue of greatest concern within the VCLP regime, and a significant 
                                                 
2168Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment (Venture Capital) Act 2002. 
2169Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011, at page 45-47. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au., accessed in June 2015. 
2170Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
2171After accepting the Board of Taxation’s recommendation. 
2172Any perceived risk to the revenue associated with AVCAL’s recommendations should be more than offset 
by increased taxation receipts from bigger and more profitable portfolio companies, and more productive 
workforces. The assessment of the Deputy Governor of the RBA, Mr Battellino, noted in the Senate Report on 
the review of private equity in 2007, was that: “[the] conclusion would be that really on a macro scale shifts in 
the patterns of financing probably do not have a big overall impact on the tax base.”
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impediment to domestic fundraising. These conclusions were largely echoed by the BoT in their 
2011 report.’2173   
 
As mentioned above, the ESVCLP is used by private equity funds targeting smaller investments with 
assets of up to A$50 million. The ESVCLP regime was introduced in 2007 under the Tax Laws 
Amendment Act 2007. In terms of an ESVCLP, income and capital gains derived from, or from the 
disposal of, qualifying investments are exempt from tax in Australia in the hands of both domestic 
and foreign investors.2174 The tax-free treatment serves as a legislative incentive aimed at mitigating 
the risk of early stage venture capital investments.2175 As with VCLPs, losses do not flow through to 
the limited partners and private equity funds structured as ESVCLPs are typically managed by the 
general partner of the limited partnership.2176 The fund must be structured as a limited partnership 
and have committed capital of at least AUD$10 million and not more than AUD$100 million.2177 
Similar to VCLPs, one of the restrictions of ESVCLPs is that they may only invest in qualifying 
investments. In addition, an ESVCLP must have an approved investment plan which demonstrates 
a focus on early stage private equity. 2178 In terms of the Tax Laws Amendment Act of 2007, the 
gross assets of an investee company at the time an ESVCLP makes its first investment in it must 
not exceed AUD$50 million. The limited partnership structures adopted by the VCLP and ESVCLP 
regimes are recognised internationally as the preferred vehicle for start-up and early stage private 
equity investment. Barkoczy et al stated that:  
 
‘If Australia wants to attract foreign investment, it is important that it allows such investment to be 
made through vehicles that are both suitable and familiar to foreign investors. The use of flow-
through vehicles should also produce a much ‘cleaner’ delivery of tax concessions than using the 
more complicated corporate structure, which is coupled with dividend and capital gains tax 
exemptions and is superimposed upon a complex imputation system.’2179  
                                                 
2173Stated in a letter addressed to the Chairman, David Murray, of the Financial System Inquiry (‘FSI’) by the 
Chief Executive Officer, Yasser El-Ansary, of the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
Limited (‘AVCAL’) dated 28 April 2014, at page 3. Sourced in Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014. 
2174Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 6-12. 
2175Laura, A., Johns, D. and Feros, P. (2014), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 29 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 6-12. 
2176Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, pages 6-154.  
2177Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, pages 6-154. 
2178Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, pages 6-154.  
2179Barkoczy, S., Sandler, D., Glover, J. and Kowalski, J. (2007), ‘Venture Capital Tax Expenditure Programs, 
An International Comparative Analysis of Legal Structures and Benefits’, A Report Prepared for the 
Department of Industry Tourism and Resources Commonwealth of Australia Government Venture Capital 
Incentives: A Multi-Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis Australian Tax Research Foundation, Research Study 
No. 46 pages 191-74193-5. 




VCLP and ESVCLPs are generally used for funds that are broadly aimed to develop Australia’s start-
up, early stage and expansion private equity industry by providing a vehicle of choice to pool private 
equity investment and to develop skills and experience in private equity fund management in 
Australia.2180 It is evident that there has been significant reform with regard to the Australian private 
equity market, most notable being with regard to tax concessions.  Nonetheless, the CIV still remains 
the most commonly used legal structure in Australia to structure private equity funds. In addition, it 
would be interesting to see whether policy makers adopt a new Australia domiciled onshore flow 
through CIV vehicle, primarily intended for investment by non-resident investors. 
 
(d) United Kingdom (‘UK’)  
 
As discussed in paragraph 3.3 of chapter two, there are three types of partnership available in terms 
of UK law; namely the general partnership;2181 the limited partnership;2182 and the limited liability 
partnership.2183 However, the limited partnership registered in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act 
of 1907 is the most commonly used legal vehicle for private equity funds.2184 It was also mentioned 
in paragraph 3.3 of chapter two, that a limited partnership established in terms of the Limited 
Partnerships Act of 1907 in the UK does not have legal personality separate from its partners.2185 
Limited partnerships established in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act of 1907, should not be 
confused with limited liability partnerships, which are established in terms of the Limited Liability 
Partnership Act of 2000.2186 Such limited liability partnerships are not typically used to structure 
private equity funds in the UK because one key disadvantage is that income and capital gains derived 
from the underlying partnership investments are not tax exempt and do not possess the tax pass-
through feature of the limited partnership registered in terms of the Limited Partnerships Act of 
1907.2187 Nevertheless, the limited partnership is the predominant legal vehicle used by private 
equity firms to structure private equity funds because it affords investors’ limited liability; it is tax 
                                                 
2180See Maarbani, S. (2011), ‘Establishing a new Venture Capital or Private Equity Fund’, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1st September 2011, at page 1. See also Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, 
Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley Finance Series, John Wiley and Sons. 
2181See Partnership Act of 1890. 
2182See Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
2183See Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000. 
2184Barry, B. (2011), ‘England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor 
Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 67. 
2185Barry, B. (2011), ‘England and Wales’, in Private Equity in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide’, contributing editor 
Cogut, C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at pages, at page 67. 
2186Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-7. A ‘partnership’ in terms of section 11 of the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act of 2000 is now considered a separate legal person and is deemed to have legal 
personality. It allows limited liability for general trading debts, but individual partners cannot limit personal 
liability for negligence. It was introduced to allow some protection against large negligence actions, where the 
risks were felt to be excessive. 
2187Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-7. 
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transparent; and  it offers a great deal of organisational flexibility so that the specific requirements of 
individual investors can be accommodated.2188 
 
The UK private equity market has strongly followed the developments in the US.2189 Despite this 
trend, UK investment institutions have not benefited from investments in the private equity market to 
the same degree as US investors. This has not only been a result of relative performances of the 
UK, as opposed to the US private equity market, but is also due to the extent UK institutions have 
generally been private equity averse.2190 According to Myners’ report to the British Treasury,2191 the 
primary reasons for the aversion relate to the UK’s regulatory and fiscal system, coupled with the 
broader issues in UK institutional investment.2192 Nevertheless, as submitted in chapter two, the 
limited partnership is the dominant investment vehicle used in the UK and US private equity 
markets.2193  
 
As mentioned above, the limited partnership in the UK is governed by the Limited Partnership Act of 
1907, which imposes strict constraints on the number of partners and on the limited partners’ 
involvement in the fund’s activities.2194 An initial drawback of the UK limited partnership was the 
twenty partner limit. In the past, it had been possible to structure funds to avoid the law, for example 
by using different structures or setting up separate partnerships, in order to take investments from 
more than twenty investors.2195 The law restricting the number of partners in a business had been in 
place since 1907. In 2002 the British Government changed legislation, in that private equity firms 
structured as limited partnerships governed under the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 became 
exempt from the twenty partner limit on 22nd March 2002.2196 Only partnerships authorised by the UK 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000 qualify, so partnerships managed from abroad will not be 
affected.2197 The UK government department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
consulted in 2008 on proposals to modify and merge the Limited Partnership Act of 1907 with the 
                                                 
2188Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted Model’, 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-2. 
2189Faber, D. (2013), ‘Legal Structures for Small Businesses’, in Part Two of ‘Reform of UK Company Law’, 
edited by De Lac, J., Cavendish Publishing. 
2190Faber, D. (2013), ‘Legal Structures for Small Businesses’, in Part Two of ‘Reform of UK Company Law’, 
edited by De Lac, J., Cavendish Publishing, at pages 82-95. 
2191Myners, P. (2001), ‘Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review’, presented to Rt. Hon Gordon 
Brown, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, His Majesty’s Treasury. 
2192Faber, D. (2013), ‘Legal Structures for Small Businesses’, in Part Two of ‘Reform of UK Company Law’, 
edited by De Lac, J., Cavendish Publishing, at pages 82-95. 
2193Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Private Equity: Fund Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation’, John Wiley & 
Sons. 
2194Limited Partnership Act of 1907, Chapter 24 7 Edw 7. 
2195See Burdett, J., Kumar, P. and Pople, Z. (2013), ‘The Limited Partnership: A Fresh Look at a Trusted 
Model’, Practical Law Publishing Limited, July 2013, at pages 1-7.  
2196Davies, P.L. (2008), ‘Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law’, 8th Edition, Sweet Maxwell 
Publishers. 
2197Davies, P.L. (2008), ‘Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law’, 8th Edition, Sweet Maxwell 
Publishers. 
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Partnership Act 1890, but the proposals did not go ahead and the 1907 Act remains the governing 
Act.2198  
 
Nevertheless, the other investment vehicle available in the UK is the stock exchange listed 
investment trust. This investment vehicle is not as commonly used as the limited partnership, but it 
can be regarded as the second most used investment vehicle in the UK private equity market after 
the partnership structure.2199 In the UK, the major difference between the two investment vehicles is 
the time-restricted nature of the limited partnership. In terms of the aforementioned trust structure, 
capital gains are reinvested rather than returned to investors, who received their investment returns 
through dividends and capital gains on trust shareholdings.2200 The basic shortcoming of the 
investment trust structure in the UK is that the timing difference between the raising of capital and 
its investment diminishes the private equity returns from the trust and often results in the fund 
manager of the trust being pressured into making early investments to compensate for this return 
dilution.2201 In addition, the control by investors of the fund managers is much weaker due to the 
dispersed shareholdings and with regard to the reinvestment of the investor’s capital, enabling the 
fund managers to avoid the effort of systematic fund raising.2202 The advantage of the investment 
trust is the trust’s transparent nature to end-investors, in that no corporation tax is levied on income 
or gains from the trust’s investments, provided that the trust meets the tax rules for distributing 
income to investors.2203 Furthermore, the UK investment trust structure is listed on a stock exchange 
and offers a degree of liquidity and market valuation.2204  
 
In another UK private equity incentive scheme, an individual subscribing for up to £100,000 of shares 
in a tax year in unlisted companies carrying on qualifying trades will get income tax relief at twenty 
percent on his or her investment, subject to a five year holding period.2205 This scheme is referred to 
                                                 
2198Faber, D. (2013), ‘Legal Structures for Small Businesses’, in Part Two of ‘Reform of UK Company Law’, 
edited by De Lac, J., Cavendish Publishing at pages 82-95. See Department of Trade and Industry (2004), 
‘Reform of Partnership Law: A Consultation Paper on the Economic Impact of the Law Commissions’ 
Proposals’, Report presented to Parliament by the UK Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, April 
2004. 
2199Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2200See generally Morse, G. (2010), ‘Partnership Law’, Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press.  
2201Listed investment trusts do not have a set ‘life-limit’, they are open-ended with the capital gains reinvested 
rather than returned to shareholders. The listed investment trust access capital from a very wide range of 
institutional and individual investors through public offering and the only direct linkage between the trust share 
prices and their net asset values are due to fluctuating supply and demand in the market for trust shares. 
Because the trust is listed the ‘committed capital’ is received by the trust / fund manager as and when the trust 
is raised, whereas in the case on the unlisted trust the committed capital is drawn down from investors as and 
when the fund manager wants to make an investment. In the case of the listed investment trust, the longer the 
fund manager takes to make an investment after having raised the fund, the greater the negative impact on 
the return / performance of the trust. 
2202See Talmor, E., and Vasvari, F. (2011), ‘International Private Equity’, Wiley and Sons. 
2203McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2204Talmor, E., and Vasvari, F. (2011), ‘International Private Equity’, Wiley and Sons. See also Myners, P. 
(2001), ‘Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review’, presented to Rt. Hon Gordon Brown, MP, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, His Majesty’s Treasury. 
2205McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
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as the Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’), and exempts capital gains on the sale of such 
investments from capital gains tax.2206 Similar to the venture capital trusts mentioned above, the EIS 
allows individuals to roll over up to £100,000 of capital gains made on disposals of any assets into 
shares subscribed in venture capital trusts, where the reinvestment in the trust occurs within one 
year before or one year after the disposal.2207 Primarily, the EIS allows certain individual investors to 
invest in small companies directly rather than through a venture capital trust. However, the conditions 
are similar to those for venture capital trusts.2208 For an investee company to qualify under the EIS 
the investor must not be connected with the company at any time between two years before and 
three years after the issue of the shares.2209 In terms of the EIS, investors are connected if they hold 
or are entitled to acquire more than thirty percent of the share capital, the loan capital and issued 
share capital of the company or the voting power in the company; control the company; and are 
employees, partners or directors of the company, unless they are unpaid directors or business 
angels.2210 According to Mason, business angels are high net worth individuals who invest their own 
money, often along with their time and expertise, directly in unlisted companies with the goal of 
making a financial gain.2211 
 
The shares acquired by the investor must be ordinary shares with no preferential or redemption 
rights, and be fully paid up in cash on issue.2212 The issuing arrangements for the shares must not 
include any arrangements for a pre-arranged exit and that protect investors against the risks of 
making the investment.2213 Provided the shares are held for at least three years, the tax reliefs 
available are (i) an income tax reduction calculated at thirty percent of the amount invested in shares 
on or after 6th April 2011, coupled with an investment limit of £500,000 for the tax year and with a 
minimum investment of £500 in any one company in any one tax year; (ii) the deferral or rollover 
relief from capital gains tax gains realised on disposal of any asset, if the proceeds are reinvested in 
a qualifying EIS investment; (iii) capital gains on the sale of EIS investments are exempt from capital 
gains tax, but loss relief2214 can be claimed on a disposal of shares at a loss.2215 Subject to 
Parliamentary and state-aid approval, changes to EIS and Venture Capital Trust Schemes are 
proposed in the Finance Act 2012.2216 Several changes will apply to shares in investee companies 
                                                 
2206The Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’) is a series of UK tax reliefs launched in 1994 to encourage 
investments in small unlisted companies carrying on a qualifying trade in the UK. The EIS offers both income 
tax and capital gains tax reliefs to investors who subscribe for shares in qualifying companies. 
2207McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2208McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2209Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2210Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2211Mason, C.M. (2011), ‘Business Angels’, in World Encyclopaedia of Entrepreneurship, edited by Dana, L.D., 
published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, at page 1. 
2212Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2213McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2214Against income or capital gains. 
2215Less any income tax relief given. 
2216Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
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issued on or after 6th April 2012.2217 Firstly, the annual amount which an individual can invest under 
the EIS is to be increased from £500,000 to £1 million. Secondly, the maximum amount which a 
company can raise under EIS and venture capital trust is to be increased from £2 million to £10 
million. 2218 Lastly, the size of eligible companies under EIS and venture capital trust is to be 
increased so that they can have fewer than two hundred and fifty employees (rather than the current 
fifty) and the gross assets of the company can be up to £15 million before the investment (rather 
than the current £7 million).2219 
 
A further UK private equity incentive scheme is a general relief where capital gains without value 
limit are reinvested within three years in unlisted companies carrying on trade, which is very similar 
to the tests of qualifying trade for venture capital trusts and the enterprise investment scheme.2220 
Furthermore, under the UK Venture Capital Trust Scheme, an individual can offset the amount of 
any capital loss made by him on disposing of shares which he has subscribed for certain unlisted 
trading companies against his liability for income tax in the current or preceding tax year.2221 UK tax 
reforms can be characterised as following a measured approach designed to encourage investment 
and economic growth. While the limited partnership remains the predominant legal vehicle to 
structure private equity funds in the UK, both the EIS and Venture Capital Trust Schemes are 
alternatives, highly tax efficient closed-end collective investment schemes that are used to provide 
capital finance for small expanding companies and that provide beneficial capital gains for its 
investors.2222 
 
(e) South Africa 
 
A few key lessons emerged from reviewing the reforms in the above jurisdictions. Firstly, it is evident 
that an appropriate tax regime is critical to the private equity industry. For instance, investment 
vehicles that are not subject to double taxation, such as the limited partnership and limited liability 
companies in the US, are the norm. Secondly, tax incentives have been widely used to stimulate 
                                                 
2217Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2218Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2219Sinclair, W. and Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2220See Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, 1st Edition, The Wiley 
Finance Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. See also Caselli, S. (2009), ‘Private Equity and 
Venture Capital in Europe: Markets, Techniques, and Deals’, Elsevier Publishing, at pages 41-66. 
2221See Hudson, M. (2014), ‘Funds: Private Equity, Hedge and All Core Structures’, First Edition, The Wiley 
Finance Series, John Wiley and Sons, at paragraph 2.2.4. See also Caselli, S. (2009), ‘Private Equity and 
Venture Capital in Europe: Markets, Techniques, and Deals’, Elsevier Publishing, at pages 41-66. See also 
British Venture Capital Association Report (2003), ‘The Economic Impact of VCTs in the UK,’ London: British 
Venture Capital Association. These schemes form part of a group of schemes and reliefs that aim to encourage 
investment in small unlisted trading companies. These UK schemes are the Enterprise Investment Scheme, 
Seed Investment Scheme, Venture Capital Trust scheme, Share Loss Relief and Corporate Venturing 
Scheme. 
2222See Brookes, D. and Ward, M. (2011), ‘Venture Capital Tax Reliefs: The VCT Scheme, the EIS and the 
CVS’, Second Edition, Bloomsbury Professional. 
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private equity investments, and most of the jurisdictions discussed above offer some form of tax 
incentives. For instance in the US, the reduction of capital gains taxes as an incentive is viewed as 
having made a significant contribution to the growth of private equity investments. At this point it 
would be important to note that the discussion to follow will not be a discussion on the taxation of a 
bewind trust or en commandite partnership in terms of South African tax law.2223 This has already 
been discussed in chapter two. Firstly, the discussion to follow will consider the South African tax 
regimes treatment of capital gains tax. The aim is to provide greater clarity as to the approach 
adopted by South African courts in determining whether share disposals are on capital or revenue 
account. In the private equity context, the accurate taxation of share disposals is crucial because it 
bears a direct impact on the ultimate returns to be earned by investors. Despite an existing body of 
case law in South Africa on the subject, there are limited precedents relating to the Eighth 
Schedule2224 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which can provide any sort of interpretation for capital 
gains purposes. This is important because as Armour and Cumming’s states: 
 
‘legislators may successfully stimulate private equity markets by reducing direct taxation, 
particularly capital gains taxation’.2225 
 
Secondly, the discussion will consider the Venture Capital Company initiative which is the only 
specific tax incentive scheme in South Africa that encourages investment in unlisted companies. 
 
As mentioned throughout the preceding chapters, the principal structures that are used in South 
Africa as vehicle to structure a private equity fund are (a) en commandite partnerships; and (b) 
bewind trusts. Both bewind trusts and en commandite partnerships are tax transparent for South 
African tax purposes. In the case of an en commandite partnership, each partner is deemed to carry 
on a trade and the partners are taxed in their personal capacities on their attributable partnership 
interests.2226 Foreign partners are only taxed on South African-sourced, or deemed sourced, income 
and are subject to capital gains tax on the disposal of immovable property or any interest or right in 
immovable property in South Africa; and assets of a South African permanent establishment.2227 The 
ownership of the assets of a private equity fund, structured as a bewind trust, resides in the hands 
                                                 
2223See paragraph 3.1 of chapter two. 
2224In terms of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, capital gains tax is levied in respect of 
the ‘disposal’ of any ‘asset’ by a person. The definition of ‘disposal’ in paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Act includes any act which results in the creation of an asset. 
2225Armour, J. and Cumming, D.J. (2007), ‘Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship’, ECGI - Law Working Paper 
No. 105/2008, American Law and Economics Review, Forthcoming; University of Cambridge Centre for 
Business Research Working Paper No. 300. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=762144, accessed 
in June 2014. 
2226Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2227Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
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of the investors, with the trustees merely administering such assets on their behalf. Bewind trusts 
are treated on the same basis as partnerships for tax purposes.2228 
 
That having been said, it is not within the scope of this thesis to argue whether South African private 
equity funds should pay higher taxes or lower taxes. Rather, it is clear from the preceding discussion 
that it would be more attractive for the local industry if a private equity fund is treated as a long term 
investor, rather than an operating business because then the returns to the private equity firm could 
be taxed at lower capital gains rates, rather than as ordinary income. Therefore, the compensation 
of private equity firms (carried interest) and profits generated from underlying investments by the 
private equity fund should be taxed at lower rates under current South African tax legislation, without 
the need for new legislation. It is submitted that this thesis does not argue for altering the tax 
treatment of a single industry because it raises tax policy concerns which are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, whether or not the current tax treatment of the private equity industry can be 
viewed as creating a distortion in the South African economy, by encouraging taxpayers to convert 
otherwise taxable income into tax-free capital gains is beyond the scope of this thesis. The South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) has observed that sophisticated taxpayers such as private equity 
funds have engaged in the conversion transactions mentioned above, which in theory erodes the 
corporate and individual income tax bases. Therefore, capital gains tax (‘CGT’) was introduced in 
South Africa in the first place (albeit not specifically for the private equity industry), as a critical 
element of any income tax system as it protects the integrity of the personal and corporate income 
tax bases.2229 Nevertheless, changing the way private equity firms, bewind trusts and en commandite 
partnerships in general are taxed is a subject that should only be undertaken after very careful 
consideration of the real and potential consequences. 
 
 
Capital Gains Tax 
 
Capital gains tax (‘CGT’) was introduced in South Africa with effect from 1st October 2001, by the 
insertion of section 26A and an Eighth Schedule into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, by the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001.2230 In terms of the South African tax regime (at the time of writing 
this thesis),2231 whether a gain is subject to capital gains tax or normal income tax will ultimately 
depend upon the intention of the investor participant concerned (in a private equity fund context), 
namely whether it held the investment on capital account or on revenue account.2232 In simple terms, 
                                                 
2228Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2229Available at www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2000/cgt/cgt.pdf, accessed in April 2016. 
2230Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
2231Specifically in terms of the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
2232See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
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a taxpayer who holds a share as a capital asset will have a capital profit or loss on disposal which 
must be dealt with in terms of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The capital 
gain or loss on disposal is determined as the difference between proceeds on the disposal and the 
base cost of the asset.2233 The determination of the base cost of shares can be complex, especially 
if the shares were purchased before the 1st October 2001, as the application of so-called ‘kink tests’ 
must be considered.2234 For example, if the shares were purchased before the 1st October 2001 and 
the proceeds on disposal fall below the market value of the shares on that date, it is likely that no 
capital loss will be recognised on disposal because of the base cost is deemed to equal the proceeds 
in terms of paragraph 26 of the Eight Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.2235  
 
Other complications occur if the taxpayer received any capital distributions in respect of the shares, 
and the rules in this regard differ depending on when the capital distribution was made.2236 
Furthermore, special valuation rules apply for the determination of capital gains or losses on disposal 
of foreign-listed shares in terms of paragraph 43(4) of the Eight Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962. For the purposes of this thesis the focus will only be the treatment of a capital loss once it 
has been determined. It is important to highlight that capital losses cannot be set off against other 
income.2237 Capital losses may be set off against other capital gains arising during the same tax year, 
and any remaining capital gain or loss after this set-off is then dealt with according to specific rules 
which vary depending on the type of taxpayer concerned.2238 In the case of companies and trusts, 
the annual exclusion does not apply, and fifty percent of the capital gain is included in taxable 
income.2239 Nevertheless, any capital loss must be carried forward to the following tax year as an 
‘assessed capital loss’. An assessed capital loss may only be set off against current or future capital 
gains, and never against ordinary income. In certain circumstances, ‘anti-loss’ rules in the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, restrict the set-off or carry forward of a capital loss.2240 
For example, if a taxpayer disposes of his or her shares at a capital loss within two years of having 
received ‘extraordinary dividends’, the capital loss is disregarded up to the amount of those 
                                                 
2233See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2234Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
2235South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2010), ‘The ABC of Capital Gains Tax For Individuals’, Legal and 
Policy Division of SARS. Available at www.marwick.co.za/docs/ABCofCGTforIndividuals.pdf, accessed in 
June 2015. 
2236See Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, De Jure, 2012, pages 172-178. Available 
at www.dejure.up.ac.za/index.php/volumes/45-vol-1-2012/notes/olivier-l., accessed in June 2015. 
2237See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2238In the case of individuals, the first R16 000 of the capital gain or loss is disregarded and if the individual 
have a remaining capital gain, 25% of that remaining amount is included in taxable income and taxed at his or 
her marginal tax rate. If there is a capital loss remaining that capital loss must be carried forward to the following 
tax year as an ‘assessed capital loss’. 
2239De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban. 
2240De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban. 
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extraordinary dividends in terms of paragraph 19 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962.2241   
 
Furthermore, ‘extraordinary dividends’ are those received during the two years before the disposal 
which exceed fifteen percent of the proceeds on disposal of the shares. Another example is the 
disregarding of capital losses on short-term ‘wash-sales’2242 in terms of paragraph 42 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.2243 This rule applies where a taxpayer disposes of 
shares at a loss and buys back the same type and the quantity of shares within a forty five day period 
on either side of the disposal. In this case, the disregarded capital loss is added to the base cost of 
the replacement shares and is, therefore, effectively deferred until the replacement shares are 
sold.2244 It should be appreciated that, with the exception of one provision, there are no specific 
provisions in South African tax law dealing with the scenario where proceeds from the disposal of 
an asset are of a capital or revenue nature.2245 In other words, there are a number of general tests 
applied by the courts over the years to determine the nature of the proceeds arising from the disposal 
of an asset.2246 Generally, proceeds will be of a capital nature if they are fortuitous and not 
deliberately sought for and worked for.2247 In other words, the proceeds should not form part of a 
business in carrying out a profit making scheme.2248  
 
The test to be applied in determining whether the profit made by a taxpayer is of revenue or of a 
capital nature has been formulated in many ways by the courts. The fundamental inquiry in the 
context of the sale of shares (and other property) is whether, in buying and selling the shares, the 
taxpayer engaged in a scheme of profit-making or whether the sale merely constituted the realisation 
of a capital asset acquired for purposes other than such a profit-making scheme.2249 The principle 
has been confirmed by our courts that the mere realisation of an asset, albeit at a profit, does not 
result in a profit-making scheme.2250 In fact, in CIR v Paul the Appellate Division2251 held that a 
disposal of a capital asset does not become a profit-making scheme merely because the owner 
                                                 
2241Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2242‘Wash-sale’ refers to anti-avoidance rule in paragraph 42 of the 8th Schedule of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
2243Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Haupt, 
P. (2012), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 31st Edition, H and H Publications, at 925. 
2244Croome, B.J. and Olivier, L. (2010), ‘Tax Administration’, Juta and Company. See also Croome, B.J. (2010), 
‘Taxpayers' Rights in South Africa’, Juta and Company. 
2245See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2246See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2247See Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. 
2248See Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. 
2249Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Strathmore Consolidated Investments Ltd, 1959 (1) SA 469 (A). 
2250Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI, 1978 (1) SA 101 (A). 
2251Then Appellate Division and now Supreme Court of Appeal.  
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seeks to realise it to the best possible advantage.2252 Something more is required to take the taxpayer 
from the category of an investor to a speculator. The facts of the case were that the taxpayer wanted 
to purchase a portion of a parcel of land on which he wished to erect a dwelling for himself.  The 
owner of the land was, however, not prepared to sell the desired portion, but insisted that the 
taxpayer purchase the whole parcel of land, which the taxpayer was accordingly obliged to do. His 
intention was, however, immediately to dispose of the surplus portion of the land not needed by him, 
and he did so, at a profit.2253 The court held that the sale of that surplus portion was, in the 
circumstances, not part of a profit-making scheme.2254 
 
According to Olivier, South African courts apply at least three different tests to determine the nature 
of an amount.2255 One such principle was applied in the leading dictum CIR v Pick-n-Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust, where the Appellate Division2256 established the principle that things acquired 
otherwise than in a scheme of profit-making, are capital.2257  The facts of the case were that a trust 
was formed to provide shares to company employees. The trust acquired shares at the market value 
from the company and on-sold them to the employees continuously. The intention of the trust was 
not to make a profit. However, it had to sell the shares to the employees at a specific price which 
resulted in the trust making a profit. The question the court had to decide was whether the profit was 
of a capital nature.2258 The majority decision of the court was that the profits were of a capital 
nature.2259 The court reached its decision by firstly having to establish whether the taxpayer 
objectively conducted a business and secondly whether it was the objective of the taxpayer to 
conduct a business.2260  Judge Smalberger held: 
 
‘The appropriate test in a matter such as the present is a well established one. The receipts 
accruing to the Trust will be revenue if they constitute “a gain made by an operation of business 
in carrying out a scheme for profit-making” in the words of the eminent Scottish judge in the 
California Copper Syndicate case quoted with approval in the passage from Overseas Trust 
Corporation Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 AD 444 at 452-3 referred to in my 
colleague’s judgement ... The corollary is that they will be non-revenue if they do not derive from 
“an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making”. The phrase from the 
California Copper Syndicate case has undergone some measure of refinement in the cases of 
                                                 
2252CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A). 
2253CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A). 
2254CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 (A). 
2255Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, De Jure, 2012, pages 172-178. Available at  
www.dejure.up.ac.za/index.php/volumes/45-vol-1-2012/notes/olivier-l., accessed in June 2015. For income 
tax purposes, the nature of an amount refers to the distinction between whether an amount or expenditure is 
of a capital nature or not. 
2256Then Appellate Division and now Supreme Court of Appeal.  
2257CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
2258CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
2259CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
2260CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
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Natal Estates Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (a) at 198E-G and Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk 
v SBI 1978 (1) SA 101 (a) at 118A-B to the extent that a distinction is drawn between the carrying 
on of a business and the pursuance of a profit-making scheme.’2261 
 
This dictum has created a legal principle which eases the burden of proof placed on taxpayers and 
a taxpayer can discharge the onus of proving that an asset is of a capital nature by satisfying the 
court that it has not engaged in a scheme of profit making.2262 This test was also applied by the court 
in CSARS v Wyner,2263 where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the profit made by a taxpayer 
when she sold her house, was taxable as it was a scheme of profit-making.2264 The facts of the case 
were that the taxpayer sold her house twelve months after buying it and that the bridging finance 
she obtained was only for a limited period of twelve months and her intention from the start was to 
sell the property after acquisition.2265 Although the transaction did not have the character of a normal 
business transaction, the court held that the profit was still taxable.2266   
 
A second test applied by the courts to determine the nature of an amount was applied in CIR v 
Visser, where it was held that ‘income’ is what ‘capital’ produces, or is something in the nature of 
interest or fruit as opposed to principal or tree.2267 This test is fairly straightforward in that income (or 
fruit) is produced by an income-producing asset (or tree) and that such income is of a revenue nature, 
while the income-producing asset is of a capital nature.2268 In CIR v Visser2269 the court held that: 
 
‘Income’ is what ‘capital’ produces, or is something in the nature of interest or fruit as opposed to 
principal or tree. This economic distinction is a useful guide in matters of income tax, but its 
application is very often a matter of great difficulty, for what is principle or tree in the hands of one 
man may be interest or fruit in the hands of another. Law books in the hands of a lawyer are a 
capital asset; in the hands of a bookseller they are a trade asset’.2270 
 
                                                 
2261CIR v Pick ’n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A), 54 SATC 271. 
2262See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2263See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Haupt, 
P. (2012), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 31st Edition, H and H Publications, at page 47. 
2264CSARS v Wyner 2003(4) SA 541 (SCA), 66 SATC 1. 
2265CSARS v Wyner 2003(4) SA 541 (SCA), 66 SATC 1. 
2266CSARS v Wyner 2003(4) SA 541 (SCA), 66 SATC 1. 
2267CIR v Visser 1978 8 SATC 271 (TPD). 
2268See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Haupt, 
P. (2013), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, 32nd Edition, H and H Publications, at page 43. 
2269CIR v Visser 1978 8 SATC 271 (TPD). 
2270CIR v Visser 1978 8 SATC 271 (TPD), at 276. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 357 
 
According to Olivier, it is often difficult to determine when an amount represents the tree and when 
it represents the fruit.2271 For instance, in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS2272 which dealt with 
the nature of expenditure, the lower court held that a payment for the right to operate under a certain 
name was of a capital nature. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the amount was 
not of a capital nature because it was more closely connected to the taxpayer’s income earning 
activities, namely the fruit, than it was to its income earning structure, namely the tree.2273 
 
A third approach adopted by the courts is that where an amount is received from the disposal of fixed 
capital (as opposed to floating capital) the court treats such an amount as being of a capital 
nature.2274 However, if it is received from the disposal of floating capital, is not of a capital nature.2275 
In SBI v Aveling2276 the court held that fixed capital is described as something held with an element 
of permanency and which will produce income for the holder. In CIR v George Forest Timber Co 
Ltd,2277 the court stated: 
 
‘Capital, it should be remembered, may be either fixed or floating. I take the substantial difference 
to be that floating capital is consumed or disappears in the very process of production, while fixed 
capital does not; though it produces fresh wealth, it remains intact. The distinction is relative, for 
even fixed capital, such as machinery, gradually wears away and needs to be renewed. But as 
pointed out by Mason J in Stephan v CIR (1919 WLD at 5) the two phrases have an ascertained 
meaning in accountancy as well as in economics. Ordinary merchandise in the hands of a trader 
would be floating capital. Its use involves its disappearance; and the money obtained for it is 
received as part of the ordinary revenue of the business. It could never have been intended that 
money received by a merchant in the course, and as the result of his trading, should not form part 
of his gross income.’2278 
 
Despite numerous tests being applied by the courts, the starting point is generally to determine the 
intention of the taxpayer at the time of acquisition and whether there has been a change of intention 
prior to the disposal of the asset.2279 Where the taxpayer has mixed intentions, it is the dominant 
intention that prevails. The factors that would generally be taken into account are the taxpayer’s ipse 
dixit;2280 the duration that the asset has been held; the frequency of transactions; the nature of the 
                                                 
2271Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, De Jure, at pages 173-174. 
2272BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS  2007, SCA 7 (RSA) 69 SATC 79. 
2273BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS  2007, SCA 7 (RSA) 69 SATC 79. 
2274Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, De Jure, at pages 173-174. 
2275Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, De Jure, at pages 173-174. 
2276SBI v Aveling 1978 (1) SA 862 at 880. 
2277CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd 1924 AD 516 1 SATC 20. 
2278CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd 1924 AD 516 1 SATC 20 at 23-24. 
2279Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. 
2280A Latin phrase meaning ‘he himself said it’. 
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taxpayer’s business; the existence of an income flow from the holding of the asset (namely dividends 
as opposed to the sale of the asset itself); and the reason for the disposal of the asset.2281  
 
In determining whether a scheme of profit-making has been engaged in, the court in SIR v The Trust 
Bank of Africa Ltd stated that this is ‘fundamentally a question of intention’.2282 In other words, the 
intention with which the shares were acquired is of the utmost importance, but not necessarily 
decisive.2283 In order to show that a receipt is of a capital nature, the taxpayer would have to prove 
that his or her dominant purpose in holding the shares was to hold them more or less permanently 
so as to produce income.2284 In ITC 1185 the Special Court held that, where the taxpayer did not 
have one clear purpose or intention in acquiring the property but was alive to more than one use, to 
which he or she might put it, the inquiry will be to determine, if possible, whether one particular 
purpose was dominant in his mind.2285 If the court is able to find that there was a dominant purpose, 
which operated decisively or very substantially in the process which led to the decision to acquire 
the property, the court will give effect to that dominant purpose or intention.2286 The court went on to 
say that the difficulty in these cases lays not so much in the formulation of an approach but in the 
application of the principles that must necessarily guide the court.2287 In other words, it is not a difficult 
matter to say that an important factor is: what was the taxpayer’s intention when he bought the 
property? The court held that it is often very difficult, however, to discover what the taxpayer’s true 
intention was.2288   
 
In trying to ascertain the intention of the taxpayer, it is necessary to bear in mind in that the ipse dixit 
of the taxpayer as to his or her intention and purpose should not lightly be regarded as decisive, as 
it is the function of the court to determine on an objective review of all the relevant facts and 
circumstances what the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer was.2289 In order to determine 
the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer, the court will consider, inter alia, the conduct of 
the taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the nature of his or her business or occupation 
and the frequency or otherwise of his or her past involvement or participation in similar 
transactions.2290 The facts in regard to those matters will form an important part of the material from 
                                                 
2281Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. 
2282SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87.   
2283SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87.   
2284SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87.   
2285ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122. 
2286Commissioner of Taxes v Levy 1952 (2) SA 413 (AD) 421; and Commissioner of Taxes v Glass 1962 (1) 
SA 872 (FC) 880-881. 
2287ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122. 
2288ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122. 
2289De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban. 
2290ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122 at pages 123-124. See Croome, B.J. and Olivier, L. (2010), ‘Tax 
Administration’, Juta and Company. See also Olivier, L. (2012), ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’, 
De Jure, 2012, at pages 172-178. Available at www.dejure.up.ac.za/index.php/volumes/45-vol-1-
2012/notes/olivier-l., accessed in June 2015. 
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which the court will draw its own inferences against the background of the general human and 
business probabilities. 2291 This is not to say that the court will give little or no weight to what the 
taxpayer says his or her intention was, as it sometimes contended in argument on behalf of the 
Commissioner in cases of this nature.2292 The taxpayer’s evidence under oath and that of his or her 
witnesses must necessarily be given full consideration and the credibility of the witnesses must be 
assessed as in any other case that comes before the court.  But direct evidence of intent and purpose 
must be weighed and tested against the probabilities and the inferences normally to be drawn from 
the established facts.2293   
 
The court in ITC 1185, further stated that it would certainly be more difficult for one whose business 
it is to buy and sell properties for profit to persuade the court that, in the particular instance which 
was in issue, his or her intention was to make a capital investment, than it would be for one whose 
occupation was in no way concerned with dealing in properties and had never before bought or sold 
property.2294 However, the court cautioned that just as proof that the taxpayer is normally a dealer in 
property is no absolute bar to establishing that a particular acquisition was made as an investment, 
so proof that a transaction was isolated and far removed from the taxpayer’s normal business 
activities will not necessarily cause the court to accept that the profits of that isolated transaction 
must therefore be a receipt of a capital nature.2295  
 
In Barnato Holdings Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue the court held that the factors which would 
tend to indicate that the shares in question were acquired for better or for worse, or, ‘relatively 
speaking, for keeps’ would include whether the shares were only disposed of due to some unusual, 
unexpected, or special circumstance, warranting or inducing the disposal.2296 In such circumstances, 
the proceeds would bear the usual badge of a fixed, capital investment. The essence of fixed capital, 
as distinct from floating capital, is ‘… ’n element van permanentheid, in die sin dat daar ’n bedoeling 
is om dié betrokke bate min of meer permanent te hou met dié doel dat dit inkomste moet 
voortbring.’2297 The purpose with which a taxpayer acquires or holds an asset is a question of fact. 
 
In SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd2298 the court held that: 
 
                                                 
2291ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122 at pages 123-124.  
2292ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122 at pages 123-124.  
2293ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122 at pages 123-124. 
2294ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122. See Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, 
The Taxpayer. 
2295ITC 1185, (1972) 35 SATC 122 at page 124. 
2296Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR, 1978 (2) SA 440 (A), 40 SATC 75. 
2297The English translation of the Judge’s Afrikaans words in this case meaning: more or less keep the asset 
permanently so as to produce income. See Bloch v SIR, 1980 (2) SA 401 (C), 42 SATC. 
2298SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87. 
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‘In an enquiry as to the intention with which a transaction was entered into for the purpose of the 
law relating to income tax, a court of law is not concerned with that kind of subjective state of mind 
required for the purposes of the criminal law, but rather with the purpose for which the transaction 
was entered into (CIR v Paul 1956 (3) SA 335 at 340-341).  It is true that although the Special 
Court found that there was no evidence that the shares in question were acquired with a view to 
a profitable resale, it nevertheless took into account that resale was never entirely ruled out as a 
future possibility, given a sufficiently tempting offer, which is exactly what in fact eventually 
occurred. Indeed there was some evidence that the merits of the participation as a possible 
profitable investment were seriously considered at the relevant time and that it was a factor in the 
decision of the management committee.  No one, however, readily buys property if he expects 
that he will eventually have to sell it at a loss, and the taxpayer is not required to exclude the 
slightest contemplation of a profitable resale of the asset (Commissioner of Taxes v Levy (1952 
(2) SA 413 (AD) at 421)).’2299 
 
In Bloch v Secretary for Inland Revenue, the court held that in order to show that a receipt was of a 
capital nature, the taxpayer would have to demonstrate that his dominant purpose in holding the 
shares was to hold them more or less permanently so as to produce income.2300 This onus that had 
to be discharged was the ordinary one that is applied in civil cases, namely on a balance of 
probabilities.2301 In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance SA Ltd, counsel for the 
Commissioner submitted that, as a general proposition, it was inherent in the management of any 
share portfolio that a measure of share dealing for profit would be involved, namely that investors in 
shares inherently have a profit-making intention.2302 Shares, so the argument ran, are by their very 
nature risk investments which have to be reviewed from time to time. A portfolio comprising a number 
and variety of counters will therefore necessitate continuous review and adjustment as and when 
required.2303 Consequently an investor in shares must necessarily deal in such shares and a simple 
intention to hold such shares indefinitely or for a long time can make no difference. Unless and until 
the shares are made part of the permanent structure of the investor on which its business rests and 
the shares are in effect taken out of its business they remain part of its floating capital.2304 The court 
gave the following response to the Commissioner’s argument: 
 
‘Neither case is authority for the proposition that a genuine investor in long-term dividend-
producing shares is obliged to hold on to each and every counter in his portfolio irrespective of 
the fortunes - or possible demise - of the companies concerned or run the risk of being taxed as 
a share dealer. Indeed both cases are based on the hypothesis that there is a distinction between 
                                                 
2299SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87 at 106. 
2300Bloch v SIR, 1980 (2) SA 401 (C), 42 SATC. 
2301Bloch v SIR, 1980 (2) SA 401 (C), 42 SATC. 
2302CIR v Guardian Assurance SA Ltd, (1991) 2 All SA 193 (A). 
2303CIR v Guardian Assurance SA Ltd, (1991) 2 All SA 193 (A). 
2304CIR v Guardian Assurance SA Ltd, (1991) 2 All SA 193 (A). 
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a share investor and a share dealer and both taxpayers were found to have been an amalgam, 
using their investments as both an income-producing capital base and at the same time as stock-
in-trade for sale at a profit. … nothing in the reasoning of the learned judge can be regarded as 
authority for the broad proposition that the management of a wide and varied share investment 
portfolio, irrespective of the care and long-term investment intention with which it had been 
compiled, causes it to be regarded as floating capital … Neither in law nor in logic can dogged 
adherence to a counter or carelessness in the management of a share portfolio be posited as 
prerequisites for qualification as a capital investor.  Prudence and foresight cannot be equated 
with an intention to speculate.’2305  
 
Similarly, in African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue it was 
held that whether or not the taxpayer set out to deal in shares for profit, the varying of its many risk 
investments would be an inherent feature of its activities.2306 It may be that such variations, however 
gainful, need not in themselves, in the case of an investment company, necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that resultant profits are to be regarded as income.2307 Another factor that the courts have 
found to be relevant in determining the intention of the taxpayer in respect of share investments is 
the period for which the shares were held.2308 In the case of ITC 1756, where a trust held a portfolio 
of shares for a period of between two to four years, it was held that the proceeds from the disposal 
of the shares were of a capital nature.2309 The trustees had given written instructions that a share 
portfolio was to be managed with maximum growth for the beneficiaries of the trust as a priority, and 
that management was to be in accordance with a medium to long term philosophy (namely the 
purpose for which the shares were purchased was long term capital growth).2310 The court held that 
the intention of the trustees when the shares were acquired showed that they set out to acquire blue 
chip shares as long term investments, and that the trustees had established that they had the 
intention of holding the shares which they acquired with a necessary element of permanence, despite 
the fact that the shares were sold at a handsome profit within a short period.2311   
 
It is clear that the intention with which, or the purpose for which, shares were acquired is fundamental 
to the question whether the eventual proceeds from the disposal of the shares are of a capital or 
revenue nature for tax purposes.2312 Where the shares represent a long term investment by the 
                                                 
2305CIR v Guardian Assurance SA Ltd, (1991) 2 All SA 193 (A) at 47. 
2306African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1969 (4) SA 259 (A). 
2307African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1969 (4) SA 259 (A) at paragraph 51. 
2308See ITC 1756, (1997) 65 SATC 375.  
2309ITC 1756, (1997) 65 SATC 375.  
2310ITC 1756, (1997) 65 SATC 375.  
2311ITC 1756 (1997) 65 SATC 375. See African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1969 (4) SA 259 
(A).  
2312Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
See South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2010), ‘The ABC of Capital Gains Tax For Individuals’, Legal 
and Policy Division of SARS. Available at www.marwick.co.za/docs/ABCofCGTforIndividuals.pdf., accessed 
in June 2015. 
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taxpayer which form part of the taxpayer’s permanent income producing structure, the proceeds from 
their eventual disposal would be of a capital nature.2313 However, where the shares were merely 
acquired in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s share dealing operations, the proceeds from their 
eventual disposal would be of a revenue nature. What is clear, however, is that a taxpayer needs 
not hold on to a share investment forever and exclude any thought of possibly selling the shares in 
question before the investment can be considered part of the taxpayer’s fixed capital.2314 Therefore, 
where a taxpayer makes a private equity investment for long term investment purposes, although 
the sale of the shares may be inevitable, the proceeds from the disposal of the shares at the end of 
the investment may be of a capital nature.   
 
There is no definitive list of tax issues that might arise in every acquisition or divestiture of an equity 
stake by the private equity fund in the underlying investee company. The specific tax considerations 
for a transaction will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of that particular deal. Certain 
tax issues and terms, however, many of which are interrelated, are far more common than others. 
Attention should also be given to the tax consequences of future distributions of the acquired 
company’s earnings and the ultimate disposition of the investee company or its assets. There are 
certain key goals that are common to most acquisition transactions. These goals should emerge 
from the analysis of the actual structure for the implementation of the proposed transaction. A primary 
issue is the basic structure of the transaction namely whether the transfer is devised as a share 
acquisition or an asset acquisition, and whether the transaction can be structured as a tax-free 
reorganisation, or if the transfer will be immediately taxable. The second issue is the stepping-up in 
the base cost of the assets so as to reduce the capital gains charge when the assets are 
subsequently disposed of by the private equity fund. Nevertheless, having concluded the discussion 
on the general guidelines developed by South African courts in determining whether a disposal is on 
capital or revenue account, it is evident that the South African tax regime so far does not provide 
specific tax relief to private equity funds. As mentioned earlier, this thesis does not argue for the 
introduction of specific tax relief for private equity funds without understanding the real impact on 
existing policy and the economy at large.  
 
Venture Capital Company 
 
The Venture Capital Company (‘VCC’) initiative is the only South African specific tax incentive 
scheme encouraging investment in unlisted companies and is regulated by section 12J of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962. The VCC scheme was first introduced in South Africa in 2009 and this initiative 
provides for tax allowances or deductions to investors for expenditure incurred in acquiring equity 
                                                 
2313Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
See also Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. 
2314See Commissioner of Taxes v Levy, 1952 (2) 413 (A). 
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shares in the VCC.2315 The VCC scheme is directed at individuals, listed companies and controlled 
group companies of listed companies.2316 In terms of the South African National Budget Review of 
2008, limited access to equity finance by small and medium-sized businesses was identified as one 
of the main challenges to the growth of the small and medium sized sector of the economy.2317 To 
this end, the South African Government introduced section 12J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
Section 12J was inserted into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 by section 27(1) of the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 60 of 2008 with effect from 1st July 2009. The section was substantially amended 
by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011, with most of the amendments applying to years 
of assessment commencing on or after 1st January 2012.2318 The VCC regime is subject to a twelve 
year sunset clause and thus will end on 30th June 2021. This will allow for review of the efficacy of 
VCC regime and a decision will then be made by the South African Government as to whether it 
should be continued.2319 In terms of section 12J(11) no deduction will be granted under section 12J 
for VCC shares acquired after 30th June 2021.2320 
 
In terms of the VCC regime, individuals can deduct up to R750 000 per investment in the year of 
assessment in which the VCC qualifying shares are issued, with an aggregate lifetime limit of R2,25 
million.2321 A listed company and its controlled group companies are not subject to a limit, but the 
VCC shares held by that company or within its group may not constitute more than forty percent of 
the VCC's equity shares. A VCC must (i) have management of investments in qualifying companies 
as its sole objective; (ii) be unlisted; (iii) be tax resident in South Africa; and (iv) not control any 
qualifying companies in which it holds shares.2322 The South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) must 
approve a company as a VCC and the VCC must submit annual returns to SARS in the prescribed 
form. 
  
                                                 
2315Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2316Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2317See South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2012), ‘External Guide: Venture Capital Companies’, Effective 
date of 1st November 2012, GEN-REG-48-G01, Revision 4. Available at 
www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/GEN-REG-48-G01., accessed in June 2015. 
2318South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2014), ‘Interpretation Note No: 43 on the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962’, 17th February 2014 at page 12. 
2319See South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2012), ‘External Guide: Venture Capital Companies’, Effective 
date of 1st November 2012, GEN-REG-48-G01, Revision 4. Available at 
www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/GEN-REG-48-G01., accessed in June 2015. 
2320South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2014), ‘Interpretation Note No: 43 on the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962’, 17th February 2014 at page 13. 
2321See South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2012), ‘External Guide: Venture Capital Companies’, Effective 
date of 1st November 2012, GEN-REG-48-G01, Revision 4. Available at 
www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/GEN-REG-48-G01., accessed in June 2015. 
2322See South African Revenue Service (SARS) (2012), ‘External Guide: Venture Capital Companies’, Effective 
date of 1st November 2012, GEN-REG-48-G01, Revision 4. Available at 
www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/GEN-REG-48-G01., accessed in June 2015. 
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In terms of the South African National Budget Review of 2014, the South African Government 
announced that it would propose one or more of the following amendments to the VCC regime, 
namely (i) making tax deductions permanent if investments in the VCC are held for a certain period 
of time; (ii) allowing transferability of tax benefits when investors dispose of their VCC holdings; (iii) 
increasing the total asset limit for qualifying investee companies, namely that companies in which 
the VCC may invest, from R20 million to R50 million, and from R300 million to R500 million in the 
case of junior mining companies; and (iv) waiving capital gains tax on the disposal of assets by the 
VCC, and expanding the permitted business forms.2323 The reasons for the aforementioned 
proposals were based on the fact that since the VCC tax incentive took effect from 1st July 2009, the 
uptake for this tax incentive scheme has been limited.2324 
 
A VCC is a company that provides individual and corporate investors with access to a wide range of 
trading companies which have the potential for growth.2325 The VCC raises funds by issuing equity 
shares to investors and the capital raised is then used to invest in such wide ranging trading 
companies which have the potential for growth.2326  VCCs are taxed in the following way (i) capital 
gains on qualifying investments disposed of by the VCC were taxable but became exempt after the 
first proposal mentioned in the Budget Review of 2014 was implemented;2327 (ii) dividends received 
from the companies making up the portfolio are exempt from dividends tax; and (iii) interest income 
is taxable. VCCs are subject to 18,6 percent capital gains tax on shares sold by the VCC and should 
capital gains tax be removed at the VCC level then investor returns will improve by 18,6 percent. An 
investor that subscribes for VCC shares receives an immediate tax deduction equal to 100 percent 
of the amount invested with no annual limit or lifetime limit.2328 The relief is available provided that 
the investor subscribes for equity shares, as opposed to buying them from other investors. The 
deduction under section 12J(2) read with section 12J(3), (3A) and (4) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 covers only the acquisition of newly issued shares, in other words the deduction does not apply 
to secondary trading in VCC shares.2329 The upfront income tax relief reduces the cost of the 
investment, which in turn would imply that overall returns should be higher.2330 The upfront income 
                                                 
2323Department National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2014), ‘Budget Review 2014’, 26th February 2014, 
Chapter 4: Revenue Trends and Tax Proposals, at pages 51-52.  
2324Department National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2014), ‘Budget Review 2014’, 26th February 2014, 
Chapter 4: Revenue Trends and Tax Proposals, at pages 51-52.  
2325Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2326Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2327See Department National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2014), ‘Budget Review 2014’, 26th February 
2014, Chapter 4: Revenue Trends and Tax Proposals, at pages 51-52.  
2328Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2329South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2014), ‘Interpretation Note No: 43 on the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962’, 17th February 2014, at page 13. 
2330For instance, say a VCC shares are priced at R10, therefore such shares effectively only cost R6 after tax 
relief for individual investors or R7,20 where the investor is a company. In addition, the VCC shares only needs 
to increase by R2 or R4,40 where the investor is a company and the investor’s investment in the VVC would 
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tax relief is temporary because in terms of the current VCC tax rules, the taxable recoupment of the 
section 12J deduction is provided for if the investor disposes of the VCC shares and recovers the 
previous deduction.2331 
 
As mentioned above, in terms of the South African National Budget Review of 2014 the proposal 
was considered and subsequently implemented making the deduction permanent if the VCC shares 
are held for a certain period of time.2332 In terms of the four 2014 Budget Review proposals mentioned 
above, the first and the third proposals were implemented as legislation.2333 The VCC tax regime 
also provides for dividends tax relief, whereby VCC shares are subject to a fifteen percent dividends 
tax unless the investor qualifies for an existing dividend tax exemption. For instance, investors which 
are South African resident companies will enjoy the company-to-company dividend tax 
exemption.2334 The tax schemes discussed previously with regard to Canada and particular Australia 
offered capital gains tax relief to an investor, however the VCC scheme offers no capital gains tax 
relief.  In terms of the VCC scheme capital gains tax is payable when investors sell their VCC shares 
at the rate applicable to the relevant investor.2335 In addition, there is no reinvestment relief afforded 
to investors, unlike those for example provided for under the closed-ended Collective Investment 
Vehicles (‘CIVs’) and Venture Capital Limited Partnership (‘VCLP’) regimes in Australia and the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 with regard to unit trusts operating under Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act 45 of 2002 (discussed further below). It is therefore not possible for an investor to defer 
the gain on another investment by applying the sale proceeds to subscribe for VCC shares.2336 For 
instance, an investor that sells shares with the intention to reinvest the proceeds of such sale in VCC 
shares will be subject to capital gains tax on the gain realised on the sale of such shares. The VCC 
scheme does however offer tax relief for capital losses on the disposal of VCC shares which can be 
offset against an investor’s capital gains. However, it is not possible to offset capital losses against 
the investors’ income.2337 
                                                 
have doubled. On the other hand, the VCC shares only need to drop by at least R4 or R2,80 where the investor 
is a company before a loss is incurred. 
2331See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2014), ‘Interpretation Note No: 43 on the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962’, 17th February 2014, at pages 12-13. 
2332Department National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2014), ‘Budget Review 2014’, 26th February 2014, 
Chapter 4: Revenue Trends and Tax Proposals, at pages 51-52.  
2333Department National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2016), ‘Budget Review 2016’, February 2016. In 
terms of the South African National Budget Review of 2014, the South African Government announced that it 
would propose one or more of the following amendments to the VCC regime, namely (i) making deductions 
permanent if investments are held for a certain period of time; (ii) allowing transferability of tax benefits when 
investors dispose of their holdings; (iii) increasing the total asset limit for qualifying investee companies from 
R20-million to R50-million, and from R30- million to R500-million in the case of junior mining companies; (iv) 
waiving capital gains tax on the disposal of assets, and expanding the permitted business forms. 
2334South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2014), ‘Interpretation Note No: 43 on the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962’, 17th February 2014. 
2335It is 18.6% for corporate investors; 26.6% for investors which are trusts. It is 13.3% for individual investors. 
2336Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2337Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 




It is widely accepted the VCC regime was primarily introduced by South African policy makers to 
increase the amount of funding for small to medium sized high growth companies in South Africa.2338 
The generous tax credits offered to VCC investors as an incentive to invest is and will be at a 
significant cost to ordinary South African taxpayers. Common sense will dictate that South Africans 
who are investing in VCCs are doing so not because they provide a high rate of return or because 
they are investing in South African companies, but rather to receive generous tax credits. It is 
submitted that the VCC scheme is an inferior way to organize a private equity fund in South Africa 
for several reasons. Firstly, VCC are constrained as to the size and nature of their investments in 
any given investee company. Furthermore, they must invest a certain percentage of the funds they 
raise within a period of time regardless of economic conditions. These financial restrictions, as well 
as investment time limits, can lead to pressure on VCC managers to invest in businesses regardless 
of market conditions, and can result in investments in inferior investee companies.2339 Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, only individuals and companies are permitted to invest in VCCs. This differs 
from the majority of private equity funds that receive significant funding from institutional investors 
such as pension funds. In addition, part of the VCCs mandate is that they can accept much smaller 
investments than conventional private equity funds which would result in VCCs having many 
shareholders each holding a small portion of the fund. Also VCC managers typically contract out 
investment management services to other professional managers as opposed to operating the VCC 
themselves, unlike a typical private equity fund where the private equity fund manager forms an 
integral part of the day-to-day management of the fund. This ‘abstract’ relationship between investors 
and fund managers in the VCC structure creates a lack of accountability to investors.2340 This is 
exacerbated by the large number of small investors making small investments in the VCC who have 
no real motive to actively monitor or take action against fund managers of VCCs.2341 According to 
Cumming and MacIntosh:  
 
‘the atomization of share ownership sacrifices most if not all of these benefits, since collective 
action and free rider problems ensure that few if any shareholders have the appropriate incentives 
to monitor or discipline fund managers.’2342 
 
In other words, people who invest a small amount in a VCC will be less likely to effectively express 
dissatisfaction with fund managers than an investor in a private limited partnership for instance, who 
                                                 
2338Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 8.8, at pages 195-198. 
2339See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, 2nd Edition, Elsevier Inc., at paragraph 9.6.3. 
2340For example for poor performance. 
2341Johan, S., Schweizer, D. and Zhan, F. (2014), ‘The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations in Canada’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(2), pages 145-161. 
2342Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at page 582. 
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invests a larger amount and has a more direct relationship with the fund manager.2343 As a result, 
VCC fund managers have less incentive to perform well than do managers of private equity funds.2344 
Another way to think about the issue is to postulate the view that VCCs in South Africa will impede 
the ability of fund managers to operate effectively as managers of private equity funds that do not 
have the same regulations in South Africa.2345 VCCs could have a negative impact on the local 
private equity industry’s development because it impedes more effective private equity funds and 
this could even result in a reversal of the intended South African Government objective by lowering 
the level of capital available for South African investee companies. If South African policymakers 
wish to improve South Africa’s private equity market, characterised by more funds raised and more 
investee companies securing funding, they should eliminate VCCs by making room for more effective 




(f) Analysis  
 
As mentioned above, collective investment schemes in South Africa offer several benefits compared 
to other investment vehicles. By amending CISCA, the ‘private equity CIS’ will enjoy certain 
exemptions with regard to paying capital gains tax. The CIS investors will only incur capital gains tax 
(once) when they sell their units in a CIS.2346 In terms of CISCA, when a portfolio manager 
restructures a CIS portfolio, that is sells an underlying share or bond in adherence to its mandate, 
capital gains tax will not be incurred.2347 Currently, a private equity fund (either trust or partnership), 
in comparison, will not be as tax effective. They will sustain a capital gains tax cost every time a 
transaction in the portfolio is realised, which could occur many times over the lifetime of a fund. 
Having capital gains tax paid outside of the CIS means that CIS portfolio managers can focus on 
their core business of managing an investment portfolio according to a mandate, rather than being 
distracted by tax issues. This could result in more focused and better investment performance. The 
                                                 
2343Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at page 582. 
2344Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2345Hypothetical Scenario: VCC tax credits to a degree substitute for a rate of return and with part of the VCCs 
rate of return provided by tax credits, the VCC managers can pay more for an investment than a conventional 
private equity fund (namely a non-VCC) while still meeting the VCC required rate of return. Therefore VCCs 
can execute transactions they would perhaps otherwise not be able to acquire. At the same time the VCC can 
pay more for a financing deal which implies that a VCC can acquire interest in investee companies that could 
have been financed by a private equity fund (namely a non-VCC). As a consequence the returns to private 
equity funds could be lower which makes such funds less attractive for potential investors that would have 
otherwise invested in such private equity fund. See Cumming, D.J. and MacIntosh, J.G. (2006), ‘Crowding Out 
Private Equity: Canadian Evidence’, Journal of Business Venturing, 21(5), at pages 569-609. 
2346See De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban.  
2347See Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Explanatory Memorandum 
on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2013’, 24th October, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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capital gains tax rate applicable to CIS investors could be as low as 4.5 percent depending on the 
investor's marginal tax rate, or as high as 10.5 percent, which is on par with shares.2348 The CIS 
investors are empowered to decide when to become liable for capital gains tax, allowing them to 
defer tax and to plan their investments appropriately. In addition, capital gains tax policy for CISs is 
transparent because investors will know when capital gains tax is incurred.2349 Finally, capital gains 
tax policy is in line with the objective of a CIS as a medium to long term savings and investment 
vehicle and should encourage CIS investors to treat them as such.2350  
 
Tax treatment of CIS as provided for in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 was amended so that it now 
applies to specific CIS in Securities.2351 Included in the definition of a ‘company’ in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is any ‘portfolio comprised in any collective investment in securities …., 
managed or carried on by any company registered as a manager under section 42 of the Act….’. 
Thus, in order to be treated as a company under paragraph (e)(i) of the above definition in the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962, an investment fund would need to fall within the definition of a CIS in Securities 
as contained in the CISCA, and the fund manager would have to be registered under the CISCA.2352 
There is no provision in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 that realisation gains derived by CISs from 
the disposal of share investments are of a capital nature. Paragraph 61 of the Eighth Schedule to 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 provides that ‘a portfolio in a collective investment scheme 
contemplated in paragraph (e)(i) of the definition of company in section 1, must disregard any capital 
gain or capital loss’. Accordingly, paragraph 61 merely provides that CISs and other CIS in Securities 
must disregard any capital gains or losses realised by the schemes.2353 Before the exclusion can 
apply, it must firstly be established that the gains or losses realised by the scheme are of a capital 
nature.2354 If general case law guidelines on the distinction between capital and revenue gains were 
to be applied strictly to the realisation gains derived by CISs, it would be difficult to justify the capital 
nature of such proceeds. More so because of the fact that CISs deal much more aggressively and 
frequently in their portfolios than private equity funds or the other investors considered in this 
document. There is no indication that share investments held by CISs are held ‘for keeps’. The CISs 
generally dispose of their share investments on a regular basis, while pursuing maximum growth 
                                                 
2348See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) (2012), ‘Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Review: South Africa 2012, Combined: 
Phase 1 + Phase 2, OECD Publishing, October 2012 (Reflecting the legal and regulatory framework as at 
June, 2012). 
2349De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban. 
2350See Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Explanatory Memorandum 
on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2013’, 24th October, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2351In terms of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 17 of 2009. 
2352See De Koker, A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, 
Butterworth Publishers, Durban. 
2353See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2009), ‘Binding Private Ruling: BPR 031 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962’, 29th May 2009, issued by Legal and Policy Division: Advance Tax Rulings of SARS. 
2354See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2009), ‘Binding Private Ruling: BPR 031 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962’, 29th May 2009, issued by Legal and Policy Division: Advance Tax Rulings of SARS. 
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and not dividend yields for the unit holders. Despite this, in terms of SARS practice realisation gains 
from the disposal of share investments by CISs are not taxed as revenue gains in the CIS’s hands, 
but treated as gains of a capital nature.2355  
 
As mentioned above, paragraph 61 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
provides for the exclusion for CISs from capital gains tax. However, before the realisation gains of a 
CIS can qualify for this exclusion, it must be established that those gains are of a capital nature in 
terms of general case law.2356 The existence of the exclusion is confirmation of SARS’ practice of 
treating realisation gains by CISs as being of a capital nature, despite their frequent trading activities. 
A collective investment scheme in shares is an investment vehicle operating on behalf of portfolio 
unit holders. Although technically treated as a company for Income Tax purposes, a number of rules 
exist to ensure that the collective investment scheme is effectively free from tax at the collective 
investment scheme level. When receiving ordinary revenue, the amount received by the collective 
investment scheme will be exempt from income tax as long as the collective investment scheme 
distributes that amount, with the generic trust deed requiring the distribution to occur within twelve 
months of receipt.2357 Capital gains of the collective investment scheme are simply exempt (and are 
in practice, not distributed). Portfolio unit holders of a collective investment scheme are generally 
viewed as receiving taxable dividends when the collective investment scheme distributes ordinary 
revenue to those unit holders.2358 The unit holders also receive capital gains when disposing of those 
units to other parties, or when surrendering those units back to the collective investment scheme if 
the collective investment scheme is distributing capital growth in exchange.2359 
 
In terms of the analysis of the key issues in South Africa and lessons learned from international 
experience, the following policy consideration is submitted. This being: the establishment of an 
appropriate legal and regulatory framework for a local private equity investment vehicle to be 
regulated under the existing Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 (‘CISCA’). 
CISCA should be amended to include the passage of a new law that sets a framework for private 
equity investing. Such an amendment should generally establish, as a minimum, a definition of an 
appropriate investment vehicle that serves as a tax pass-through so that only the investor is subject 
to the assessment of taxes. The proposed new flow through, closed-ended collective investment 
vehicle (‘CIV’) will be a South African domiciled onshore private equity vehicle, intended for 
                                                 
2355Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2356Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
2357See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2009), ‘Binding Private Ruling: BPR 031 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962’, 29th May 2009, issued by Legal and Policy Division: Advance Tax Rulings of SARS. 
2358See South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2009), ‘Binding Private Ruling: BPR 031 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962’, 29th May 2009, issued by Legal and Policy Division: Advance Tax Rulings of SARS. 
2359Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Olivier, 
L. and Honiball, M. (2011), ‘International Tax: A South African Perspective’, Blue Weaver Marketing. 
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investment by resident and non-resident investors. The definition of the collective investment vehicle 
should encompass en commandite partnerships and bewind trusts and any future vehicle which 
meets the criteria, irrespective of whether it is aimed at larger and/or smaller private equity 
transactions.  
 
Whereas the current CISCA defines a collective investment scheme in terms of Section 1, as having 
to be an ‘…open-ended… vehicle…’ the proposal is that the definition should also include ‘closed-
ended’ vehicles. This is because investment vehicles such as private equity funds are fairly illiquid, 
and internationally mutual funds that hold illiquid assets are structured as closed-ended vehicles.2360 
For example, property and private equity funds structured as collective investment schemes are 
typically all closed-ended. Very similar to Australian private equity funds structured as closed-ended 
collective investment vehicles regulated in terms of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001.   
 
CISCA should be amended to accommodate private equity vehicles because of its favourable 
treatment of capital gains tax in favour of investors. Investors in private equity funds structured as 
bewind trusts or en commandite partnerships in South Africa currently do not enjoy the same 
favourable capital gains tax advantages enjoyed by collective investment schemes (‘CIS’) under 
CISCA.2361 In addition, CISCA offers investors and unit holders various protections not available to 
current local private equity investors.2362 The benefits enjoyed by CIS investors with regard to capital 
gains tax and unit holder protection should be extended as far as practically possible to the traditional 
self-liquidating, closed-end, third party private equity funds. The reform should include the deferment 
of taxes on investors until a distribution is made by the fund, as well as the establishment of a 
regulatory framework directed toward investment by qualified retail and institutional investors.2363 
Where the private equity is limited to such investors, the regulatory regime can be focused on 
adequate disclosure rather than on detailed substantive regulation.  
 
The proposal in this instance is not for a listed closed-end private equity vehicle, but an unlisted one. 
CISCA should be amended to make provision for the establishment of a closed-ended, unlisted, tax 
transparent private equity vehicle that is subject to an indirect tax regime. In brief, the salient features 
of such a vehicle would be: a closed-ended fund which would consist of a limited number of units, 
because of the private equity vehicle or fund’s initial fixed capitalisation (open-end funds are 
constantly redeeming and issuing new units); the fund manager does not need to worry about ill-
                                                 
2360See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, 2nd Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2361Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2362Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023.  
2363South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (2009), ‘Binding Class Ruling: BCR 004 of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962’, 14th May 2009, issued by Legal and Policy Division: Advance Tax Rulings of SARS.  
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timed redemptions; and is never under pressure to sell investments in order to raise cash for 
redemptions. In addition, a closed-end fund does not redeem its units, except at termination of the 
fund.2364 In a weak market, the fund manager of an open-ended fund is often forced to sell shares at 
low prices in order to raise cash for redemptions. A manager of a closed-end fund can also buy into 
relatively illiquid assets because the fund is free of the redemption pressures that could force it to 
liquidate in an unfavourable environment.2365  
 
It is submitted that the proposed closed-end unlisted collective investment vehicle to be regulated 
under CISCA must contain the following minimum features, namely allow flow through; complete 
transparency, including flow through of losses, so that there are equivalent tax results for direct 
investment and indirect investment through the collective investment vehicle; the regime should 
allow legal entities of different types to elect, irrevocably, to be collective investment vehicles;  the 
new regime should have a specific designation that can be easily incorporated into future Double 
Tax Agreement negotiations; and allow accumulation and reinvestment for all investors. In addition 
‘private equity CIS’ will enjoy certain exemptions with regard to paying capital gains tax, in that CIS 
investors will only incur capital gains tax (once) when they sell their units in the ‘private equity CIS’.  
 
A counter policy argument to this proposal could centre on one crucial question;2366 namely, do 
private equity firms that manage private equity funds merely act as investors or do they manage the 
underlying portfolio investee companies they acquire on behalf of the private equity funds in order to 
generate profits for the private equity firm? For instance, private equity firms make the legal argument 
that they only invest, but their marketing material more than often state that they actively intervene 
in the management of distressed investee companies before on selling (exiting) them at a profit. This 
counter proposal would be premised on the argument that these private equity firms earn their profits 
in the course of a trade or business.2367 Thus, as with any company that makes a profit as part of its 
trade or business, its returns should be taxed as ordinary income. This counter argument to the 
CISCA proposal would thus be that private equity firms compensation (carried interest) should not 
be treated as capital gains, but rather be taxed at the higher ordinary income rate. This provoking 
policy argument would imply that the returns to private equity funds, as well as the private equity 
firms (carried interest) are already ordinary income under current South African law; which 
furthermore means that SARS and the South African tax courts have been incorrect all this time to 
the benefit of private equity funds, private equity firms and ultimately its investors. Nevertheless, the 
general argument throughout is that private equity funds and the private equity firms are long term 
                                                 
2364Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Explanatory Memorandum on 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2013’, 24th October, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2365Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Explanatory Memorandum on 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2013’, 24th October, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2366The proposal for the amendment of CISCA to accommodate private equity vehicles is because of CISCA’s 
favourable treatment of capital gains tax in favour of investors. 
2367Acquiring distressed or start-up companies, improving their management then on selling them at a profit. 
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investors and not managers of the underlying portfolio investee companies they acquire on behalf of 
private equity funds, therefore the profits they generate should continue to be treated at the lower of 
capital gains rates. 
 
The next paragraph 2.2 will discuss the taxation of share options in the US, Canada, Australia, UK 
and South Africa. The taxation of share options is an important tax consideration particularly when 
used as an incentive mechanism in underlying portfolio investee companies. The discussion to follow 
is aimed at analysing how the above mentioned jurisdictions have addressed the taxation of share 
options with regard to their respective private equity industries in a manner which could be beneficial 
to South African law. 
 
2.2 Taxation of Share Options in Investee Companies 
(a) United States (‘US’) 
 
A private equity investment in an underlying portfolio company could typically involve a share 
incentive scheme offered by the investee company to its managers. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, Lerner et al stated that the Stock Options Law of 1981 has had a wide-ranging effect on the 
US private equity industry.2368 The latter piece of legislation provided that taxes on share options are 
to be paid when shares are sold, instead of when the options were exercised. Tax structuring 
alternatives may be available to partially mitigate the amount of capital gains tax in this regard. In 
the US, share options are taxed at capital gains rates when the shares are sold if certain 
requirements are met.2369 No tax is due when they are exercised and therefore the issuer is not 
entitled to a tax deduction. To achieve capital gains treatment, the shares must be held for both two 
years following the share options’ grant date; and one year after the share option is exercised by the 
manager.2370 
 
A Section 83(b) election in the US would for example be a situation where a portfolio company grant 
managers profit interests in the company in exchange for performing services for the company.2371 
Profit interests represent the right to a share of the company's future profits and are treated as capital 
gains at the level of the manager, to the extent that the underlying income is a capital gain.2372 When 
                                                 
2368Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. In terms of Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 provides special tax treatment for certain employee options with the introduction of ‘incentive stock 
options’ into the US Internal Revenue Code. 
2369Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 5th 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. 
2370Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2371US Code: Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II, Section 83 
that relates to property transferred in connection with performance of services. 
2372Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
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the portfolio company is sold the gain is treated as capital gains at the level of the manager. However, 
it must be noted that this differs from ordinary income from the exercise of non-qualified share options 
or the vesting of restricted shares without a section 83(b) election.2373 A section 83(b) election is a 
tax election to include in the taxpayers’ income the fair market value of property he/she have received 
in connection with the performance of services which he/she may not get to keep.2374 Generally, 
under the tax code, if the taxpayer receives property in connection with the performance of services 
that he/she may not get to keep, and which he/she cannot transfer, then he/she does not have to 
take the fair market value of that property into income until it is determined that he/she will either get 
to keep it, or the property becomes transferable.2375 Section 83(b) also provides an opportunity to 
elect to be taxed at the time of the receipt of the property instead of waiting for the property to become 
transferable or is no longer subject to a risk of forfeiture.2376 
 
For instance, a startup company’s founder is issued founders’ shares that are subject to a company 
repurchase at the shares cost, but the repurchase right lapses over a service based lapsing 
period.2377 Basically this is the company allowing its founders to purchase equity in the company as 
a way of incentivising them to use their best efforts to grow and expand the business. This founder 
has received shares, but because the shares are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the founder 
does not have to pay tax on his receipt of the shares until it vests.2378 However, the founder may 
prefer to make a Section 83(b) election to pay tax on the value of the shares today because its value 
is lower than it is expected to be when it vests or because the founder paid full value for it today, so 
the Section 83(b) election costs him no additional tax today.2379 The making of the Section 83(b) 
election also starts the founder’s capital gains holding period.2380  
 
It is a common misconception, but a Section 83(b) election generally cannot be made with respect 
to the receipt of a private company share option.2381 The option must first be exercised and the 
shares acquired before a Section 83(b) election can be made, and the taxpayer would only make a 
Section 83(b) election in that instance if the taxpayer exercised the option and 
                                                 
2373Section 83(b) election of the US Internal Revenue Code. US Code: Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II, Section 83 relates to property transferred in connection with 
performance of services. 
2374US Code: Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II, Section 83 
deals with shares transferred in connection with performance of services. 
2375US Code: Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II. 
2376US Code: Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II. 
2377See Schenk, D.H. (2014), ‘Federal Taxation of S Corporations’, Law Journal Press, at pages 3-44. 
2378See Schenk, D.H. (2014), ‘Federal Taxation of S Corporations’, Law Journal Press, at pages 3-44. 
2379See Schenk, D.H. (2014), ‘Federal Taxation of S Corporations’, Law Journal Press, at pages 3-44. 
2380Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2381See generally, Swartz, L.Z. (2012), ‘A Layman's Guide to LLC Incentive Compensation’, Cadwalader, 
Wickersham and Taft LLP, article last updated, 25th July 2012. Available at 
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/188646/tax+authorities/A+Laymans+Guide+To+LLC+Incentive+Compensa
tion., accessed in June 2015. 
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acquired unvested shares (if the shares acquired on exercise of the share option was vested, there 
would be no reason to make a Section 83(b) election).2382 Another common misconception is that 
Section 83 does not apply to restricted shares that are purchased at fair market value.2383 Section 
83 applies even to shares that have been purchased at fair market value, if the shares are subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture and received in connection with the performance of services.2384 In 
Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the appellant taxpayers, a husband and wife, sought a 
review of a tax court decision sustaining a US federal income tax deficiency finding.2385 The issue 
was section 83 which required that an employee who purchased restricted shares in connection with 
his performance of services must include as ordinary income the share's appreciation in value 
between the time of purchase and the time the restrictions lapse, unless at the time of purchase he 
elected to include as income the difference between the purchase price and the fair market value.2386 
The appellant husband, who paid full market value for the shares, argued that the purchase was not 
in connection with services, and that the statute should not apply where full market price was paid. 
The court affirmed the decision, holding that the statute's language and history dictated its 
application.2387 To avoid the tax on appreciation, the taxpayer was required to elect in the year of 
purchase.2388  
 
The legal issue the court had to decide was whether the taxpayer had to pay the appreciation value 
of the shares when he paid full market value at the time he originally purchased or when it became 
unrestricted? The legal rule was that Section 83, which required an employee who purchased 
restricted shares in connection with performance of services to include the shares' appreciation as 
ordinary income, applied even where the employee paid full market value for the shares. The court 
ruled against the appellant taxpayers.2389 The court held that Section 83, which required an employee 
who purchased restricted shares in connection with performance of services to include the shares' 
appreciation as ordinary income, applied even where the employee paid full market value for the 
shares.2390  
 
(b) United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
                                                 
2382Sheinfeld, M.M., Witt, F.T., and Hyman, M.B. (2013), ‘Collier on Bankruptcy Taxation’, 15th edition, 
LexisNexis, ISBN 1579111084, 9781579111083. 
2383Restricted stock or shares in terms of US law are shares that have been granted to an employee that is 
non-transferable and subject to forfeiture under certain conditions, such as termination of employment or failure 
to meet either corporate or personal performance benchmarks.  
2384Sheinfeld, M.M., Witt, F.T., and Hyman, M.B. (2013), ‘Collier on Bankruptcy Taxation’, 15th edition, 
LexisNexis, ISBN 1579111084, 9781579111083. 
2385Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). 
2386Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). 
2387Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). 
2388Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). See Shulman v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 93, US Tax Court, 623, (1989). The court held that section 83 governs the 
issuance of an option to acquire a partnership interest as compensation for services provided as an employee. 
2389Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). 
2390Alves v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 79, T.C. 864 (1982), 13.03 (A)(1), 13.04 (E). 




Founders and employees may be incentivised in a number of ways. Generally speaking, 
management in UK companies can be incentivised inter alia by way of the granting shares or options 
to acquire shares.2391 The area of employee shares schemes in the UK are complex and far reaching 
and a detailed discussion thereof falls beyond the scope of this discussion. Broadly speaking, certain 
employee share schemes are either regulated by UK legislation and others are not. The main 
difference is that employees do not usually pay income tax when they acquire shares under a 
regulated scheme.2392 In the UK, where regulated employee share plans apply, the employee 
taxpayer is generally treated for capital gains purposes as acquiring the applicable shares at the 
date when he/she exercised the option.2393 The basic principle is that the employee will only be taxed 
on the growth in share value when he/she disposes of the shares, and at that stage, under the capital 
gains tax regime.2394 However, this will be subject to all conditions set out in the relevant UK tax 
legislation having been fulfilled.  
 
UK Government regulated statutory schemes can be categorised into three broad types. The main 
statutory scheme where shares can be offered free is the Share Incentive Plan (‘SIP’), under which 
shares must be offered, with certain exceptions, to the entire workforce. Employees' shares are held 
in a special employee trust.2395 Beneficial tax treatment is available if the shares are held in trust for 
three years and the value of the shares will be free of all taxes if the shares are held for at least five 
years. This is in line with the UK Government’s policy objective of encouraging employers to offer 
incentives linked to share price performance over the medium term and not as a short term substitute 
for taxable salary.2396 A second type of statutory scheme allows employees to receive the opportunity 
to purchase shares on favourable terms through the SIP using gross employment income.2397 In this 
instance, shares are bought for the current market value but the company can offer one or two free 
shares for each share bought.2398 The third category of regulated share plan statutory schemes 
consist of three employee share option schemes, namely the Enterprise Management Incentive 
                                                 
2391Rayney, P. (2013), ‘Tax Planning for Family and Owner-Managed Companies 2013/14’, Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc. 
2392Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2393Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, Forty Second Edition, St. 
James's Place Wealth Management. 
2394Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2395See HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM40100 to ESSUM48000: Company Share Option Plan 
(CSOP)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM40000.htm, 
accessed in June 2015. 
2396See HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM40100 to ESSUM48000: Company Share Option Plan 
(CSOP)’, HM Revenue and Customs. 
2397See HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM40100 to ESSUM48000: Company Share Option Plan 
(CSOP)’, HM Revenue and Customs. 
2398Rayney, P. (2013), ‘Tax Planning for Family and Owner-Managed Companies 2013/14’, Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc. 
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(‘EMI’) option scheme, the Company Share Option Plan (‘CSOP’)2399 and Save-As-You-Earn 
(‘SAYE’) option scheme.2400 In terms of these three broad categories of employee share plans the 
general rule is that there is no tax on grant and generally no tax on exercise.2401 Any gains realised 
on the ultimate sale of the shares will be subject to capital gains tax, not income tax, and any capital 
gains tax may be reduced by the annual personal capital gains tax exemption.2402  
 
Two further UK schemes that fall outside of the above mentioned three broad categories, namely 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’) and the Entrepreneurs' Relief (‘ER’) are not specific employee 
share options, but can be categorised as regulated targeted tax incentive schemes generally 
available to underlying portfolio investee company managers investing in their company.2403 In fact 
all the schemes mentioned above can be applied in a private equity context as schemes available 
to underlying portfolio investee company managers. However, not all regulated schemes may be 
suitable in all circumstance despite the applicable tax benefits.2404 For instance, not all companies 
can meet the statutory conditions for tax beneficial regulated employee share plans. The three 
regulated tax schemes available to underlying portfolio investee company managers that are 
relevant to the discussion at hand are the Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’), the Entrepreneurs' 
Relief (‘ER’) and Enterprise Management Incentive (‘EMI’).2405 The rules governing all three schemes 
are strictly drawn and are generally restricted to small and medium size companies, however they 
highlight UK policymakers acknowledgement of the importance of employee ownership models as a 
means to incentivising growth.2406 In addition, they align the interests of employees with those of the 
shareholders of the applicable company, albeit that the shareholder might be a private equity fund.   
 
Entrepreneurs' Relief (‘ER’) Incentive 
 
Entrepreneurs' Relief (‘ER’) incentive scheme reduces the amount of the capital gains tax on a 
disposal of qualifying business assets on or after 6th April 2008, as long as the taxpayer has met the 
qualifying conditions throughout a one-year qualifying period either up to the date of disposal or the 
                                                 
2399See HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM40100 to ESSUM48000: Company Share Option Plan 
(CSOP)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM40000.htm, 
accessed in June 2015. 
2400In terms of the Save-As-You-Earn (‘SAYE’) option scheme which can be offered to employees, the offer 
must be made to the entire workforce generally and the tax advantages accrue over the medium term. Up to 
a 20 percent discount is allowed on the value of the shares at the date of grant and employees have a formal 
saving contract over a three or five year period which can be used to pay for the shares or employees can take 
their savings in cash. 
2401Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2402Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. In the UK, the 
capital gains tax rate have been reduced since 1988 from 40 percent to 10 percent for higher-rate taxpayers 
for long-term investments, although the personal threshold is only £7,100.2402 The CGT rate increased again 
from 10 percent to 18 percent in 2008. 
2403See McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2404See McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2405See Langley, A. (2013), ‘Employee Reward Structures’, 5th Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2406See Langley, A. (2013), ‘Employee Reward Structures’, 5th Edition, Spiramus Press. 
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date the business ceased.2407 ER gives managers an allowance of £10 million of capital gains on 
qualifying business disposals on which tax is charged at 10 percent.2408 Gains in excess of the 
threshold are charged at the normal capital gains tax rates.2409 The £10 million allowance does not 
apply to past disposals and begins when the relief is first claimed.2410 The latter allowance is a lifetime 
allowance and a tax rate of 10 percent can be claimed for any number of qualifying disposals that 
take place from 6th April 2008 onwards, until the cumulative limit of £10 million is reached.2411 ER is 
available to individuals but it is not available to companies or personal representatives of deceased 
persons.2412 
 
ER is available on a disposal of shares by an individual2413 (for example a manager), provided that 
throughout a period of one year ending on the date of disposal, the applicable company is a trading 
company or a holding company of a trading group; the applicable manager is an officer or employee 
of the company or a group company; and such manager owns at least 5 percent of the ordinary 
share capital of the company, which gives the manager at least five percent of the voting rights.2414 
ER tax relief is also available on the disposal of all or part of a business that an individual has owned 
for at least one year prior to the date of disposal.2415 The disposal must be of assets comprising the 
business, and not just of assets used in the business.2416 In the UK there have been a few cases 
that have considered the latter distinction. In the tribunal case of Gilbert v HMRC, it was held that 
entrepreneurs’ relief could be claimed on the basis that the one ninth part of the business sold did 
constitute a mini business in its own right, namely that it could be run as a separate and individual 
business.2417 The Appellant had carried on a business of selling food on commission, representing 
nine different suppliers. In 2008, the Appellant agreed to sell part of his business to one of the 
suppliers. The sale agreement defined ‘business’ sold as that part of the Appellant's business 
consisting of the sale of the suppliers products to customers. The sale agreement stated that the 
purchase was to include the customer database relating to the business and goodwill, the trade 
marks which the Appellant had registered relating to various brands and business information, 
                                                 
2407See Langley, A. (2013), ‘Employee Reward Structures’, 5th Edition, Spiramus Press, at page 261. 
2408See Cockburn, R. (2011), ‘Small Business Tax Planning: All you need to know from start-up to retirement’, 
1st Edition, Harriman House Ltd. 
2409Which are currently 18 percent and 28 percent respectively, depending on whether the individual is a basic 
or higher-rate taxpayer. 
2410Rayney, P. (2013), ‘Tax Planning for Family and Owner-Managed Companies 2013/14’, Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc. 
2411Limits of £5 million for disposals before 6th April 2011, £2 million for disposals before 23rd June 2010 and 
£1 million for disposals before 6th April 2010 also apply. 
2412Cockburn, R. (2011), ‘Small Business Tax Planning: All you need to know from start-up to retirement’, First 
Edition, Harriman House Ltd. 
2413Not companies, partnerships, limited liability partnerships or other corporate bodies. 
2414McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2415McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2416HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘Helpsheet 275: Tax year 6 April 2013 to 5 April 2014,  Entrepreneurs' 
Relief (2014)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/hs275.pdf, accessed in 
June 2015. 
2417Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 705 (TC). 
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together with the benefit and burden of unperformed contracts and the records.2418 After the sale the 
Appellant could no longer use the trademarks nor have any contact with the customers of the 
supplier. The Appellant in his 2008/09 tax return showed a gain from the disposal of the assets of 
£285,000 and sought to claim Entrepreneurs' Relief which reduced the amount of the gain by four-
ninths. HMRC enquired into the return and decided that Entrepreneurs' Relief was not available.2419   
 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) argued that for the Appellant to qualify for ER tax 
relief was not enough for him to make a disposal of assets used in the business, there needed to be 
the disposal of an identifiable part of the business which on its own was separately definable.2420 
Whilst the Appellant sold the brands and customer base, HMRC's view was that, in the scheme of 
how the business itself operated, those disposals did not amount to the disposal of a separately 
definable business. HMRC accepted that if the changes to the business caused by the sale of the 
assets could lead to the conclusion that the position after the sale was wholly different from the 
position before the sale, then it might be reasonable to say that the business after the sale was not 
the same as the one before, and therefore part of the business must have been sold.2421 However, 
HMRC contended that the operation of the business in this case did not appear to have changed 
wholly or even noticeably after the disposal of the brands/customer base. HMRC submitted that on 
the facts the same business was being carried on after the sale as before. Therefore there was not 
a material disposal within the meaning of the legislation so that ER was not available.2422 
 
The Appellant submitted that effectively there were nine separate businesses. The sale by the 
Appellant was of all the business connected to the supplier and various brands. The Appellant 
argued this was clearly a separate and definable part of the business. In delivering its judgment, the 
Tribunal took in account each party's submissions and the only question for the Tribunal was whether 
there had been a ‘disposal of....part of a business’.2423  Assessing the facts, the Tribunal found that 
the Appellant did dispose of the business as a going concern, judging that the business sold was a 
‘viable section’.2424 The Tribunal referred to Lord Walker's comments in Maco Door and Window 
Hardware (UK) Ltd v HMRC where he stated that a business is recognisable as a business even 
                                                 
2418Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 705 (TC). Available at www.burges-
salmon.com/Practices/tax/complex_compliance_and_disclosure/News/9640.aspx., accessed in June 2015. 
2419Watt, G. (2014), ‘Trusts and Equity’, Oxford University Press. Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 
705 (TC).  
2420Watt, G. (2014), ‘Trusts and Equity’, Oxford University Press. Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 
705 (TC).  
2421Watt, G. (2014), ‘Trusts and Equity’, Oxford University Press. Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 
705 (TC).  
2422Watt, G. (2014), ‘Trusts and Equity’, Oxford University Press. Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 
705 (TC).  
2423Watt, G. (2014), ‘Trusts and Equity’, Oxford University Press. Commentary: Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 
705 (TC).  
2424Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 705 (TC).  
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when separated from the whole.2425 The Tribunal reached this conclusion because the transfer of 
business included the customer database, goodwill, trademarks, business information, and the 
benefit and burden of unperformed contracts and records.2426 Particularly, the sale of the customer 
database was regarded as a crucial asset in distinguishing a sale of a going concern from mere sale 
of assets.2427  
 
However, the UK High Court case of Russell v HMRC did not allow the sale of thirty five percent of 
farmland to qualify for ER tax relief because the court held that the sale did not relate to the sale of 
a business but was rather the sale of a business asset which did not therefore qualify.2428 The 
position has historically been that the sale of some of the farmland is not a disposal of part of a 
farming business. The court held that the test is to look at the nature and extent of the business 
activities before and after the transaction.2429 If the business is run in exactly the same way both 
before and after the sale, the sale will probably not be considered as a sale of a business and so will 
not qualify for ER tax relief and the standard rate of capital gains tax will be charged on the gain 
arising on the sale.2430 Furthermore, ER tax relief will apply to a disposal of one or more qualifying 
assets used for the purposes of a business at the time when it ceased to be carried on, provided 
both of the following conditions are met: (i) the business has been owned by the individual (whether 
as a sole trader or in partnership) throughout the period of one year ending on the date on which the 
business ceases to be carried on and (ii) the business ceased to be carried on in the period of three 
years ending with the date of the disposal.2431 Assets held for investment purposes and assets that 
are not used for the business purposes are excluded from entrepreneurs’ relief.  For example, 
companies with large cash deposits could be excluded from entrepreneurs’ relief.  It may be 
advantageous in such situations to review whether a dividend payment could improve the position 
for the taxpayer.2432 
 
In addition, ER tax relief will apply to a disposal by a partner or shareholder of a personally-owned 
asset that is used in the business will benefit provided that certain conditions are met. These 
conditions include that the disposal is ‘material’ and that the partner or shareholder is withdrawing 
                                                 
2425Maco Door and Window Hardware (UK) Ltd v HMRC, 2008, UKHL 54. The Tribunal in the Gilbert case also 
referred to Bestway (Holdings) Ltd v Luff, 1998, BTC 69. 
2426Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 705 (TC).  
2427Gilbert v HMRC 2011, UKFTT, 705 (TC). See also Rayney, P. (2013), ‘Tax Planning for Family and Owner-
Managed Companies 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2428Russell v HMRC, 2012, UK FTT, 623 TC02299. 
2429Russell v HMRC, 2012, UK FTT, 623 TC02299. 
2430McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2431See Rayney, P. (2013), ‘Tax Planning for Family and Owner-Managed Companies 2013/14’, Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc. 
2432See HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘Helpsheet 275: Tax year 6 April 2013 to 5 April 2014, 
Entrepreneurs' Relief (2014)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/hs275.pdf, accessed in June 2015. 
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from the business.2433 A further condition is that the asset was used by the partnership or company 
for the purposes of its business throughout the period of one year ending with the date of the disposal 
and not for unconnected purposes.2434 In many cases partners receiving a capital sum on retirement 
from partnership can benefit from entrepreneurs’ tax relief providing that the settlement deed is 
structure correctly.2435 
 
Enterprise Management Incentive (‘EMI’) Options 
 
A second form of such tax incentive in the UK is the Enterprise Management Incentive (‘EMI’) 
options. EMI was introduced in the UK in 2000 by the Finance Act 2000 and offer tax-advantaged 
and flexible incentives for companies which meet the various qualifying criteria.2436 They are intended 
to help smaller companies with growth potential to recruit and retain the best employees, and offer 
generous tax advantages to employees of those companies which qualify.2437 There are several legal 
requirements which companies must satisfy in order for their share options to qualify as EMIs, 
including:2438 (i) the company must carry on a ‘qualifying trade’ in the UK.2439 If the option is for a 
group of companies, at least one company in the group must carry on such a trade; (ii) the company 
or group of companies must not have gross assets exceeding £30million at the time the share option 
is granted; (iii) the company whose shares are used may be listed or unlisted on a stock exchange, 
but it must be an independent company which implies that, in the case of a group of companies, the 
options must be over shares in the parent company to meet the EMI requirements; and (iv) the 
company or group of companies must have fewer than 250 full-time equivalent employees at the 
time the share option is granted.2440 Only companies that are deemed independent, qualify, therefore 
companies controlled by a private equity fund could be ‘disqualified’ to take advantage of the 
scheme.2441 Also the scheme only holds for employees who spend the majority of their time working 
                                                 
2433HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘Helpsheet 275: Tax year 6 April 2013 - 5 April 2014, Entrepreneurs' 
Relief (2014)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/hs275.pdf, accessed in 
June 2015. 
2434See McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2435See McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2436Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2437Gibson, E. (2014), ‘Tax Schedule: A Guide to Warranties and Indemnities’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2438Gibson, E. (2014), ‘Tax Schedule: A Guide to Warranties and Indemnities’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2439According HMRC interpretation of ‘qualifying trade’ is one that is carried out with the intention of making a 
profit. Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/shareschemes/emi-
new-guidance.htm, accessed in June 2015. 
2440The company or group of companies must have fewer than 250 full-time equivalent employees. A full-time 
employee is one who works 35 hours a week or more, and the company must include fractions representing 
part-time employees. Non-executive directors and overseas employees and employees of "qualifying 
subsidiaries" in which the parent company owns a controlling stake, must also be counted. In order to qualify, 
participating employees, including executive directors, must spend at least 25 hours per week or, if less, 75 
percent of their working time, on the business of the company or group of companies. Employees must give 
written declarations confirming that they meet this working time requirement, and the company must retain 
those declarations. Individuals with a ‘material interest’ (broadly a 30 percent interest) in the company or any 
of its subsidiaries, either on their own or together with one or more associates, are also unable to participate. 
2441Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press 
Ltd. 
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for the company.2442 In addition, EMI options can be subject to restrictions but they must be ordinary 
shares which are fully paid up and not redeemable or convertible.2443 Also, there is a company limit 
of £3million on the total value of shares, as at the grant date which may be available under EMI 
options at any given time.2444 There is also an individual limit on the value of shares, as at the grant 
date which any one employee may hold under the EMI option. This limit is £250,000.2445 Once this 
maximum has been reached, no further qualifying EMI options can be granted until three years after 
the last of those options was granted.2446 Options under any Company Share Option Plan (‘CSOP’) 
operated by the company also count towards this limit.2447 A company can seek advance clearance 
from the HMRC that it satisfies the above mentioned requirements.2448 
 
For an individual, the tax treatment of an EMI share option means that there are no tax implications 
when the option is granted.2449 Capital gains tax is only payable on the sale of the option shares. On 
the sale of shares following exercise, the gain made over the value of the shares at grant or the 
option exercise price, if higher is a chargeable gain for capital gains tax purposes from 23rd June 
2010, this is subject to a rate of 18 percent or 28 percent depending on whether the individual is a 
basic or higher-rate taxpayer.2450 Since 6th April 2008, the relevant period of ownership for capital 
gains tax for entrepreneurs' relief purposes assuming the qualifying conditions are met, which may 
be rare in a portfolio company begins on the acquisition of shares following exercise of an EMI 
option.2451 
 
Typically no income tax will be payable when an employee exercises the share option within ten 
years of grant,2452 unless the exercise price is less than the market value of the shares on grant then 
the lower figure is used to calculate the tax liability.2453 If an EMI option is granted with an exercise 
price below the market value of the shares at the date of grant and is then exercised, income tax is 
payable on the excess of the aggregate market value of the shares at the date of grant over the 
aggregate option exercise price.2454 If the aggregate market value of the shares at the date of 
exercise is lower than the aggregate market value of the shares at the date of grant, income tax is 
                                                 
2442Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2443Gibson, E. (2014), ‘Tax Schedule: A Guide to Warranties and Indemnities’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2444Gibson, E. (2014), ‘Tax Schedule: A Guide to Warranties and Indemnities’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2445Gibson, E. (2014), ‘Tax Schedule: A Guide to Warranties and Indemnities’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2446Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2447See HMRC Employee Share Schemes User Manual (ESSUM), available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM50000.htm, accessed in June 2015. 
2448See HMRC Employee Share Schemes User Manual (ESSUM), available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM50000.htm, accessed in June 2015. 
2449Langley, A. (2013), ‘Employee Reward Structures’, 5th Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2450Langley, A. (2013), ‘Employee Reward Structures’, 5th Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2451Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
2452Employees must be able to exercise EMI share options within ten years. The option terms must be set out 
in a written agreement which must detail any restrictions on the shares. 
2453Cohen, D. (2013), ‘Emi Share Options: The Complete Guide’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. See also 
available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM54300.htm, accessed in June 2015. 
2454Moody, K. (2013), ‘Employment-Related Securities and Unlisted Companies’, 2nd Edition, Spiramus Press. 
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payable on the excess of the aggregate market value of the shares at the date of exercise over the 
aggregate option exercise price.2455 The employing company must account for the income tax under 
pay-as-you-earn (‘PAYE’) and social security payments are also due, if the shares are readily 
convertible assets for tax purposes.2456 
 
In addition, the exercise of an option does not give rise to a liability to income tax or social security 
obligations if the favourable tax treatment has not been lost through a disqualifying event.2457 Such 
an event could be (i) the company ceasing to carry out a qualifying trade; (ii) the option holder 
ceasing to be a qualifying employee; (iii) the option holders being granted an additional tax-
advantaged company share option (CSOP) taking them over their individual (£250,000) EMI limit; 
(iv) the company being taken over; and (v) certain alterations to the company's share capital. In 
addition to these substantial tax advantages, the employer company may also be able to claim 
corporation tax relief on the option gain.2458   
 
According to HMRC, it is recommended that unlisted companies establish the market value of the 
shares that will be put under option before EMI options are granted.2459 The value can be formally 
agreed with HMRC or the company can use its own valuation although it would then be open to 
HMRC to query this.2460 For companies and employees who meet the qualifying conditions, EMIs 
are a flexible and tax-favoured share incentive arrangement, however only companies that are 
deemed independent, qualify. By the very nature of the private equity business model companies 
controlled by a private equity fund would not qualify to take advantage of the scheme. Private equity 
funds hold numerous underlying portfolio investee company interests and any one of these investee 
companies cannot be regarded as independent. 
 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’) Relief 
                                                 
2455Cohen, D. (2013), ‘Emi Share Options: The Complete Guide’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.  
2456HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM57100 to ESSUM57900: Taxation of EMI Options’, HM 
Revenue and Customs. Available at  www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM57000.htm, accessed in June 
2015. 
2457HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM57430 to ESSUM57480: Taxation of EMI Options’, HM 
Revenue and Customs. Available at  www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM57000.htm, accessed in June  
2015. 
2458HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘ESSUM57430 to ESSUM57480: Taxation of EMI Options’, HM 
Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM57000.htm, accessed in June 
2015. 
2459See HMRC Employee Share Schemes User Manual (ESSUM), available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/essum/ESSUM50000.htm, accessed in June 2015. If EMI options in an unlisted 
company are granted the company can, if it wishes, agree the market value of the shares with HMRC Shares 
and Assets Valuation (SAV). To agree a market value with them the company will need to propose a value for 
the shares and provide background information to support the proposal. It will need to complete form Val 
231 for EMI options. The form outlines the information needed to support the proposed valuation. When it is 
complete, it should be sent it to HMRC Shares and Assets Valuation (SAV).  
2460HM Revenue and Customs (2014), ‘Helpsheet 275: Tax year 6 April 2013 - 5 April 2014, Entrepreneurs' 
Relief (2014)’, HM Revenue and Customs. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/hs275.pdf, accessed in 
June 2015. 




A third form of such tax incentive in the UK falls under the Enterprise Investment Scheme (‘EIS’). 
EIS relief is available where a qualifying company issues new shares. The purpose of issuing these 
shares, and any others issued at the same time, must be to raise money for a qualifying business 
activity.2461 The EIS shares must be subscribed wholly in cash and the cash must be paid in full by 
the time the shares are issued.2462 In order to benefit from the relief, the relevant shares must be 
held for at least three years after issue or, if later, three years after the company begins to trade. To 
take advantage of this relief, the EIS investor must not dispose of the shares for at least three years 
after the date of issue or, if later, three years after the company begins to carry on a qualifying trade. 
The relief consists of an initial thirty percent income tax saving and exemption from capital gains tax 
when the EIS shares are disposed of. It may be possible for EIS shareholders to defer an existing 
capital gains tax liability by rolling it into the EIS shares which is referred to as EIS reinvestment 
relief.2463 Shareholders may also be able to obtain further income tax relief if the shares are later 
sold at a loss. If the investor makes a loss when disposing of the shares that person can elect for 
the amount of that loss, less any income tax relief given, to be set against income made in the year 
in which the shares were disposed of, or any income from the previous year, instead of being set off 
against any capital gains.2464 
 
The individual's income tax liability for the year of the share issue will be reduced by thirty percent 
of the amount used to subscribe for shares. In effect, this means that up to thirty percent of the cost 
of the individual's share investment will be paid for by the HMRC.2465 The maximum amount of EIS 
relief which a person can claim in any one tax year is £1 million. Unused EIS relief cannot be carried 
forward to be used in later years. Provided that the EIS relief has not been withdrawn, no capital 
gains tax will be payable when the EIS shares are disposed of other than on any gain rolled over 
into those shares under the reinvestment relief provisions.2466  
 
There are certain restrictions affecting the investor, the main one being that the EIS investor cannot 
be 'connected' with the company. An investor will be connected with a company if the investor and 
the investor's associates' interest in the company exceeds thirty percent.2467 According to Slorach 
and Ellis, 'interest' includes the company's share capital, voting rights or assets on a winding up; if 
the investor or any of the investor's associates is an employee or partner of the company; if the 
                                                 
2461Squire Sanders Hammonds (UK) LLP (2013), ‘Tax Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Private 
Company's Shares’, Twenty Second Edition, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2462Slorach, J.S. and Ellis, J.G. (2013), ‘Business Law 2013-2014’, 21st Edition, Oxford University Press UK. 
2463Slorach, J.S. and Ellis, J.G. (2013), ‘Business Law 2013-2014’, 21st edition, Oxford University Press UK. 
2464Squire Sanders Hammonds (UK) LLP (2013), ‘Tax Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Private 
Company's Shares’, Twenty Second Edition, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2465Watson, L. (2010), ‘Taxation of EIS and VCT Investments’, LTax Publishing. 
2466Watson, L. (2010), ‘Taxation of EIS and VCT Investments’, LTax Publishing. 
2467Watson, L. (2010), ‘Taxation of EIS and VCT Investments’, LTax Publishing. 
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investor or any of the investor's associates is a director of the company.2468 However, an investor 
who has not previously been connected with the company or employed in the business can take an 
active role in its management after making the investment through becoming an unpaid or a paid 
director, 'reasonable and necessary' remuneration will be permissible.2469 EIS can therefore be used 
for management buy-ins, but not for management buy-outs since in this case the directors would 
have been connected with the company beforehand.2470 These relief rules are strictly drawn and 
relief is not generally available for an employee or manager investing in his own company unless he 
is a business angel.2471 This exemption is very restricted but directors may qualify for relief if they 
are connected with the company only as directors of the company or subsidiary.2472 Any 
remuneration they receive or are entitled to receive is reasonable for their services rendered to the 
company as directors.2473 They subscribed for eligible shares at a time when they had never been 
either connected with the issuing company; or involved as sole trader, employee, partner or director 
in carrying on its trade, business, profession or vocation, for instance, as part of a buyout team.2474 
 
All three the above mentioned schemes were intended by UK policy makers to help UK companies 
with growth potential to recruit and retain the best employees, and offer generous tax advantages to 
employees of those companies which qualify.2475 The common thread of all three schemes involve 
the reduction of the amount of the capital gains tax and the allowance of no income tax being payable 
when an employee exercises the share option, unless the exercise price is less than the market 
value of the shares on grant then the lower figure is used to calculate the tax liability. Capital gains 
tax in terms of all three schemes, is only payable on the sale of the applicable shares and that the 
gain made over the value of the shares at grant or the option exercise price, if higher is a chargeable 
gain for capital gains tax purposes. In addition, if investors in all three schemes make a loss when 
disposing of the shares that person can elect for the amount of that loss, less any income tax relief 
given, to be set against income made in the year in which the shares were disposed of, or any 
income from the previous year, instead of being set off against any capital gains. 
 
Nonetheless, specific commercial factors may outweigh the tax benefits of regulated employee share 
plans or regulated tax schemes such as EIS and ER, therefore unregulated share incentive plans 
                                                 
2468Slorach, J.S. and Ellis, J.G. (2013), ‘Business Law 2013-2014’, 21st Edition, Oxford University Press UK. 
2469Squire Sanders Hammonds (UK) LLP (2013), ‘Tax Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Private 
Company's Shares’, Twenty Second Edition, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2470Squire Sanders Hammonds (UK) LLP (2013), ‘Tax Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Private 
Company's Shares’, Twenty Second Edition, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2471Squire Sanders Hammonds (UK) LLP (2013), ‘Tax Aspects of the Purchase and Sale of a Private 
Company's Shares’, Twenty Second Edition, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. See also Mason, C.M. (2011), 
‘Business Angels’, in World Encyclopaedia of Entrepreneurship, edited by Dana, L.D., published by Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, at page 1 for definition of ‘business angels’. 
2472Sinclair, W. And Lipkin, E.B. (2013), ‘St. James's Place Tax Guide 2013-2014’, 42nd Edition. 
2473Watson, L. (2010), ‘Taxation of EIS and VCT Investments’, LTax Publishing. 
2474Slorach, J.S. and Ellis, J.G. (2013), ‘Business Law 2013-2014’, 21st Edition, Oxford University Press UK. 
2475Lam, J. (2014), ‘Enterprise Risk Management: From Incentives to Controls’, 2nd Edition, John Wiley and 
Sons. 
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are still used in the UK. The most straightforward plans, which do not enjoy the tax benefits as do 
regulated schemes, would for instance be the granting of share options. Such schemes are still 
regulated by statute but enjoy no special reliefs.2476 In the UK, where unregulated employee share 
plans apply, the basic principle is that if the employee exercised an unapproved share option before 
10th April 2003, the capital gains cost of the shares is the market value at the time the employee 
exercised the option.2477 If the taxpayer exercised an unregulated share option after 9th April 2003, 
the capital gains cost of the shares is the total of what was paid for the option plus the price paid for 
the shares when the employee exercised the option, and the amount chargeable to income tax on 
the exercise.2478 However, should an employee receive free shares or acquire discounted shares in 
terms of an unregulated scheme and not by exercising a share option, the capital gains cost is the 
market value at the date of receipt or acquisition respectively.2479  
 
The questions of whether and if so, when taxable income was derived in terms of a share option 
taxation benefit was discussed in the leading UK case of Abbott v Philbin.2480 The facts of the case 
was that in 1954 the taxpayer paid to acquire an option to purchase 2000 shares in his employer at 
a fixed price being the market value at the time the options were granted. In 1956 he exercised the 
option and acquired 250 shares. The UK Revenue Office in terms of Schedule E of the Income Tax 
Act of 1952 included an amount in his assessable income based on the difference between the 
exercise price and the market value in 1956.2481 In accordance with what was then the common 
practice of the UK Revenue Office at the time, a sum equal to the difference between the current 
market price and the amount paid for the shares, together with a proportionate part of the cost of the 
option, was included in the taxpayer’s assessment for the year in which the option was exercised.2482 
However, The House of Lords held by majority that no amount could be included as income in 1956 
and also implied that any tax consequences arose only in 1954 when the option was granted.2483 
The House of Lords held that the benefit of the option contract could be converted into money, even 
though it was not assignable, because the employee could have obtained money from a third party 
by agreeing to exercise the option when instructed and thereupon transfer the shares, and that as 
such it was a ‘perquisite of office or employment’ so as to attract tax under Schedule E of the Income 
Tax Act of 1952, which was taxable on its value at the time of grant and not on the value when 
                                                 
2476McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2477McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2478McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2479McLaughlin, M. (2013), ‘Tax Planning 2013/14’, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
2480Abbott v Philbin , 1961, AC 352. 
2481Abbott v Philbin , 1961, AC 352. 
2482Abbott v Philbin , 1961, AC 352. 
2483Abbott v Philbin , 1961, AC 352. See O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: 
Cross Border Issues Arising From Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership 
Project, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne. 
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exercised.2484 The law relating to share options was subsequently amended in the UK to over-rule 
the decision in Abbott v Philbin.2485 The current UK legislation provides statutory support to what was 





This discussion is not intended to be a detailed review of all the relevant tax considerations affecting 
share option plans in terms of Canadian tax legislation and the assessing policies and practices of 
the Canadian Revenue Agency (‘CRA’). In Canada, employee share options are taxed under the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (‘ITA’).2486 The two main provisions are sections 7 and 
110 of the ITA. Section 7 of the ITA deals with share options agreements under which employees of 
a company acquire rights to acquire shares of the applicable company.2487 Section 110 of the ITA 
provides various deductions that may be claimed in computing a taxpayer's taxable income.2488 
Subsection 7(7) of the ITA defines the expressions ‘qualifying person’ and ‘security’ for the purposes 
of section 7 and certain other provisions of the ITA relating to such agreements. ‘Qualifying person’ 
is defined as a corporation or a mutual fund trust. ‘Security’ is defined as a share issued by a 
corporation or a unit of a mutual fund trust.2489 Subsection 7(7) was amended in 1998 to have these 
definitions also apply for the purposes of subsections 110(1.7) and (1.8) of the ITA.2490  
 
The income tax consequences of exercising the option depend on whether the company granting 
the option is a Canadian-controlled private corporation (‘CCPC’),2491 the period of time the employee 
                                                 
2484Abbott v Philbin , 1961, AC 352. See O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: 
Cross Border Issues Arising From Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership 
Project, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne. 
2485Smith, D.G. and Macpherson, A. (2008), ‘Hong Kong Taxation: Law and Practice’, 2008-09 Edition, Hong 
Series, The Chinese University Press. 
2486Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp), as amended. 
2487Sections 7(1)(a) to (e) of the ITA stipulate various rules that apply where a company have agreed to issue 
shares to an employee of it or another company with which it does not deal at arm's length (an ‘option 
agreement’). Similar rules apply to mutual fund trusts as per section 7(7) of the ITA. 
2488Canadian Department of Finance (2012), ‘Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act Part 5: Clause 
237’, Canadian Government, 19th October 2012. Available at www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-
eng.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
2489Canadian Department of Finance (2012), ‘Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act Part 5: Clause 
171, Canadian Government, 19th October 2012. Available at www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-
eng.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
2490Canadian Department of Finance (2012), ‘Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act Part 5: Clause 
171, Canadian Government, 19th October 2012. Available at www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-
eng.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
2491See Canadian Interpretation Bulletin IT-73R6 (2002), ‘Income Tax Act: The Small Business Deduction’, 
25th March 2002. In general terms, a ‘CCPC’ means a ‘private corporation’ that is a ‘Canadian corporation’ (as 
defined in terms of section 125(7) of the ITA) and also that is not controlled by non-residents, ‘public 
corporations’ or by any combination thereof. The definition of ‘CCPC’ does not require control by Canadian 
residents, but rather requires a lack of control by non-residents of Canada.  For instance, a ‘private corporation’ 
that is owned 50 percent by non-residents of Canada and 50 percent by residents of Canada qualifies as a 
‘CCPC’. Available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it73r6/it73r6-e.html., accessed in June 2015.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 387 
 
holds the shares before selling such shares and whether the employee deals at arm’s-length with 
the company.2492 The company may provide its employees with the right to acquire shares in the 
company at a fixed price for a limited period.2493 Typically the shares will be worth more than the 
purchase price at the time the employee exercises the option. Thus, when and if the employee 
decides to exercise the option, the employee will realise a gain if the market price of the share is 
higher than the exercise price in accordance with section 7 of the ITA.2494 For instance, an employee 
is provided with an option to acquire 100 shares at $50 each which is the fair market value for the 
share at grant of the option.2495 Subsequently the share price increases to $100 and the employee 
exercises his/her option to acquire the shares for $5000 resulting in a $5000 profit for the 
employee.2496  
 
The difference between the fair market value of the shares at the time the option was exercised and 
the option price will be taxed as employment income in the year the shares are sold.2497 This gain 
will be considered employment income and if certain conditions are met as set out in terms of section 
110 of the ITA, the employee will be entitled to deduct half of the amount for income tax purposes.2498 
                                                 
2492In terms of section 7(1)(a) of the ITA the employee is deemed to have received a benefit from his or her 
employment at the time that he or she acquires shares under the option agreement unless, in the case of the 
exercise of an option agreement by an arm's length employee to acquire shares of a CPCC the recognition of 
this benefit is deferred until the time that the employee disposes of the shares. However, no deferral election 
is possible after 4th March 2010 because of the repeal of subsection 7(8) announced in Canadian Federal 
Budget of 2010. The Canadian Federal Government Budget of 2010 introduced section 180.01 into the ITA 
and the section establishes the conditions for taxpayer eligibility for the special elective tax treatment and sets 
out the rules applicable in respect of the election by the taxpayer to benefit from the relief measure. Section 
180.01 of the ITA is a special elective tax treatment for taxpayers who elected under subsection 7(8) to defer 
tax liability on their stock option benefit until the disposition of the optioned securities. Subsection 180.01(1) 
set out the conditions that a taxpayer must fulfill in order to make an election to obtain relief from the deferred 
tax liability. The taxpayer must have made an election under former subsection 7(8) to defer tax liability on an 
employment benefit deemed to have been received in respect of rights exercised on a stock option agreement 
under paragraph 7(1)(a). The taxpayer may make the election for the special relief in any year before 2015 in 
which he or she is required to include in income a qualifying deferred stock option benefit. 
2493Marcil, M.C. and Tassé, L. (2014), ‘Stock Options: Tax Treatment of Cash Payments in Lieu of Exercise’, 
Issue 1, 9th January 2014, Tax Intelligence Series, Couzin Taylor LLP in association with Ernst and Young 
LLP. 
2494In the case of Steen v The Queen, 86 DTC 6498, [1986] 2 CTC 394 (FCTD), the court ruled that where an 
employee ‘acquires’ shares pursuant to a share option agreement at the time when he exercises his option to 
purchase shares from his corporate employer, rather than at the time of the granting of the option. The court 
held that the word ‘value’ in section 7(1)(a) is essentially synonymous to ‘fair market value’ or ‘market value’. 
2495In terms of section 7(1)(a) of the ITA, the amount of the benefit is equal to the ‘value’ of the shares at the 
time of their acquisition by the employee minus the exercise price, namely the amount paid by the employee 
under the option agreement to acquire the shares.  In the unusual circumstance where the employee have 
paid an amount to acquire the option agreement, the amount of the computed benefit is correspondingly 
reduced. The amount of the computed benefit then is included in the employee's income under section 6(1)(a) 
of the ITA. 
2496Marcil, M.C. and Tassé, L. (2014), ‘Stock Options: Tax Treatment of Cash Payments in Lieu of Exercise’, 
Issue 1, 9th January 2014, Tax Intelligence Series, Couzin Taylor LLP in association with Ernst and Young 
LLP. 
2497Marcil, M.C. and Tassé, L. (2014), ‘Stock Options: Tax Treatment of Cash Payments in Lieu of Exercise’, 
Issue 1, 9th January 2014, Tax Intelligence Series, Couzin Taylor LLP in association with Ernst and Young 
LLP. 
2498Canadian Department of Finance (2012), ‘Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act Part 5: Clause 
237’, Canadian Government, 19th October 2012. Available at www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-
eng.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
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Subsections 110(1.7) and (1.8) of the ITA was introduced into the ITA and applies after 1998. 
Subsection 110(1.7) ensures that a reduction in the exercise price under an employee share option 
will not disqualify the employee from claiming the share option deduction under section 110(1)(d) of 
the ITA, provided certain conditions are met.2499 For instance, these conditions include a minimum 
exercise price requirement under the option giving rise to the benefit under subsection 7(1) of the 
ITA.2500 Thus, half of the difference between the ultimate disposal price and the fair market value of 
the shares at the date the option was exercised will be the taxable capital gain.2501 In the instance of 
the above example, it will be the $5000 profit made by the employee.2502   
 
As a general rule, the taxable benefit and the share option deduction, if any, have to be included in 
the individual’s income tax return for the year in which the option is exercised.2503 However, there 
are measures that allow the employee to defer the taxation of the taxable benefit relating to the stock 
option until the shares are sold.2504 This deferral is available for options exercised by employees of 
a CCPC and until 4th March 2010 to certain options exercised by public company employees. In 
terms of the Canadian tax regime, there are different rules that apply for publicly traded corporations 
and CCPC’s, however the basic principles are the same and the employer cannot claim a deduction 
on the issuance of share options to its employees.2505 No deferral election is possible after 4th March 
2010 because of the repeal of subsection 7(8) announced in Canadian Federal Budget of 2010.2506  
 
The applicable rule introduced by the Canadian Federal Budget of 4th March 2010 implies that when 
an employee exercises a share option and buys shares in the applicable company, such employee 
must immediately pay tax on any unrealised profit despite such employee not even having sold any 
of the shares.2507 Thus prior to the 4th March 2010 budget an employee could defer the tax on any 
                                                 
2499Subsection 110(1.8) sets out the conditions that must be met in order for subsection 110(1.7) to apply. 
2500Canadian Department of Finance (2012), ‘Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act Part 5: Clause 
237’, Canadian Government, 19th October 2012. Available at www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-
eng.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
2501Paragraph 110(1)(d) of the ITA provides a deduction in computing taxable income in circumstances where 
subsection 7(1) of the Act deems an employee to have received a benefit from employment in connection with 
the exercise, transfer or disposition of rights under an employee option agreement. The deduction is equal to 
one-half of the amount of the employment benefit, and the effect of the deduction is to tax the benefit at a rate 
equivalent to the capital gains inclusion rate. 
2502Stikeman, H.H. (2006), ‘Income Tax Act ... Annotated’, R. De Boo Publishers. 
2503Stikeman, H.H. (2006), ‘Income Tax Act ... Annotated’, R. De Boo Publishers. 
2504Subsection 7(8) of the ITA. 
2505Lee, J.Y. (2010), ‘Stock Option Plans and Other Equity-Based Incentives’, 2010 Tax Law for Lawyers, 30th 
May – 4th June 2010, Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP. 
2506The Canadian Federal Government Budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year was presented to the Canadian 
House of Commons by Finance Minister Jim Flaherty on the 4th March 2010. Subsections 7(8) to (15) of the 
ITA set out the rules allowing for the deferral of taxation under certain conditions on an employment benefit 
realised when an employee acquires shares underlying employee share options granted by a public 
corporation or a mutual fund trust. These deferral measures have been repealed pursuant to proposals 
announced in the Canadian Federal Government Budget of March 2010. The repeal of subsections 7(8) to 
(15) applies in respect of share options exercised after 4th March 2010. 
2507Lee, J.Y. (2010), ‘Stock Option Plans and Other Equity-Based Incentives’, 2010 Tax Law for Lawyers, 30th 
May – 4th June 2010, Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP. 
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artificial profits until the year in which he/she sells the shares that he/she acquired. In addition, the 
CRA post-March 2010 requires that the applicable company withhold the tax on such artificial 
profits.2508 According to Lee:  
 
‘The rationale given (by the CRA) for the repeal is that it will prevent situations in which an 
employee is unable to meet his or her tax obligations as a result of the decrease in the value of 
shares following the election to defer recognition of the employment benefit.’2509 
 
In Canada, companies treated as Canadian-controlled private corporations (‘CCPC’) are 
characterised as receiving tax advantages and one such benefit is that employees of such 
companies with share options do not pay capital gains tax when they exercise their shares. Such 
employees only pay capital gains tax when the shares are sold.  It is submitted that the repealing of 
section 7(8) of the ITA is a step backward for the Canadian private equity industry because share 
option exercises should not be taxed in the first instance until actual financial benefits are realised, 




The current Australian legislation on employee share option plans and employee share schemes 
came into effect in July 2009. In terms of these rules, gains are assessed as ordinary income and 
can be taxed prior to the gains being realised.2510 The Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited’s (‘AVCAL’) position is that employees of companies who receive benefits under 
employee share option plans and employee share schemes should only be taxed when a realisation 
event occurs, and this should only be on capital account.2511 Australian income tax is payable on 
assessable income, which falls under two broad categories, namely ordinary income2512 and 
statutory income. Statutory income is income that is not ordinary income and that a taxpayer will 
                                                 
2508Marcil, M.C. and Tassé, L. (2014), ‘Stock Options: Tax Treatment of Cash Payments in Lieu of Exercise’, 
Issue 1, 9th January 2014, Tax Intelligence Series, Couzin Taylor LLP in association with Ernst and Young 
LLP. 
2509Lee, J.Y. (2010), ‘Stock Option Plans and Other Equity-Based Incentives’, 2010 Tax Law for Lawyers, 30th 
May – 4th June 2010, Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP, at page 10. 
2510In Australia, the Corporations Act 2001 regulates the offer to and investment by investors, including 
employees in their employer bodies. The offer of securities and other financial products to investors, including 
to employees, is regulated under Ch 6D of the Corporations Act (for securities) and under Ch 7 (for other 
financial products). Unless a relevant exemption applies, the Corporations Act 2001 requires bodies 
establishing an employee share scheme to provide a prospectus or other disclosure document to employees 
and, in some instances, to obtain an Australian financial services (AFS) licence. The Act also prohibits certain 
other conduct in relation to offers under the scheme. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that investors 
have adequate information to make an informed investment decision. 
2511Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014, page 
10. 
2512In terms of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) section 6-5. 
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include in assessable income because of a specific rule in the Australian tax legislation.2513 For 
instance, a net capital gain is statutory income. 
 
The taxation of employee share option plans and employee share schemes are dealt with under the 
Australian income tax system by a special division within the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, 
namely Division 83A.2514 In terms of Section 83A-10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, an 
employee share scheme is defined as a scheme under which ‘employee share scheme’ is provided 
to employees including past or prospective employees of the company or a subsidiary in relation to 
an employee’s employment. The discounts in relation to such shares or options are included in 
assessable income under section 6-10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 which deals with 
statutory income.2515 If an amount can be both ordinary income and statutory income, the statutory 
provisions apply unless a contrary intention is found.2516 According to O’Connell, Division 83A of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 applies rather than the ordinary income provision, other than in 
the absence of such a contrary intention.2517 In terms of Division 83A of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1997, the default position is that shares or rights received in respect of the provision of services 
will be subject to tax on receipt.2518 Division 83A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 provides 
that discounts on shares and rights acquired under an employee share scheme are included in 
assessable income 2519 and the discount amount being the market value of the shares or options less 
any amount paid or to be paid to acquire them.2520  
 
There were two critical amendments to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 that adversely impact 
the ability of Australian companies to use employee share option plans and employee share 
schemes since 1st July 2009. The first was the removal of the ability of an employee to elect to pay 
tax upfront. The second was the deferral of tax until vesting rather than exercise of options or 
cessation of employment.2521 Prior to the 1st July 2009 amendments, employees could elect to be 
                                                 
2513Bernhard, S. (2010), ‘Employee Share Schemes: What you Need to Know about the New Tax Rules’, Allens 
Arthur Robinson, 6th May 2010. Available at www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/tax/paptaxmay10.pdf., accessed in 
June 2015. 
2514Inserted into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 by the Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Budget Measures 
No 2) Employee Share Schemes Act 2009. 
2515The term ‘discount’ is not defined in the legislation. Under the previous legislation it was defined as the 
difference between the market value of the share or right less any consideration paid or given by the taxpayer: 
section 139CC of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
2516Section 6-25(3) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
2517O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: Cross Border Issues Arising From 
Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership Project, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne, at page 10. 
2518O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: Cross Border Issues Arising From 
Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership Project, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne, at page 10. 
2519Section 83A-25 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
2520Explanatory Memorandum, note 9, para 1.102. 
2521Bernhard, S. (2010), ‘Employee Share Schemes: What you Need to Know about the New Tax Rules’, Allens 
Arthur Robinson, 6th May 2010. Available at www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/tax/paptaxmay10.pdf., accessed in 
June 2015. 
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taxed up front and any eventual realised gains were taxed under the capital gains tax.2522 In terms 
of the current legislative regime employees can no longer elect to pay tax up front and consequently 
tax would arise on vesting even though the gain was not realised at that point in time.2523 The up-
front taxation of employee share options means that employees will be taxed when they receive their 
share options from the applicable company.2524 The employee must therefore pay tax on the options, 
despite such shares not having been realised, even when employees resign or are made redundant. 
According to the AVCAL, this represents a significant impediment to companies offering share option 
plans and employee share schemes to employees because tax can be imposed prior to a realisation 
event, either at vesting or cessation of employment; and that the gain is assessed as ordinary income 
rather than a discount capital gain.2525 The employee is taxed on the imputed value of the option at 
the time of his/her departure instead of when the option is realised. For instance, an employee may 
have an option with an exercise price of $100 per share, but when they leave the company the share 
price drops to $50. The employee would still be taxed at the exercise price of $100 despite the share 
being worth only $50. Prior to 2009, employees could defer the tax on shares or rights for up to a 
period of ten years, however post-2009 legislation meant that tax must be paid immediately.2526 
 
AVCAL submitted two critical policy recommendations to the Australian Government in this 
regard.2527 Firstly, Australia should follow a US approach where the employee will only be taxed 
when a realisation event occurs.  
 
‘The exercise price is typically equal to the underlying market value of the ordinary shares so that 
the employee can share in growth in the value of the company from the date of grant. However, 
tax would arise on vesting even though the gain was not realised at that time. Taxing unrealised 
gains is prohibitive especially because the recipient of the benefit may never actually receive any 
benefit from the ESOP and ESS. The use of cessation of employment as a taxing point should 
also be removed, as this is a significant disincentive to accept options.’2528 
                                                 
2522Bernhard, S. (2010), ‘Employee Share Schemes: What you Need to Know about the New Tax Rules’, Allens 
Arthur Robinson, 6th May 2010. Available at www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/tax/paptaxmay10.pdf., accessed in 
June 2015. 
2523O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: Cross Border Issues Arising From 
Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership Project, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne, at page 10. 
2524O’Connell, A. (2010), ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: Cross Border Issues Arising From 
Employee Share Ownership Plans’, The Employee Share Ownership Project, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation and The Tax Group, The University of Melbourne, at page 10. 
2525Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Financial System Inquiry: 
Submission Two’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Report, April 2014, page 
10. 
2526See CCH Australia Staff, Cch. (2012), ‘Australian Master Tax Guide 2012’, CCH Australia Limited. 
2527Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Employee Share Schemes and 
Startups’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Submission to the Australian 
Government on Employee Share Schemes and Startups, February 2014. 
2528Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Employee Share Schemes and 
Startups’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Submission to the Australian 
Government on Employee Share Schemes and Startups, February 2014, at page 6. 




Secondly, when the employee realises a gain such as when they exercise their right to sell the shares 
and any gain should only be taxed as a capital gain.   
 
‘An option issued with a zero inherent value (i.e. the exercise price is equal to the underlying price 
of the share at the time of issue) under an employee share option plan should be deemed to have 
no taxable value. Tax on any gains would then be calculated on capital account and the taxing 
point would only arise when the options are sold or cancelled or if the options are exercised, when 
the shares are sold. This would align the tax treatment with the US, where upon making a statutory 
election under section 83(b) of Internal Revenue Code, the options are taxed on grant. However, 
the options are considered to have zero value if the exercise price equals the market value of the 
underlying share, determined in accordance with section 409A. Any further gains on such options 
are taxed on capital account on the date the property is transferred … It would also bring Australia 
into alignment with countries such as the US and the UK.’2529  
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) regard employee incentive 
schemes as a critical mechanism for companies to retain staff, and a means for employees to share 
in the success of a company.2530 
 
(e) South Africa 
 
In South Africa, an employee may be subject to income tax when they acquire shares from their 
employer or from an employee share purchase trust set up by the employer.2531 In this regard, any 
gain or loss on shares acquired is determined in accordance with special rules contained in sections 
8A, 8B and 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Section 8A applies specifically to shares or options 
acquired before 26th October 2004 and any revenue gain determined under section 8A will be 
included in an employee’s income.2532 Typically, such a gain will arise when the employee exercises 
an option to acquire shares from his/her employer and the price paid for the shares is less than the 
market price at the time of acquisition.2533 When an employer does not allow an employee to sell the 
                                                 
2529Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (2014), ‘Employee Share Schemes and 
Startups’, Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited Submission to the Australian 
Government on Employee Share Schemes and Startups, February 2014, at page 5. 
2530Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) (2013), ‘Consultation Paper 218: Employee 
Incentive Schemes’, Issued 14th November 2013 and is based on the Corporations Act 2001 at the date of 
issue. 
2531Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
2532Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See De Koker, 
A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, Butterworth Publishers, 
Durban. 
2533Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403.. 
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shares before a certain date, the employee can elect to delay the taxation of the gain until that date. 
Once an employee has been subject to income tax under section 8A on the shares acquired from 
the employer a further gain or loss may arise when the shares are disposed.2534 The capital or 
revenue nature of this further gain or loss is determined in the normal way; that is, shares held as 
capital assets will be subject to capital gains tax, while shares held as trading stock will be subject 
to income tax in full.2535 For capital gains tax purposes the base cost of the shares will be the market 
value that was taken into account in determining the section 8A gain.2536  
 
Section 8B of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 applies to qualifying broad-based employee share 
plans when at least eighty percent of the employees in the company are entitled to participate. In 
order for an employee to qualify, the market value of the shares given to him/her in the current and 
immediately preceding four years of assessment must not exceed R50 000.2537 If an employee holds 
a share acquired under such a plan for at least five years, the gain on disposal will be of a capital 
nature and subject to capital gains tax.2538 However, if an employee disposes of the share within five 
years, any gain will be taxed as income in the hands of such employee, and section 9C of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 which deems shares held for at least three years to be on capital account, will 
not apply. This serves as an encouragement for an employee to hold his/her shares for at least five 
years. The benefits of section 8B do not apply if an employee was a member of any other employee 
share incentive scheme at the time when he/she received the shares. In such a case the employee 
will be taxed under section 8C.2539 Section 8B is restricted to a specific type of scheme, coupled by 
a restrictive quantum of R50 000. Section 8C replaced section 8A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
and applies to shares and options acquired from an employer on or after 26th October 2004. A 
revenue gain or loss will arise when a share or option vests in the taxpayer/employee.2540 Vesting 
will usually happen when an employee acquires the share with no restrictions, or when all restrictions 
are lifted. If an employee is restricted from disposing of the share, the revenue gain or loss will be 
                                                 
2534Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See De Koker, 
A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, Butterworth Publishers, 
Durban. 
2535Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403.. 
2536Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403.. 
2537Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See Croome, 
B.J. (2010), ‘Taxpayers' Rights in South Africa’, Juta and Company. 
2538Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See Croome, 
B.J. and Olivier, L. (2010), ‘Tax Administration’, Juta and Company. 
2539Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See Haupt, P. 
(2014), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Third Edition, H and H Publications. 
2540Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
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determined at the time when the restriction is lifted.2541 This differs from section 8A in which the 
revenue gain was frozen at the time of acquisition of a share and on election deferred until the 
restriction ended.2542 Once an employee has been subject to income tax under section 8C on the 
shares acquired from his/her employer, a further gain or loss may arise when the employee disposes 
of such shares.2543  In the important judgment of Bosch and Another v CSARS, handed down on the 
20th November 2012 by the full bench of the Western Cape High Court.2544 In this case the court 
held: 
 
‘[95] Section 8 C provides that ‘a taxpayer must include... in his or her income for a year of 
assessment any gain... determined in terms of subsection (2) in respect of the vesting during that 
year of any equity instrument if that equity instrument was acquired by the taxpayer (i) by virtue 
of his or her employment.’ For s 8C to apply, the relevant scheme shares must have been 
acquired by the appellant within the meaning of s 8C and s 8 (2)(b) of the Act 32 of 2004 and; 
that is the relevant scheme shares must not have been acquired by way of the exercise of any 
right granted before 26 October 2004 and in respect of which s 8A applied. [96] On the evidence, 
the relevant scheme shares were acquired, by the exercise of rights which were granted to the 
appellant before 26 October 2004. Section 8A therefore applies pursuant to our analysis above 
and therefore s 8C is not applicable to this dispute.’2545 
 
The facts of the case were that the appellants were employees of the Foschini group of companies 
and participants in an employee share incentive scheme.2546 The effect of the scheme was that the 
provisions of section 8A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 were circumvented. The appellants were 
assessed by SARS for income tax in respect of shares received in respect of the scheme. The 
employees were granted options to purchase shares, which they had to exercise within twenty one 
days.2547 Once the option was exercised, delivery and payment in respect of the shares were delayed 
and would take place in three tranches, each two years apart. However, before delivery and 
payment, the employees could not vote on the shares, dispose of or encumber the shares and were 
not entitled to dividends.2548 Therefore, the risks and benefits did not pass to the employees until 
delivery and payment. The scheme provided that employees could sell their shares back to the 
                                                 
2541Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
2542Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
2543Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
2544Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC). 
2545Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC), at paragraphs 95-96. The 
main judgment was written by Davis J (Baartman J concurring) and a separate judgment was written by Waglay 
J. The matter was on appeal from the Tax Court. 
2546Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC). 
2547Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC), at paragraph 12. 
2548Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC), at paragraph 12. 
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employer if the share price fell below the price that was payable on delivery; and the employees had 
to sell their shares back to the employer for the same price payable on delivery if they terminated 
their service for any reason other than sequestration, death, superannuation or ill health. 2549 The 
court held that only gains arising within the twenty one day option period would be subject to section 
8A and be taxable as income in the hands of the employees, as opposed to the full gains over the 
longer periods until delivery and payment.2550 In short, Bosch and Another v CSARS dealt with the 
issue of simulated transactions.2551  The court accepted the view that parties are free to arrange their 
affairs so as to avoid the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.2552 Judge Davis stated that 
the mere existence of an avoidance motive or purpose, on its own, would not be sufficient to 
conclude that a transaction is simulated; and that the only question is whether the parties 
truly intended for their agreement to have the legal effect, as between them, subject to the terms of 
such an agreement.2553 
 
In South Africa, in terms of section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, a revenue gain or loss will 
arise when a share or option vests in the taxpayer. In addition, once the employee is subject to 
income tax under section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 on the shares acquired from the 
employer a further gain or loss may arise when the employee disposes of them.2554  The effect of 
section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is that if the option generates a gain, the taxpayer is 
required to include such gain in his income for the tax year in which the instrument vests in him. The 
gain is calculated by subtracting from the market value of the equity instrument at the time that it 
vests in the taxpayer the sum of any consideration paid by the taxpayer in respect of the equity 
instrument.2555 This means that the gain will be subject to income tax at the taxpayer's marginal 
income tax rate. If the equity instrument/option generates a loss, the taxpayer is required to deduct 
that loss from his income for the tax year in which the equity instrument vests in him.2556 The tax 
liability on the part of the taxpayer arises on the date that the equity instrument vests in the taxpayer. 
This enables the tax authorities to tax as much of the growth in the value of the equity instrument as 
                                                 
2549Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC), at paragraph 13. 
2550An argument raised by SARS was that the scheme was a simulated transaction and that there was no real 
unconditional sale at the time of exercise of the option, but that the parties actually intended that the sale be 
subject to the suspensive condition that the employees remain employed until the date of delivery and 
payment. SARS’s argument as to simulation was rejected. For this and other reasons the appeal was upheld. 
2551Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC). 
2552Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC). At paragraph 72, Judge 
Davis stated: ‘… while accepting the fundamental principle that a taxpayer is entitled to arrange his or her 
affairs as to remain outside of the provisions of the Act …’.  
2553Bosch and Another v CSARS (2012) ZAWCHC 188; (2013) 2 All SA 41 (WCC), at paragraphs 79-83. The 
main judgment was written by Judge Davis (Baartman J concurring). 
2554Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. See also Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) (2013), ‘Tax Administration 2013: Comparative 
Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Energy Economies’, OECD Publishing. 
2555Emslie, T. and Davis, D. (2012), ‘Income Tax Cases and Materials’, The Taxpayer. See also Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) (2013), ‘Tax Administration 2013: Comparative 
Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Energy Economies’, OECD Publishing. 
2556See Croome, B.J. (2010), ‘Taxpayers' Rights in South Africa’, Juta and Company. 
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possible.2557 After the equity instrument has vested in the taxpayer, any further growth in the value 
of the equity instrument may be subject to capital gains tax which is levied at a lower rate than income 
tax.2558 
 
Therefore the fundamental policy considerations with regard to share incentive schemes throughout 
the jurisdictions discussed above are to afford employees the opportunity to share in the growth of 
the applicable company and also afford the employer to recruit and retain employees. In 1997, the 
Katz Commission highlighted the benefits of employee share ownership plans. The Katz 
Commission referred to a report by the Employee Share Ownership Plans Association in the US, 
where it stated: 
 
‘The growth of employee ownership in recent decades has been a significant development in the 
areas of business competitiveness, employee compensation, corporate finance and business 
continuation. Though there are several forms of employee ownership, employee stock ownership 
plans, or ESOPs, have achieved the most widespread acceptance and support. The rapid and 
continuing growth in the number of ESOPs being established and the breadth of industries 
covered have important ramifications for employees, corporations and the economy as a whole 
...  The ESOP concept is based on the theories of capital ownership developed by Dr. Louis O. 
Kelso. Kelso reasoned that only through widespread capital ownership could modern economies 
provide for more equitable distribution of wealth. According to Kelso, the concentration of wealth 
in the U.S. economy results from the fact that capital-producing assets are owned by a small 
minority of individuals. In an economy in which capital is inexorably replacing labour as the means 
by which wealth is produced, Kelso emphasized the importance of providing the majority who do 
not presently own capital with a means of achieving substantial stock ownership. Only by sharing 
in the ownership of productive capital would workers be able to obtain through the market a 
second income to supplement the wages they earn through their labour. Since the average worker 
does not have the financial capability to buy that capital with his or her own earnings, Kelso 
conceived of the ESOP as a means of providing employees with access to capital credit. By giving 
employees a stake in corporate financial transactions, their capital ownership could be paid out 
of the future earnings produced by the corporation. Widespread application of the ESOP concept 
would thus promote broadened ownership of wealth through free-enterprise initiatives, rather than 
resorting to government redistribution through taxation. Promoted as a means of broadening the 
ownership of capital and improving the productivity of the American workforce, ESOPs have been 
at the forefront of a movement for employee ownership that is having profound effects on methods 
                                                 
2557Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See De Koker, 
A.P., Williams, R.C., Silke, J.M. and Silke, A.S. (2013), ‘Silke tax yearbook 2012-2013’, Butterworth Publishers, 
Durban. 
2558Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 
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of employee compensation, techniques of corporate finance and efforts to increase corporate 
America's performance and competitiveness.’2559 
 
To this end, the reasons advanced for the adoption of the employee share ownership plans concept 
in the US are applicable to prevailing socio-economic conditions in South Africa. The 2011 
introduction of section 10(1)(k)(i)(dd) into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is somewhat puzzling and 
seems to be counterintuitive to the fundamental policy considerations with regard to share incentive 
schemes in South Africa. Under the current South African tax regime, subject to certain exceptions, 
local dividends received and accrued to a South African tax residents are exempt from normal tax in 
terms of section 10(1)(k) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Section 10(1)(k)(i)(dd) of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 is an exception that applies to employee share schemes. Section 10(1)(k)(i)(dd) of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which was introduced from the 1st January 2011, states that a 
dividend will not be exempt from normal tax if such dividend is received or accrued in respect of a 
restricted equity instrument (as defined in section 8C) unless: 
 
‘A) the restricted equity instrument constitutes an equity share, other than an equity share that 
would have constituted a hybrid equity instrument as defined in section 8E(1) but for the 
three-year period requirement contemplated in that definition; 
B) the dividend constitutes an equity instrument as defined in that section; or 
C) the restricted equity instrument constitutes an interest in a trust and, where that trust holds 
shares, all of those shares constitute equity shares, other than equity shares that would have 
constituted hybrid equity instruments as defined in section 8E(l) but for the three-year period 
requirement contemplated in that definition.’ 
 
Prior to the above mentioned legislative enactment, an employee’s income tax liability would only 
incur (in the case of restricted equity instruments) when the underlying equity instrument increases 
in value over the period of the restriction.2560 However, the introduction of an additional income tax 
on dividends received during the restriction period implies that employees will pay income tax on the 
realised benefits of their investment, as well as income tax on the underlying gains on the investment 
itself.2561 This basically contradicts the purpose of employee incentive plans which is to retain 
employees by locking them in for a specific period of time by way of such restrictions. 
                                                 
2559South African Revenue Services (‘SARS’) (1997), ‘Third Interim Report of the Katz Commission into Tax 
Reform’, 7th March 1997, Pretoria, chapter 16 at sub-paragraph 16.1.2 to 16.1.3. Available at 
www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/commissions/katz16-17.html, accessed in June 2015. 
2560Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. See also 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) (2012), ‘Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Review: South Africa 2012, Combined: Phase 1 + Phase 
2, OECD Publishing, October 2012 (Reflecting the legal and regulatory framework as at June, 2012). 
2561Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 1, January 2017, paragraph 11, at pages 395-403. 






In general, South African policy makers should provide that taxes on share options are to be paid 
when shares are sold, instead of when the options vest or are exercised. In the US, share options 
are taxed at capital gains rates when the shares are sold if certain requirements are met.2562 No tax 
is due when they are exercised and therefore the issuer is not entitled to a tax deduction. Employee 
compensation is a significant expense for most companies and South African companies should find 
it easier to pay a portion of their employees' compensation in the form of shares, particularly as an 
incentive mechanism in the context of the private equity business model. Not only will this form of 
compensation reduce the amount of cash compensation, but it will also serve as an incentive for 
increased employee productivity and allow employees to use their best efforts to grow and expand 
the business.2563 Nonetheless, capital gains treatment of share options should become a key part of 
South African tax law and should be based on the principle of reward for those who take 
entrepreneurial risk and provide risk capital that will ultimately foster greater capital formation and 
economic growth.  
 
The employee share option tax framework in South Africa should be simplified and there should be 
no need for a special tax dispensation for employee share options. As a starting point policy makers 
should repeal the counterintuitive provisions introduced by section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962. Also section 10(1)(k)(i)(dd) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 which states that a dividend will 
not be exempt from normal tax if such dividend is received or accrued in respect of a restricted equity 
instrument (as defined in section 8C), should be repealed. Generally, any gain made by an employee 
in terms of an employee share scheme must be regarded as being of a capital nature. In addition, 
gains from employee share scheme should continue to be taxable in accordance with the current 
South African capital gains tax rules. South African policy makers should also consider the policy 
framework used in jurisdictions such as the US and UK as a starting point for what would constitute 
a workable employee share scheme tax framework for South African private companies. For 
instance, the earlier analysis of the UK's Enterprise Management Incentive (‘EMI’) scheme is a 
precedent of how a tax-advantaged share option scheme can be drafted to assist small to medium 
sized companies in attract and retain key employees.  
 
An obvious reason for the current legislative status quo is that SARS would be concerned about tax 
avoidance structuring where high-income taxpayers would be able to structure their remuneration 
                                                 
2562Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) 
(2013), ‘Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Energy 
Economies’, OECD Publishing. 
2563Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
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packages to reduce their tax liability out of proportion to what SARS would consider being fair. 
However, such avoidance or perceived ‘abuse’ would in all likelihood be restricted mainly to high 
income earners. The consequences of the recommendation put forward would be outweighed by the 
potential economic growth suggested above, which is intended to extend beyond high-income 
taxpayers. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, this thesis does acknowledge that the submission 
put forward could raise unintended tax policy concerns which are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The next paragraph 2.3 will discuss the taxation of carried interest in the US, Canada, Australia, UK 
and South Africa. The discussion to follow is aimed at analysing how the above mentioned 
jurisdictions have addressed the taxation of carried interest with regard to their respective private 
equity industries in a manner which could be beneficial to South African law. 
 
2.3 Taxation of Carried Interest  
(a) United States (‘US’) 
 
As mentioned above, a private equity fund located in the US will typically be structured as a limited 
partnership because of the lack of an entity-level tax on partnerships under US tax law. The limited 
partners will be the investors and general partner will be the manager of the fund. The carried interest 
is the share of profits that the fund manager receives from his/her ownership interest in the fund’s 
assets.2564 Carried interest is an important part of private equity investing and is received by the fund 
manager for negotiating, structuring and implementing the investments of the private equity fund. In 
addition, carried interest is intended to align the fund manager’s interests with those of the 
investors.2565  In terms of current US law, the investments made by a private equity fund in capital 
assets and the gains and losses realised by the private equity fund on the realisation of such capital 
assets are appropriately treated as capital gains and losses.2566 The fund manager’s carried interest 
in a private equity fund is taxed on a ‘pass-through’ basis, like any other equity interest in any other 
partnership. For tax purposes, the fund’s income, gains, losses, and deductions flow through to the 
partners in the fund, including the fund manager, with the same timing and character as recognised 
by the fund.2567 If the fund’s returns include ordinary income or loss, the carried interest is taxed as 
such; and to the extent that the fund’s returns are long-term capital gains or losses, the proportionate 
share of those items is allocated to the fund manager in connection with its carried interest.2568 
                                                 
2564Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 713-762. See also Rosenzweig, A.H. (2014), ‘Revisiting the 
Law of Moses' Rod: The Case of Inversions’, Tax Notes, 145(4), at pages 429-435. 
2565See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2566See Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. 
2567Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2568Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 




There is an ongoing debate in the US over the taxation of carried interest.2569 This debate pertains 
to the treatment of carried interest as capital gain for the managers of private equity funds.2570 Under 
current US tax law,2571 income resulting from carried interests is often taxed at capital gains rates 
(as broadly mentioned above).2572 However, in terms of legislative proposals in the US carried 
interest income would be taxed at the higher ordinary income tax rates.2573 In terms of the US Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, a service partner is not taxed on the receipt of a ‘profits interest’2574 in a 
partnership.2575 A profits interest in a partnership is the right to receive future profits in the partnership 
but does not generally include any right to receive money or other property upon the immediate 
liquidation of the partnership.2576 The tax-free receipt of a profits interest does not apply if the profits 
interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from partnership assets, 
such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high quality net lease, or in certain other limited 
circumstances.2577 On the other hand, a partnership capital interest received for services is generally 
includable in the partner's income upon receipt.2578 A partnership capital interest is generally an 
interest that would entitle the receiving partner to a share of the proceeds if the partnership's assets 
were sold at fair value and the proceeds were distributed in liquidation.2579 The character of 
partnership items2580 passes through to the partners as if the income items were realised directly by 
the partners.2581 Therefore, to the extent a service partner is allocated income, the character of the 
income passes through. In a typical US private equity structure, the private equity fund will recognise 
capital gain income on the disposition of its investment and, therefore, the service partner generally 
                                                 
2569Cochran, W.G. (2014), ‘Searching for Diamond in the Two-and-Twenty Rough: The Taxation of Carried 
Interests’, Stanford Law Review, 66, at 953. See also Field, H.M. (2014), ‘The Real Problem with Carried 
Interests’, Hastings Law Journal, 65(2). 
2570 See Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. See also 
Borden, B.T. (2014), ‘Notable Partnership Articles from 2013’, Tax Notes, 143, at 1513. 
2571Section 702 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
2572See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2573See Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. See also Field, H.M. 
(2012), ‘The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the Carried Interest Tax Proposals’, Florida Tax Review, 13(1), 
at pages 1-40. 
2574Namely carried interest. 
2575Revenue Procedure (‘Rev. Proc.’) 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; and Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 of 
section 702 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
2576Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. See also 
Burke, K.C. (2010), ‘Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform’, Columbia Journal of Tax Law, 1(1), at pages 
1-44. 
2577Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; and Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 of section 702 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. See Weisbach, D.A. (2008), ‘The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private 
Equity’, Virginia Law Review, at pages 715-764. 
2578See Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. See also Levin, J.S., Rocap, D.E. and Welke, W.R. 
(2010), ‘Carried Interest Legislative Proposals and Enterprise Value Tax’, Tax Notes, 1st November 2010. 
2579Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 of section 702 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
2580Either capital gains or ordinary income. 
2581See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. See also Levin, J.S., Rocap, D.E. and Welke, W.R. (2010), 
‘Carried Interest Legislative Proposals and Enterprise Value Tax’, Tax Notes, 1st November 2010. 
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receives capital gain treatment on its allocable share of that income resulting from the carried 
interest.2582 According to Rosenzweig: 
 
‘This debate has focused on whether private equity fund managers who earn a percentage of the 
returns generated by the fund should be entitled to preferential ‘capital gain’ treatment on such 
returns. The primary concern in this debate revolves around whether managers are effectively 
being compensated for services normally taxed at higher rates while receiving the benefit of 
preferential rates reserved for capital gains. Proponents of reform point to the services being 
performed by the managers, while proponents of the current system point to the investment 
exposure to the underlying assets of the fund. In reality, however, both sides are partially correct: 
carried interest is ‘blended’ in that it represents both a return to services and a return on capital. 
Since carried interest is blended in this manner, an analogy to either proves less than 
satisfying.’2583 
 
In the US during 2013, the Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives had 
solicited industry comments on various aspects of tax policy that the Committee and its Working 
Groups were considering as part of the tax reform in the US.2584 An important tax policy under 
consideration was the possible increase of the tax rate on carried interest. This consideration 
represents a possible major setback for the US private equity industry, because it was the substantial 
reduction of capital gains tax in the first place that was instrumental in increasing the flow of capital 
into the US private equity industry.2585 In a letter by the PEGCC to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives, the PEGCC set forth clear 
reasons opposing a proposal for increasing the current tax treatment of carried interest.2586 In the 
letter, the PEGCC argued that: 
 
‘A carried interest tax increase would nearly double taxes on businesses that facilitate investment 
and job growth in the United States. While some supporters of the tax increase claim it is only a 
                                                 
2582Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, The 
Journal of Finance, 69(5), pages 1851-1882. See Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private 
Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), pages 65-75. See Cory 
M. Vargo, C.M. (2012), ‘Carried Interest Taxation and Private (and Horizontal) Equity’, Tax Notes, 22nd October 
2012. 
2583Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 713-762. See also Rosenzweig, A.H. (2014), ‘Revisiting the 
Law of Moses' Rod: The Case of Inversions’, Tax Notes, 145(4), at pages 429-435. 
2584Available  at www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf, accessed in April  2015. 
2585See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. See also Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of 
Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. 
See also Field, H.M. (2014), ‘The Real Problem with Carried Interests’, Hastings Law Journal, 65(2). See also 
Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. See also Borden, 
B.T. (2014), ‘Notable Partnership Articles from 2013’, Tax Notes, 143, at 1513. 
2586Dated 15th April 2013. 
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tax on hedge fund managers, the proposed tax increase is squarely aimed at real estate, private 
equity, venture capital, and other businesses that make long-term investments that stimulate job 
creation and innovation. Tax rates on carried interest should remain fully aligned with the tax rates 
on all other similarly situated capital gains. Many countries with which the United States compete, 
tax carried interest as capital gains and often at lower rates than the United States. The carried 
interest tax increase also contains an enterprise value tax, which would deny long-term capital 
gains treatment on the value of an investment partnership business built over many years if the 
business is eventually sold in whole or in part. In short, under this proposal, investment 
partnerships would be the only form of business in America subject to this discriminatory 
treatment. While some proponents of the carried interest tax increase proposal have recognised 
that the enterprise value tax is problematic, none of the proposed fixes to date have adequately 
eliminated the enterprise value tax. The key criterion for capital gains treatment is whether the 
taxpayer has made an entrepreneurial investment of capital or labour in a long-lived asset, the 
return for which depends entirely on the growth in the value of the asset.’2587 
 
According to Postlewaite, the primary concern over the taxation of carried interest is that fund 
managers are being compensated for their services but are receiving the benefit of the preferential 
rates applied to long-term capital gains.2588 According to Rosenzweig, one way the law has attempted 
to address the issue was by imposing a ‘holding period’ requirement.2589 In terms of this approach, 
not all investments are created equal, but rather only capital investments held for an arbitrary period 
of time while bearing the risk of loss qualify for preferential rates.2590 Rosenzweig contends:  
 
‘It is precisely these rules that prevent managers of certain private funds, such as hedge funds, 
from obtaining the benefit of preferential capital gains tax rates for their carried interest in most 
instances. In other words, not all carried interests are created equal.’2591 
 
                                                 
2587Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, setting forth reasons opposing a 
proposal for increasing the current tax treatment of carried interest, 15th April 2013. Available  at 
www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2588Postlewaite, P.F. (2008), ‘Fifteen and Thirty Five-Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue 
Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise’, 
Northwestern University School of Law, Faculty Working Paper 170, 28, at pages 1-68. See also Postlewaite, 
P.F. (2009), ‘Taxation of Compensatory Profits Interests: The Blind Men and the Elephant’, Northwestern 
University Journal of International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 763-778. 
2589Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 713-762. See also Rosenzweig, A.H. (2014), ‘Revisiting the 
Law of Moses' Rod: The Case of Inversions’, Tax Notes, 145(4), at pages 429-435. 
2590Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 713-762. See also Rosenzweig, A.H. (2014), ‘Revisiting the 
Law of Moses' Rod: The Case of Inversions’, Tax Notes, 145(4), at pages 429-435. 
2591Rosenzweig, A.H. (2009), ‘Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 713-762. See also Rosenzweig, A.H. (2014), ‘Revisiting the 
Law of Moses' Rod: The Case of Inversions’, Tax Notes, 145(4), at pages 429-435. 
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According to Judge, the present US law tax treatment of carried interest is based on two established 
tax policies, namely that capital gains are designed to reward entrepreneurial risk-taking and 
secondly that partnership profits should be taxed on a pass-through basis.2592 Judge argues that 
disturbing either of these established tax principles would have a negative affect not only on private 
equity funds, but also adversely affect the treatment of other enterprises that involve carried interest 
or are dependent upon the personal efforts of the owners.2593 One of the principles why capital gains 
was historically reduced for long-term capital gains in the US is founded on the concept of 
entrepreneurial investment.2594 Judge contends that capital gains treatment is intended to encourage 
risk-taking investment by rewarding those who invest in capital assets and realise capital gains.2595 
According to Postlewaite, entrepreneurial investments are not limited to capital investments, but also 
extend to investments of labour.2596 The US tax system recognises that a taxpayer may be entitled 
to capital gains treatment with respect to the sale or exchange of property where the gains are 
attributable in whole or in part to the taxpayer’s own personal efforts.2597 The key criterion for capital 
gains treatment is not whether the gains are attributable to capital or to labour, but rather whether 
the taxpayer has made an investment of capital or labour in a long term asset, the return for which 
depends entirely on the value of the asset.2598  
 
                                                 
2592Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, setting forth reasons opposing a 
proposal for increasing the current tax treatment of carried interest, 15th April 2013. Available at  
http://www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2593Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, setting forth reasons opposing a 
proposal for increasing the current tax treatment of carried interest, 15th April 2013. Available at  
http://www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2594See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. See also Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of 
Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. 
See also Field, H.M. (2014), ‘The Real Problem with Carried Interests’, Hastings Law Journal, 65(2). See also 
Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. See also Borden, 
B.T. (2014), ‘Notable Partnership Articles from 2013’, Tax Notes, 143, at 1513. 
2595Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, 15th April 2013. Available  at 
http://www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-taxation/# 
sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2596Postlewaite, P.F. (2008), ‘Fifteen and Thirty Five-Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue 
Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise’, 
Northwestern University School of Law, Faculty Working Paper 170, 28, at pages 1-68. See also Postlewaite, 
P.F. (2009), ‘Taxation of Compensatory Profits Interests: The Blind Men and the Elephant’, Northwestern 
University Journal of International Law and Business, 29(3), at pages 763-778. 
2597Field, H.M. (2012), ‘The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the Carried Interest Tax Proposals’, Florida Tax 
Review, 13(1), at pages 1-40. 
2598See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. See also Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of 
Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. 
See also Cory M. Vargo, C.M. (2012), ‘Carried Interest Taxation and Private (and Horizontal) Equity’, Tax 
Notes, 22nd October 2012. 
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According to Judge, the same principles apply in the pooled investment context, where the partners 
join together to invest capital and labour.2599 The value of a private equity fund’s investments is 
enhanced by the skill of the fund manager in sourcing investment opportunities, structuring the 
finance and later exiting the investment at an enhanced value.2600 Furthermore, the private equity 
fund is entitled to capital gains treatment on the disposition of their underlying investments in 
recognition of the entrepreneurial risk they have taken by investing the capital and labour of their 
partners (both fund manager and investors).2601 Judge further states that: 
 
‘The core notion of partnership taxation is that partners receive a “distributive share” of income 
jointly derived from pooled labour and capital. The tax system has long recognised that parties in 
a venture may organize as a partnership, and arrange their equity interests to allocate the income, 
gains, losses, and deductions of the partnership among themselves as they see fit, so long as 
those allocations reflect the economics of the venture. By adopting a flexible system of pass-
through taxation for partnerships, the tax law respects the parties’ contractual arrangements, and 
enables joint ventures with complex equity structures to be conducted on a predictable tax basis. 
As a matter of long-standing tax principle, if the parties genuinely agree to share the profits of a 
venture in a particular way (whether those profits are operating income, dividends, capital gains, 
or interest), that agreement will be respected for tax purposes.’2602 
 
Nevertheless, in a private equity fund the fund manager’s carried interest represents its share of the 
gains and losses of the fund.2603 If the gains are from long-term capital assets, amounts received by 
the fund manager will be taxed at capital gains rates.2604 The tax treatment of income received under 
a carried interest on a pass-through basis based on the amount and character of a partnership’s 
gains and losses, albeit the fund manager or investor(s), properly reflects the underlying premise of 
the taxation of private equity fund arrangements.2605 Nonetheless, the US Congress decided there 
                                                 
2599Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, 15th April 2013. Available at 
www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-taxation/# 
sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2600See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2601See Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. 
2602Judge, S. (2013), ‘Letter by Private Equity Group Capital Council to Dave Camp, the Chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the US House of Representatives’, 15th April 2013. Available at  
http://www.pegcc.org/issues/comment-letters/pegcc-comment-letter-on-flow-through-pass-through-
taxation/#sthash.BQQlUci1.dpuf., accessed in April 2015. 
2603See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2604See Harris, R.S., Jenkinson, T. and Kaplan, S.N. (2014), ‘Private equity performance: What do we know?’, 
The Journal of Finance, 69(5), at pages 1851-1882. 
2605See Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. See also Field, H.M. (2014), ‘The Real Problem with 
Carried Interests’, Hastings Law Journal, 65(2). See also Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the 
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should be lower tax rates for capital gains for a variety of reasons, all of which ironically are applicable 
to private equity.2606  
 
(b) Canada  
 
As mentioned previously, the limited partnership is the predominant legal structure used in Canada 
as a vehicle for private equity funds.2607 Canadian limited partnerships are fiscally transparent in 
terms of the Canadian Income Tax Act (‘ITA’).2608 The ITA generally does not impose entity-level tax 
on a partnership, but it does require that the income or loss of the partnership initially be computed 
as if the partnership were a separate person and that the income or loss then be allocated to the 
partners.2609 In terms of section 96(1)(c) of the ITA the determination of the capital gains of a 
partnership is made as if the partnership were a separate person and under section 96(1)(f) of the 
ITA, any capital gains so determined are then allocated to the partners in accordance with their 
respective shares. In addition, section 96(1)(f) of the ITA ensures that the character of allocated 
income, which depends on the source of the income, is maintained in the hands of the partner.2610 
Accordingly, the question of whether the gain allocated to the partner is ordinary income or capital 
gains is determined at the partnership level so that a gain realised by the partnership is either all 
realised on capital account or all realised on income account.2611  
 
On the 29th November 2011, the Canadian Revenue Agency (‘CRA’) introduced an administrative 
policy with regard to the interpretation of section 96(1)(c) of the ITA, which stated that:  
 
‘the treatment of amounts allocated to a partner as on income account or capital account will turn 
on the particular circumstances of the partner rather than on whether the amount was or was not 
realised by the partnership on capital account.’2612 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the question on the taxation in Canada of carried interests earned by 
the private equity fund manager, the Directorate for the CRA stated:2613 
                                                 
Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. See also Borden, B.T. (2014), ‘Notable Partnership Articles from 
2013’, Tax Notes, 143, at 1513. 
2606Marples, D. (2014), ‘Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers’, Congressional Research 
Service, RS22689, 7th March 2014. Available at www.crs.gov, accessed in June 2015. 
2607As discussed in paragraph 3.5 of chapter two. 
2608Canadian Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, (5th Suppl), as amended. 
2609Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2610Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2611Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2612Canadian Interpretation Bulletin T.I. 2011-0424591M4 (2011), ‘Income Tax Act: Section 9 Capital vs Profit 
– Partnership Interests’, 29th November 2011. Available at http://taxinterpretations.com/?page_id=317 
&highlight=carried+interest., accessed in July 2014. 
2613Canadian Interpretation Bulletin T.I. 2011-0424591M4 (2011), ‘Income Tax Act: Section 9 Capital vs Profit 
– Partnership Interests’, 29th November 2011. Available at http://taxinterpretations.com/?page_id=317 
&highlight=carried+interest., accessed in July 2014. 




‘Carried interest is a term often used to describe an arrangement in which a manager of a financial 
partnership, such as a hedge fund, private equity fund, or venture capital fund, receives an equity 
participation in the fund in exchange for his or her services. Determining whether a gain or loss 
from such activities will be taxed as either an income gain or loss or as a capital gain or loss is 
ultimately a question of fact that can be determined only on a case-by-case basis.  Generally, the 
gains and losses of a taxpayer who is a trader or dealer or who carries on a business of trading 
in securities are taxed as an income gain or loss.  The factors considered in making such a 
determination are discussed in Interpretation Bulletin IT-479R.’2614 
 
In terms of Interpretation Bulletin IT-479R,2615 a taxpayer's gain or loss from the disposition of shares 
or a debt obligation such as a bond, debenture, bill, note or hypothec will be taxed as either an 
income gain or loss or as a capital gain or loss. The full amount of income gains is subject to tax 
while fifty percent of the amount of capital gains is subject to tax.2616 In terms of section 39(4) of the 
ITA, where a taxpayer has disposed of a Canadian security2617 such taxpayer may elect in the return 
of income for that year and any subsequent year to deem a disposition of a capital property to be 
either a capital gain or loss. The effect of such an election is that all Canadian security dispositions 
in the year of election and all subsequent years, must be given capital gain or loss treatment2618 and 
the election cannot be rescinded.2619 Section 39(4) of the ITA provides that the taxpayer may elect 
in the return of income for that year that: 
 
                                                 
2614See Canadian Interpretation Bulletin IT-479R (1984), ‘Income Tax Act: Transactions in Securities’, 29th 
February 1984.  Available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it479r/it479r-e.html., accessed in June 2015. 
2615Canadian Interpretation Bulletin IT-479R (1984), ‘Income Tax Act: Transactions in Securities’, 29th February 
1984.  Available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it479r/it479r-e.html., accessed in June 2015. 
2616Canadian Interpretation Bulletin IT-2013-0505111I7E (2013), ‘Income Tax Act: Mark-to-market property’, 
13th November 2013. Available at http://taxinterpretations.com/?p=24210&highlight=Interpretation+ 
Bulletin+IT-479R, accessed in June 2015. 
2617This term is defined in subsection 39(6) of the ITA as a security (other than a prescribed security) that is a 
share of the capital stock of a corporation resident in Canada, a unit of a mutual fund trust (applicable to 1979 
and subsequent taxation years) or a bond, debenture, bill, note, mortgage, hypothec or a similar obligation 
issued by a person resident in Canada. 
2618Pursuant to subsection 39(5) of the ITA, the election under subsection 39(4) does not apply to a 
disposition of a Canadian security by a taxpayer who, at the time the security is disposed of, is (a) a trader 
or dealer in securities, (b) a bank to which the Bank Act or the Quebec Savings Bank Act applies, (c) a 
corporation licensed or otherwise authorised under the laws of Canada or a province to carry on in Canada 
the business of offering to the public its services as trustee, (d) a credit union within the meaning assigned 
by subsection 137(6), (e) a non-resident, or, after November 12, 1981 (f) an insurance corporation, (g) a 
corporation whose principal business is the lending of money or the purchasing of debt obligations or a 
combination thereof, or any combination thereof. An election that have been made under subsection 39(4) 
does not apply to any securities disposed of during the time that subsection 39(5) applies to a taxpayer. If 
subsection 39(5) ceases to apply, a previous election under subsection 39(4) becomes re-applicable after 
that time. 
2619Canadian Interpretation Bulletin IT-479R (1984), ‘Income Tax Act: Transactions in Securities’, 29th February 
1984. Modified 6th September 2002. Available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/it479r/it479r-e.html., accessed in 
June 2015. 
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‘(a) every Canadian security owned by the taxpayer in that year or any subsequent year is 
deemed to be capital property owned in those years, and (b) every disposition of every Canadian 
security owned by the taxpayer in that and any subsequent year is deemed to be a disposition 
of a capital property.’ 
 
Where a taxpayer has not elected under subsection 39(4) of the ITA or does not qualify for the 
election, the taxpayer must determine whether the transaction in securities is on income account 
or capital account.2620 Therefore some security transactions are clearly on income account and for 
other security transactions it will be necessary to examine the facts of the specific case in order to 
determine whether a transaction is on income or capital account. The tests that the Canadian 
Courts have applied in making such a determination are those of ‘course of conduct’ and 
‘intention’.2621 In the Canadian case Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, the Supreme Court recognised 
that shares ‘constitutes something the purchase of which is, in itself, an investment’ and that the 
entering into of a transaction with the intention of disposing of shares at a profit as soon as there 
was a reasonable opportunity of doing so was not, by itself, sufficient to make that transaction an 
adventure in the nature of trade.2622  
 
In the Gardner case, the taxpayer which was a securities dealer, ceased in 1938 to comply with 
requirements of the investment dealers' association of which it was a member as a result of bank 
advances to it being too high relative to the value of securities held by it.2623 It accordingly transferred 
its physical equipment, records and goodwill to a new company in consideration for shares, and itself 
ceased to be a member of the investment dealers' association, but retained the securities and the 
bank debts, and traded those securities and other securities between 1938 and the end of the 
Second World War.2624 In finding that the taxpayer's gains were on income account, Judge Rand 
stated:  
 
‘Investments, in the sense urged, look primarily to the maintenance of an annual return in 
dividends or interest. Substitutions in the securities take place, but they are designed to further 
that primary purpose and are subsidiary to it. On the facts before us, there cannot, in my opinion, 
be any real doubt that there was no such dominant purpose here.’2625 
 
Respecting a submission that a purchase of the shares of a particular corporation was effected in 
1944 in order to obtain effective control of that corporation, thereby permitting the principal of the 
                                                 
2620Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2621See Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66. 
2622Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66. Section 248(1) of the ITA. 
2623Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66. 
2624Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66. 
2625Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66, at page 1016. 
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taxpayer to introduce his sons to industrial management, Judge Rand stated that a business could 
include:  
 
‘...a business of taking over, by means of stock control, run down industries, building them up, 
and disposing of them.’2626 
 
The general rule is that in share transactions if the whole course of conduct indicates that the 
taxpayer is disposing of shares in a way capable of producing gains and with that object in view, 
and that the transactions are of the same kind and carried on in the same way as those of a trader 
or dealer in securities then the proceeds of sale will normally be considered to be income from a 
business and, therefore, on income account.2627 Furthermore, subsection 248(1) of the ITA defines 
the term ‘business’ to include ‘an adventure or concern in the nature of trade’ and the courts have 
held that ‘an adventure or concern in the nature of trade’ can include an isolated transaction in 
shares where the ‘course of conduct’ and ‘intention’ clearly indicate it to be such.2628 
 
A taxpayer's intention to sell at a gain is not sufficient, by itself, to establish that the taxpayer was 
involved in an adventure or concern in the nature of trade.2629 According to Hogg et al, the latter 
intention is almost invariably present even when a true investment has been acquired if 
circumstances should arise that would make it financially more beneficial to sell the investment than 
to continue to hold it.2630 In the case of Imperial Stables (1981) Ltd v The Queen, the court held that 
something more is required in order for a purchase of shares to be on income account, for instance 
the length of time for which the shares were held, the trading volume and/or the background of the 
taxpayer.2631 Such factors together with other factors may assist in finding that the shares were 
                                                 
2626Gardner Securities Ltd v MNR, 54 DTC 1015, (1954) CTC 24, (1964) S.C.R. 66, at page 1016. 
2627See Edgar, T., Sandler, D., Cockfield, A.J. and Brooks, N. (2010), ‘Materials on Canadian Income Tax’, 
Carswell Publishers. 
2628Edgar, T., Sandler, D., Cockfield, A.J. and Brooks, N. (2010), ‘Materials on Canadian Income Tax’, Carswell 
Publishers. 
2629Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2630Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2631Imperial Stables (1981) Ltd v The Queen, 90 DTC 6135 (FCTD), affirmed 92 DTC 6189 (FCA). The 
taxpayer, which for convenience was referred to in the reasons for judgment by the name of its controlling 
individual shareholder (‘Culley), who had a history of making large stock market purchases of shares which 
were held for a very short period of time. The taxpayer purchased, primarily in the summer of 1981, over 
$1.2 million of Dome Petroleum shares, held those shares through a falling market and eventually liquidated 
its position commencing in June 1982 for a loss of over $900,000. Judge Martin had no doubt that ‘there was 
in Mr. Culley's mind at the time he acquired the Dome shares the possibility that he would sell them quickly if 
the price should rise to an acceptable level’, at page 6141 Judge Martin accepted the view of the Crown's 
expert witness that the Dome share transactions did not have the hallmarks of those of a trader or dealer in 
securities. ‘The trader or dealer is characterised by buy/sell, buy/sell and not by buy/buy/buy which is what 
Culley did’, at page 6140. When the market price of Dome shares declined, Culley averaged down rather than 
quickly cutting its losses. In addition, Culley had no specialized knowledge of the market, acquired the shares 
with its cash rather than borrowed funds, and made no special effort to study factors which would affect the 
price of the Dome shares. ‘The fact that there was no income from the shares by way of dividends is of no 
significance for no doubt Culley was expecting, when [it] eventually sold the shares, to sell them at a profit’, at 
page 6141. The court held that the loss sustained by Culley was a capital loss. 
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acquired on income account. Therefore the dispositions of shares are prima facie on capital 
account.2632 In the case Atwater Western Corp v MNR, two individuals with extensive experience in 
the purchase and sale of real estate incorporated the taxpayer to acquire a long-term lease of 
Montreal land with a view to constructing thereon a large multi-purpose building, and then had the 
taxpayer contribute the lease to a joint venture company (‘West End’), with the taxpayer 
also subscribing for 200 of the 1 000 shares of West End at $1 per share.2633 Four years later, the 
majority shareholder forced the taxpayer to sell its shares to such shareholder by threatening to abort 
the project if this were not done.2634 In finding that the gain was on capital account, Judge Jackett 
held:  
 
‘there may be circumstances in which a subscription for shares in a new company, while prima 
facie a capital transaction, may be a mere step in the carrying on by the acquirer of a profit-making 
business or venture.  If, for example, the acquirer made a business of taking over old businesses, 
giving them new images and corporate identities and then selling the shares in the new 
companies, a profit from the overall enterprise would be a profit from a business even though, 
looked at more narrowly, that profit were a profit from the sale of shares acquired by subscribing 
for the capital of a new company.  However, I find no such enterprise here.’2635 
 
According to Edgar et al, where the tests applied by the courts suggests an adventure or concern 
in the nature of trade and it can be established that the taxpayer's intention was to sell the property 
at the first opportunity, intention will be viewed as corroborative evidence.2636 However, the inability 
to establish an intention to sell does not exclude a transaction from being regarded as an adventure 
or concern in the nature of trade if it can otherwise be so regarded pursuant to one or more of the 
applied tests.2637 Therefore the general principles would be applied in determining whether flow-
through shares were acquired on capital account.  According to the CRA, the fact that there is a 
tax benefit to be derived from the purchase of such shares would not itself result in their being 
acquired as an adventure in the nature of trade.2638 In addition, the CRA stated: 
 
‘where a taxpayer is obligated to sell a particular property for a pre-determined sale price that is 
less than its original acquisition price such that it results in an "economic loss" (ignoring the value 
of any relevant tax attributes connected with the property) but results in a gain or profit for income 
                                                 
2632Hogg, P.W., Magee, J.E. and Li, J. (2013), ‘Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law’, Carswell Publishers. 
2633Atwater Western Corp v MNR, 70 DTC 6312, (1970) CTC 472 (Ex Ct). 
2634Atwater Western Corp v MNR, 70 DTC 6312, (1970) CTC 472 (Ex Ct). 
2635Atwater Western Corp v MNR, 70 DTC 6312, (1970) CTC 472 (Ex Ct), at page 6314. 
2636Edgar, T., Sandler, D., Cockfield, A.J. and Brooks, N. (2010), ‘Materials on Canadian Income Tax’, Carswell 
Publishers. 
2637Edgar, T., Sandler, D., Cockfield, A.J. and Brooks, N. (2010), ‘Materials on Canadian Income Tax’, Carswell 
Publishers. 
2638Canadian Interpretation Bulletin TI-2012-0438651E5 (2012), ‘Income Tax Act: Capital vs Income’, 20th 
March 2012. Available at http://peartreefinserv.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CRA-Technical-
Interpretation-Capital-vs-Income-Mar-2012.pdf., accessed in July 2014. 
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tax purposes as a result of the operation of the rules in the Act, the courts have held that such 
gain or profit cannot, absent the presence of other factors, result in income earned from an 
adventure in the nature of trade.’2639 
 
The taxation of the carried interest income or loss of the private equity firm (‘general partner’) will 
initially be computed as if the partnership were a separate person and that the income or loss then 
be allocated to the partners. Thus, the determination of the capital gains of the private equity firm’s 
carried interest2640 is made as if the private equity firm were a separate person. In addition, section 
96(1)(f) of the ITA ensures that the character of allocated income, which depends on the source of 
the income, is maintained in the hands of the private equity firm. As stated above, the dispositions 
of shares by a private equity fund structured as a limited liability partnership in terms of Canadian 
tax law are prima facie on capital account. The determination as to whether the private equity firm’s 
carried interest constitutes a gain or loss from such activities will be taxed as either an income gain 
or loss or as a capital gain or loss is ultimately a question of fact that can be determined only on a 




Prior to the 2010 Australian Reform,2641 profits on the disposal of assets that flow to the private equity 
firm via carried interest have generally been treated as capital gains, resulting in more favourable 
tax treatment than if they were treated as income.2642 However, this position previously depended 
on the specific facts and circumstances, including the holding period and the intention in relation to 
the assets.2643 The Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) confirmed its view in 2010 that profits on the 
disposal of assets by private equity funds can be income and not capital gains.2644 The pre-2010 
approach, adopted by the ATO was somewhat the same approach broadly applied in Canada.2645 
                                                 
2639Canadian Interpretation Bulletin TI-2012-0438651E5 (2012), ‘Income Tax Act: Capital vs Income’, 20th 
March 2012. Available at http://peartreefinserv.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CRA-Technical-
Interpretation-Capital-vs-Income-Mar-2012.pdf., accessed in July 2014. 
2640In terms of section 96(1)(c) of the ITA.  
2641Tax Laws Amendment Bill 2010, amended the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936.  The term ‘carried interest’ is defined in section 104–255 of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1997 to mean (a) the entitlement of a partner in a venture capital limited partnership or an Australian 
venture capital fund(s) to a distribution from partnership or fund, to the extent that the distribution is contingent 
upon the attainment of profits for the limited partners in the entity, or (b) the entitlement of a limited partner in 
a venture capital management partnership to a distribution from the venture capital management partnership, 
to the extent that the distribution is contingent upon the attainment of profits for the limited partners in certain 
specified venture capital entities in which the venture capital management partnership is a general partner.  
2642Income Tax Assessment Act, 1997.  
2643See Evans, C. and Kerr, J. (2012), ‘Tax Reform and 'Rough Justice’: Is it Time for Simplicity to Shine?’, 
In Australian Tax Forum, 27(2), at pages 385-408. See also Eccleston, R. (2013), ‘The Tax Reform Agenda in 
Australia’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72(2), at pages 103-113. 
2644Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011. 
2645See Eccleston, R. (2013), ‘The Tax Reform Agenda in Australia’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 72(2), at pages 103-113. See also Taylor, G. and Richardson, G. (2013), ‘The determinants of 
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The general principle was that it was up to the managers of private equity funds to assess for 
themselves whether carried interest payments should be taxed as income or capital gains. This was 
based on the principle that the profits from private equity are mostly derived from long term assets 
they are usually classed as capital gains, which is taxed at a lower tax rate than income.2646 However, 
currently in terms of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, the only circumstance in which carried 
interest payments can receive a capital gains tax concession is in the case of funds set up to satisfy 
all the requirements of the venture capital limited partnerships regime.2647 Generally speaking, in 
Australia carried interest is treated as ordinary business income of a private equity firm.2648 
 
The underlying question with which Australian policy makers were faced with was whether capital 
gains should include carried interest or should carried interest be taxed as ordinary income?2649 
Historically, the answer to this question was that capital gains interest should not be treated as 
regular income.2650 For instance, the interest accrued for capital gains should not be taxed as 
ordinary income because the cash is not always immediately available or sufficiently liquid enough 
to be accessible.2651 It would not make sense to tax someone for income in a year that was not 
available to them as cash in hand. On the other hand, there are those who do not believe capital 
gains should include carried interest. They regard carried interest as a loop hole that should be 
closed and the carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income.2652 For instance, like the 
proposed reforms to carried interest put forth in the US as discussed earlier under paragraph 2.3(a) 
of this chapter. It is clear now that in terms of the 2010 tax law amendments, the Australian tax 
regime has taken the radical approach in treating carried interest on revenue account.2653 Thus only 
in the case of venture capital limited partnership structures, will the private equity firm be allowed to 
treat the profit on a carried interest in the as capital and not trading income. This means that the 
                                                 
thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures: Evidence from Australian firms’, Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 22(1), at 12-25. 
2646Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, at 6-154. 
2647For instance the VCLP and ESVCLP discussed earlier under paragraph 2.1(c) of this chapter above. 
2648Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, pages 6-154. 
2649Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011. 
2650See Evans, C. and Kerr, J. (2012), ‘Tax Reform and 'Rough Justice’: Is it Time for Simplicity to Shine?’, 
In Australian Tax Forum, 27(2), at pages 385-408. 
2651See Eccleston, R. (2013), ‘The Tax Reform Agenda in Australia’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 72(2), at pages 103-113. 
2652Taylor, G. and Richardson, G. (2013), ‘The determinants of thinly capitalized tax avoidance structures: 
Evidence from Australian firms’, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 22(1), at 12-25. 
2653Tax Laws Amendment Bill 2010, amended the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936.  The term ‘carried interest’ is defined in section 104–255 of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1997 to mean (a) the entitlement of a partner in a venture capital limited partnership or an Australian 
venture capital fund(s) to a distribution from partnership or fund, to the extent that the distribution is contingent 
upon the attainment of profits for the limited partners in the entity, or (b) the entitlement of a limited partner in 
a venture capital management partnership to a distribution from the venture capital management partnership, 
to the extent that the distribution is contingent upon the attainment of profits for the limited partners in certain 
specified venture capital entities in which the venture capital management partnership is a general partner.  
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private equity firm may be eligible for the capital gains tax discount on the profit if it holds the interest 
as an individual for a period in excess of twelve months.2654 In any other circumstances and fund 
structures, carried interest would be treated as income.  
 
The rationale for exceptional treatment for venture capital limited partnerships regime fund managers 
(‘general partners’) is to attract capital and fund manager expertise to the small to medium size 
private equity market.2655 In addition, there is a need for consistency with overseas private equity 
regimes in order to make Australia’s small to medium size private equity market globally competitive. 
This was confirmed by the Australian Board of Taxation in its review of the VCLP regime, whereby 
it was stated that: 
 
‘Unlike managers in the passive funds management industry, venture capital managers are 
actively involved in the management of the companies in which the funds invest and typically 
share in the capital gains on investments made by the fund after all the investors committed 
capital has been returned. This is referred to as the carried interest and is designed to strongly 
align the interests of the fund manager and investors. To ensure the capital gain treatment of 
such gains flows through to the individual fund managers, if the general partner is a limited 
partnership, it will also be treated as a flow-through entity for tax purposes. … Taxing the 
carried interest of venture capital managers as capital is also consistent with the international 
tax treatment of these gains. An internationally consistent tax treatment is critical in attracting 
highly skilled international venture capital managers to Australia. Such managers will 
contribute to the expertise and competitiveness of Australia’s venture capital industry, which, 
in turn, will attract venture capital funds by offshore investors.’2656  
 
Nevertheless, the history and nature of the private equity business model is based on the private 
equity firm taking calculated investment risks on investments that will yield a desirable return to 
investors over the long term. Thus the primary reason for taxing capital gains at favourable rates is 
to encourage individuals to take risks with their accumulated capital, thereby growing the economy 
in the process through job creation and a lower cost of capital.2657 It is submitted that the tax increase 
effective after 2010 on carried interest from capital gains rates to ordinary income rates under Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997, was intended to increase Australian tax revenue under the disguise of a 
punitive attack on a specific sector of the Australian private equity industry. The amendments to the 
                                                 
2654Section 118-425 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
2655Financial Services Council (FSC) Submission Report (2011), ‘Commentary on the outcomes of the Review 
of the Tax Arrangements applying to Collective Investment Vehicles by the Board of Taxation, 1st March 2011. 
2656Australian Government: The Board of Taxation (2011), ‘Review of Taxation Arrangements under the 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Regime: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer’, The Board of Taxation, 
June 2011, at page 23. Available at www.taxboard.gov.au, accessed in May 2015. 
2657Laura, A., Johns, D., and Feros, P. (2012), ‘Fund Formation: Australia’, in Private Equity in 32 Jurisdictions 
Worldwide’, contributing editor Cogut. C., published by Getting the Deal Through, pages 6-154. 
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Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 discussed above do not take into account the risks undertaken 
by the private equity firm in managing a private equity fund and its underlying portfolio of investee 
interests and treats carried interest income as if it were the fund managers salary. It is also submitted 
that carried interest is not guaranteed salary income to the fund manager instead it is the fund 
managers share of the profit. Management fees charged by the fund manager for managing the 
private equity fund are already taxed as ordinary income. In addition, carried interest cannot be 
valued at the time it is granted since its payment is contingent upon the ultimate success of the 
underlying investment. Therefore, it is more in the nature of a long term risk investment that should 
treated as capital gains. Effectively, the Australian tax regime has eliminated the incentives for fund 
managers to undertake the risks inherent to the private equity business model and this could have 
a significant negative impact on the Australian private equity industry. For instance, it would stem 
the flow of investment capital into the Australian private equity market.  
 
(d) United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
 
In the UK, most carried interest is taxed as gains and not as income under the UK capital gains tax 
rules.2658 In 2003, HM Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) and the British Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (‘BVCA’) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’) which had the 
effect that most carried interest gains continued to be taxed as capital gains and not as income.2659 
In 2007, the capital-gains tax rules were reformed to the extent that it increased the rate on gains to 
the current eighteen percent.2660 The 2003 MOU is a crucial initiative to the UK private equity industry 
because  before the application of this MOU, the Finance Act of 1972 provided that gains on 
investments acquired by reason of rights or opportunities offered to individuals as directors or 
employees were, subject to various exceptions, taxed as income and not capital gains.2661 This may 
strictly have applied to the carried interests of most private equity executives despite them being 
partners and not employees of the applicable private equity fund, because they were often directors 
of the investee companies.2662 The first agreement between HMRC and the BVCA was in 1987 which 
essentially provided that in most circumstances gains on carried interest were not taxed as 
                                                 
2658Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (‘ITEPA 2003’) as amended by Finance Act 2003. 
2659HM Revenue and Customs (2003), ‘HMERSM30520-Restricted Securities: Memorandum of Understanding 
between the BVCA and HM Revenue and Customs on the income tax treatment of managers' equity 
investments in venture capital and private equity backed companies’, 25th July 2003. Available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ersmmanual/ersm30520.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2660For 2013-2014 the following Capital Gains Tax rates apply in the UK: 18 percent and 28 percent for 
individuals. See HM Revenue and Customs (2013), ‘HM Revenue and Customs: Capital Gains Tax: the 
basics’. Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/cgt/intro/basics.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2661See Prassl, J. (2015), ‘The Employment Impact of Private Equity Investors: A Return of the Barbarians?’, 
Industrial Law Journal, 44(1), at pages 150-157. See also Moore, C.B., Payne, G.T., Bell, R.G. and Davis, J.L. 
(2015), ‘Institutional Distance and Cross‐Border Venture Capital Investment Flows’, Journal of Small Business 
Management, 53(2), at 482-500. 
2662The 2003 MOU describes a typical private equity limited partnership fund structure and sets out guidelines 
agreed by the BVCA and HMRC on the application of the provisions introduced by Schedule 22, Finance Act 
2003, to a carried interest in a limited partnership fund structured in this way. 
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income.2663 Subsequently, the Finance Act of 2003 broadened the circumstances in which 
investment gains were treated as employment-related and therefore taxed as income. The 2003 
MOU states: 
 
‘Section 2 of the agreed BVCA Statement on limited partnerships used as venture capital 
investment funds dated 26 May 1987 (the ‘1987 Guidelines’), provides that individual partners 
involved in the management of such a limited partnership, whether as directors or employees 
of the general partner or anybody corporate providing services to the general partner or 
otherwise, and who receive full arm’s length remuneration for the services they perform as 
directors and employees, will not be considered to have acquired either their partnership 
interests or their interests in underlying investments of the partnership after they became 
partners by reason of rights conferred on them or opportunities offered to them as directors or 
employees for the purposes of section 79 of Finance Act 1972. This part of the 1987 Guidelines 
is of limited relevance following enactment of Finance Act 2003. This is because section 
421B(3) Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA 2003) deems securities to be 
employment-related if the right to acquire them is made available by the employer or a person 
connected with the employer. This memorandum therefore sets out what the parties believe to 
be the appropriate treatment that the Inland Revenue will apply in relation to ‘carried interests’ 
issued on or after 16 April 2003, under the provisions of Finance Act 2003.’2664 
 
In practice, favourable tax treatment can be achieved by ensuring that the carried interest falls within 
the terms of the above mentioned MOU. Namely, that the MOU will only apply to carried interest 
which falls within the terms and conditions of the MOU.2665 The benefits of structuring carried interest 
to fall within the MOU are for instance, (i) that there will be no UK employment tax on the acquisition 
of carried interest; (ii) that there will be no employment tax on carried interest returns or profits; and 
(iii) that carried interest returns derived from capital gains realised by the private equity fund will be 
taxed as capital gains in the hands of the private equity managers.2666 Structuring carried interest to 
                                                 
2663HM Revenue and Customs (1987), ‘CTM36580-Companies in Partnership: British Venture Capital 
Association statement and guidelines’, May 1987. Available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/ctm36580.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2664HM Revenue and Customs (2003), ‘HMERSM30520-Restricted Securities: Memorandum of Understanding 
between the BVCA and HM Revenue and Customs on the income tax treatment of managers' equity 
investments in venture capital and private equity backed companies’, 25th July 2003, at paragraph 1.2. 
Available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ersmmanual/ersm30520.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2665See Wetherly, P. and Otter, D. (2014), ‘The Business Environment: Themes and Issues in a Globalizing 
World’, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, at pages 113-142. See also McFall, J. and Walker, D. (2007), 
‘Private equity: oral and written evidence’, By Great Britain Parliament, House of Commons, Treasury 
Committee, 11th December 2007. 
2666See Snieska, V. and Venckuviene, V. (2015), ‘Venture Capital Impact on the Region’s Competitiveness’, 
Economics and Management, (14), at pages 961-967See Spangler, T. (2013), ‘One Step Ahead: Private 
Equity and Hedge Funds After the Global Financial Crisis’, Oneworld Publications. See also Spangler, T. 
(2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at chapter 6, 
paragraphs A-I. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 415 
 
fall within the MOU is subject to several key requirements, one of which is that the MOU requires the 
carried interest to take the form of a limited partnership interest in a ‘carry limited partner’ that feeds 
into a private equity fund which is itself a limited partnership.2667 For instance, in the UK carried 
interest is typically structured as a limited partnership interest in a feeder limited partnership. This is 
typically referred to as a carried interest limited partnership which is in itself a partner in the relevant 
private equity fund.2668 The private equity fund will generally take the form of an English limited 
partnership as discussed previously. The private equity managers normally pay a nominal 
consideration for their interest in a carried interest limited partnership which as a carried interest will 
deliver returns only if and when investor returns from the private equity fund have achieved the 
applicable hurdle rate.2669 In the case of UK fund managers employed by the private equity house, 
the acquisition of a partnership share in the carried interest limited partnership will be treated as 
remuneration from the manager’s employment.2670 The fund manager is therefore subject to 
employment income tax on the value of his a carried interest limited partnership interest to the extent 
that he does not pay full value for the interest.2671  
 
However, in practice favourable tax treatment can be achieved by ensuring that the carried interest 
falls within the terms of the 2003 MOU. While other carry and fund structures may be possible, they 
are likely to be more difficult to comply with all the requirements of the 2003 MOU. The fund must 
be regarded as a private equity partnership which implies that the underlying investment objective 
must to invest in unlisted companies.2672 Another impediment created by the MOU, is that the private 
equity fund managers must contribute their appropriate proportion of capital to acquire their carried 
interest.2673 For instance, if the profits of the private equity fund are to be split in terms of the typical 
80:20 profit split between the fund’s investors and the fund managers after the contracted hurdle 
                                                 
2667See Prassl, J. (2015), ‘The Employment Impact of Private Equity Investors: A Return of the Barbarians?’, 
Industrial Law Journal, 44(1), at pages 150-157. 
See Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, at 
chapter 6, paragraphs A-I. See also Spangler, T. (2012), ‘The Law of Private Investment Funds’, Second 
Edition, Oxford University Press, at chapter 6, paragraphs A-I. 
2668See Clarysse, B., Knockaert, M. and Wright, M. (2009), ‘Benchmarking UK Venture Capital to the US and 
Israel: What lessons can be learned?’, Report prepared for the British Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA). 
2669See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2670See Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An 
International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2671HM Revenue and Customs (2003), ‘HMERSM30520-Restricted Securities: Memorandum of Understanding 
between the BVCA and HM Revenue and Customs on the income tax treatment of managers' equity 
investments in venture capital and private equity backed companies’, 25th July 2003. Available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ersmmanual/ersm30520.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2672See Cumming, D.J. (2012), ‘The Oxford Handbook of Private Equity’, Oxford Handbooks in Finance Oxford 
Handbooks, Oxford University Press. See also Cornelius, P. (2011), ‘International Investments in Private 
Equity: Asset Allocation, Markets, and Industry Structure’, First Edition, Elsevier Publishing. See also McFall, 
J. and Walker, D. (2007), ‘Private equity: oral and written evidence’, By Great Britain Parliament, House of 
Commons, Treasury Committee, 11th December 2007. 
2673See Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, 
Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. See also McFall, J. and Walker, D. (2007), ‘Private equity: oral and 
written evidence’, By Great Britain Parliament, House of Commons, Treasury Committee, 11th December 2007. 
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rate has been attained, the MOU requires that the private equity fund managers contribute 20 
percent of the private equity fund’s investable capital. In practice, however, this will be a nominal 
amount on the basis that the majority of investor capital commitments to the private equity fund will 
be made by way of loan.2674 The private equity fund managers must receive their normal full arm’s 
length remuneration for their employment as managers by the private equity fund management 
company. The carried interest must be acquired on the establishment of the private equity fund and 
the carried interest must be structured as ‘whole fund’ carry and not on a deal by deal basis.2675 A 
further restriction created by the 2003 MOU is that MOU compliance must be attained before the 
carried interest is acquired and/or subsequently increased.2676 It will be impossible to achieve MOU 
compliance after the initial set up of the private equity fund in all cases. In addition, the MOU only 
applies to private equity funds and excludes property, infrastructure, hedge and other types of 
funds.2677 
 
The central debate at hand pertains to the taxation of carried interest as a profit-sharing scheme 
within the private equity business model. This profit-sharing scheme is a fundamental characteristic 
of the private equity business model and it allows the private equity firm to reward its managers. The 
fund managers determine a private equity fund’s investment strategy. On the other hand the fund’s 
investors provide the capital with limited control and liability. In addition, the managers invest only a 
small amount in the private fund themselves, however they get to keep a fifth of the overall profits 
above the hurdle rate. It is evident from the discussions of the three previous jurisdictions,2678 that 
there is a concerted shift away from the historical approach of taxing carried interest on capital 
account towards taxing carried interest on revenue account. For instance, if the legislative proposals 
in the US gets legislated into US law, carried interest income would be taxed at the higher ordinary 
income tax rates. However, current in US the private equity fund will recognise capital gain income 
                                                 
2674See Wetherly, P. and Otter, D. (2014), ‘The Business Environment: Themes and Issues in a Globalizing 
World’, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, at pages 113-142. See also Spangler, T. (2013), ‘One Step 
Ahead: Private Equity and Hedge Funds After the Global Financial Crisis’, Oneworld Publications. 
2675See Bishop, M. (2012), ‘The Future of Private Equity: Beyond the Mega Buyout’, First Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, at pages 1-235. See also Spangler, T. (2013), ‘One Step Ahead: Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
After the Global Financial Crisis’, Oneworld Publications. 
2676See Prassl, J. (2015), ‘The Employment Impact of Private Equity Investors: A Return of the Barbarians?’, 
Industrial Law Journal, 44(1), at pages 150-157. See also Moore, C.B., Payne, G.T., Bell, R.G. and Davis, J.L. 
(2015), ‘Institutional Distance and Cross‐Border Venture Capital Investment Flows’, Journal of Small Business 
Management, 53(2), at pages 482-500. See also Snieska, V. and Venckuviene, V. (2015), ‘Venture Capital 
Impact on the Region’s Competitiveness’, Economics and Management, (14), at pages 961-967. See also De 
Cock, C. and Nyberg, D. (2014), ‘The possibility of critique under a financialized capitalism: The case of private 
equity in the United Kingdom’, Organization, 21, 1350508414563526. See also McFall, J. and Walker, D. 
(2007), ‘Private equity: oral and written evidence’, By Great Britain Parliament, House of Commons, Treasury 
Committee, 11th December 2007. 
2677HM Revenue and Customs (2003), ‘HMERSM30520-Restricted Securities: Memorandum of Understanding 
between the BVCA and HM Revenue and Customs on the income tax treatment of managers' equity 
investments in venture capital and private equity backed companies’, 25th July 2003. Available at 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ersmmanual/ersm30520.htm., accessed in June 2015. 
2678Namely, the US, Canada and Australia. 
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on the disposition of its investment and, therefore, the fund manager generally receives capital gain 
treatment on its allocable share of that income resulting from the carried interest.2679   
 
It is submitted that the Canadian tax rules so far seem to follow the more measured approach as to 
the determination as to whether the fund manager’s carried interest should be taxed on capital or 
revenue account, which is ultimately a question of fact that can be determined only on a case-by-
case basis. The Australian Government on the other hand has legislated that carried interest should 
be taxed on revenue account with the exception being the venture capital limited partnership 
structures, the rules of which will allow carried interest to be treated on capital account.  In essence 
the UK tax regime also applies a similar approach to that of Australia. For instance, the UK Finance 
Act of 2003 has broadened the circumstances in which investment gains are treated as employment 
related and therefore taxed as income, provided the carried interest of a specific private equity fulfills 




(e) South Africa 
 
One of the key characteristics of the private equity business model discussed in chapter one is the 
remuneration of the private equity firm. Central to the latter is the private equity firm’s profit share, 
which is commonly referred to as the ‘carried interest’. This was extensively discussed throughout 
the first three chapters2680 and the preceding paragraphs2681 of this chapter. It is evident that the 
taxation of carried interest in the jurisdictions discussed above has historically been treated as capital 
gains. However there is a definitive shift towards a more measured approach whereby the capital 
versus revenue determination is either applied on a case by case basis or determined strictly in 
accordance with the applicable legislation.2682   
 
For South African tax policymakers carried interest arrangements raise two significant tax issues: 
the timing and the character of the income earned by the private equity firm. Both of those issues 
involve the same underlying question, which is whether a private equity firm’s carried interest should 
be treated as a quasi-investment in the private equity fund by the other investor participants, with 
the result that the carried interest would be subject to the same tax rules as apply to the other investor 
participants’ interests, or some form of contractual undertaking by the other investor participants (or 
                                                 
2679See paragraph 2.3(a) of this chapter above. 
2680Specifically paragraph 4.1.1 of chapter one. 
2681Specifically paragraphs 2.3(a) to (f) of chapter four. 
2682See earlier paragraph 2.1(e) of this chapter, more specifically ‘Capital Gains Tax’ section, in relation to 
possible policy concerns. 
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the private equity fund) to compensate the founding member for management services.2683 The first 
tax issue involves the timing of a private equity firm’s tax liability for the carried interest that it receives 
for managing the private equity fund. In terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 carried interest is 
not taxed at the time the right to the future profits is granted (for example, when the private equity 
fund is created) but rather when the private equity fund realises profits that are allocated to the 
private equity firm.2684 At one level, deferral is a specific example of a more pervasive phenomenon, 
which is the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962’s reliance on realisation events, the sale of an investment, 
for example to determine the timing of income from investments. Other investor participants in a 
private equity fund also enjoy the benefits of deferral because they do not pay tax on unrealised 
gains, but only on gains that have been recognised through a sale or similar event.2685  
 
However, deferral as applied to a private equity firm’s carried interest effectively assumes the 
resolution of the underlying technical and policy issue as to (a) whether the private equity firm’s 
carried interest should be treated as a simple investment by the private equity firm (albeit one that 
has no claim to the current capital of the fund but only to the future appreciation thereof), or (b) 
whether, at least to some degree, the carried interest is in substance a form of compensation paid 
by the other investor participants to the private equity firm for services in managing the private equity 
fund.2686 The second issue is the character of the income received as carried interest. Under the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, carried interest is treated in the same way as all other profits from the 
private equity fund for tax purposes.2687 In particular, carried interest flows through to the private 
equity firm on the basis of the nature of the income from the underlying investments. Thus, if the 
carried interest arises from realisations of capital gains on the investments held by the private equity 
fund, the private equity firm is taxed on the carried interest at the prevailing capital gains tax rate. In 
the paradigmatic private equity case, most profits arise from capital gains, so the profit allocated to 
the private equity firm’s carried interest will be taxed as capital gains.2688    
 
This means that carried interest in South Africa is typically derived in the form of a share of the gains 
from the disposal of shares by the private equity fund. Capital gains tax and taxes on the disposal of 
an asset are regulated in terms of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which 
primarily centre on the question South African courts would ascertain, namely whether the applicable 
                                                 
2683See Batchelder, L. (2008), ‘Business Taxation: What is carried interest and how should it be taxed?’, Tax 
Policy Center, updated 7th February 2013 by Rosenthal, S. Available at www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/key-elements/business/carried-interest.cfm., accessed in June 2015. 
2684Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Haupt, 
P. (2015), ‘Notes on South African Income Tax’, Thirty Fourth Edition, H and H Publications. 
2685See discussion under paragraphs 2.1(e) and 2.2(e) of this chapter above. 
2686Burke, K.C. (2010), ‘Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform’, Columbia Journal of Tax Law, 1(1), at 
pages 1-44.  
2687See discussion under paragraphs 2.1(e) and 2.2(e) of this chapter above. 
2688See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
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gains are of a revenue or capital nature.2689 In addition, if such gains qualified under the safe-harbour 
provisions of section 9C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and did not fall within the scope of the 
provisions of section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, would they generally be taxed at capital 
gains tax? At this point in the discussion, it is important to note that the latter question has been 
extensively discussed under paragraphs 2.1(e) and 2.2(e) of this chapter. There is uncertainty in 
South Africa regarding the tax treatment of the carried interest. For instance, some observers view 
carried interest as a mixture of compensation for management services and capital returns. These 
tax issues and those described under paragraphs 2.1(e) and 2.2(e) of this chapter, all have given 
rise to proposals to change the tax treatment of carried interest. The first draft of the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2007 contained the following statement: 
 
‘It has come to Government’s attention that a number of private equity deals involve 
management ‘carried interests’. These carried interests represent a form of services, which 
should be taxed at ordinary rates. However, these carried interests are often arranged so that 
they are instead taxable as a capital gain. One mechanism for disguising these interests may 
be through the use of shares. The proposed 3-year deemed capital rule may accordingly be 
adjusted at a later date to eliminate this potential for arbitrage. Any changes in this regard will 
be subject to further analysis.’ 
 
At the time of writing this section of this thesis, the above statement has not been incorporated into 
South African tax law. However, it is an indication that the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) 
will in future scrutinize carried interest payments. Policymakers considering such proposals may 
want to weigh the underlying substance of the tax issue at hand with various other considerations. 
For example, changes in tax policy that have significant and potentially unexpected effects on 
particular industries should generally be approached with caution, because a broader policy 
objective may be served by stability and an associated perception of fairness.2690 Furthermore, as 
noted above, carried interest arises not just within private equity funds; it is also a common feature 
of other sectors.2691 Many of the underlying tax issues that arise with regard to the taxation of carried 
interest in the financial services sector arise in those other sectors as well, and policy makers 
interested in changing the tax treatment of carried interest therefore need to evaluate the costs and 
                                                 
2689See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. 
2690See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Vargo, 
C.M. (2012), ‘Carried Interest Taxation and Private (and Horizontal) Equity’, Tax Notes, 22nd October 2012. 
See also Winchester, R. (2014), ‘Carried Interest for the Common Man’, Tax Notes, 142(11), at 1250. 
2691See Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., Van Zyl, L., Wilcocks, J.S. and De Swardt, R.D. (2017), ‘Silke: South 
African Income Tax’, LexisNexis, Volume 2, January 2017, paragraph 28, at pages 902-1023. See also Vargo, 
C.M. (2012), ‘Carried Interest Taxation and Private (and Horizontal) Equity’, Tax Notes, 22nd October 2012. 
See also Stoff, I. and Braun, R. (2014), ‘The Evolution of Private Equity Fund Terms Beyond 2 and 20’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 26(1), at pages 65-75. See also Cochran, W.G. (2014), ‘Searching for Diamond 
in the Two-and-Twenty Rough: The Taxation of Carried Interests’, Stanford Law Review, 66, at 953. 
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benefits of changing that treatment for all carried interest relative to restricting the change to the 
financial services industry.2692   
 
It is submitted that carried interest represents a performance-based compensation for services 
undertaken by the private equity firm. This is supported by two important themes. First, a private 
equity firm that manages a private equity fund undertakes a fundamentally different economic role 
from that of the other investor participants, because the private equity firm is responsible for 
managing the fund’s assets on a day-to-day basis.2693 Second, the carried interest is not principally 
based on a return to the private equity firm’s own financial assets being at risk. If the purpose of the 
preferential tax rate on capital gains in South Africa is to encourage investors to put financial capital 
at risk, there is little reason for that preference to be made available to the private equity firm, whose 




South African policymakers should consider the background of carried interest as the primary 
incentive for the fund management firm before they decide to adjust the 3-year deemed capital rule. 
As discussed above, carried interest does not simply represent a form of services, which should be 
taxed as ordinary income. Instead South African policymakers should maintain their current 
approach with regard to the taxation of carried interest and should be cautious when considering 
current legislative proposals being considered in the US, including the radical approach adopted in 
Australia (discussed above). On the other hand, the UK and Canada have followed a more measured 
approach, with Canada dealing with the capital versus revenue determination on a case by case 
basis, coupled with the prima facie position that carried interest is of a capital nature until established 
otherwise. In the UK, the taxation of carried interest is treated on capital account in terms of the UK 
Income Tax Act of 2003 as amended by the Finance Act of 2003.  
 
Carried interest in South Africa has traditionally and should continue to be treated as capital gains 
income taxed at favourable capital gains rates. However, any proposed amendment to the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 aimed at adjusting the current 3-year deemed capital rule and tax carried interest 
on income account would disproportionately impact the South African private equity industry 
because it forms a vital component of the local private equity industry’s business model. The latter 
may not in itself represent a strong enough reason not to implement the aforementioned legislative 
consideration, however then it should not be intended solely as a revenue-raising measure or as a 
                                                 
2692See Field, H.M. (2012), ‘The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the Carried Interest Tax Proposals’, Florida 
Tax Review, 13(1), at pages 1-40. See also Field, H.M. (2014), ‘The Real Problem with Carried Interests’, 
Hastings Law Journal, 65(2). See also Borden, B.T. (2014), ‘Notable Partnership Articles from 2013’, Tax 
Notes, 143, at 1513. 
2693Basically by virtue of its expertise, contacts, experience and talent. 
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punitive attack on the private equity industry alone. Adjusting the current 3-year deemed capital rule, 
ignores the negative impact it would have on the South African private equity market and could 
potentially slow the flow of investment capital to the local private equity market. Any such legislative 
change to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 should only be undertaken in the context of overall 
comprehensive reform of the South African tax rules, where the total impact of the changes on the 
private equity market can be balanced. It is submitted: 
 
(i) Firstly, carried interest is not a guaranteed salary income to the private equity firm. The 
private equity firm’s management fees for services received by the private equity firm are 
already taxed as ordinary income. In addition, it is virtually impossible to quantify a private 
equity firms carried interest monetary value at the time it is granted because the payment 
thereof is dependent on the final performance of the applicable private equity fund.  This 
makes carried interest in the nature of a long term investment that should treated as capital 
gains. 
(ii) Secondly, the private equity firm’s carried interest is received in return for the risks taken by 
fund management firm in managing the private equity fund and its underlying portfolio 
investments. The private equity firm is responsible for all the affairs of the private equity fund 
on a day to day basis. 
(iii) Thirdly, taxing carried interest on the higher revenue account basis will increase tax on 
carried interest which would undermine the socio-economic objectives of the South African 
Government. For instance, it would undermine the entrepreneurial activity in the small to 
medium size private equity market and in those areas of the South African economy where 
high risk investing is most required. Therefore, the appetite by private equity firms to 
undertake higher risk private equity investments would be reduced by higher taxes on the 
ultimate return, which would mean that job-creating investments will not be undertaken or at 
least significantly reduced. 
(iv) Fourthly, taxing carried interest on the higher revenue account basis will negatively impact 
the flow of capital to the private equity industry because private equity firms could demand 
different forms of compensation structures before they undertake the risk of managing a 
private equity fund. This could make the local private equity market unattractive to potential 
investors.  
(v) Fifthly, if the 3-year deemed rule discussed above is adjusted then the tax increase based 
on revenue account will apply to any legal structure that has a carried interest component in 
terms of South African law. 
 
Nevertheless, whether a private equity firms’ carried interest should be taxed at a higher or lower 
rate, is not a matter of substantial critical analysis in this thesis, other than to submit that it should 
continued to be taxed at the lower capital gains tax rates. To this end, changing the way private 
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equity firms, bewind trusts and en commandite partnerships in general are taxed is a policy 
consideration that should only be undertaken after careful consideration of the real and potential 
consequences. 
 
3. Private Equity Exit Alternatives 
 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter will critically analyse how the lack of exit alternatives in South 
Africa is an impediment to the growth of the local private equity industry. The objective of a private 
equity fund is to realise the return on its investment in each underlying portfolio investee company 
after a period of time once the initial transaction was concluded. The private equity fund achieves 
this objective by exiting the underlying portfolio investee companies and this process is an integral 
part of the private equity business model.2694 In addition, the ultimate success of a private equity fund 
is reflected by the number of successful exits it has achieved, which in turn has a direct impact on 
the ability of such a private equity firm to attract investors and raise more funds.2695 Therefore, the 
various potential exit routes in a private equity market also directly impacts on an investor(s) decision 
as to whether or not it will commit to invest in a particular private equity fund.2696 Although fund raising 
and investment activity in South Africa seems reasonably consistent, exiting alternatives remain a 
challenge for the local industry.2697 In order for a private equity market to flourish, private equity firms 
must have clear exit strategy alternatives that enable them to realise the gains on their investments. 
According to the South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (‘SAVCA’), stock 
market listings and trade sales are the main exit strategies in South Africa. Thus, perhaps the most 
challenging aspect of private equity investing in South Africa has been the difficulty of exit.2698 
 
In broad terms, there are four methods used by private equity funds to exit from their underlying 
portfolio investee companies, namely trade sales, stock market listings, recapitalisation and 
secondary buyouts.2699 According to Lerner et al, these represent the most widely used exits routes 
                                                 
2694Cumming, D.J. (2010), ‘Private Equity: Fund Types, Risks and Returns, and Regulation’, Kolb Series in 
Finance, Essential Perspectives, John Wiley and Sons. 
2695Lerner, J., Hardymon, F. and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. 
2696See Broere, M. (2013), ‘Decision-Making in Private Equity Firms: An Empirical Study of Determinants and 
Rules’, Springer Science and Business Media, at pages 113-150. See also Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. 
(2007), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity Markets’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 31, pages 3218-3250. 
2697KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. 
2698KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013, at page 2. 
2699Most of the leading authors in the field suggest that these four methods are the main methods of exiting. 
Lerner, J., Hardymon, F. and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Contracting: An International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. See also Gilson, R.J., and Milhaupt, 
C.J. and (2004), ‘Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance’, Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 251; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 282. 
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in the US, Canada, Australia and the UK.2700 At this point it is important to note that it is not the 
purpose of this discussion to provide a detailed analysis of the various exit alternatives in each of 
the above mentioned jurisdictions. Instead, this discussion has commenced by stating why the 
availability of exit routes is important and the lack thereof represents an impediment to the growth of 
a country’s private equity market. The discussion on exiting will comprise of a general description of 
the most widely used exits routes mentioned above and secondly, the state of exiting in the South 





3.1 Exiting Defined 
 
A critical characteristic of the private equity business model is the pre-determined, fixed life period 
of a private equity fund. In addition, private equity investments are by their very nature illiquid 
investments that cannot be sold as readily, say for instance, as listed shares trading on a stock 
exchange. This, coupled with the limited investment period highlights the crucial nature of private 
equity exiting, which involves the private equity firm ensuring the ultimate redemption of the 
investor’s capital and investment returns.2701  The pre-determined, fixed life period of a private equity 
fund basically requires that the investment relationship of the parties thereto, namely between the 
private equity firm, the investors and the underlying investee companies has to be terminated after 
a period of time.2702 This creates the situation that the private equity firm and its investors are 
contractually ‘forced’ to exit from the underlying portfolio investee companies. Gompers and Lerner 
defines exiting as the disinvestment process whereby the private equity fund sells its stake in an 
underlying portfolio investee company in full or in part, aiming to reduce the fund’s exposure.2703 
 
Stock Market Listing 
 
A stock market listing and initial public offering (‘IPO’) which is interchangeable used, refers to the 
method whereby a company’s shares are listed on a stock exchange and where the investor will be 
able to sell its shares to the public.2704 This is one of the most common forms of exit used by private 
                                                 
2700See Meyer, T. (2014), ‘Private Equity Unchained: Strategy Insights for the Institutional Investor’, First 
Edition, MacMillan Publishers Ltd, at pages 149-160 and 259-270. See also Lerner, J., Hardymon, F. and 
Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons. 
2701Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International 
Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. See also Popov, A. (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Industry Structure: 
Evidence from Local US Markets’, Review of Finance, 18(3), at pages 1059-1096. 
2702See Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, 
Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2703Gompers, P.A. and Lerner, J. (1999), ‘The Venture Capital Cycle’, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
2704A financial instrument that is traded through an exchange such as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
When a private company decides to go public and issue shares, it will need to choose an exchange on which 
to be listed. To do so, it must be able meet that exchange's listing requirements. Listing requirements vary by 
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equity firms. According to Lerner et al, studies of the US market suggest that the most profitable 
private equity investments have, on average, been exited by way of stock market listing.2705 Private 
equity investors in South Africa cannot rely on these offerings, and even in a bull market where large 
capital inflows are occurring on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘JSE’), institutional funds are 
usually concentrated in a few of the largest corporations.2706 Smaller and new firms typically do not 
attract significant institutional holdings, and have much less liquidity. By contrast, the fortunes of 
private equity investors in the US and UK have been largely linked to those of the market for stock 
market listing and there has been a strong link between the health of the market for stock market 
listing and the ability of private equity funds to raise more capital.2707 
 
Despite a stock market listing being an attractive exit route, it still has noticeable disadvantages 
compared to other common forms of exit routes. For instance, the complexities of the financial 
markets and the high costs of stock market listings, coupled with it being a lengthy process puts it at 
a distinct disadvantage to the other common forms of exiting. According to Lerner et al,2708 the public 
offering of shares in itself does not mean an exit. The private equity fund will only be able to exit its 
investment when its shares are eventually sold on the stock market, which in practice does not 
happen at the time of the listing. According to Caselli, the investors who have undertaken a listing 
as an exit will be exposed to the stock market risk factors and its fluctuations for a period of time 
after the listing.2709 Nonetheless, compared to the other exit options, a stock market listing provides 
a company with a fresh injection of capital via its new shareholders and also provides shareholders 




                                                 
exchange. Exchanges have listing requirements to ensure that only high quality securities are traded on them 
and to uphold the exchange's reputation among investors. Available at 
www.investopedia.com/terms/l/listedsecurity.asp., accessed in June 2015. 
2705Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private 
Equity: History, Governance, and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2706KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014. See also Leeds, 
R. (2015), ‘Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets: Opportunities for Value Creation’, First Edition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, at page 43. 
2707Povaly, S. (2007), ‘Private Equity Exits: Divestment Process Management for Leveraged Buyouts’, Springer 
Science and Business Media Publishers, at pages 36-41. See also Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private 
Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2708Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO 
and Turn-Around Capital’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2709Caselli, S. (2009), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe: Markets, Techniques, and Deals’, Elsevier 
Publishing, at pages 41-66. See also Gaughan, P.A. (2015), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate 
Restructurings’, Sixth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 349-370. 
2710Stowell, D.P. (2012), ‘Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity’, Second Edition, Academic 
Press. 
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The trade sale is another widely used exit route which involves the private equity fund selling its 
shares in an underlying portfolio investee company to a third party trade buyer, which is often a 
company operating in the same industry as the investee company.2711 This method entails a 
complete and an immediate exit of the investment by the private equity fund from the underlying 
portfolio investee company. Compared to a stock market listing, a trade sale’s negotiations are 
subject to less regulatory restrictions and occur with a single buyer allowing for a more efficient exit 
process. In addition, the private equity firm can exercise greater control over the negotiations and in 
certain instances might even obtain a better price for the investee company’s shares compared to 
the other exit alternatives.2712 However, the investee company’s management could be unsupportive 
to a trade sale because it could for instance imply a change in management control. In addition, a 
trade sale may result in a business risk to the investee company because the potential buyer would 
in all likelihood gain access to valuable confidential business information during the negotiation 
stage, albeit subject to the typical non-disclosure agreements.2713 According to SAVCA, the sale of 
a portfolio company to a third party industry peer is the most common exit route for the South African 
private equity industry.2714 According to Demaria, a trade sale represents a complete exit which is 




According to Povaly, a secondary buyout occurs when a private equity fund sells its interest in an 
underlying portfolio investee company to another private equity fund.2716 The secondary buyout 
method is typically used by the management of the underlying investee company when they want to 
replace the private equity fund backing the investee company with another private equity fund.2717 
The secondary buyout method is attractive to the private equity fund exiting the investment because 
                                                 
2711Povaly, S. (2007), ‘Private Equity Exits: Divestment Process Management for Leveraged Buyouts’, Springer 
Science and Business Media Publishers. See also Gaughan, P.A. (2015), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
Corporate Restructurings’, Sixth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 349-370. 
2712Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, 
Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. See also Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. 
(2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2713Demaria, C (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO & Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley & Sons. 
2714KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. See also KPMG 
and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2014), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry 
Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014. See also Leeds, R. 
(2015), ‘Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets: Opportunities for Value Creation’, First Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, at pages 1-245. 
2715Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley and Sons. See also Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: 
History, Governance, and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2716Povaly, S. (2007), ‘Private Equity Exits: Divestment Process Management for Leveraged Buyouts’, Springer 
Science and Business Media Publishers. See also Gaughan, P.A. (2015), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
Corporate Restructurings’, Sixth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 349-370. 
2717Povaly, S. (2007), ‘Private Equity Exits: Divestment Process Management for Leveraged Buyouts’, Springer 
Science and Business Media Publishers. See also Gaughan, P.A. (2015), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
Corporate Restructurings’, Sixth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 349-370. 
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it involves a complete and immediate exit. In addition, the entire exit process can be implemented 
relatively quicker than a trade sale and a stock market listing.2718   
 
According to Achleitner  et al, secondary buyouts can also reduce the investment period with which 
a private equity fund holds an underlying portfolio investee interest.2719 For instance, the private 
equity fund that made the initial investment into an investee company may no longer be willing to 
invest further cash into the investee company despite the investee company not being ready for a 
trade sale or stock market listing. Therefore, the sale of the investee company by the initial private 
equity fund to another private equity fund, that sees the further investment potential of the investee 
company, is the logical exit.2720 This in itself has become important for private equity firms which has 




According to Yong, a leveraged recapitalisation represents a partial exit route for a private equity 
firm in that the private equity fund is able to realise a portion of its initial investment from an underlying 
portfolio investee company without having to completely exit from the investee company.2722 This is 
done by leveraging the company, for instance by substituting part of the investee company’s equity 
with additional debt.2723 In practice, the investee company will raise money by borrowing from a bank, 
which amount is then used to repurchase the company’s own shares from the investor. According to 
Yong, a leveraged recapitalisation is not a true form of exit, as it does not reduce a private equity 
fund’s interest in an investee company.2724 Partial exits through leveraged recapitalisations are used 
in most jurisdictions including the US, UK, Australia, South Africa and Canada where the main 
methods of exiting are either not available or not attractive enough at the time in the respective 
private equity markets. For instance, in the US, UK and Canadian private equity markets, leveraged 
recapitalisations often provide the sole source of liquidity and return of capital for private equity funds 
because the climate for stock market listings were either not favourable or strategic buyers for trade 
                                                 
2718Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, John 
Wiley and Sons. See also Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Contracting: An International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2719Achleitner, A.K. and Figge, C. (2014), ‘Private Equity Lemons? Evidence on Value Creation in Secondary 
Buyouts’, European Financial Management, 20(2), at pages 406-433.  
2720Achleitner, A.K. and Figge, C. (2014), ‘Private Equity Lemons? Evidence on Value Creation in Secondary 
Buyouts’, European Financial Management, 20(2), at pages 406-433.  
2721Achleitner, A.K. and Figge, C. (2014), ‘Private Equity Lemons? Evidence on Value Creation in Secondary 
Buyouts’, European Financial Management, 20(2), at pages 406-433.  
2722Yong, K.P. (2012), ‘Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities’, John Wiley and Sons. See also 
Caselli, S., Ippolito, F. and Garcia-Appendini, E. (2013), ‘Contracts and Returns in Private Equity Investments’, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(2), at pages 31-38. 
2723See Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, 
Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. See also Cumming, D.J., and Johan, S.A. (2013), ‘Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Contracting: An International Perspective’, Second Edition, Elsevier Inc. 
2724Yong, K.P. (2012), ‘Private Equity in China: Challenges and Opportunities’, John Wiley and Sons. See also 
Caselli, S., Ippolito, F. and Garcia-Appendini, E. (2013), ‘Contracts and Returns in Private Equity Investments’, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(2), at pages 31-38. 
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sales were not available or secondary buyouts were just not available.2725 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that despite the latter a leveraged recapitalisation is not a true form of exit for the purpose 
of this discussion because it does not reduce a private equity fund’s interest in an investee company. 
Instead it is nothing more than financial engineering aimed at creating liquidity for private equity 
investors.  
 
3.2 Exiting in South Africa 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, South Africa’s capital markets are generally characterised by a lack of 
liquidity, especially for private equity investments.2726 This lack of liquidity negatively impacts the 
private equity industry because a private equity firm’s success is gauged by the number of successful 
exits it has achieved.2727 For example, the more favourable the environment for stock market listing 
is as an exit route for private equity investments, the more favourable the environment is for private 
equity firms to raise more capital.2728 In addition, it has a direct impact on the ability of such a private 
equity firm to raise more funds.2729 For example, studies of the US market suggest that the most 
profitable private equity investments have, on average, been exited by way of stock market listing.2730 
Nevertheless, while trade sales and secondary buyouts are important exit methods available to the 
South African market, it is submitted that the stock market listing method remains critical to the long 
term success of the local private equity industry. As Lerner states: 
 
‘…the types of environments where private equity funds have thrived in the US are quite similar 
to developing nations: the investors have specialized in financing illiquid, difficult-to-value firms 
in environments with substantial uncertainty and information asymmetries. In short, it would 
not be surprising if the private equity industry in developing nations slowly matures, with the 
investment cycle becoming increasingly similar to that of developed nations…’2731 
 
                                                 
2725Stowell, D.P. (2012), ‘Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity’, Academic Press. 
2726See Leeds, R. (2015), ‘Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets: Opportunities for Value Creation’, 
First Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, at pages 1-245. 
2727See Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, 
and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
2728See Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, 
Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. See also See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture 
Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons. 
2729See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 
Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons.  
2730Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons.  
2731Lerner, J. (1999), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, John Wiley and Sons, at page 257. 
Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, Fifth 
Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO 
and Turn-Around Capital’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. 
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The 2011 SAVCA report on exit data for the 2010 calendar year indicates that funds returned to 
investors2732 increased by R15.3 billion from R2 billion during 2009 to R17.3 billion during 2010.2733 
According to the report there were no stock market listings during 2009 and 2010 as an exit 
mechanism by private equity funds.2734 Earlier SAVCA reports highlighted the above trend of the lack 
of liquidity for exiting in the South African private equity market. In fact, there were only twenty-nine 
liquidity events for private equity investments in South Africa in 2000 and twenty-one in 1999, and of 
these, only two were through stock market listings.2735 The value of disposal proceeds increased 
from R3.1 billion in 2012 to R5.4 billion during 2013.2736 The 2014 SAVCA report on exit data for the 
2013 calendar year indicates that secondary buyouts, namely a sale to another private equity firm 
was the most popular exit route.2737 The 2013 SAVCA report on exit data for the 2012 calendar year 
indicates that trade sales was the most popular exit route.2738 Similar to the earlier SAVCA reports, 
the exit patterns highlight the lack of liquidity (especially the JSE) for exiting in the South African 
private equity market. In addition, this shows that because of a depressed market for stock market 
listings, the vast majority of private equity firms exit investments primarily via trade sales in South 
Africa. Interestingly secondary buyouts, namely the sale to another private equity firm, was the 
second most preferred method of returning funds to investors in the calendars years 2010 to 
2013.2739 
 
In the long term, sustained growth in the South African private equity market will be difficult to achieve 
unless there is an improvement in the demand for new listings. An initiative between the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘JSE’) and the Department of Trade and Industry (‘DTI’) has been 
the introduction of an alternative exchange for small to medium sized companies, called AltX.2740  
                                                 
2732Which are the proceeds on exit of investments through disposals, repayments of loans and dividend 
receipts. 
2733KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2011), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2010 calendar year’, Survey, 2011. 
2734KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2011), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2010 calendar year’, Survey, 2011. 
2735KPMG and SAVCA, (2000), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital’, Survey, 2000. 
2736KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014. 
2737KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014. 
2738KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. 
2739See KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2014), ‘Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2013 calendar year’, Survey, 2014. See also 
KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2013), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2012 calendar year’, Survey, 2013. See also KPMG 
and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2012), ‘Private Equity and Venture Capital Industry 
Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2011 calendar year’, Survey, 2012. 
See also KPMG and SAVCA (South African Venture Capital Association), (2011), ‘Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Industry Performance Survey of South Africa covering the 2010 calendar year’, Survey, 2011. 
2740AltX was launched in October 2003. AltX, the alternative exchange, is a division of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (‘JSE’). It is a parallel market focused on small and medium sized high growth companies. AltX 
provides smaller companies not yet able to list on the JSE Main Board with a clear growth path and access to 
capital. Available at www.jse.co.za/How-To-List/AltX.aspx., accessed in June 2015. 
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AltX aims to give smaller companies the opportunity to issue new shares, raise capital, widen their 
investor base and have their shares traded in a regulated market.2741 AltX is differentiated from the 
main board at the JSE, for instance both exchanges have separate listing requirements. One of the 
AltX’s aims is for companies that list on AltX to become large companies in the future, which will 
eventually migrate to the JSE main board.2742 AltX has reduced listing fees, but is supported by the 
full range of JSE services, including the trading of shares on the same system as the main board, 
market surveillance to eliminate irregularities and settlement of AltX securities through the JSE's 
electronic system, STRATE.2743 AltX has listing requirements appropriate for small and medium 
companies, placing emphasis on initial and ongoing disclosure of company information. There is 
also a focus on the enhancement of the skills of directors of AltX companies, with a compulsory four-
day directors' induction programme.2744 Companies require no profit history to list, but a minimum 
share capital of R2 million is required, as well as a minimum of one hundred shareholders, fifteen 
percent free float and it needs to appoint an AltX-designated adviser.2745  
 
There exists no real data to make the claim that the AltX and the local private equity industry will 
complement each another in that the former will provide an exit platform for the latter. However, 
since its inception in October 2004, one hundred and eleven companies have listed on the AltX and 
at the time of writing this section appropriately sixty remain listed on the AltX, twenty four have 
migrated to the JSE main board and twenty seven companies have delisted from AltX.2746 According 
to a 2011 study, the lack of liquidity is the main reason why many institutional investors have not 
invested in AltX listed companies.2747 Typically, the co-founders of many companies listed on the 
AltX hold the majority of shares in issue, making it difficult for investors, such as institutional fund 
managers, to acquire shares in these companies. The lack of liquidity is believed to be a key factor 
                                                 
2741See Sokołowska, E. (2015), ‘The Principles of Alternative Investments Management: A Study of the Global 
Market’, Springer Publishers, at page 142. See also Best, M. and Soulier, J.L. (2010), ‘International Securities 
Law Handbook’,  Kluwer Law International, World Law Group Series, Volume 9, at pages 521-538. 
2742See Sokołowska, E. (2015), ‘The Principles of Alternative Investments Management: A Study of the Global 
Market’, Springer Publishers, at page 142. See also Best, M. and Soulier, J.L. (2010), ‘International Securities 
Law Handbook’,  Kluwer Law International, World Law Group Series, Volume 9, at pages 521-538. 
2743As South Africa’s Central Securities Depository (CSD), Strate is licensed to be the independent provider of 
post-trade products and services for the financial markets. Strate provides electronic settlement of equities 
and bonds transactions concluded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. It also settles transactions in money 
market securities and have introduced a collateral management service. Available at http://www.strate.co.za., 
accessed in August 2014. 
2744Niemann, M. (2012), ‘Perceived Constraints to Investments in the JSE Alt-X by Professional Portfolio 
Managers’, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Graduate School 
of Business Administration. 
2745Niemann, M. (2012), ‘Perceived Constraints to Investments in the JSE Alt-X by Professional Portfolio 
Managers’, Wits University, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Graduate School of Business 
Administration. 
2746Peters, F. (2014), ‘AltX: springboard to capital or liquidity trap?’, Business Day Report, 8th MAY 2014. 
Available at www.bdlive.co.za/markets/2014/05/08/altx-springboard-to-capital-or-liquidity-trap., accessed in 
August 2014. 
2747BDO (2011), ‘BDO research project into JSE listing’, Southern African Coordination (Pty) Ltd, March 2011. 
Available at www.bdo.co.za/documents/jse-listings-research-project.pdf., accessed in August 2014. 
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in the decline of new listings on the exchange. In 2013 only five companies listed on AltX compared 
with nineteen in 2006 and thirty seven in 2007.2748 
 
It is clear that South Africa lacks a strong market for stock market listings, which is a critical 
component necessary for the development of the South African private equity market. Although the 
JSE is the largest stock exchange in Africa, it is still not considered a well developed stock market 
for private equity-backed companies.2749 Furthermore, the question as to how the current state of the 
JSE will progress to create a favourable market for stock market listing (namely, exit strategy) for 
private equity investments is difficult to assess. However, this is only one component of developing 
a private equity market and with the appropriate legislative reform the JSE could receive greater 
portfolio allocations from money managers in the short term. In addition, one must note that a 
depressed JSE automatically creates a greater level of private equity activity and opportunities, and 
the economic importance of the asset class will over time positively contribute to enhancing the 
overall performance of the JSE. A depressed stock market yields opportunities for later-stage buy-
outs, whereby the delisting of South African companies with poor performing stocks on the JSE also 
presents attractive buyout opportunities.2750 It is a widely believed and accepted proposition in private 
equity literature that a public listing of a private equity portfolio company is the ultimate and most 




At this point it is important to note that it is very difficult to submit a specific recommendation as to 
how policymakers can improve exit routes or improve the liquidity of South Africa’s capital markets. 
However, it is evident that one of the main challenges for South African private equity firms is finding 
a profitable way to exit from underlying portfolio companies. From the SAVCA industry data 
discussed above, it is clear that stock market listings feature very little as an exit route. Trade sales 
and secondary buyouts have become the predominant method of exiting for private equity firms in 
South Africa. According to Barth et al, a well functioning stock market plays an important role in a 
                                                 
2748Peters, F. (2014), ‘AltX: springboard to capital or liquidity trap?’, Business Day Report, 8th MAY 2014. 
Available at  www.bdlive.co.za/markets/2014/05/08/altx-springboard-to-capital-or-liquidity-trap., accessed in 
August 2014. 
2749See Sokołowska, E. (2015), ‘The Principles of Alternative Investments Management: A Study of the Global 
Market’, Springer Publishers, at page 142. See also Best, M. and Soulier, J.L. (2010), ‘International Securities 
Law Handbook’,  Kluwer Law International, World Law Group Series, Volume 9, at pages 521-538. See also 
Leeds, R. (2015), ‘Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets: Opportunities for Value Creation’, First 
Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, at pages 1-245. 
2750See Cendrowski, H., Petro, L.W., Martin, J.P., Wadecki, A.A. (2012), ‘Private Equity: History, Governance, 
and Operations’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons. See also Demaria, C. (2013), ‘Introduction to Private 
Equity: Venture, Growth, LBO and Turn-Around Capital’, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons.  
2751See Lerner, J., Hardymon, F., and Leamon, A. (2012), ‘Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook’, 
Fifth Edition, Wiley and Sons. See also Gaughan, P.A. (2015), ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate 
Restructurings’, Sixth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, at pages 349-370. 
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private equity market, especially as an exit route.2752 The question as to how South African 
policymakers can develop policy aimed at promoting the local stock market to improve its 
attractiveness as an exit route is beyond the scope of this discussion. Trying to answer this question 
would be complex and too wide ranging and would include a analysis of all the legal, regulatory, 
accounting, tax and supervisory systems that influence stock market liquidity.2753 In addition, the 
prevailing political and macroeconomic conditions also have a direct impact on stock markets 
liquidity.2754 Nonetheless, the South Africa stock market plays a crucial role in the long term 
development of the economy and the local private equity market. The ability to trade listed shares 
with maximum ease should encourage greater investment and hopefully promote the efficient 
allocation of capital for private companies that intend listing on the stock exchange which would 
stimulate long term economic growth. However, it is submitted that South African policy makers 
should not adopt an interventionist approach, for instance by introducing tax incentives aimed at 
artificially trying to improve South Africa’s capital market’s liquidity. Also interventionist schemes 
underpinned by tax incentives such as the Venture Capital Company (discussed under paragraph 
2.1(e) of this chapter) and AltX discussed above are two examples of an interventionist approach 
that has not succeeded. According to Levine:  
 
‘The available information suggests that policymakers should remove impediments, tax, legal, 
and regulatory barriers to stock market development. But there is not strong evidence to support 
interventionist policies like tax incentives that artificially boost stock market size and activity.’2755 
 
In addition, Claessens et al  studied how local stock market development and listing, trading, and 
capital raising in international exchanges are related to economic fundamentals.2756 They argued 
that higher income economies with sounder macro policies, more efficient legal systems, greater 
openness, and higher growth opportunities have more developed local markets.2757 Importantly, 
these fundamentals also relate to internationalisation, and actually more so, since the better the 
                                                 
2752Barth, J.R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2012), ‘Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us’, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press. See also Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012), ‘Getting up to speed on the financial, 
crisis: A one-weekend-reader’s guide’, Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1), at pages 128-150. 
2753See Laeven, L., and Levine, R. (2009), ‘Bank governance, regulation and risk taking’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 93, at pages 259–275. 
2754Barth, J.R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2012), ‘Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us’, MIT 
Press. 
2755Levine, R. (1996), ‘Stock Markets: A Spur to Economic Growth’, Finance and Development Division, the 
World Bank's Policy Research Department, 33, at 7-10. 
2756Claessens, S., Klingebiel, D. and Schmukler, S.L. (2006), ‘Stock market development and 
internationalization: Do economic fundamentals spur both similarly?’ Journal of Empirical Finance, 13, at 316–
350. Barth, J.R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2012), ‘Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us’, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press. 
2757Claessens, S., Klingebiel, D. and Schmukler, S.L. (2006), ‘Stock market development and 
internationalization: Do economic fundamentals spur both similarly?’ Journal of Empirical Finance, 13, at pages 
316–350. 
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fundamentals, the higher the ratio of internationalisation to local market activity.2758 Therefore, easing 
restrictions on international capital flows would be a good starting point for South African 
policymakers. Nevertheless, private equity firms should become more innovative in seeking liquidity 
in light of the challenges surrounding all three of the established exit routes in South Africa.2759 
Private equity firms should also look for alternative buyers for their underlying portfolio investee 
companies. For instance, sources of capital that provide a broader range of exit alternatives could 
be sovereign wealth funds, public market fund managers willing to bridge the pre-listing stage for an 





South African policymakers have a key role to play in creating the framework which will enhance the 
human and financial resources needed for a dynamic private equity sector. The framework must 
improve the potential for capital formation via private equity funding from South African investors and 
individuals; encourage the development of entrepreneurship; and remove practical impediments to 
private equity investing. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in order for the private equity 
market to flourish, there should be as little legal, tax and regulatory impediments as possible. Two 
key lessons emerged from reviewing the reforms in the above jurisdictions.  
 
Firstly, an appropriate tax regime is critical to the private equity industry. Investment vehicles that 
are not subject to double taxation are the norm. Tax incentives have been widely used worldwide to 
stimulate private equity investments and all of the countries discussed above provide some form of 
tax incentives. For instance, the reduction of capital gains taxes in the US as an incentive is viewed 
as having made a significant contribution to the growth of private equity investments. Another 
important event that contributed to the success of the private equity industry in the US was the Stock 
Options Law of 1981 discussed above. It provided that taxes on share options are to be paid when 
shares are sold, instead of when the options were exercised. In addition, South African policymakers 
should maintain its current approach with regard to the taxation of carried interest, namely dealing 
with the capital versus revenue determination on a case by case basis, and should be cautious when 
considering current legislative proposals being considered in the US aimed at taxing carried interest 
as ordinary income. 
 
                                                 
2758Claessens, S., Klingebiel, D. and Schmukler, S.L. (2006), ‘Stock market development and 
internationalization: Do economic fundamentals spur both similarly?’ Journal of Empirical Finance, 13, at pages 
316–350. See also Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012), ‘Getting up to speed on the financial, crisis: A one-
weekend-reader’s guide’, Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1), at pages 128-150. 
2759Namely trade sales, secondary buyouts and stock market listing. 
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Secondly, in order for a private equity market to flourish, private equity firms must have clear exit 
alternatives that enable them to realise the gains on their investments. Stock market listings and 
trade sales are the main exit strategies in South Africa. Thus, perhaps the most challenging aspect 
of private equity investing in South Africa has been the difficulty of exit. It is clear that South Africa 
lacks a strong market for stock market listings, which is a critical component necessary for the 
development of the South African private equity market. Private equity reforms aimed at improving 
exit options have not attempted to change the JSE, but rather focus on the creation of new, minimally 
regulated exchanges (such as AltX) in which smaller companies can be actively traded.  
 
Based on the analysis of the key issues in South Africa and lessons learned from international 
experience, the next chapter will submit several policy considerations aimed at contributing to a more 
progressive South African private equity industry. 
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Chapter Five: Policy Considerations for Private Equity in South Africa 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The development of regulatory policy in South Africa needs to recognise the unique South African 
context and should attempt to balance the competing interests of the economic actors and of society 
at large.2760 South Africa has made significant strides over the past twenty years of democratic 
government in terms of development; socially, politically and economically.2761 However, ‘two 
economies’ appear to exist in South Africa. The first is an advanced, sophisticated economy, based 
on skilled labour, which is becoming more globally competitive. The second is a mainly informal, 
marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the 
formal sector.2762 Despite the impressive gains made in the first economy, the benefits of growth 
have yet to reach the second economy, and with the enormity of the challenges arising from the 
social transition, the second economy risks falling further behind if there is no decisive government 
intervention. These sentiments were echoed more than ten years ago by the authors of a Department 
of Trade and Industry corporate law reform paper.2763 Ten years later and twenty years into South 
Africa’s ‘new’ democracy, government has still not been able to decisively address the problems of 
the ‘second’ economy. 
 
In South Africa, the Minister of Finance is primarily responsible for the policy framework for the 
regulation of the South African financial system. According to former Minister Pravin Gordhan: 
 
‘... South Africa is committed to the highest standards for regulating the financial sector. This is 
because the financial sector affects all people and companies who transact through the financial 
system, including those who do so outside South Africa’s borders. It affects pensioners, workers, 
depositors, employers, businesses, as all receive, invest, or send money via a financial 
institution. The 2008 global financial crisis has demonstrated the weaknesses of a light-touch 
financial regulatory system. Even though our financial system weathered the storm, South Africa 
lost nearly a million jobs as a result of the global contagion that originated from the crisis in the 
banking and financial systems of the developed world. Had South Africa experienced a financial 
crisis, many more jobs would have been lost ... The dilemma that faces most countries is that 
the financial sector is globally integrated, but regulated nationally. For this reason, there needs 
                                                 
2760See International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), (2013), ‘South Africa: 2013 Article IV Consultation’, International 
Monetary Fund African Department, Issues 13-303 of IMF Staff Country Reports.  
2761See OECD (2013), ‘OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2013’, OECD Publishing. 
2762See Saul, J.S. and Bond, P. (2014), ‘South Africa: the Present As History: From Mrs Ples to Mandela and 
Marikana’, Boydell and Brewer Ltd. 
2763Department of Trade and Industry (2004), ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform’, Report presented by the Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa. 
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to be minimum international standards and greater co-ordination among different national 
regulators.’2764 
 
Taking into account the vision of the economy and the particular challenges that South Africa faces, 
it is proposed that policy reform within the areas of capital formation, capital gains tax and legislation 
fostering small business development within the context of South Africa’s existing regulatory 
environment, would foster the development of South Africa’s financial markets. However, the primary 
objective of such policy reform is to promote the competitiveness and development of the South 
African economy, by providing a predictable and effective regulatory environment that recognises 
the broader social role of companies.  
 
Nevertheless, South African policymakers cannot with certainty predict how the South African 
financial markets will react to the introduction of policy reform mentioned above and often the 
introduction of new laws and regulations have unintended consequences. For instance, in paragraph 
3.1 of chapter one, the rationale for the introduction in the US of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
was discussed. Namely, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in response to the 
accounting scandals in the early 2000s; and required that public companies put in place costly 
internal financial controls; and that the chief executive and chief financial officers of public companies 
personally attest to the veracity of their companies’ financial statements.2765 Since the law raises the 
cost of running a public company and makes senior management legally liable for the accuracy of 
the financial information it provides, fewer companies have an incentive to be public in the US.2766 It 
was argued in chapter one of this thesis, that the law was designed to deal with financial fraud 
experienced at companies like Enron and Worldcom, but has had the unintended consequence of 
negatively impacting the private equity industry. 
 
According to Wang, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 inter alia has contributed to the decline in the 
number of private equity backed companies going public since its promulgation in the US.2767 The 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have made public companies in the US more costly to 
                                                 
2764Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1st February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa, at page 2. 
2765Wang, J. (2008), ‘The Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Small Business’, Chapter 
3, Public Policy in an Entrepreneurial Economy, Volume 17 of the Series International Studies in 
Entrepreneurship, at pages 67-93.  
2766Howell, E.C. (2013), ‘Two Essays on the Unintended Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley on Small Banks 
and Small Businesses’, Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects. Paper 554. 
Available at http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/etd/554, accessed in April 2016. 
2767Wang, J. (2008), ‘The Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Small Business’, Chapter 
3, Public Policy in an Entrepreneurial Economy, Volume 17 of the Series International Studies in 
Entrepreneurship, at pages 67-93.  
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run and have reduced the incentive to list companies on a stock exchange.2768 The decline in stock 
market listings is problematic to private equity backed companies as discussed in paragraph 3 of 
chapter four. Howell argues that the decline in stock market listings has reduced private equity firm’s 
earnings, which, in turn, has reduced the amount of private equity funding available to 
entrepreneurs.2769 Nevertheless, it is accepted that the law was introduced to curb financial fraud 
experienced at companies like Enron and Worldcom. However it has had the unintended 
consequence of negatively impacting the private equity industry and entrepreneurship. Neverthless, 
the proposals submitted in paragraph 3 of this chapter cannot definitively anticipate the potential 
adverse effects for the South African financial system and the private equity industry. Furthermore, 
the proposals submitted in paragraph 3 of this chapter are aimed at shaping the South African 
economic system to fit the designs of policy makers and could possibly result in unintended 
consequences. This means that laws designed to solve unrelated problems often end up imposing 
unnecessary and counterproductive burdens on entrepreneurs and their businesses. 
 
The development of a regulatory framework for the South African private equity industry is a 
fundamental part of the latter process. Saxenian and Sabel examined the creation of private equity 
industries in emerging economies and highlighted the ways in which public and private sector 
stakeholders, such as investors, private equity firms, government, regulators, the management of 
investee companies and the like, build on networks they ‘ﬁnd’ and how the day to day activities 
associated with the private equity business model can construct an institution that systematically 
creates further networks to foster and monitor the progress of new companies and industries.2770 
The above mentioned authors conclude that the development of a private equity industry in an 
emerging economy: 
 
‘can serve as a powerful search network in developing economies when the investors have global 
as well as local connections. By supporting a diverse portfolio of ventures and combining hands-
on monitoring and mentoring with market selection, investors are institutionalizing a process of 
continuous economic restructuring—and learning about how to improve the institutions of 
restructuring—that transforms the domestic economy by linking it to the most demanding and 
capable actors in global markets.’2771 
                                                 
2768Wang, J. (2008), ‘The Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Small Business’, Chapter 
3, Public Policy in an Entrepreneurial Economy, Volume 17 of the Series International Studies in 
Entrepreneurship, at pages 67-93.  
2769Howell, E.C. (2013), ‘Two Essays on the Unintended Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley on Small Banks 
and Small Businesses’, Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects. Paper 554. 
Available at http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/etd/554, accessed in April 2016. 
2770Saxenian, A., and Sabel, C. (2008), ‘Venture Capital in the “Periphery”: The New Argonauts, Global Search, 
and Local Institution Building’, Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography, 84(4), at page 381. Available at 
www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/EG_84401-Saxenian.pdf., accessed in August 2014. 
2771Saxenian, A., and Sabel, C. (2008), ‘Venture Capital in the “Periphery”: The New Argonauts, Global Search, 
and Local Institution Building’, Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography, 84(4), at page 392. Available at 
www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/EG_84401-Saxenian.pdf., accessed in August 2014. 




The growth of the South African private equity industry will depend on creating an environment in 
which investors and regulators alike clearly see the advantages and disadvantages of private equity. 
Private equity as an asset class has clear and demonstrable benefits for the South African economy, 
but also poses several dangers, such as limited liquidity, conflicts of interest, excessive fees charged 
by private equity firms and lack of transparency. In addition, private equity risk management by 
investors of private equity funds lags that of other asset classes. For instance, because of the private 
nature of the industry, relationships between investors and private equity managers, and long time 
horizon and illiquid nature of these investments, private equity creates some challenges relative to 
other asset classes with regard to monitoring investments and risk.2772 Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the development of South Africa’s private equity industry will not only serve the country’s 
economic goals, but also its crucially important social goals.  
 
2. Current Financial Services Regulatory Framework 
 
At the outset it is important to note that the purpose of this paragraph is to provide a broad analysis 
of the current financial services regulatory framework solely aimed at contextualizing the 
considerations being proposed.2773 The current supervision and financial regulation framework in 
South Africa consists of several regulators, however the main regulators are the FSB and Bank 
Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank (‘SARB’). SARB regulates and 
supervises banks whereas the FSB regulates and supervises non-bank financial institutions and the 
securities markets.2774 The FSB relies on self-regulatory organisations such as the JSE and STRATE 
with regard to the regulation and supervision of the securities markets.2775 SARB has a direct 
reporting line to the Minister of Finance on legislative issues and the FSB is subject to the general 
authority of the Minister of Finance.2776 
 
In 2007, the South African government undertook a formal review of the South African financial 
regulatory system and as a result it was proposed that South Africa move towards a ‘twin peaks’ 
                                                 
2772D’Angelo, E. (2008), ‘Limited Partners’ Perceptions and Management of Risk in Private Equity Investing’, 
Kellog School of Management, Zell Center for Risk Research, at page 2. 
2773See paragraph 4 of chapter 2. 
2774Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers, at pages 193-251. See Lamprecht, I. 
(2015), ‘Four regulatory reforms you should know about: legislation’, Personal Finance Newsletter, (409), at 
pages 8-9. 
2775As South Africa’s Central Securities Depository, Strate is licensed to be an independent provider of post-
trade products and services for the financial markets. Strate provides electronic settlement of equities and 
bonds transactions concluded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘JSE’). It also settles transactions in 
money market securities and have introduced a collateral management service. Strate offers an asset servicing 
product range which augments the services it offers to issuers in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and 
the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. Available at www.strate.co.za/about-strate/our-company, accessed in 
June 2015. 
2776Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2011), ‘A Safer Financial Sector to 
Serve South Africa Better’, National Treasury Policy Document, 23 February 2011, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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model of financial regulation.2777 The above mentioned review led to the Minister of Finance releasing 
a 2011 policy document,2778 that become the precursor to a subsequent policy document released 
by the Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee2779 in February 2013.2780 Before the release 
of the last mentioned policy document, the previous Minister of Finance during his 2012 Budget 
Speech stated: 
 
‘As announced last year, we intend to shift towards a twin peaks system for financial regulation, 
where we separate prudential from market conduct supervision of the financial sector. 
Consultations will continue this year, with a view to tabling legislation in early 2013.’2781 
 
The move to a ‘twin peaks’ model is an effort to address the inefficiencies in the current regulatory 
structure.2782 The shift to the ‘twin peaks’ model is also aimed at causing the least amount of 
disruption to the financial industry and the current regulators.2783 The introduction of the ‘twin peaks’ 
model will see the establishment of two regulators namely be the ‘prudential regulator’ and the 
‘market conduct regulator’.2784 The prudential regulator will form part of SARB.2785 It will enhance 
financial stability by promoting safety and soundness of regulated institutions. The market conduct 
regulator will form part of a restructured FSB.2786 The proposed reforms to the current financial 
services regulatory system is aimed at maintaining and enhancing several policy objectives; namely: 
2787 
                                                 
2777Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1 February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2778Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2011), ‘A Safer Financial Sector to 
Serve South Africa Better’, National Treasury Policy Document, 23 February 2011, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2779The Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee is a task team that is co-chaired by Lesetja 
Kganyago, Deputy Governor of the South African Reserve Bank; Ismail Momoniat, Deputy Director-General: 
Tax and Financial Sector Policy of the National Treasury; and Dube Tshidi, Chief Executive Officer of the FSB. 
2780Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1 February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa. See also Godwin, A. (2015), ‘The 
Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South Africa: Lessons From Australia’, CIFR Paper, (52). 
2781Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2012), ‘2012 Budget Speech’, 22 
February 2012, Pretoria, South Africa, at page 28. 
2782Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers, at pages 193-251. See also Lamprecht, 
I. (2015), ‘Four regulatory reforms you should know about: legislation’, Personal Finance Newsletter, (409), at 
pages 8-9. 
2783Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2011), ‘A Safer Financial Sector to 
Serve South Africa Better’, National Treasury Policy Document, 23 February 2011, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2784Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1 February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2785Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers, at pages 193-251. See also Lamprecht, 
I. (2015), ‘Four regulatory reforms you should know about: legislation’, Personal Finance Newsletter, (409), at 
pages 8-9. 
2786See Bosch, R. (2012), ‘Banking Regulation: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers. 
2787Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1 February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa. See also Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond 
Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers, at pages 193-251. 




(i) transparency with regard to regulators’ decisions, actions and approaches;  
(ii) principles and rules based regulation to achieve regulatory outcomes;  
(iii) appropriate, intensive and intrusive supervision;  
(iv) comprehensive coverage of financial services activities and consistent principles and rules 
for comparable activities;  
(v) risk-based and proportional regulatory and supervisory approaches;  
(vi) pre-emptive and proactive frameworks that enable regulators to identify and mitigate 
emerging risks;  
(vii) reliable methods that allow regulators to possess and use the authority to enforce adherence 
to principles and rules; and  
(viii) appropriate alignment with international standards.  
 
By way of the proposed ‘twin peaks’ model, South Africa is aiming to improve consumer confidence 
thereby hoping to increase employment, development and economic growth, and ultimately creating 
a more sustainable financial sector.2788 Both SARB and the FSB will base their regulatory framework 
on the same comprehensive set of principles however each of these regulators will place varying 
degrees of significance onto each principle.2789 This model differs significantly from the current 
financial regulatory framework in which the responsibility of prudential regulation and market conduct 
regulation is shared by both SARB and the FSB.2790 
 
The prudential regulator will operate within the SARB and be subject to the SARB’s governance 
arrangements. The market conduct regulator will be governed by a fulltime commissioner and 
executive management team appointed by the Minister of Finance.2791 Independent audit, 
remuneration and risk committees will have administrative oversight. The ‘twin peaks’ model of 
financial regulation separates regulatory functions by objectives, thereby allowing each regulator to 
focus on a single core mandate.2792 According to the National Treasury, the introduction the ‘twin 
peaks’ model in South Africa has two broad objectives. Firstly, it is aimed to strengthen South Africa’s 
approach to consumer protection and market conduct in financial services and secondly it is aimed 
at creating a more robust and stable financial system.2793  
 
                                                 
2788See Bosch, R. (2012), ‘Banking Regulation: Jurisdictional Comparisons’, Sweet and Maxwell Publishers. 
2789See Oxford Business Group (2012), ‘The Report: South Africa 2012’, Oxford Business Group. 
2790Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2013), ‘Implementing a Twin Peaks 
Model of Financial Regulation in South Africa’, Published for public comment by the Financial Regulatory 
Reform Steering Committee, 1 February 2013, Pretoria, South Africa. 
2791Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers. 
2792Pretorius, D. (2014), ‘Beyond Play’, Xlibris Corporation Publishers. 
2793Department of National Treasury of the South African Government (2011), ‘A Safer Financial Sector to 
Serve South Africa Better’, National Treasury Policy Document, 23 February 2011, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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The imminent introduction of the ‘twin peaks’ model to the South African financial services regulatory 
framework creates a unique opportunity for the South African private equity industry. The South 
African private equity industry has the opportunity to consult more effectively with Government and 
key stakeholders, not only on the proposed reforms discussed above, but on industry specific 
regulations required to foster a better private equity market. It is hereby submitted that the private 
equity industry has not always been effective in communicating its business model, as well as the 
socio-economic benefits of its business model. It is therefore an imperative that the formal 
representatives of the South Africa private equity industry, albeit via the relevant industry bodies, 
show commitment to engage more effectively with policy makers and key stakeholders moving 
forward and contribute to the creation of a regulatory environment that supports a competitive and 
robust South African economy. 
 
3. Proposed Regulatory Reform Relating to Private Equity 
 
In this paragraph three, specific policy proposals are made. Regulatory reform in South Africa should 
be driven by the goals for creating a transparent, sustainable, sound and efficient financial system 
for the future. The South African private equity industry (as represented by either SAVCA and/or 
ASISA)2794 should co-operate closely with Government, the Financial Services Board (‘FSB’) and 
other related institutions in developing an appropriate and proportionate regulatory framework. This 
framework should consist of enhanced unified professional standards and an effective enforcement 
regime with oversight thereof by the appropriate national bodies. The South African private equity 
industry can be part of the solution to help overcome the current lack of liquidity of the local capital 
market and thereby play an active role contributing to the recovery of the South African economy. 
The industry is an important source of long term capital throughout all stages of a company's growth 
strategy, namely from seed capital to larger scale corporate restructurings. The private equity 
industry employs a hands-on approach to working with management teams to develop more 
successful businesses. In this way, the private equity industry also makes an important contribution 
to South African employment, competitiveness and innovation.  
 
However, the development of the above mentioned regulatory framework will only be successful if 
the private equity industry participants themselves acknowledge and actively address the 
disadvantages and real risks posed by the private equity industry on the South African financial 
system. In paragraph 5 of chapter one, these disadvantages are summarised as: 
 
‘Conflicts of interest, because private equity partners involved in the running of companies may 
have different priorities from other investors in the private equity fund; Shorter investment 
                                                 
2794Industry bodies are the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (‘ASISA’) and the South 
African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (‘SAVCA’). 
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horizons, because the aim is usually to sell the company after a few years, rather than focusing 
on long-term growth; Lack of transparency, making them less accountable to the public and their 
workforces; Greater leverage, making companies more vulnerable to economic downturns and 
with the potential to pose risks to lenders and the financial system; Risk of job destruction through 
seeking to extract value; Risk to pensions, through selling assets and loading companies with 
debt.’2795 
 
If the introduction of new laws and regulations is required to addressing these disadvantages, then 
South African policymakers should be cognizant of their unintended consequences as highlighted in 
paragraph 1 of this chapter. As Scott so aptly states: 
 
‘What is the lesson here? Policy makers need to recognise ... No matter how benevolent, 
intelligent, and farsighted policy makers might be, they cannot anticipate how markets will react 
to laws and regulation. Efforts to shape the economic system to fit the designs of policy makers 
inevitably result in unintended consequences. In the case of small business, this means that laws 
designed to solve unrelated problems often end up imposing unnecessary and counterproductive 
burdens on entrepreneurs and their businesses.’2796 
 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that a private equity fund's aim is to increase the stability and value of 
the business it acquires, which in turn would be beneficial for both employees and wider civil society 
as the company's stability increases and more employment is created.2797 Many investors in private 
equity funds are pension funds that typically require adherence to high ethical standards. They 
expect the private equity firm to have the same standards. For example, a breach of legal obligations 
in a portfolio company or publicity around inappropriate behaviour towards workers will be damaging 
to the private equity firm's ability to raise future private equity funds.2798 While there is conflict in all 
businesses between maximizing the rewards to workers and employees and maximizing profitability 
and return to investors, employees are a key part of increasing the value of a private equity fund's 
investment, and there is no incentive for a private equity fund to behave inappropriately towards 
workers or employees.2799 Therefore clear governance structures ensure an alignment of interests.  
 
The detailed description and analysis of existing laws, regulations and professional standards 
throughout this thesis demonstrates that the private equity industry is already highly-regulated at 
                                                 
2795See House of Commons Treasury Committee, (2007), ‘Private Equity’, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, 
Volume 1, Ordered by House of Commons, July 2007, at chapter 3, pages 11-18. 
2796Scott, S. (2010), ‘Born Entrepreneurs, Born Leaders: How Your Genes Affect Your Work Life’, 1st Edition, 
Oxford University Press, at pages 1-182. 
2797Civil Society, is the collection of individuals and classes of individuals as determined by their sense of 
belonging (together with their official and unofficial representative groupings) which taken as a whole compete 
and collaborate to form the system of interaction between people that is the world in which we live.  
2798See Fraser-Sampson, G. (2011), ‘Private Equity as an Asset Class’, John Wiley and Sons. 
2799See Fraser-Sampson, G. (2011), ‘Private Equity as an Asset Class’, John Wiley and Sons. 
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national level, and does not pose systemic risks either through its funding model or the companies 
in which it invests. Moreover, this thesis’s assessment shows that the current practices in terms of 
contractual agreements between sophisticated investors and private equity firms are characterised 
by a high level of understanding among parties on how contractual clauses should be structured in 
relation to the underlying investment strategies, their risk and the compensation of managers. Retail 
investors play an insignificant role in the market and, in the few cases they are engaged, are 
protected by the laws covering public offerings. As a customer of financial services, the private equity 
industry is no different from other investors and is not immune from the financial turmoil. The private 
equity industry should support appropriate changes in capital market regulation which could help to 
revitalise capital markets, provided that it maintains the level playing field between the private equity 
industry and other users of financial services. The important recommendations of this thesis in the 
areas of industry standards and supervision for private equity are intended to contribute to this 
objective.  
 
The starting point in considering the broad regulatory framework aimed at ‘reforming’ the South 
African private equity market should be with the main ‘actors’ themselves. On the one hand this 
would consist of the private equity industry which would be represented by the two central figures, 
namely the private equity firms via their representative industry bodies, such as ASISA and/or 
SAVCA and investors such as pension funds. On the other hand will be the policy makers and 
relevant regulators such as the FSB, National Treasury and the other relevant government agencies. 
As stated above, the South African private equity industry should co-operate closely with 
Government, the FSB and other related institutions in developing an appropriate and proportionate 
regulatory framework. 
 
3.1 The Private Equity Industry’s Policy Considerations 
 
The South African private equity industry should commit to a unified industry set of professional 
standards. These should be principle-based to allow national implementation of approved variations 
to fit with local practices and legislation. A good starting reference would be the King IV Code, in 
particular supplements 6.4 and 6.52800 thereof.2801 Given the important national and international 
                                                 
2800Supplement 6.5 relates to small medium enterprises. 
2801The King Report on Corporate Governance is a booklet of guidelines for the governance structures and 
operation of companies in South Africa. It is issued by the King Committee on Corporate Governance. Three 
reports were issued in 1994 (King I), 2002 (King II), and 2009 (King III) and a fourth revision (King IV) in 2016. 
The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) owns the copyright of the King Report on Corporate 
Governance and the King Code of Corporate Governance. Compliance with the King Reports is a requirement 
for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Report_on_ Corporate_Governance, in December 2017. 
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status of the King Codes,2802 the relevance of these practices and principles cannot be ignored.2803 
For example, supplement 6.4 focuses specifically on the retirement fund industry given that such 
retirement funds play a significant role in the institutional investor industry.2804 This applies to all 
retirement funds in accordance with their definitions in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.2805 
Supplement 6.4 recommends that Board of Trustees of retirement funds should consider the King 
IV Code principles in conjunction with the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa 
(‘CRISA’),2806 as well as the Financial Services Board Circular PF 130, which King IV refers to being 
complementary to the Code.2807 On the one hand, any improvement to the governance requirements 
that are in the best interests of the retirement fund members, are positive. On the other hand, 
guidelines should not become too onerous that it leads to an increase in costs, which essentially 
negates any benefit of what the guidelines are aiming to achieve. The reality is that as governance 
requirements increase, so do administrative costs, therefore innovative ways need to be 
implemented in order to balance the benefits with the unintended consequences. 
 
The unified set of professional standards should be based on: 
 
(a) a code of conduct;  
(b) corporate governance guidelines in the management of private equity-held companies;  
(c) reporting to investors;  
(d) valuation guidelines;  
(e) transparency and disclosure guidelines; and  
(f) governing principles for the establishment and management of private equity funds.  
 
In addition, the private equity industry should introduce and establish an enforcement regime for the 
industry professional standards in South Africa, and make it subject to oversight by the appropriate 
national supervisory bodies. The enforcement regime should create: 
 
                                                 
2802Increasingly recognised by South African courts. 
2803King IV Code (2016), ‘The King Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa’, The Institute of Directors 
in Southern Africa, November 2016. The King IV Code was released on 1 November 2016 and was aimed to 
bring it up to date with international governance codes and best practice.  
2804See King IV Code (2016), ‘The King Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa’, The Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, November 2016, supplement 6.4 at pages 95-102.  
2805King IV Code (2016), ‘The King Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa’, The Institute of Directors 
in Southern Africa, November 2016, supplement 6.4 at pages 95-102.  
2806The Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (‘CRISA’) applies to institutional investors such as 
pension funds and insurance companies as the owners of assets and their service providers including asset 
managers and consultants. It encourages institutional investors and service providers to adopt its principles 
and practice recommendations on an "apply or explain” basis. The effective date for reporting on the 
application of CRISA was 1 February 2012. 
2807CRISA has been endorsed by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA), the Principal Officers 
Association (POA), and the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA). The principles of 
CRISA are supported by the Financial Services Board (FSB) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
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(a) accountability to the appropriate national supervisory bodies;  
(b) protection of the process from conflicts of interest; and  
(c) proportionality according to the risk posed by various industry participants.  
 
3.2 The Government’s Policy Considerations 
 
Based on the analysis of the key issues in South Africa and lessons learned from international 
experience, this thesis recommends the following policy considerations, which are largely a summary 
of all the key points critically analysed and raised in the preceding chapters. These are: 
 
a. The establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for a local private equity investment 
vehicle to be regulated under the existing Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 45 of 
2002 (‘CISCA’).  
 
i. The investment vehicle must serve as a tax pass-through vehicle so that only the investor 
is subject to the assessment of taxes.  
ii. The proposed new flow through, closed-ended collective investment vehicle will be a 
South African domiciled onshore private equity vehicle, intended for investment by 
resident and non-resident investors.  
iii. The definition of the collective investment vehicle should encompass en commandite 
partnerships and bewind trusts and any future vehicle which meets the criteria, 
irrespective of whether it is aimed at larger and/or smaller private equity transactions.  
iv. The proposed closed-end unlisted collective investment vehicle must contain the 
following minimum features, namely allow flow through; complete transparency, 
including flow through of losses, so that there are equivalent tax results for direct 
investment and indirect investment through the collective investment vehicle; the regime 
should allow legal entities of different types to elect, irrevocably, to be collective 
investment vehicles;  the new regime should have a specific designation that can be 
easily incorporated into future Double Tax Agreement negotiations; and allow 
accumulation and reinvestment for all investors.  
v. The ‘private equity CIS’ should enjoy certain exemptions with regard to paying capital 
gains tax, in that CIS investors will only incur capital gains tax (once) when they sell their 
units in the ‘private equity CIS’. 
 
b. A US and UK-style approach should be adopted and provision should be made that taxes on 
share options are to be paid when shares are sold, instead of when the options vest or is 
exercised. No tax is due when they are exercised and therefore the issuer is not entitled to a 
tax deduction.  




i. The counterintuitive provisions introduced by section 8C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, 
furthermore should be repealed. A starting point in this regard is current section 
10(1)(k)(i)(dd) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 which states that a dividend will not be 
exempt from normal tax if such dividend is received or accrued in respect of a restricted 
equity instrument (as defined in section 8C). This section should be repealed.  
 
c. Carried interest should continue to be treated as capital gains instead of ordinary income. 
Policymakers must consider the background of carried interest as the primary incentive for 
the private equity firm before it decides to adjust the 3-year deemed capital rule. 
 
d. The legal duties of a private equity firm needs to be explicitly stated in a private equity 
regulatory framework. To this end, the framework must provide the expertise and resources 
for good governance; and these duties must be enforced by efficient regulation.  
 
i. The regulatory framework should encourage the involvement of institutional investors. The 
participation of institutional investors in risk capital should be encouraged through legal 
authorisation, education, public information campaigns, and discussion forums. The 
participation of banks in a multi-faceted way in the risk capital industry should also be 
facilitated. 
 
e. South African policy makers should not adopt an interventionist approach in trying to improve 
the liquidity of the local stock markets such as introducing tax incentives aimed at artificially 
trying to improve South Africa’s capital market’s liquidity.2808 National Treasury, in conjunction 
with the FSB, ASISA and SAVCA should commission a detailed study aimed at developing 
policy that will improve the attractiveness of the local stock markets as viable exit routes for 
private equity funds. The study must extend beyond the private equity industry and should 
include an analysis of all the legal, political, macroeconomic, regulatory, accounting, tax and 




This thesis examined how the law affects the structure of a private equity industry, as well as the 
structure of private equity funds and the relationships between the various parties related to a fund, 
inter alia investors, the fund manager and underlying portfolio investments. It also examined how the 
                                                 
2808For example the South African Venture Capital Company (‘VCC’) intiative discussed under chapter 4, 
paragraph 2.1(e) at pages 355-359. Also see the discussion under chapter 4, paragraph 3.2 (titled ‘Private 
Equity Exit Alternatives’) at pages 414-425. 
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law can be structured to promote business development. In addition, it examined the role of private 
equity in advancing social responsible investing in South Africa. 
 
This thesis shows that private equity in South Africa is a major asset class. It is also important that 
policymakers understand the link between the stock market and the private equity market, because 
the two central characteristics of the US and UK private equity market have been the rapid exit by 
private equity funds from investments in portfolio companies, and the common practice of exit 
through a stock market listing. In addition, it is clear that private equity has a significant impact in 
fostering job creation and economic growth. Nevertheless, while private equity has been found to 
contribute to increased economic growth, it has also been argued that the studies analysing the 
interrelationship between private equity and economic growth have not clearly highlighted the 
influence of regulation on the impact of private equity on economic growth.2809 In addition, some of 
the risks commonly associated with private equity investing mentioned in chapter one are conflicts 
of interest, lack of transparency and disclosure, high leverage and the allocation of fees and 
expenses by private equity firms.  However, the growth of the South African private equity industry 
will depend on creating an environment in which investors and regulators alike clearly see the 
advantages and disadvantages of private equity. Private equity as an asset class has clear and 
demonstrable benefits for the South African economy, but also poses several dangers. Despite 
obvious weaknesses, private equity has become an attractive investment choice amongst investors 
and as a source of equity financing.  
 
The decision as to the appropriate legal vehicle to structure a private equity fund depends on 
numerous factors, including the need for limited liability and tax transparency. This thesis discussed 
the bewind trust and en commandite partnership in South African law as two suitable legal vehicles. 
Furthermore, the favourable legal characteristics of collective investment schemes should be 
extended to private equity funds formed in South Africa. Compared to other investment vehicles, 
collective investment schemes are unique in terms of capital gains tax.  
 
In addition, corporate governance plays an important role in a modern economy because the heart 
of it lies in affording efficient investor protection, together with the common law principles of fiduciary 
duties. Sound corporate governance is essential to the well being of an individual company and its 
stakeholders. It is also a critical ingredient in maintaining a sound financial system and a robust 
economy. This thesis shows that investor protection via legal rules and regulations is more effective 
in developing countries’ financial markets than the traditional law and economics perspective of 
financial contracting.  
                                                 
2809As mentioned in chapter one, the relationship between private equity and economic growth could be in the 
reverse, that is, economic growth contributes to private equity activity. See Strömberg, P. (2009), ‘The 
Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research Findings’, Stockholm School 
of Economics, Institute for Financial Research (SIFR), September 2009, at page 6. 




In conclusion, the thesis also reviewed reform policy in several jurisdictions and four key lessons 
emerged. Firstly, an appropriate tax regime is critical to the private equity industry. Secondly, private 
equity investments by pension funds have a significant impact on the private equity industry. Thirdly, 
corporate governance has played a significant role in shaping a private equity industry. Lastly, the 
various potential exit routes in a private equity market directly impact on an investor’s decision as to 
whether or not it will commit to invest in a particular private equity fund. Therefore, in order for a 
private equity market to flourish, private equity firms must have clear exit strategy alternatives that 
enable them to realise the gains on their investments. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the current 
system can be improved and should be reformed in a manner that fosters economic and employment 
growth, but at the same time addresses the real risks that the private equity industry poses on the 
financial system. 
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